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Abstract 
This thesis offers a constructivist framework to set out political features in capitalist 
diversity that the current literatures on „Varieties of Capitalism‟ and „Comparative 
Capitalisms‟ have not fully shed light into so far. Taking these scholarly contributions 
as a starting point, I argue that their investigations are able to highlight the 
distributional outcomes in terms of which actors relatively benefit from a particular 
socio-economic setting. However, that they have difficulties to point to the political 
aspects of different models of capitalism that relate to their constitutive nature. I then 
suggest a method that is able to underline how the very understandings of the 
individual economic subject and of the state are themselves political as their 
definitions marginalise alternatives ways to make sense of these economic concepts. 
Starting from the indeterminacy of the human mind and the theoretically many ways 
to interpret the lived environment according to sets of „naïve theories‟, it builds on the 
recent developments in constructivist institutionalism to present an account that puts 
the individual-state relationship at its core. As such, it breaks with the focus on 
production prevalent in the literature, and enables analysis of the normative depiction 
of a particular ideal-typical type of economic subject that then engages with consumer 
markets. What becomes essential is the exact ways in which a particular 
understanding of the state in the eyes of policy-makers leads to the facilitation of 
certain definitions of economic agency and market mechanisms, and the exclusion of 
their alternatives. The empirical chapters then apply this framework to the cases of the 
British and German home ownership and mortgage markets (1997-2007) to explore 
the discursive framing patterns that were put forward to legitimate a particular 
definition of the ideal-typical home owner and mortgagee in these two economies. 
Through the study of parliamentary debates, the findings demonstrate not only that 
differences exist in the conceptualisations of the economic subject, but hence also the 
political character of such differences as excluding each other. At the same time, such 
a process is shown to be deeply political in terms of the policy instruments that are 
not considered due to particular taken-for-granted conceptions of policy-makers 
themselves. In short, this constructivist account showcases the multiplicity of political 
aspects with regards to state interventions in contemporary capitalist economies. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, the literature on comparative capitalisms and on „Varieties of 
Capitalism‟ (VoC) more specifically has exploded. According to the Social Science 
Citation Index, the number of journal articles about capitalist diversity has been on a 
steep upwards trajectory (Streeck 2010b, 57). Due to this proliferation of academic 
interest, it is now well established, theoretically as well as empirically, that capitalism 
as such comes in diverse forms or setups. The very term of capitalism then needs to 
be handled with care as it encompasses a large range of concrete socio-economic 
relationships (Thompson 2010, 197). These differences are understood to be 
nationally specific and are hence compatible with a study of nation-states (Perraton 
and Clift 2004). Hence they appeal to the research domains of comparativist scholars 
(Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). Starting from a relatively limited amount of cases 
studied (Shonfield 1965; Hall and Soskice 2001), this academic field has now moved 
onto not only a multitude of analyses (Feldman in Hancké et al. 2007), and has been 
discussed in a diversity of ways as well (Bruff 2011).  
 
In relation to this body of academic texts and debates, the thesis lays bare some of the 
developments within it and attempts to address these by setting forward a theoretical 
and methodological framework that is then applied to case studies. I am most 
interested in the ways that studies of various national models of capitalism have 
highlighted the political nature of such regimes. It is in this sense that he main claim 
of the literature consists in arguing that a constructivist perspective, built from 
developments in the field of constructivist institutionalism but also from approaches 
more firmly grounded in social theory, could present additional political features of 
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capitalist diversity. By building upon attempts of scholars to bring the state and hence 
the political characteristics back into the study of comparative capitalisms, such a 
perspective is said to provide a reading that focuses on some essentially political 
elements that have not yet been fully investigated within the literature so far. This is 
not to say that the Varieties of Capitalism or Comparative Capitalisms approaches are 
of little value or that they were unable to highlight political elements. It is much more 
a stance about turning the spotlight towards some complementary political aspects 
within capitalist variety. Indeed, it is the very realisation of potential variation in 
capitalist models, as highlighted in these bodies of literature, that is taken as a starting 
point to explore additional features of differentiation whose deeply political nature is 
then carved out. In this sense, the thesis builds upon previous and current 
contributions to the literature to demonstrate in more explicit terms how such an 
approach brings out political features. The body of studies critiqued is then not 
questioned per se, its political implications are only highlighted in more advanced 
terms.  
 
As such, the thesis states that the VoC literature can benefit a great deal from further 
engagements with its own key reflections and objective once the latter are approached 
with a constructivist lens. The constructivist approach laid out here on the one hand 
builds upon classical sociological theory (Berger and Luckman 1966) and the insights 
from constructivist institutionalism (Schmidt 2009a).  Such a line of investigation is 
set out to show how an alternative reading of the position of the individual and of the 
state within differential capitalist regimes can open the comparative focus onto 
additional political features of capitalist variety. Building on from social theory, the 
argument is that open-ended ontological foundations of the individual set out the 
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methodological base from which supplemental features of differentiation can be 
discovered. The concept of the individual here does not refer to each individual 
person as such, but to an ideal-typical individual that is depicted as the model to 
follow. In relation to the economic sphere, the notion of „economic agency‟ is also 
used, referring to the domains of individual behaviour that refer to the economy. 
 
Differences in the making of this individual are not located at the firm level, as the 
literature on Varieties of Capitalism claims, but they are located at the rank of the 
socio-political relationship between a particular type of ideal-typical individual and 
the state in a particular form. Instead of further refining the analytical concepts of the 
established methods of VoC (Crouch et al. 2007), I claim that a theoretical step back 
from such efforts that involves a connection with constructivist thinking can provide a 
complementary account of the varieties of capitalist organisation. I argue that such a 
re-reading leads to bringing out additional facets of the political nature of economic 
regimes, exactly through the process of outlining differences in capitalism (Hunt and 
Schwartz 1972, 33). It is in fact the very comparative method that enables such a view 
as it allows for variety and the closure of such variety through the marginalising of 
alternative models. If such a line of reflection is proceeded with in relation to the 
individual, what comes into focus are the different ways in which the individual is 
constituted, and constitutive, by/of the economic system in place. 
 
Even though there have been techniques to bring out the political features of VoC 
they have skipped the first step of discussing the nature of the individual-state 
relationship first. Indeed, they have mainly argued for bringing the state back in 
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(Schmidt 2009b), I argue that they have only been able to achieve their aim to a 
certain degree. It is true that the VoC framework pays little attention to the state as an 
actor in the context of the economy (Hancké et al. 2007, 8), but I claim that initiatives 
to bring back the state on its own do not go far enough. Indeed, the analyses tend not 
to take as far back a step as interrogating the very relationship between state policies 
and the individual as an economic agent. I argue that a constructivist perspective 
allows from exactly such a regress. What the thesis then proposes is a framework that 
offers a perspective into investigations of varieties of capitalist organisation that 
posits a novel ontological point of departure and explores the concrete individual-state 
relationships as constitutive to capitalist variety and the political features of the latter. 
Such a break is proceeded with by pointing to contributions that are located outside 
the limited domain of VoC or even the comparative capitalisms literature, hence 
allowing for alternative theoretical and methodological reflections. 
 
Falling back on more or less recent contributions from social theorists, I start from the 
assumption that the human mind is indeterminate (Vico 1744, 75). In other words, the 
human being is not a predetermined being through its physical constitution (Berger 
and Luckman 1966), but that he/she acquires specific patterns of interpretation and of 
sense-making over time (Ross 1997, 42). Again, the individual here is not meant to be 
a specific person, but the abstract individual. This means that I am not so much 
interested how sense is produced in a case-by-case basis, but more generally how the 
very economic concepts are defined on their own terms in a particular setting. This 
break with the natural, and hence pre-determined, constitution of the human being 
corresponds to introducing the possibility of variety into the domain of the human 
mind, hence rendering it political. Political is here understood to mean that on a 
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theoretical level, alternative patterns of interpretation of the lived everyday
1
 world 
have been marginalised (Laclau 1990, 34). The mere potentiality of variance then 
entails political features as only a limited amount of conceptually possible 
interpretations of the economic domain can be adopted. The individual-state 
relationship gains relevance in this regard as state interventions are judged to 
potentially facilitate particular conceptions of economic reality and hence of 
economic agency within this domain. If the understandings about economic subjects 
are not set by nature i.e. the domain of the a-political, the study of how their 
perception has been coming about becomes of interest (Giddens 1986). It is here that 
the constructivist elements of the thesis become relevant yet again (Ruggie 1998, 857). 
The making of the ideal-typical economic agent through state action is what is at 
stake. 
 
Relating back to the VoC literature, introducing the individual into the debate through 
falling back onto the work of constructivist scholars provides an account that breaks 
with universally valid and hence context-independent notion of the economic domain 
and of markets that VoC studies tend to bring forward. As the economic agent as well 
as economic reality, such as „the market‟, are depicted as deeply social constructions, 
such a reading opens the meaning of economic phenomena to wider social events 
(Ryner 2003, 201). Such a perspective is unfamiliar to the VoC literature as it centres 
on firm behaviour and does not include the individual as such as a unit of analysis 
unit. Against the various politicisation techniques that focus on the state per se, such 
an account not only transgresses the reasons for why the state matters when it comes 
                                                        
1
 Even though the word „everyday‟ is used in this thesis, the argument does not engage with 
the relatively recent emergence of „everyday IPE‟ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007, 2). The main 
reason is that this body of literature is only in the process of institutionalisation, which makes 
it hard to pin it down at this point in time. 
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to studying capitalist diversity, but also pays attention to the political aspects not only 
of state action but also of the definition of economic realities on their own right. 
Again, the political is first defined as the marginalisation of alternative conceptions of 
economic phenomena. As such, political regimes are inevitably political. However, 
this is achieved not through focussing on the state per se, but by introducing it only as 
a secondary step once on open-ended ontology of the individual has been presented. 
 
This constitutes a move that sets out further political features of capitalist variety that 
tends to see the politics in the distributional effects of firm strategy. Due to its fall-
back upon a theory of the individual that steps outside of the VoC domain to borrow 
from constructivist scholars, the thesis is able to offer additional insight into this 
literature. Once the ontological and methodological basis is modified upon which to 
reflect about contemporary capitalist regimes, an account can be set forth that adds 
ontologically political elements to VoC. Before the key differences between the 
current literature and the perspective suggested in the thesis are outlined in more 
detail, I shortly describe how this introductory chapter unfolds. 
 
After setting up the argument about a constructivist view on models of capitalism in 
relation to the literature in question, this chapter presents its contribution to the latter. 
It then phrases the research question by focussing on the main rationale of the thesis 
and offers some methodological reflections of how the argument is delivered. In a 
final stage, it outlines the structure of the thesis chapter by chapter. All of these 
elements follow from one another and constitute the basis upon which the subsequent 
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arguments refer back to, from the literature review to the theoretical framework and 
the illustrative case studies. 
2 Towards a Constructivist Account of the Political in VoC 
It is now acknowledged by the secondary literature that the VoC framework “is 
„apolitical‟, equilibrium-biased and downplays conflict” (Hancké et al. 2007, 8). It is 
said to be „apolitical‟ in the sense that it depicts economic regimes in a functionalist 
way that is unable to describe sources of change (Streeck and Thelen 2005) as it 
presents “a rather agentless and apolitical conception of institutional adaptation” (Hay 
2005, 107). This is now the common understanding of Hay‟s statement, and various 
alterations of the framework have been set forward to address the issue (Mayntz 
2006). However, what I intend to do is to explain how such accounts are still missing 
out in exposing particular political features, namely through a lack of engagement 
with the individual that follows a constructivist reading (Hay 2002, 67). The starting 
point of the firm to explain capitalist modes of organisation in VoC is surely 
insightful when it comes to study patterns of innovation and institutional 
complementarities (Hall and Soskice 2001, 17), but it offers limited scope to explore 
the integration of the individual within certain macro-economic structures (Streeck 
2010a, 41). A more sociological reading following constructivist approaches can be 
helpful in this regard. 
 
Also, the intellectual connections to the field of institutionalist analyses do not offer 
tools to explore the individual in a way that would set out such additional political 
elements of comparative capitalisms (Amable and Palombarini 2009). Indeed, the 
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focus on the firm as the point of departure to study capitalist diversity is only able to 
highlight political issues related to the distributional effects of certain institutional 
features of the production process. The example of wage bargaining strategies as 
investigated by Hancké and Herrman is illustrative here (Hancké and Herrmann 
2007). The main political issue is with the national competitiveness of the firm, which 
then means that some countries experience steeper growth paths than others (p. 126). 
An additional process of differentiation is how well labour is able to bargain for its 
own wages, hence introducing distributional differences between the socio-economic 
groups of workers between national economies more specifically (p. 132). 
 
In short, the sphere of the political is related to that one of competitive advantage in a 
global economy setting (Porter 1990). As some economies do better than others, and 
as some groups inside each of the economies reap more benefits than others, the 
notion of the political catches the ways in which the internationally created wealth is 
distributed between and among national populations. Such an approach matches the 
classic description of politics as the study of „who get what when and how‟ (Lasswell 
1936). However, what it does not investigate is the very definition of these actors, and 
how economic processes are perceived in the first place. It does not account for the 
possibility that in different regimes the actors are depicted in diverse ways, hence 
offering variation in the ways in which the distribution of economic goods are 
proceeded with. VoC not only assumes all economic regimes to be comparable, but it 
does so under the assumption that the definitions of the economic notions at hand are 
identical. The latter assumption needs closer investigation. That is not to say that 
regimes stop be to comparable, but more attention is required in differentiating their 
constitutive terms. 
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In two market economies for instance, VoC (in the form of Hall and Soskice 2001) 
assumes that the constitution of the economic agent of the private individual is the 
same. However, this does not need to be the case. The mere discovery of varieties in 
those market economies points not only to differential institutional arrangements per 
se as VoC analyses have outlined in multiple accounts, they also relate to differential 
integrations of the individual, and differential meanings of this individual. Indeed, the 
economic agent might relate very differently not only to the firm, but also to the very 
notion of the market (Carrier 1997; Jabko 2006, 32). Extended in such a fashion, the 
literature could then also allude to reflections about differential definitions of the 
ideal-typical individual, in the sense that they are differently embedded into market 
structures. Again, the notion of the individual here should not be taken as an 
individual person, but as the abstraction of the economic individual. It is then possible 
to imagine that the institutional differences on the level of the macro-economy, 
outlined by the current VoC literature, are complemented by differences in the 
conceptions of the individual as an economic agent as well. This is described by the 
notion of „micro-macro complementarities‟, building on from the concept of 
institutional complementarities‟ in the VoC literature (Crouch 2005c). Whereas 
„micro‟ refers to the specific understanding of the ideal-typical economic agent, 
„macro‟ relates to the characteristics of a particular socio-economic setting in terms of 
collective outcomes. These differences are then related to the position of the 
individual per se, but also in relation to the market and the state as a set of policies 
alike. A constructivist account that concentrates on the identity of the individual then 
brings out the political features of states and markets alike as excluding alternative 
conceptions of these two notions. 
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Indeed then, there are additional dimensions to what the domain of the political can be 
meant to be than those currently outlined. It is this regard that a look outside the VoC 
domain can contribute to a theoretical approach that takes into account the individual 
as an economic agent. A reference to Bourdieu is insightful here as he rejects the 
assumption of a universally defined economic subject as well, the very basis of this 
thesis. 
Only a very particular form of ethnocentrism, which assumes the guise of 
universalism, can lead us to credit economic agents universally with the 
aptitude for rational economic behaviour, thereby making disappear the 
question of the economic and cultural conditions in which this aptitude (here 
elevated into a norm) is acquired (…) (Bourdieu 2005, 5)2 
In other words, instead of assuming the individual to universally have the same 
conceptions of economic phenomena, and thus naturalising a state that is 
manufactured, what needs further investigating is the wider social context that such an 
individual is located into. 
 
Such a perspective offers an account of capitalist diversity that reveals additional 
aspects of the political as it not only regards the individual as constitutive of socio-
economic regimes, but also as it takes the mere potentiality of differences in the 
make-up of the individual as a political element. Following an Aristotelian line of 
thought, the human being is regarded as an inevitably political being. Once the 
question is posited of what exactly constitutes an economic agent, each possible 
answer necessarily discriminates between a range of options, prioritising some over 
                                                        
2
 This quote is indicative and should not be taken as the thesis to develop according to 
Bourdieusian lines. 
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others. Hence, the mere observation of differences in the understandings of what the 
proper economic individual is supposed to be indicates a process of judgement that 
qualifies some conceptions as more appropriate than others (Laclau and Zac 1994, 
13). It is exactly this, often implicit, dimension in relation to economic agency and 
notions of the market that the thesis is interested in (Abercrombie et al. 1986, 5). 
 
The domain of the political is thus not only that one of distributional justice, but also 
that of alternative conceptions of economic life that have been rejected in favour for 
one particular reading (Soeffner 2004). This act of „violence‟ is political in itself as it 
leads to potentially very different economic realities (Laclau 1990, 34). Following on 
constructivist and ideationalist lines of thought (Blyth 2002, 10; Clift 2012), I argue 
that how agency and markets are conceived is constitutive of economic processes 
themselves. That is not to say that such conceptions are internally consistent or that 
they would be stable over time. Actually, quite the opposite is true. Indeed, each view 
of what economic life is, is characterised by tensions, themselves the representations 
of the originally open space of interpretation and hence reflections of their political 
nature.  
  
It is at this point that the focus shifts towards the state and more specifically to the 
individual-state relationship. As the social context of economic life cannot be thought 
without the policy interventions of state actors, the definition of the economic agent 
passes through state action (Hay et al. 2005). Indeed, through its policy-setting and 
discursive efforts it can facilitate certain understandings of the individual and of 
markets more than others, hence playing a key role in the discrimination between 
varieties of subjectivities. What becomes central to the thesis in this regard is the 
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individual-state relationship. It relates to the concrete way by which the individual 
and market mechanisms are depicted, but also how these state interventions are 
legitimated in relation to the individual, which gives hints at how the economic agent 
and the market are made sense of. 
 
Such efforts then refer to the ways in which a particular socio-economic regimes with 
a particular political apparatus in terms of state setup necessarily puts forward certain 
understandings of what the most adequate ideal-typical economic subject is supposed 
to be. Gramsci saw the state as central in such a process. 
(…) educative and formative role of the state. Its aim is always that of creating 
new and higher types of civilisation; (...) hence of evolving even physically 
new types of humanity. But how will each single individual succeed in 
incorporating himself into the collective man (…) (Gramsci 1971, 242)3 
What the thesis is interested in is the making of this „collective man‟, and how such a 
process is deeply political, in the justifications put forward against others, but also in 
the way that the state intervenes into the economic regime, materially and 
ideationally. What is central is the process itself, how one certain understanding, even 
if not consistent, is rendered to be the most appropriate or, in other words, how “the 
political task is essentially a task of civilization and culture” (Maritain 1951, 54-55). 
 
Such an investigation puts forward particular theories of the individual and of the 
state. I shortly explain which these theories are. In relation to the individual, what is 
central is that everyday people are seen as creatures that try to explain the world 
                                                        
3
 As before, this quote is indicative only and does not mean a Gramscian framework is used in 
the thesis. 
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around them in a consistent way and that can be grasped in a limited set of 
propositions, what I refer to as „naïve theories‟ in chapter three (Heider 1958). Again, 
Gramsci makes a very similar statement when he writes: 
The principle must first be established that all men are “philosophers”, that is, 
that between the professional or “technical” philosophers and the rest of 
mankind, the difference is not one of “quality” but only of “quantity”.  
(Gramsci 1971, 347) 
The reference to philosophers means that everyday people tend to see themselves as 
part of structures that can be explained by systems of thought. Instead of relating to 
the constitution of existential issues as in the case of philosophy, naïve theories 
provide explanations and justificatory narratives of everyday conceptions, for instance 
of economic realities as described above. My theory of the individual is hence based 
upon an ontology that allows for variations in the ways everyday agents see 
themselves and market processes. 
 
As far as my theory of the state goes, I distinguish between the state as an institution, 
and as a policy-making body with a particular rationale for state intervention (Jessop 
1990, 207; Watson 2005, 180). This entails that (1) the institutional setting of the 
political apparatus and (2) the plan of actions that are enacted by the latter are taken 
apart (Barrow 1993, 15). At the same time it allows me to connect the two together by 
drawing links of how the form of the state and the policy output are linked (Cerny 
1990, 88). I proceed in this way by exposing (1) certain ways in which the state actors 
relate to the individual, mostly in terms of legitimation (2) and how these influence 
the conceptions of the individual and of the market that are facilitated. The term of 
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individual-state relationship then comprises two aspects that are only heuristically 
separate. On the one hand the thesis is interested in how the individual relates to the 
state as an institution, on the other how certain state policies depict this very ideal-
typical individual. The first dimension focuses on the institutional setup of state 
actors, the second on the output of the state as such. Such a distinction allows me to 
analyse public policies and parliamentary debates without assuming a homogenous 
state bloc (Watson 2005, 179). 
 
Instead of focussing onto the firm and the production side as VoC tends to do, a 
method that provide a limited reading of the political, the perspective here “sees 
politics as an open-ended process of social self-production” and reproduction (Rupert 
1995, 3). With the self coming to the forefront, it is also able to move into issues of 
consumption. The VoC method and its institutionalist focus renders it complicated to 
engage with topics of consumption as the latter mostly relate to the private individual. 
Hence the ways in which it engages with the individual and consumption themes go 
hand in hand. Their methodological focus on institutions does not give space for 
empirical investigations into consumption. It is also into this gap that the thesis 
attempts to make a dual contribution, one methodological, the other one empirical. 
Even though the theoretical chapters draw from the constructivist institutionalism 
literature, this is not to say that it reproduces the same focus on institutions as VoC. 
Indeed, what I highlight are the attempts of this literature to connect the individual to 
the institutions and policies of the state. As such, I use these contributions to highlight 
how they can contribute to the comparative capitalisms literature, but still present 
certain issues I attempt to address. 
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After the theoretical outlines, the thesis then operationalises the suggested framework 
to particular consumer markets, that of owned houses and of mortgages. Following a 
comparative method, it investigates the conceptions of the economic agent and of the 
notion of markets in the cases of the United Kingdom and Germany, depicted by the 
VoC literature as contrasting cases (Hall and Soskice 2001, 19). Looking into key 
aspects of contemporary regimes, the cases demonstrate the differential readings of 
economic agency and exemplify how capitalist variety can be read in complementary 
political way. 
3 Contribution to the Literature 
Even though VoC more generally is not overly concerned with the individual or 
consumption issues, I make these claims in relation to a wider literature, the one that 
comes under the comparative capitalisms banner. These points are taken up in more 
detail in the literature review chapter. What is important here is that the thesis 
positions itself against various attempts to explain capitalist regimes. Following from 
the reflections already offered, I am most interested in the way that a society, and 
hence an economy, is organised, hence how the individual is embedded into a larger 
context (Rose 1999). In this sense, I locate my argument in the literature that analyses 
the socio-economic organisation of societies. Furthermore, the very existence of 
variants in capitalism is itself taken as a point of departure for an extended reading of 
politics (Yeatman 1994, 106). In relation to this field of study, and following the 
limited nature of the domain of the political in the comparative capitalism literature at 
the moment, the thesis makes a set of theoretical and empirical contributions.  Each of 
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them comes in three parts as they relate back to the individual, consumption and the 
political. 
 
First, criticising the contemporary contributions to the VoC literature, the theoretical 
parts make the case for why and how the individual can be seen as a relevant unit of 
analysis in the context of socio-economic regimes. Building on from constructivist 
institutionalist approaches, the thesis provides the VoC literature with an ontological 
account of the individual that is novel in its own terms. A full inclusion of the 
individual as an economic agent is doubled with a theoretical framework that allows 
for varieties in the definition of the latter. As such, it introduces a complementary 
element of the political into the analysis. Following a constructivist perspective, it 
provides a starting point to extend the study of comparative capitalism towards the 
individual. 
  
Second, and building on from the developments in relation to the individual, the thesis 
also then provides VoC with a framework that allows it to investigate issues of 
consumption not merely as an add-on to wider phenomena, but to study them per se. 
But as the individual comes in various forms, the exact way in which these issues are 
presented in different socio-economic contexts can also vary. In then adds to the VoC 
literature in the sense that such a perspective is able to evaluate the standing and the 
understanding of consumption more finely, in a differentiated way. As such, the thesis 
contributes to the theoretical opening of the existing VoC framework towards new 
domains of enquiry. 
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Third, against the recent attempts to politicise the VoC literature by bringing back in 
the state (Schmidt 2009b), this thesis goes beyond such moves and integrates the 
individual as a political element. Once an ontological starting point is set that allows 
for variation in the way economic agency is defined, it leads to including the state, but 
only in a second stage. This method then provides an alternatively political reading of 
capitalist diversity, an account that considers the political to be ontologically 
constitutive, even inevitably so, to the latter in ways that have not yet been explored 
in the literature. This theoretical contribution builds on from the lines of though 
developed earlier in this chapter. 
 
The empirical contributions then come in the same order. Indeed, the application of 
the suggested framework to two apparently different types of capitalist organisation 
provides the thesis with strong and detailed empirical case studies. Indeed, the 
definition of the individual, but also of wider economic notions is studied for the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Germany, the latter often being referred to as being the 
corner points of capitalist variety (Hall and Soskice 2001, 19). At the same time, as 
both housing markets display very different price trajectories, they do seem to be 
opposing cases. The more specific areas chosen are the homeownership and the 
mortgage markets, both fields of private consumption where the making of the 
economic agent are apparent to the way these markets work. These case studies are 
introduced to demonstrate the operationability of the theoretical setting on the one 
hand, but also offer insights in their own right on the other. 
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Fourth then, the case studies provide VoC with an exemplary case of how the 
individual can be integrated into the way in which socio-economic regimes reproduce 
themselves in the current era. At the same time, the differences in the understandings 
of that individual between the British and German case are showcasing how capitalist 
variety goes beyond institutional features to include everyday elements. Indeed, the 
economic agent him/herself is depicted in diverse fashions that go hand in hand with 
different conceptions not only of economic notions like the market, but also of the 
state as an institution. As such, the inclusion of the individual into the theoretical 
design links with an analysis of state interventions in empirical terms. 
 
Fifth, the chapters on the housing and mortgage markets demonstrate how issues of 
private consumption can be integrated into VoC once the theoretical framework is set 
up in the way discussed earlier. Instead of seeing these markets as reflections of 
global structures of finance, the thesis analyses them according to the definition of the 
economic individual within them. Simultaneously, they also represent empirical 
contributions on their own as they provide details into the variation of how particular 
economic notions are make sense of in diverse socio-economic contexts. These 
chapters then also add insights to the VoC literature when it comes to topics it has not 
yet been able to cover (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008). 
 
Sixth, the empirical parts again showcase the extended nature of the political nature of 
economic regimes, taken on their own and in relation to the potential variety. Through 
an in-depth investigation of understandings and conceptualisations of the economic 
agent and other economic notions, the chapters provide VoC not only with an 
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example of which additional political features economic regimes are constituted of. 
Indeed, they also hint at the political characteristics that can be discovered though a 
comparative analysis of how the individual is depicted in various socio-economic 
contexts, here more specifically for the British and German cases. In general, the 
emphasis on the politics of markets and their agents within them is central to the 
thesis, starting from the literature review chapter. 
 
Even though a multitude of contributions are to be made here, the central added value 
ought to be seen in the constructivist integration of the individual into theories of 
capitalist diversity, and the subsequent politicisation of the latter towards this ideal-
typical individual. The focus on consumption follows on from such an argument, just 
as the empirical chapters highlight.  
4 Research Question and Methodological Observations  
Following from the theoretical points made before, the thesis first offers a theoretical 
account of how the political making of the individual can be studied in a deeper way 
than the current literature on economic regimes has engaged in with so far. It falls 
back on the very basic notions of how to conceptualise the individual in a particular 
societal context. Sociological elements are relevant as they give insight into how the 
individual and society interact (Foucault 1991; Campbell 2009), and how the 
individual then becomes to be regarded in a particular context (Joas and Knoebl 
2009). This is exactly what the thesis is interested in, to study the very definition of 
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the ideal-typical individual itself, the making of the self as an economic agent.  The 
central research question then becomes the following: 
How can a constructivist understanding of the individual open up the field of 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ in a way as to provide a complementary political 
analysis of public policies in relation to consumption issues, more specifically 
in the cases of British and German home ownership and mortgage markets? 
Positioned in the VoC literature, the argument sets forward an alternative approach. 
Indeed, what comes to the forefront are “the economic and cultural conditions in 
which this aptitude is acquired”, referring to the aptitude to act as an individual inside 
a particular economic context of market processes and state interventions. Also, a 
diachronic approach is taken when it comes to the empirical part as to fully bring to 
the forefront the political tensions in the making of certain everyday conceptions of 
economic agency (Watson 2011a).  
 
The case studies then cover a time span of eleven years each, from 1997 to 2007. This 
time frame has been chosen as it represents the period when British house prices 
experiences considerable growth levels. For each economic regime, state 
interventions into the home ownership market and the mortgage market are analysed 
in order to shed light into the definition of economic agency in each of them. These 
markets are chosen as they represent not only instances where conceptions of the 
individual are vital, but also as they constitute economic loci that are central to both 
varieties of capitalism, even though in diverse ways as the empirical chapters show. 
The hypothesis is that the conceptions of the individual are consistent among the same 
economy as the socio-political context is similar, but that they differ between 
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countries as the wider conditions are significantly different. As the framework sets out 
the relationships between the definition of the ideal-typical economic subject and the 
context in which such an understanding is reproduced, the logic is that the 
environment acts upon the making of the individual in a consistent way. This 
hypothesis is taken from the VoC literature itself that uses the notion of institutional 
complementarities to underline that the different features of economies follow the 
same logic (Hall and Soskice 2001, 19). This is also why categorisations can be 
performed that compare the totality of economies. In relation to the thesis, what then 
comes to the forefront in the empirical studies are the exact fashions in which the 
individual is embedded into, on the one hand economic market mechanisms, and on 
the other hand the depictions of the latter by state actors. In this triangular relationship 
between the individual, the market and the state, applied to the theme of housing 
consumption, the thesis outlines the deeply political features not only of sets of 
policies but also of the process itself by which the individual is depicted as an 
economic agent, on his/her own and in relation to other market participants. 
 
As regards the methodological approach, the empirical data for the case studies is 
constituted of parliamentary discussions and commissioned reports then discussed in 
parliament outlining certain policies. As such they highlight the features of the central 
line of thought behind such state interventions, they set out the contours of a 
particular rationale for state intervention to use the terminology introduced above 
(Bayley 2004). Once the concept of the state is conceptualised as an institution and as 
a set of policies in relation to the individual in this case, the justifications of a certain 
kind of state intervention can be traced back in debates between state actors. As such 
parliamentary debates are the most relevant sources of enquiry in relation to the 
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research question set out above. Indeed, it is especially in parliamentary discussions 
that justifications for specific plans of action are set forward, hence hinting at the 
rationale for the underlying reasons behind state policies. In these utterances, state 
actors make a case for their approach to various economic themes. More specifically, 
they are also setting out particular readings or definitions of the economic agent per 
se, as well as of how the market is supposed to work, on its own and in relation to the 
individual. 
 
The character of debate is especially insightful in parliamentary utterances as it forces 
the state actors to express his/her views against others, hence exactly proceeding with 
the marginalisation of alternative naïve theories. As described above, it is this very 
process of construction of sense (Every and Augoustinos 2007), that can come in 
more or less explicit fashions, that is central to the efforts of the thesis to point 
towards complementary political features of capitalist variety. At the same time, 
following parliamentary debates allows the scholar to set out the potentially 
inconsistent elements of the rationale for state action, as well as spotting naïve 
theories of economic agency and of the market that are contradictory, or at least 
inconsistent. As such, the political nature of policy interventions can be tracked down 
in a way that allows for the theoretical focus on the facilitation of certain sets of naïve 
theories to be operationalised (Van Dijk 2000, 88). At the same time, the diachronic 
focus allows for a time dimension in the justification of economic policy. 
 
As the capitalist economies investigated here are governed by the means of a 
parliamentary system, comparability is ensured. However, that is not to say that the 
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institutional features of the British and German parliament can be assumed to be the 
same. In fact, chapter four sets out a theoretical account of how to take these 
differences into account. The concept of individual-state relationship then not only 
picks up on the content of the policy outcome, but also on its form. Again then, the 
distinction introduced in relation to the state as an institution and as a set of policies is 
a heuristic one, meaning that it allows for a scholarly refinement without assuming 
that the two sides are ontologically separate. The theoretical as well as the empirical 
chapters reflect such a perspective. 
5 Thesis Structure 
Before going over to the argument as such, this section offers an overview of the way 
that the thesis develops. This is done in order to offer a comfortable way for the 
reader to navigate through the multiple pages but also to point at the internal 
consistency of the argument. Even though many sub-arguments are made throughout 
the thesis, it is important to show how they all connect to contribute in the ways 
developed above.  
 
After this first introduction, I review the „Varieties of Capitalism‟ literature and more 
generally the engagements with comparative capitalisms in relation to the way in 
which they bring out the political elements of differences in socio-economic models 
of organisation. After a short exposition of the main arguments of this field of study, I 
argue that its partial omission of political features relates to its inability of include the 
individual into its realm of investigation. I also show why and how more recent 
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attempts at bringing the state back into investigations of models of capitalism tend to 
replicate the same methodological approaches than VoC does. This is problematic, as 
a simple inclusion of the state per se does not lead to a more political reading of the 
ways that capitalist societies are constituted. At the same time, these contributions 
also have difficulties making sense of issues of private consumption. 
 
Chapter three is the first of two theoretical parts that set out the framework that firstly 
is able to address the issues set out in the literature review and that secondly is used as 
the basis upon which the empirical case studies are explored at a later stage. Starting 
from a constructivist reading of the human being, I explore how the ontologically 
indeterminate character of human nature represents itself a political feature. As the 
human mind is posited to be open to a variety of interpretative schemes and so-called 
„naïve theories‟, the nature of politics is located at the individual level. The process of 
socialisation and normalisation is pointed at that leads to a closure of the original state 
where a multitude of options of how to organise the economic sphere of life is 
possible. The closure of this state is exactly what is essentially political in the 
transcendence of the individual into a community. It is as such that the human being 
is inevitably political.  
 
In chapter four the individual is linked to the state as a central institution in the 
making of economic realities. Indeed, in the process of the narrowing down of 
potential types of institutionalisations of socio-economic regimes, state actors occupy 
a particular position that allows them to facilitate certain understandings of economic 
aspects of economic life. But the state only comes in due to the specific features of 
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human constitution. This is where my account crucially differs from the literature as I 
engage in a framework that goes beyond the state per se as a universal concept. I then 
explore how differences in the setup of state institutions translate into variations in the 
concrete individual-state relationships. I claim that the form and content of policies in 
relation to the individual are influenced by this relationship that also plays into the 
ways an economic regime is legitimised in parliamentary debates. At the same time, it 
allows the inclusion of issues of consumption as a well as a deeper reading of the 
politics of economic governance.  
 
Chapters five to eight cover the empirical part. As described, the first case study is the 
British housing market, more specifically concerned with the state interventions into 
the home ownership market between 1997 and 2007. Falling back onto parliamentary 
debates, I investigate the facilitated naïve theories of the economic agent when it 
comes to the economic mechanisms surrounding the acquisition of an owned home. 
What is central here is the definition of the individual in relation to a topic of private 
consumption, but also of the economic processes more generally. Indeed, state 
conceptions of markets are also explored to then investigate the individual-state 
relationship in relation to the latter. The political elements of such interventions are 
relayed, at the level of the individual per se but also at the level of the policy 
outcomes. As such, the way in which economic policies have been legitimated also 
plays a role here. The main findings here are that the British policy-makers were 
facilitating a version of economic agency that is closely connected to the market as a 
self-equilibrating mechanism once state policies were able to make sure consumers 
were fully informed. The individual was then seen with his/her financial capacity to 
accumulate wealth in the housing market after having engaged in mortgage practices. 
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Indeed, as housing markets now involve large amount of financial resources, 
households are looking for external funding, mostly in the national mortgage market. 
Thus, in order to make sense of the practices that are related with the housing issues, 
it is necessary to investigate yet another consumption market. Chapter six then applies 
the method set out in the theoretical framework and already applied beforehand to the 
conceptualisations in relation to mortgage processes in the UK (1997-2007). Just as 
for the housing case, the central question is how the integration of the individual 
allows for a complementary political reading of economic processes, here as far as 
mortgages are concerned. The exact definitions of the mortgagee as well as of his/her 
embeddedness into the mortgage market are analysed (Jackson and Deeg 2008a, 683), 
also in relation to the findings of the previous chapter. As stated, I expect the sets of 
naïve theories to be consistent over these two areas of study. In general terms, the 
depicted ideal-typical British mortgagee is confident with the rightfulness of markets 
and hence engages in extensive mortgage activity, preferring flexible interest products 
as they allow him/her to play with the volatility of markets. 
 
The two subsequent chapters conduct the same method for the German case. Whereas 
chapter seven looks into the facilitated meanings of the home buyer, chapter eight 
explores depictions of the financial processes surrounding the act of acquiring an 
owned home by falling back on external resources, hence mortgages. Apart from 
these chapters being empirical studies in their own right, their comparative dimension 
allows for other political features to be highlighted. Indeed, not only are political 
tensions pointed at, but so are also the differences between the German and British 
cases. As the novel dimension of the political lies in the closure of options of socio-
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economic types of organisations, these chapters show how the same economic 
processes can be framed and understood in diverse ways. They display how the 
definitions of the economic agent and of the market, but also that of the state itself as 
an economic actor, vary between the cases. This variety is then interpreted in political 
terms. Indeed, the German home owner is characterised not merely in financial terms 
but also in social ones, more specifically in his/her quality as a parent. It is essential 
that savings were being accumulated first and that the particular home that was 
acquired was being used for a long time, hence hindering spatial mobility and 
financial upgrading in the housing sector. At the same time, the quality of the home 
owners was linked to macro-economic issues, not to the home ownership market per 
se. 
 
The conclusion comes back to the theoretical argument and sums up the main 
empirical findings. It also engages in some reflections about future research themes 
following from the thesis. 
 
In the annexes I replicate the dual empirical focus on housing and mortgage markets 
for the Luxembourgish case. The reasons for this additional work are practical and 
academic. First, as I am funded by the „Fond National de la Recherche Luxembourg‟, 
the thesis requires the inclusion of an analysis of concerns directly relevant for 
Luxembourgish context. Again, I would like to express my gratitude for the financial 
support and the opportunity to be proceeding with my studies in a way that gave me 
the time to engage with themes that I am highly interested in. Second, as Luxembourg 
is yet another case of capitalist economy, these chapters are again demonstrations of 
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the framework set forth and empirical contributions on their own right. The chapter in 
Annex I thus deals with the facilitation of naïve theories in the Luxemburgish home 
ownership market, whereas the chapter in annex II does so for the mortgage market. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the broader Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature in order to 
present the intellectual context into which my research question, as described in the 
previous chapter, comes in. In this sense, the relationship between the existing body 
of knowledge and the contribution of the thesis is central to the discussion here. This 
chapter then maps out some of the approaches that scholars have taken when studying 
contemporary modes of capitalist organisation of societies. The aim is not to give a 
complete overview of the whole literature, but to offer commentary on the way that 
the thesis reads the latter to then provide an alternative framework in chapters three 
and four. A particular point of interest is the way in which scholars have been 
presenting accounts that give space to the political aspects of capitalist diversity. As 
the central contribution of the thesis is to provide VoC with a constructivist 
framework that explores additional or different aspects of the political related to 
economic agency in the study of capitalist variety, this review is centred on the 
various ways in which scholars have engaged with the relationship between the state 
and the individual. In this sense, I pick up on diverse strands in the wider comparative 
capitalism literature (Jackson and Deeg 2006a). Again, there might be different 
understandings of the body of knowledge, the one presented here is the one that 
logically leads to introduce the theoretical contribution of the thesis.  
 
This review chapter is crucial with regard to the questions it raises as it sets the 
foundations for the theoretical and empirical arguments made throughout the thesis. It 
is here where the gaps in the literature are presented that is then filled by the 
subsequent explanations. Before doing so, it is helpful to explain the procedure that 
 
 
40 
 
the review chapter takes before the contribution is reached. Indeed there are a few 
steps that progressively become more targeted, moving from the literature as such 
towards particular issues with it. This is necessary as the contribution needs to relate 
not only to a very specialist domain of knowledge, but must also be embedded into 
larger frameworks of scholarly enquiries. As outlined, the starting point is the VoC 
literature in its broader meaning, not only those pieces written under this name. What 
this chapter is concerned with is the literature on comparative capitalisms. 
 
Firstly, I argue that the contributions to this literature have been offering outstanding 
insight into the workings of different models of capitalism, but that they tend to focus 
on the production side without integrating elements of its political governance of 
consumption. They hence tend to depict the role of the state as relating to the 
production sphere. This is not an issue in answering their research questions, but such 
a perspective is not well positioned to draw out a range of political aspects of 
capitalist diversity are. Second, I turn towards those scholars that present a richer 
understanding of the political by focussing on state activity in relation to capitalist 
variety. I claim that such accounts only partly solve the issue of further political 
insights. Indeed, what is still missing is an account that is context-dependent upon the 
social mechanisms of legitimation in relation to the individual, that goes beyond the 
state as a universal category per se. I argue that it is only when an ontology of the 
individual is presented that state intervention is understood in terms that allow for an 
alternative conception of varieties of capitalism as it allows a focus on varieties of the 
definition of the economic subject. The notion of individual-state relationship is 
crucial in this context. At the same time, these reflections prepare the ground for a 
discussion of the relevance of constructivist institutionalism in chapter four. 
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This chapter is organized according to the objectives it pursuits. In the next section, I 
start by reviewing the work of Hall and Soskice in 2001 that has led to the 
institutionalisation of the term „Varieties of Capitalism‟. However, it is important to 
have a look at earlier writings as the theme of comparing variants of economic 
organisation has been described well before the millennium, especially in relation to 
the way that they understand the political aspects of capitalist models. The third part 
then explores contributions that include the state and state activity into their model of 
analysis for the sake of assimilating additional political dimensions into their 
investigations. Even though the issue of the state is treated in more complex ways in 
these writings, they still present a conception of the state, and more importantly of the 
individual-state relationship, that does not allow for variations in the ways it deals 
with the constitutive element of all capitalist regimes: the individual itself as an 
economic agent. It is here where the constructivist literature comes in later on as it 
more closely analyses the relationship between political actors and the general public. 
To conclude, the chapter explains the implications of such an approach to the political 
nature of comparative capitalisms.  
2 Varieties of Capitalism, Precursors and Critiques 
The scholarly body of VoC offers the broader environment that the thesis is located 
into. As Hall and Soskice are seen by the majority of scholars to have presented the 
central text to the literature in 2001(Crouch et al. 2005; Hancké et al. 2007), I review 
their chapter first. Then the focus shifts towards earlier works on the topic before 
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engaging with the critiques to Hall and Soskice. Finally, the latest developments in 
the field are reported upon. Even though these sections present descriptive features, 
they do so for reasons that go beyond this literature. As developed above, this review 
is targeted as to introduce the gaps into which the subsequent chapters come in. As 
such, it focuses on the themes that this thesis is paying most attention to: the 
individual, the domain of the political, and consumption.  
 
Hall and Soskice‟s piece (2001, p.1) is the work that has most imprinted its approach 
onto the VoC discipline, and their edited book has launched a whole range of 
responses as noticed in the reference to the Social Science Citation Index (Streeck 
2010a, 57). Judging by the comments, their work is of extraordinary quality, or has at 
least been described as such. Indeed, some of the critics have been most eager to 
depict the chapter as a stellar contribution. Examples include Blyth who states that 
their work will become „canonical‟ (2003a, 203) in the current decade, and Watson 
who goes on to say that the authors have „pioneered‟ (2003, 227) the VoC approach. 
Other scholars who have referred to their findings have also been impressed, like 
Engelen et al. (2008) who see the whole of the VoC approach summarised in this one 
chapter. Similarly, Froud et al. (2007) consider Hall and Soskice as the „leaders‟ (p. 
341) of these studies. Howell uses the word „superb‟ to describe the chapter (Howell 
2003, p. 105). These references should not directly be taken to indicate the quality of 
the contribution, they are simply examples highlighting that this piece had a 
considerable influence the literature. 
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These accounts are certainly right in their claim that Hall and Soskice 2001 has 
transformed large parts of the comparative politics literature (Goodin 2003), also 
beyond the topics that they directly deal with. However, care is to be taken as their 
chapter would have been unable to be written down without the intellectual work 
from earlier scholars (Berger and Dore 1966; Goldthorpe 1985; Boyer and Drache 
1996; Kitschelt et al. 1999). The term „Varieties of Capitalism‟ is indeed not an 
invention of Hall and Soskice themselves but has been coined by Hodgson (1995, 
575). Moreover, although this is a matter of denominations (Jackson and Deeg 2008b), 
it seems to be an overly simplified effort to equate VoC with this single chapter, or 
with their specific type of approach. When using this term, I am referring to a wide 
body of literature at the centre of which I see the pieces reviewed here. Thatcher 
(2004, 753) adopts a very similar approach when referring to the traditional VoC 
authors. The central claims of this piece then can be summed in three steps (Soskice 
1999, 101; Hall 1999, 135; Hall and Soskice 2001, 1). 
 
First, firm behaviour is influenced by national institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001, 9). 
As there is considerable variation among institutions, corporate strategy varies 
accordingly (2001, 2). However, as institutions can be categorized into two groups, 
firms behave according to one of two logics. Thus there are also two types of 
economies, liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies 
(CMEs; 2001, 8). One underlying assumption is that economies, i.e. societies 
governed by various capitalist modes of organisation, are made up of institutions and 
firms. Second, different firm behaviour, conditioned by institutions, entails different 
comparative advantages for the economies they operate in (2001, 35). Hence, firm 
specialization in one area or another leads to the respective economies having 
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comparative advantages in one type of sectors or the other type (2001, 42; see also 
Lenway and Murtha 2004; Schneider and Paunescu 2012). Finally different nations, 
i.e. the firms in these countries, specialize in one field of industrial activity or the 
other. Consequently, the argument runs that LMEs are radically innovative, whereas 
CMEs are incrementally innovative (2001, 44; see also Ettlie et al. 1986). Third, 
institutions in an economy can be more or less complementary, meaning that they are 
mutually reinforcing each other (Hall and Soskice 2001, 27; Hall and Gingerich 2004; 
Hall and Thelen 2009, 254). This implies that economies with a coherent system of 
LME institutions and those with a coherent CME institutional setup do best in terms 
of economic growth. It also entails that institutions follow certain paths and are not 
subjected to change unless it originates from external shocks (Crouch 2005c, 167). 
 
As can be taken from this relatively short exposition, the central VoC piece does not 
include an analysis of the state, even if more or less close ties to „the state‟ are 
mentioned for some economies (Hall and Soskice 2001, 35). Maybe more importantly 
for the thesis, this account of capitalist diversity does not refer to the way in which the 
individual is embedded into such economic regimes. As described in the previous 
sections, the approach is more interested in the ways that firms behave and how that 
leads to international patterns of competition than with the political features of such 
findings. The distributional features of the world economy can come into focus, but 
not how the individual is perceived of as an economic agent (Hall and Soskice, 36). In 
general the analysis is more inclined towards the fashion in which national differences 
in corporate governance structures entail distributional consequences on the 
international level that towards an in-depth study with national economic models per 
se (Crouch et al. 2009). That is not to say that the approach is of no value, not at all, it 
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is only a comment pointing towards the partial investigation that VoC constitutes in 
relation to a topic as broad as that of economic regimes. 
 
As the firm is seen as the central departure into the study of capitalism (Whitley 2000), 
the investigation adopts a perspective more closely related to business approaches 
(Hancké 2010), but then moves into much wider domains of human activity when it 
makes claims about capitalist regimes in their totality. As such, it inevitably offers a 
limited understanding of how societies work, one that is exclusively focusing on how 
the productive sphere is influenced by institutional factors. It is clear that such a rather 
narrow horizon (Allen 2004) is unable to account for what the term „capitalism‟ is 
supposed to mean (Pontusson 2005, 164). At the same time, even though the literature 
talks about markets, the political features of the definition of such a notion are not 
addressed, hence leaving VoC to be an account of capitalist diversity that is little 
concerned either with the individual, nor with the political sphere and consumption 
issues. 
 
A look at scholars publishing earlier to Hall and Soskice adopt a similar point of view, 
even though less restricted. Indeed, such an exercise offers hints at how wider societal 
issues can be integrated into VoC. Shonfield (1965) already analyses different modes 
of capitalist organization back in a time when most Western observers were occupied 
with the communist regime. Porter (1990) publishes an extensive volume that reflects 
about the role of firm strategy in a world of international markets. It is significant that 
Porter gives consumers a significant role in the developments of growth paths as he 
gives consumers the ultimate say in what sells and what not (1990, 86). However, 
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such a move is not used as to analyse the individual in more depth and hence remains 
in line with the firm-approach similar to VoC. The French economist Albert compares 
the „Rhenan‟ and the „American‟ model of capitalism (Albert 1993, 16). He 
operationalises a very similar distinction to what Hall and Soskice come up a decade 
later. A distinctive asset of his work in relative to my research is that he integrates 
discussion about households, attitudes, culture and ethical choices (Albert 1993, 44, 
117, 142, 149 resp.) and thus presents a version of economic regimes that highlights 
their political elements.  Political as it integrates questions of the ideational 
construction of economic realities into the framework. Moreover, the focus is 
specifically on the relationship between agents and institutions, something that the 
thesis is keen to bring back into the debate together with a constructivist focus. Coates 
is another example of an account that offer political features. It is not so much the 
integration of the state than his concern with “sets of ideational attributes” (Coates 
2000, 122) that renders his analysis political in the sense that conceptions of the 
economic realities are not assumed to be identical between national social contexts. 
Again, these ideational bits are fallen back onto in the development of the framework 
suggested in chapters three and four. 
 
Whitley develops a „comparative-business-systems approach‟ (1999, 5) that can be 
linked to VoC. Speaking of „institutional structuring‟ (1999, 10) as context rather than 
as causal factor, he describes how firms behave in a way that allows for 
inconsistencies (1999, 24), hence breaking with the inherent functionalism of VoC.  
Indeed, the Hall and Soskice piece is much more static, even deterministic, in this 
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regard
4
. The institutional features investigated are "the state, the financial system, the 
skill development and control system, and the dominant conventions governing trust 
and authority relations" (1999, 47). In this sense, his analysis is broader than Hall and 
Soskice's, offers a more historical and political account, but also includes the state as 
an actor in the making of capitalist variety. These accounts demonstrate that other 
scholars have put forward more methodologies that bring out the political sides in 
capitalist diversity. Indeed, by including a wider range of variables such frameworks 
embed firm behaviour into a social context that is inevitably political. However, they 
are not outlining the political features of varieties of economic subjects in relation to 
the individual. 
  
In a similar line of thought, scholars have taken position for and against the Hall and 
Soskice piece by drawing attention to its benefits and weaker spots. Streeck for 
instance put forward a methodology that sees the evolution of economies as 
historically embedded and as inevitably political because socially embedded (Streeck 
1997; 33; Streeck 2001, 9; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 1; Streeck 2005, 364; Streeck 
2007, 543; Beckert and Streeck 2008; 10; see also Howell 2003, 110). Talking about 
the importance of economic culture (Streeck 1997, 39), he also points towards the 
relationship between institutions and agents as an interaction essential in 
understanding contemporary capitalisms. Also Thelen‟s notion of „political 
realignement‟ (2004) includes interest groups as driving change, political by 
definition. These accounts then focus on the distributional aspects of capitalist 
diversity. By analysing national entities under the point of view of actors, they raise 
                                                        
4
 A very similar critique could be addressed to this thesis. As I explain a bit later, what it is 
interested are the ways in which an ideal-typical economic agent is depicted, an effort that 
does not deny agential capacities. 
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the question of who get what, when, hence focus on the ways that the economic 
product is distributed among the different socio-economic groups. These studies then 
present a more, or at least differently, political version of comparative capitalisms as 
the Hall and Soskice piece, but they still do not challenge the assumption that the 
economic individual can potentially be different between units of observation i.e. 
types of economic regimes. 
 
Just as Streeck, Hollingsworth has been writing about models of capitalism well 
before 2001 (Hollingsworth in Crouch and Streeck 1997; see also Grahl and Teague 
2000). Together with Boyer, he coined the term of „social systems of production‟ 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, 1 and 19; see also Amable 2000) which involves a 
complex theoretical model with multiple levels of analysis, where  
It would be a serious mistake to downplay the importance of individuals and 
micro level analysis as we study institutions. (Hollingsworth 2000, 603) 
An important point here is that production systems cannot operate in isolation from 
the rest of the society (Hollingsworth and Boyer in Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, p. 
190), and that the individual can be investigated in relation to wider social influences. 
Hollingsworth illustrates this by reinforcing the Polanyian point that capitalism, or 
better certain types of individual-state relationships, might undermine the social 
institutions that are necessary for its very success (Hollingsworth 1997, 13; see also 
Watson 2005a, 152). In other words, economic activity is embedded into social 
relations a point that the thesis is setting forward and that more constructivist 
approaches also highlight (Beckert 1996; Swedberg 2003, xi). 
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This account then offers a potential starting point into a version of VoC that 
additional political features. What is important here is that the awareness of the 
individual being embedded into larger social contexts of meaning is central to the 
framework that is proposed in the next two chapters. Combined with an ontology of 
the individual that allows for variation in the ways that the economic agent is making 
sense of markets processes, such a starting point actually leads to what is suggested 
here: an individual (in ideal-typical terms) that can take on various forms as an 
economic agent, according to the social influences that act upon it. As such, my 
argument builds on from these readings of economic regimes. They contain elements 
of an exposition of political characteristics, but as they avoid theorising the individual 
in more detail, they remain partly blind to some of them. 
 
Crouch (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Crouch 2005b; Crouch 2005c, 167; Crouch et al. 
2005; Crouch et al. 2007) also offers an insightful point of departure that breaks with 
the firm-centred view (Herrmann 2008). 
(...) we need to deconstruct the wholes that contemporary institutionalism 
takes for granted and discover their constituent elements - elements which are 
able to survive in combination other than those thus identified. (Crouch 2005a, 
440) 
Indeed, one of the issues with the Hall and Soskice piece is that it externalises all 
other actors unrelated to the direct production process, hence taking them for granted. 
As such, it is unable to consider the individual-state relationship to a degree that 
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would add political features to the framework (Hay 2005). The thesis is then 
following Crouch‟s piece of advice by going beyond the current approaches and 
identifies elements other than those already identified, the individual here. Setting up 
an ontological basis that demonstrates why and how the inclusion of the individual 
into concerns of capitalist diversity not only enlarges the field but also sets out some 
more of its political features, is an attempt that the thesis engages in, theoretically first, 
then empirically through the case studies. 
 
In relation to these theoretical developments, Jackson and Deeg not only present a 
good overview (2006b; 2008b) but also put forward a more complex view that links 
institutions to their constitutive parts (Deeg and Jackson 2007, 681; Jackson and Deeg 
2008a; also see Hancké et al. 2007, 7; Hall and Thelen 2009, 8). In order to do so, 
they come back to notion of „embeddedness‟ of institutions (Granovetter 1985, p.481; 
Jackson and Deeg 2008a, p. 683, Blyth 2003b; Herrigel 2005) and favour an approach 
that considers economic themes as being part of larger societal evolutions that 
comprise agents (Hall and Thelen 2009, 10). Such an approach goes into the direction 
of integrating individuals as genuine agents into the analysis, just as the constructivist 
institutionalist literature does that as highlighted in chapter four only. More generally, 
various scholars now seem to be agreeing on an actor-centred methodology that some 
scholars have advocated some time ago (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Dore 1997, 28; 
Hollingsworth 2000, 625; Wood 2001, 266; Crouch 2005b, 23; Streeck and Thelen 
2005, 11; Crouch et al 2007, 527; Soskice 2007, 90; Whitley 2007, 549). However, I 
argue that such theoretical advancements have stayed at that stage without translating 
into an appropriate framework when it comes to analysing models of capitalist 
societies. Whereas they make the case for integrating the individual, they do not relate 
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to individual-state relationships, nor are they presenting arguments from social 
theoretical or constructivist approaches that deal with the deep ontological issues of 
such attempts. Again, the thesis builds upon these reflections, providing VoC with the 
basis for a perspective that sees varieties in the definition of the individual as political. 
As such, it complements the literature instead of running counter to it. 
 
This review of the wider literature has so far demonstrated that even though there are 
many appealing features with the Hall and Soskice‟s chapter (2001), their 
contribution should be taken with care for a series of reasons. First, the focus on firms 
leads to an account that does not take into account more general variables relating to 
the wider societal context, especially those that relate to the individual as a consumer. 
Second, their approach is exclusively interested in the production sphere without 
mentioning concerns with consumption (Carrier and McC Heyman 1997). Third, their 
perspective tends not to focus on the concrete relationship between the individual and 
state policy as part of a particular mode of society (Streeck 2012, 17). Consequently, 
it offers a picture of the variations within capitalism that is very developed as far as 
the firm goes, but that offers less insight into the political features of capitalist variety. 
The introduction of the individual is then one way to add a stronger focus on the 
political that goes beyond the politics of distribution.  
 
This is particularly important in relation to the understandings of institutions and 
economic agency. As institutions are seen as independent of actors, the concrete links 
between the two are not explored (Dugger 1995). At the same time, a notion agency is 
operationalised that is solely concerned with the maximising principles without 
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asking what is to be maximised (Hay 2005). As such, it presents a rather technical 
explanation as opposed to one that depicts the political features of varieties of 
capitalism. This is unsatisfactory when economic processes are related to the wider 
society, and to differential understandings of what the latter is supposed to be. Indeed, 
such an understanding can not only be found in firm strategy but also in everyday life. 
 (...) the way we include obligation and enforcement into our concept of 
institution, we can explicitly provide for a significant amount of 'play' in the 
rules actors are expected to follow, and thus for the possibility that 
institutional change may be generated as a result of the normal, everyday 
implementation and enactment of an institution. (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 11; 
original emphasis; see also Mayntz 2006, 394) 
 
Even though some of the contributions presented here critique the literature and offer 
additional features of the political in the literature, they tend not to go as far as 
examining the potentially different understandings of economic agency per se. 
Whereas Boyer and Hollingsworth move beyond the sole focus of production 
(Whitley 1999, 16), and that other scholars have put forward models of analysis that 
take into account the social embeddedness of the economic sphere, there still exists a 
gap to bring the individual into the study of comparative capitalism through an 
ontological study. I argue that such an effort is a method that opens the subject to a 
different political reading as it takes the potential varieties of economic agency as the 
starting point to showcase how alternative conceptions have been marginalised. As 
the notions of institutions and agency become open to variability, they are infusing 
the very concept of variety with political weight. Indeed, starting from the individual 
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entails an approach that is deeply interested in the exact meaning of economic 
processes and their interpretation by official bodies. 
3 Attempts to Bring the State and Politics Back In 
The most common way to offer a more political focus into the analytical toolkit when 
it comes to comparative capitalisms have been efforts at „bringing the state back in‟ 
(Schmidt 2009b; see also Skocpol 1979; Evans et al. 1985). This has been done 
through various methods as is presented in this section. At the same time however, 
they also highlight how such theoretical advances have not gone far enough for the 
main reason that they tend to replicate similar points of departure than those critiqued 
beforehand. Simply adding the state (as an institution and as a set of policies) to the 
existing frameworks does not bring out additional political features per se. Focussing 
on the state as a universal concept instead of as a relationship that centrally involves 
the individual as an economic agent (Elias 2010, 606), they tend to have difficulties in 
moving away from established approaches in the sense that they do not engage in 
micro-level analysis as more sociological approaches do. It is true that the state 
represents the cornerstone of politics at the national level, but only adding it to a 
methodology does not fully explore the political issues in comparative capitalisms as 
the state is regarded per se, without being further analysed. Again, what such a 
rationale underlines are the distributional consequences of state intervention, but they 
do not challenge the assumption that the very definition of the individual as an 
economic agent allows for variety. It is in this sense that such contributions still 
present a picture of capitalist diversity that does not present some of the central 
political issues in varieties of capitalism. I claim that it is only when the ontological 
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foundations are set up in relation to the individual that the political aspects of models 
of capitalism can be started to be presented more fully.  
 
One way to include the state into capitalist variety is by identifying one variant where 
the state as an institution and as a set of policies is considerably more developed than 
in the others, hence differentiating between regimes where the state has a considerable 
function in the economic management and those where that is not the case (Schmidt 
2002b, Jackson and Deeg 2008a). The classical case here is the observation that in the 
French regime, the state plays a much bigger role in coordinating the economic sphere 
as is the case for other setups (Carney 2006; Clift 2007). My concerns with such a line 
of action are double. First, even though it looks more closely at actors internal to the 
state, the analysis stays at an institutional level in the sense that actors are seen as 
being of a collective nature. The investigation is not concerned with the definition of 
the individual, or the self, as such. Second, and more importantly, depicting the state 
as essential in some forms of economic regimes and not others does not demonstrate 
why it is a relevant unit of analysis altogether, it might actually serve as much to 
demonstrate that it is not worth of investigations. Indeed scholars render the 
significance of the state dependent on very particular configurations and cases, and 
hence deny its importance in absolute terms (Palier and Thelen 2010, 123). For all the 
other cases, the state is seen as not important. As such, such a strategy is not forceful 
in bringing the state back in, nor in depicting the politics of the state. Indeed, the 
political features only relate to the distribution of power in a specific context of 
governance structures (Goyer 2006).  
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In other words, the state is not seen as ontologically constitutive of the political 
regime, it is not a variable to take into account independent of state action. As such, 
these scholars focus on the outcomes of the state much more than upon its very nature 
(Loriaux 2003) which matches with their focus on distributional issues. The state acts 
upon other institutions, influencing the latter to change their decisions, just as in the 
case of the firm-focus in VoC. The linkages between the state and firms are 
exemplary here. But because this strand of literature does not take into account the 
relationship between state action and the individuad, it does not ground the relevance 
of the state into an ontological precursor. The state matters for its own sake, not for 
how it facilitates certain ways of making sense of economic processes. Again, the 
underlying focus on production and not on private end consumption pushes such 
analyses to avoid confrontations with policy effects that go beyond their institutional 
impact (Patalano 2007). 
 
As a complement to such attempts now stand calls that highlight the importance of 
fully internalising state behaviour into an analysis of models of capitalism, 
independently of the concrete outcomes per se (Martin 2005, 53). Such claims are 
seen as strategies to add political content to the literature and present various reasons 
for such an endeavour. For some scholars, the structure of states influences firms, 
either through policy-making (Martin 2005) or through particular types of regulation 
(Regini 2003). Others conclude that the world economy cannot meaningfully be 
explained in empirical terms when no state component is included (Watson 2003). 
Even though these stances are valid on their own terms (Levi-Faur 2006, 367), they 
tend to reiterate the context-independent methodology of VoC when it comes to 
studying national forms of capitalist organisation. Indeed, the main issue is that they 
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assume a static definition of the state that does not look at the concrete processes that 
underlie national models of capitalism (Jackson and Deeg 2008a, 699). States are 
regarded as meta-social entities whose meaning and roles are stable in space and over 
time, hence that do not allow for variety in how they relate to the individual. 
 
Indeed, the statements refer to the state as a notion that is equally applicable to the 
political apparatus in all countries, at least those with a capitalist economy. As such, 
they do not acknowledge the historical formation of state apparati and different 
national traditions (Clift 2012, 8). The literature in state capacity is insightful in his 
regard. 
State action is also a deciding factor in explaining the different trajectories of 
change of otherwise seemingly similar types of national models. (…) compare 
Denmark and Germany (…) which nevertheless followed markedly dissimilar 
paths of change since the early 1990s. This is attributed largely to the differing 
roles of the state. In Denmark, a large state (…) provides state actors with both 
an incentive and the capacity to sustain macro-level corporatist bargaining. 
Public sector workers find a strategic political ally among low wage workers 
and together are powerful enough to induce workers and employers in the 
export sectors to sustain national bargaining. (…) In Germany, a much smaller 
state with less capacity could not sustain macro-level corporatism under 
similar conditions, and German firms maintain institutions of coordinated 
capitalism mostly for the manufacturing sector. (Jackson and Deeg 2008a, 
699-700) 
However, it might be overly hasty to hold up such the assumption of the universal 
concept of the state without further looking in more detail into the potentially 
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different constitutions of states in relation to the economic subject. Such analyses tend 
to make theoretical statements about state behaviour with universal validity that 
follow from empirical observations that are necessary context-specific. In the quoted 
section, the Danish and German states are taken to be of the same nature, but to act in 
different ways. The political features are then related to the distribution of power that 
policies have among other actors. However, what is not investigated is the more 
concrete understanding of the state in terms of the conceptions held about what it is to 
be and to produce in the first place. As such, they do not take into account the 
potential variety that exists in the ways that state action influences not only 
institutions but also how individuals and policy-makers make sense of the very 
economic regime (Gamble and Kelly 2000, 33-4; Lehmbruch 2001, 80). 
 
At the same time, another issue with such arguments is that they are unable to set out 
the state as an entity that is worth of studying for ontological reasons. Starting from 
empirical cases and then universalising the key findings, they repeat the method of 
those scholars that see the state as only crucial in certain settings (Bevir et al. 2003). 
Indeed, unless a method is operationalised that makes theoretical arguments that 
depart from a universal basis and only then moves over to the empirical case studies is 
able to circumvent criticisms that the findings are context-dependent. Otherwise, the 
claims still only reflect those cases studied and are unconvincing in putting forward 
an argument for the ontological significance of the state under all conditions. In other 
words, before studying the state as a legislator, its significance needs to be proven 
with causally prior concepts. That is not to say that the context is not important, 
actually quite the opposite is true as becomes obvious in the next chapters. At this 
point, the argument is only about the chronological order in which certain statements 
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need to be made in order to come to an alternatively political reading of capitalist 
variety (Hansen 2008, 5). That is why the thesis starts with the individual and only 
then introduces the state as a secondary unit of analysis, logically following from the 
first. The thesis claims that the political features of capitalist variety that go beyong 
the distributional implications of state policy lay in the very differences of how the 
individual is integrated in relation to state policies. These political characteristics then 
lay anterior to the state per se. 
 
In other words, the comments reviewed here are welcome critiques of the literature, 
but they do not provide advanced accounts of the political domains of capitalist 
variety. Even though new advances are being made in exploring the links between 
states and individuals (Hay and Gofas 2009), they still see the state as a legitimate 
object of study per se, not so much because of its relationships that it entertains with 
the individual. They hence still see the state as a concept that is prior to the individual, 
not vice versa (Alber 1988). The analysis is unable to refer to elements higher up the 
causality chain that would explain the relevance of the state in such terms. I argue that 
it is necessary to introduce such ontologically prior elements upon which a deeper 
reason and way is found to integrate the state into the study of comparative 
capitalisms. As such, the state does not matter for the sake of itself, but due to the way 
that it interacts with the individual, that is also why the concept of individual-state 
relationship is central to the thesis. The presentation of an open-ended ontology of the 
individual is the cause for why the state is a relevant unit of analysis. Indeed, what is 
fundamental is not the state per se, but the individual-state relationship, the latter 
entailing a distinctively political understanding of differences in the setup of socio-
economic regimes, and of economic subjectivities themselves. 
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In relation to this, several scholars have started to explore promising theoretical routes 
that highlight the deeply political relevance of the state as an actor in society and 
hence in the economic domain. If modern markets are best made sense of as complex 
loci at the interplay of firms, states and individuals (Fligstein 2001), then the reasons 
for why the state matters must be found in elements that are ontologically prior to 
states as historically specific constructions (Woll 2008, 10). The state not only matters 
for what it does in material terms of institutional regulation, but also for how a 
particular rationale for state intervention facilitates particular understandings of the 
individual self in a specific state-market setting (Rose 1999). If the economy is 
always dependent on state guidance as markets are creations of states (Lutter 2011), 
then states matter beyond their institutional impact. These theoretical reflections are 
better able to bring back in not only the state, but also the political features of 
capitalist diversity. Once states and markets are not seen as separate or acting upon 
each other, but as ontologically much more intertwined, state action becomes 
constitutive of market mechanisms. The notion of „market-making‟ is of value here 
(Clift 2012). At this point, it is only a matter of presenting an open-ended ontology of 
the individual to show how state policies can potentially define economic agency in 
various ways, marginalising alternative conceptions and hence acting deeply 
politically. 
 
Indeed, the statements that states act upon markets should not only be taken on the 
institutional level where firms adopt their behaviour in relation to state policies, but 
also at a more constitutive one. The very notion of market only makes sense when the 
underlying economic actors are taken into account, meaning individual agents. But it 
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also means that markets, and economic realities more generally, cannot be taken to be 
exactly the same in different socio-economic environments, as state mechanisms are 
essential in the very definition of a particular type of economic individual. The state, 
the market and the individual are all social constructs that act inside the same 
meaningful context, and as such the depictions of state policies in relation to all three 
notions become open to variability. Again, it becomes obvious how a constructivist 
account starts to come together here. Such variety then is interpreted in political terms 
as in facilitating certain readings of the interconnections of the individual, state 
policies necessarily reject the legitimacy of all alternative conceptions that are 
possible to imagine, or even possible to observe in different contexts. This is why the 
thesis is comparative in nature, as this method sheds light into the alternatives as to 
how to make sense of the economic agent and the market.  
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the perspectives that serve as a basis for the 
framework developed in the next two chapters borrow elements from outside the VoC 
literature. As such the follow classical political economists and contemporary 
economic sociologists. Against a „productionist bias which pervades most of social 
science‟ (Campbell 1987, 7), both offer a picture of capitalist relations that is 
concerned with the individual and consumption issues. Just as outlined by Thorstein 
Veblen, I regard market economies as historically specific constructions that are 
related to the prevalent ideas at a certain point in time (Swedberg 2003, 104). He was 
for instance interested in the ways that the individuals play their role in the economy, 
as a potential entrepreneurs (Veblen 1904) and as a consumers (Veblen 1899) alike. 
This thesis still considers the economy, and hence a particular variety of capitalism, as 
being embedded into a larger type of society (Zafirovski 2000; Beckert 2007), and 
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that the production and consumption side are two aspects of economic life that need 
to be studied in parallel. I argue that an approach starting from the individual and 
investigating social relations, in this case those between the state and the individual as 
far as housing and mortgage markets are concerned, leads to a complementary way of 
how the political aspects of examinations of various forms of socio-economic regimes 
can be brought out more distinctively. 
 
Indeed, building on from theoretical reflections offers a starting point that allows for 
variations in its very core, hence offering a unique point of departure that still 
accommodates for variety. Such an approach is then able to deal with the 
particularities of the case studies that are presented later on in the empirical chapters. 
A focus on individual-state relationship is also a way to integrate a large field of 
potential topics of political economy, might they be more closely related to the 
production or the consumption side. As the thesis wants to demonstrate how concerns 
with the latter can also be seen as part of the debate on capitalist variety, it chooses 
case studies that underline such a contribution to the current literature. The empirical 
analyses of state interventions in the British and German housing and mortgage 
markets are examples of how a focus on individual-state relationships is applicable to 
consumer markets that have become essential under capitalist developments. At the 
same time, they are showcases how such an approach entails a move away from 
production issues towards concerns with how the individual is embedded into a larger 
context of markets which he/she daily interacts with (Martin 2002). 
 
Crucially, such a perspective puts the individual-state relationship at the very centre 
of it intellectual endeavours, which adds political aspects to the debate on capitalist 
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models to a degree that surpasses the contemporary discussions. Indeed, bringing in 
the individual into the study of politics is what is really novel here, a novelty that 
enlarges the notion of varieties to the very definition of the economic subject, to 
varieties of subjectivities, complementing varieties of capitalisms understood in 
institutional terms. The political nature of capitalist diversity then not only lays in its 
distributional effects, but also in its constitutive elements, hence the conception of the 
individual and the market themselves. What then comes to the forefront in the cases 
studies are the ways of which the individual makes sense of economic processes in 
relation to a specific conception of the market and the state, as an institution and a set 
of policies. 
 
This section has thus demonstrated how attempts to offer additional political features 
to the analytical frameworks to study capitalist variety have been endeavours that 
point into the right direction, but that have difficulties to break with the VoC 
background in a way as to set out a qualitatively different approach. The literature that 
this thesis then addresses is not merely the one dealing with the variants of socio-
economic organisation, but more specifically the contributions that have already been 
made to add a political dimension to this body of knowledge that goes beyond the 
political as understood in distributional terms. The central contribution lies with the 
presentation of an alternative point of departure into the study, one that sees political 
features not merely as an addition to economic processes and various modes of 
governance, but that locates the very notion of the political in the potential varied 
rationales according to which capitalist societies can come together. The domain of 
the political is hence not limited to the characteristics of the state and its institutional 
output, but needs to be located in the interaction between the individual and the state. 
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To use Schmidt‟s words (Schmidt 2009b), the thesis is not an exercise in how to bring 
the state back in, but to move beyond it by locating its ontological basis in the 
variability of the human mind and hence to bring politics back in.  
4 Conclusion: Towards a Differently Political Account of VoC 
As explained beforehand, the main objective of the thesis is to introduce a different 
political reading into VoC and the wider literature on comparative capitalisms. 
Building on from the scholars who are attempting to introduce the state into these 
endeavours, this piece only sees the state as a unit of secondary importance, in the 
literal meaning of the terms. In other words, the state is not worthwhile of analysis 
just because it is often seen as the cornerstone of politics, but because of the 
constitutive relationship it nurtures with the individual. As such, the investigation here 
goes beyond the state as a universal concept and locates the political domain in 
elements ontologically prior to the state. The modern state must be taken as a 
historically specific construction (Bonney 1995), one that is embedded into larger 
meanings about the individual, the market and the legitimation of the state itself. Such 
a perspective (Jackson 2006) allows to deconstruct the concept of the state into an 
institution that is in a relationship with the individual.  
 
It is this opening towards potential variability not only of institutional features as the 
VoC literature so successfully demonstrates but of the concrete individual-state 
relationship that introduces deeply political features into the ways state policies act in 
relation to the economic regime. As the facilitation efforts of some conception of the 
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individual always come with elements that legitimate the latter and delegitimizes 
others, state policy must be seen as political, as adopting some assumptions of good 
economic life over others. These efforts are tracked down through an investigation of 
parliamentary debates that showcase the narratives of legitimation and delegitimation 
that were present in relation to the British and German homeowner/mortgager (1997-
2007). After a discussion of various types of state discourse in chapter four, the 
implied meanings of state policies in relation to housing and mortgaging are analysed 
empirically. 
 
What then becomes of prime interest is the triangular relationship between the 
individual, the state, and the market as well as other economic mechanisms. It is 
hence not merely that the state is added onto an existing framework, but the state 
plays a central role in the understanding of the economic agency and of the economy 
more generally. Such an approach follows from perspectives that integrate societal 
variables into the study of comparative capitalisms and hence refute their distinction 
into separate fields of enquiry (Zafirovski 2002, 2). At the same time however, it does 
not fall into anecdotic story-telling whose character is limited to a very particular 
context (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). The aim is not to follow a certain individual 
and relate back how he/she makes sense of economic processes but to track down the 
ways in which the individual as such is depicted in relation to the latter by official 
authorities. Again, the individual here is understood as a theoretical category then, not 
as a specific person. 
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Once such a point of departure is chosen, it leads to consumption issues in a way that 
the VoC contributions are unable to engage with. It breaks with the productionist bias 
(Hancké et al. 2007, 7) and opens up towards issues of how the individual is made 
sense of, as a consumer of housing and of mortgages for instance. Such a break from 
VoC then allows to complement this literature with an alternative framework, one that 
is not focussing onto the firm. Instead it provides a toolkit for investigating the 
individual, its relationship with the state, and concerns with markets from a point of 
view that is supplementary to the literatures mentioned. In this sense, the notion of 
„markets as politics‟ applies to this thesis (Fligstein 2001, 98; see also Zelizer 1983; 
Stehr 2008). The thesis makes a contribution to the literature that sheds a different 
light onto comparative capitalisms and its political nature. 
 
In relation to the concept of institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
17; Hall and Gingerich 2004; Palier and Thelen 2010), the thesis introduces the 
concept of micro-macro complementarities. Such a notion reflects the focus on the 
relationships between the two levels of analysis. It points towards the theoretical 
observation, later demonstrated empirically through the case studies, that consumer 
markets require the constitution of particular types of market agents that match with 
the conceptions of this market more broadly. In other words, the conceptions held 
about the individual match with those about markets, as the former are constitutive 
parts of the latter. This is not a finding in itself but follows logically from the 
theoretical framework set out in this chapter and refined in the subsequent parts. What 
it highlights however is how the individual must be seen as a constitutive part of the 
market, and how state actors frame both in a way that is consistent, at least at the first 
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glance. This notion is referred back to when the form and content of policy initiatives 
are discussed in chapter four.  
 
To conclude, this chapter has explored the vibrant VoC literature, starting from its 
most influential text. It has shed light into various perspectives on a range of issues 
that are relevant for the research that I am engaging with, most centrally how the 
literature has performed in regard to provide a political account of capitalist diversity 
that goes beyond the distributional features of various economic models of capitalism. 
At the same time, it has also shows how this study fits into a distinct lineage of 
reflections and how it builds on the current state of knowledge, even though it goes 
beyond it. Apart from the theoretical contributions, the thesis also offers a great 
amount of empirical insight into the case studies. So even though the prime rationale 
is to lay bare a novel methodology of how to study capitalist diversity, the empirical 
chapters also present arguments that are valid as contributions on their own right. 
However, before going over to the empirical parts, the next two chapters lay the 
foundations. Building on from the incomplete treatment of the political features of 
models of capitalism, they present an ontological basis that explains how and why the 
individual and the state alike can be seen as constitutive of the variability, and hence 
the political nature, of capitalist types of socio-economic organisation.  
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Chapter 3: Why the Individual and the State? The Politics of Naïve 
Theories 
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1  Introduction 
The previous chapter has outlined how accounts in the comparative capitalisms 
literature offer an exposition of the political nature of these regimes that is centred on 
distributional issues. Indeed, it has pointed to their relative failure to adequately 
define the state in relation to the individual and vice versa, and hence does not allow 
for variety in how economic agency and markets are understood in separate socio-
economic settings. The firm-centred focus of VoC depicts economic regimes as 
technical sets of productionist relations without investigating the individual-state 
relationship in more detail. I have argued that it hence misses out upon certain deeply 
political characteristics of capitalist types of organisation, located at the individual 
level (Hay and Lister 2006, 10). This chapter then takes on the described weaknesses 
and goes back to the fundamental questions of societal processes in order to position 
the individual into a context of sense-making that allows for variability in 
interpretative schemes in relation to the lived environment. As such, it follows 
constructivist lines of thought as set out in academic texts that are located outside the 
domain of comparative capitalisms. As such, the thesis introduces the definition of 
economic agency per se as a political issue by falling back onto concepts from 
sociology and social psychology. These help set up an ontology (Hay 2002, 61; Hay 
2007) of the individual upon which an alternative understanding of economic 
regimes are established here and in the next chapter. Whereas this part makes the 
claims for why the individual matters, the next one relates such a finding to the 
constructivist institutionalist literature to set out how various forms of the state, or 
polities, entail different political features for the individual-state relationship 
(Herrigel 2005, 560; Hay 2006). 
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Only if the individual is approached through a rethinking of his/her position in 
relation to institutions, hence through an understanding of micro and macro elements 
(Marchart 2003, 81), is it possible to come to a rationale that includes the definition 
of economic subjectivity into the analytical realm. It is by positioning the individual 
inside varieties of capitalist regimes that the thesis provides a broader picture that 
includes additional political features that go beyond those of distributional issues 
(Zizek 1991, 193). This becomes apparent in the subsequent chapter when the 
institution of the state and variants of state structuring are laid out. At the same time 
the case studies in chapters five to eight (and the two annexes) offer empirical 
demonstrations of the claim made here. In this sense, chapters three and four form 
the framework of the thesis, with chapter two having explored the literature in 
relation to which the argument is taking a stance.  
 
I claim that because of the firm- and production-centred perspective on economic 
regimes, comparative political economists have not approached housing and 
mortgage markets until recent years (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008 are an exception 
here). For most of the time, these issues have been considered to be research domains 
outside the domain of VoC. Even though scholars have offered valuable attempts to 
address these topics (Blyth 2008; Broome 2008; Schwartz 2008; Sofus Tranoy 2008; 
Crouch 2009; Hay 2009; Watson 2009b), they have not yet sketched out a coherent 
framework that integrates the individual into these economic processes. The 
arguments proclaim the possibility for the state to act upon financial agency, also as 
far as housing is regarded (Robertson 2006; Langley 2008; Ronald and Nakano 
2012), but they have so far not explained why such intervention is possible in 
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theoretical and ontological terms. I hence argue that this chapter has the potential to 
put forward a scheme of investigatory methods that can depict additional political 
processes of capitalist diversity, especially as regards housing and mortgage markets.  
 
What is at stake here is not only the individual and various conceptions of economic 
agency, but also the concept of economic rationality in terms of its heuristic value 
and the positioning of its limits. Once economic agency is subject to variability, the 
universal nature of economic behaviour in the form of „rationality‟ is rejected 
(Zafirovski 2000, see also Bourdieu quote in chapter one), the thesis goes on to offer 
a revisited i.e. extended notion that is called „axio-rationality‟ as it essentially 
embeds the way of how people behave into a set of larger issues of social meaning 
upon which it is contingent (Boudon 2002, 22). However, before doing so, an 
ontology of the individual and its social relationships with his human and 
institutionalised environment, i.e. the state as an institution and a set of policies, need 
to be sketched out in order to visualise the introduced concept in a coherent way. As 
developed in the previous chapter, the intrinsic issues with the comparative 
capitalisms literature lay in how it envisages the individual. As described, the thesis 
then follows classical political economists in the conviction that an investigation into 
economic matters always presupposes wider interests, with the individual and society 
(Veblen 1904; Aspromourgos 2011, 83). However, the texts referred to here are 
taken from the constructivist strand. 
 
By “starting at the start”, hence the ontology, and not with the state already, this 
chapter lays out an alternative understanding of human behaviour, later exemplified 
when it comes to housing and mortgages. It is a perspective that regards economic 
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behaviour and rationality as contingent upon a wider societal context of ways to 
understand i.e. make sense of the economy (Bieler and Morton 2008, 110). An open-
ended perspective of human rationality then gives explanatory capacity to factors that 
are usually taken out of the study of economic relations. This is hence a shift away 
from the firm-centred approaches towards the study of individual-state relationships 
in the context of consumer markets. By digging into the economic subject/self not 
only are additional elements of capitalist variety highlighted, but so is the inherently 
political i.e. exclusionary nature of variations of human schemes of interpretation 
(Hansen 2008, 5). 
 
This chapter starts to draw out the political aspects of models of capitalism from the 
bottom up as it focuses on the ontological priority of the individual. In the 
subsequent chapter, the argument moves forward into this direction. As outlined, the 
thesis attempts to bring the political back in, although not immediately through an 
integration of the state as such (Phillips 2005, 90; Weiss 2005; Schmidt 2008b), but 
by firstly questioning the understanding of the individual and its political constitution 
(Watson 2005a, 31). The state is considered (in section four) because its importance 
arises from the ontology laid out in section two and the notion of axio-rationality 
developed in part three here. Its relevance is intrinsic to the model of explanation 
brought forward and does not only constitute an add-on to explanatory framework of 
capitalist variety as some contributions to the comparative capitalisms literature tend 
to do (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). Hence the centrality of the individual and of 
the political is the cause for the integration of the state and not the other way round. 
The thesis claims that such a view is able to make a stronger case for an analysis of 
state intervention than the current VoC critiques tend to do (Jessop 2010).  
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This chapter unfolds in five sections. After the introduction here, part two examines 
the human nature of the individual and the constructed features of collective life 
through a constructivist lens. The openness of the human mind is pointed at, as is its 
need for structures of moral interpretation. Section three goes on to integrate those 
structures into the concept of economic rationality, which brings up the notion of 
axio-rationality as well as those of means and ends. Fourthly, the relevance of state 
activity is explained by the ability of state policies to act upon those interpretative 
frameworks. The politics of such involvement is shed light into as well. Finally, the 
conclusion recapitulates the argument and bridges towards the next chapter that deals 
with different types of state-individual relationships. 
2 An ontology: The Indeterminate Mind 
The opening of the human mind to different sets of naïve theories provides a critique 
of economistic (Higgott 1999, 26; de Goede 2003, 80), hence limited, conception of 
agency. As the VoC literature is unable to present a theory of the individual, this is 
where this framework comes in (Hay 2005). I then argue that not only does such an 
understanding narrow the view of what to integrate into debates about differential 
socio-economic modes of capitalist organisation, but also that it is the cause for two 
further interlinked flaws, first a conception of rationality that artificially extracts the 
economic from its social environment (Zafirovski 2000, 186) and second, a 
conception of the political that is limited to distribution issues. However that is not to 
say that the individual is the wrong point of departure (Boudon 2002, 12 and 2003, 
394), it only means that an alternative, more open ontology needs to be put in place. 
 
 
73 
 
 
Because the treatment of the individual is so central to the argument that is put 
forward in the thesis, I start by outlining an ontology that puts the individual, and 
subsequently the state, back into the study of economic regimes (Watson 2007). By 
doing do, the social and the political are connected to the economic (Beckert and 
Streeck 2008). Sociological elements and insights from social psychology are taken 
as points of departure to investigate the nature of the human mind, as well as 
variations in moral frames of meaning and collective behaviour, hence politics 
(Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999). The argument develops through five stages: the 
Indeterminate Mind; human sociality; interaction and naïve theories; the normativity 
of collective life; and politics as exclusion. By engraining politics into everyday 
meaning of the economy, and enabling for varieties of interpretation of good i.e. 
appropriate economic behaviour, the thesis shows how variation in the definition of 
economic subjectivities is produced and reproduced, and how such variety is political. 
 
The starting point in this endeavour is best summed up with Vico‟s words. 
 (…) I propose here the following axioms (…) By its nature, the human mind 
is indeterminate. (Vico 1744, 75, original emphasis) 
At the start of the 18
th
 century, the philosopher Vico claims that the human mind is 
indeterminate (1). Together with his „verum esse ipsum factum‟ (“the true itself is 
made; Von Glasersfeld 1997, 75), he expresses the idea that the truth, or what people 
take as truth is „made‟. By stating that the mind is indeterminate, he takes distance 
from any materialist stance that the human body, and with it the human mind, are 
predetermining factors in the way that our species can interact with each other and 
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with the environment. Current scholars interested in the distinction between material 
and ideational domains adopt a very similar attitude to Vico (Sorsensen 2008, 7; 
Cartesen 2010, 849). Theoretically speaking, he posits that the human being as such 
is an unfinished product, it always in the making (Butler 2000, 12; Bröckling 2007, 
19), that it can adapt to various social circumstances and that its existence involves a 
process of acquiring a mode of how to make sense of its own situation (Béland 
2008).  
 
More than two-hundred years later, Berger and Luckmann claim that even though the 
materiality of the human constituency is a limiting factor in what the individual can 
do and be, it cannot be seen as strictly determining the way by which the human 
mind makes sense of the collected experiences, present and past (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). All constructivist theory must by definition start with the 
assumption that varieties of interpretations exist. Some political economists have 
fallen back onto Braudel to make this point about the elasticity and indeterminacy of 
human life (Germain 1996). Indeed, the whole idea is not only that reality is 
constructed (Guzzini 2000), but also that it can be constructed in different ways, at 
least two. In order for this to be possible, a necessary condition is the indeterminacy, 
plasticity (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 66) of the human mind, as construction takes 
place in the mind (Grafstein 1997, 1042), as opposed to the material world imposing 
itself on it. In other words, constructivism and its extension in terms of varieties of 
conceptions of the lived environment, in time and space (Watson 2005a, 18; 
Bröckling 2007, 31), can only exist once the material determinacy of the human 
mind is rejected. In this sense, constructivism is anti-essentialist (Alker 1990, 163; 
Schmidt 2001b, 140). This affirmation about the individual forms the core of 
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constructivist thought (Sterling-Folker 2000, 98), and is the point of departure by 
which this thesis is approaching the issue of comparative capitalisms and differential 
logics in housing and mortgage markets. Indeed, if there is no naturally given way to 
consider or make sense of these two domains, then varieties in their constitution 
itself are possible, and political. That is not to say that differences are necessarily 
observed, it just puts forward the mere possibility of varieties of housing regimes. 
 
By doing so, this perspective pulls together two distinct areas of investigation in 
order to bring out the deeply political character of the individual itself, more 
precisely of the conception of the individual. This might seem as a long warm-up to 
the final argument, but it is crucial to point out that, in my view, varieties of 
capitalism are only possible because varieties of constructed realties are possible. 
Previously, I have criticised the literature for not clearly discussing its ontological 
position of the individual and claimed that this then filters through the firm-centred 
approach that follows. Against this approach, I foreclose that this thesis can only be 
fully appreciated if the reader shares its ontological position, even if this might only 
be for the time he/she deals with the chapters presented here.  
 
On the one hand, taken individually, the human mind is indeterminate; on the other 
side it also seeks the contact with other human beings. Social psychology is littered 
with examples and experiments showing that the human individual, at the stage of 
birth or in adulthood, is profoundly affected by the people surrounding him/her 
(Hogg and Cooper 2003). Human affection and recognition is one of the ultimate 
drivers of action. In sociology, Durckheim‟s Suicide shows that people across 
cultures with very few ties to peers are much more likely to put an end to their 
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existence than those in company (Durckheim 1989). The ethnomethodological 
approach displays that people rely on collective schemes of interpretation in their 
everyday life, and that „breaching‟ those patterns of commonly shared patterns of 
sense-making is profoundly disturbing to them (Garfinkel 1984; Pollner, 1974; 
Odysseos 2002, 374; Rasmussen 2008, 178
5
). In short, sociality, the tendency for the 
human being to form into groups or communities, is a factor that is universal (2) (in 
contrast to the exact setup of the human mind; Rakoff, 1977, 90; Ashley1983, 477; 
Ruggie 1998, 857; Brito 2008, 54; Langley 2010, 73). Most theories attribute 
sociality to the presence of uncertainty, or even insecurity in the environment of the 
individual (Bates et al. 1998, 14). Housing and mortgages are domains among the 
many arenas in modern economic regimes characterised by uncertainty in the way 
that people cannot make sense of them in an easy and straightforward way. 
 
From (1) it can be redefined that there is no predetermined guide for action, and not 
for the interpretation of the external world. In a universe of open possibilities with no 
given criteria of evaluation, the degree of uncertainty is maximal (Trope and Gaunt 
2003, 191). On the one hand, the future is open; on the other hand it is this very 
indeterminacy that is hindering any initiative to act as all alternatives seem of the 
same value. An indeterminate mind is thus inclined to set up categories in order to 
structure the interpretation of the lived environment (Tajfel 2010). In other words, 
openness and closeness are the two sides of the same coin (Butler 2000, 23). 
                                                        
5
 Even though the focus on ethnomethodology is not further developed throughout the thesis, 
it is mentioned here as it shows how a constructivist approaches brings up the questions that 
are dealt with in the thesis. 
 
 
77 
 
(…) understandings are largely determined by external social factors. 
Consequently (…) “the actor‟s own understanding is an area of 
underdetermination” (Yee 1996, 206, quotes Hollis and Smith(1991)). 
Once the axiom of human indeterminacy is accepted, the properly constructive 
aspect of constructivist theory comes into play. Upon an open field of alternatives (1), 
an interactive and collective process takes place among social agents (2) that reduces 
the original uncertainty ((1) + (2)) into a more or less coherent interpretation of the 
lived world (Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999, 4). 
 
Through „habitualization‟ (Garfinkel 1974; Bourdieu 1994), the construction 
involves patterns of repetition, the setting up of agreed modes of interpretation that 
reduce the multiplicity of theoretically possible options to one that will then be 
followed, in the way people make sense of it and how they act. What is crucial here 
are the interactive features of the reduction of potential interpretations of the lived 
environment (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 70; Pusey 1987, 106; Soeffner 2004, 20). 
The argument picks up on this concept later on in this chapter when the relevance of 
the state is explained. As housing and mortgages go, everyday people interpret the 
corresponding markets in specific terms, the latter having the possibility of being 
different in separate socio-economic contexts. Consequently, people will act 
according to the premises of the theories that make sense to them (Bates et al. 1998, 
13; Joas and Knöbl 2009, 123). However, that is not to mean that agents are denied 
creativity in the ways that they act upon the facilitated subjectivities. It is just that 
that is a topic that the thesis does not address in more detail. 
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For the moment, the process by which a certain interpretation „makes sense‟ stands at 
the forefront. The notion captures explanations that are easily understandable, i.e. 
where the complexity of potential explanations is narrowed down (Bruner 1991). 
Collective narratives are established to offer a consistent set of statements about the 
nature of the lived environment and about the position of the individuals within (Suhr 
2010, 29). What is constructed is a collective (2) story that is able to reduce 
uncertainty (1) by offering a causal model at which end sits the situation as 
experienced at present or a situation to be experienced in the future. The way that 
people see what is around them is thus not only dependent on the materiality of the 
latter but also on this process of validation of some modes of explanation and the 
exclusion of others (Brito 2008, 54). This is just what Vico meant with his “verum 
esse ipsum factum”. What people make of their own housing and their own housing 
finance management is then influential upon their behaviour in that very market. 
 
This process is interactive as it involves at least two individuals or actors, without 
meaning that every agent has the same amount of power in the determination of the 
outcome. This is developed later on in this chapter and in subsequent part by 
introducing a constructivist account of institutional analysis. So now, constructivist 
theory often stresses how modes of explanations in the form of theories can take on a 
quasi-own existence in the form of institutions that then act as external forces upon 
the individual (Durkheim 1895). This is certainly a useful heuristic observation, but 
what I am mostly concerned with here is the individual level per se. Indeed, the 
concept of naïve theories (Heider 1958) points towards the sets of explanatory 
frameworks that people tell themselves or believe in as they reduce uncertainty. 
Naïve as they „de-complexify‟ the situation faced by explaining it through a single, 
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causally coherent mechanism (Leiser 2001). That does not mean that they are 
logically coherent with the other naïve theories facilitated as is illustrated in the case 
studies. „De-complexification‟ is the process by which the multiplicity of potential 
explanations is being narrowed down. Naïve stands hence in opposition to overly 
complex, and is not meant to have a pejorative undertone. In this sense, 
constructivism is always a theoretical perspective that points towards what has not 
been constructed, what interpretations have been side-lined (Soeffner 2004, 28). 
 
In the process of adopting a certain set of naïve/everyday theories, moral judgements 
are formed about those that are right and those that are wrong. In other words, the 
closure of the openness posited by the human mind involves statements of the good 
and the bad, of morality. „Original violence‟ (Laclau 1990, 34) is performed against 
alternative conceptions of good individual life (or in the case of this thesis: good 
housing and mortgage practices) and collective life (good macroeconomic house 
price trajectories and good mortgage conditions for instance). Stated bluntly, the 
modes of explanation chosen are qualified as good, and those conceptions of the 
experienced world that are not adopted are denominated as bad. Stated differently, a 
certain legitimation regime (Habermas 1976, 70) is put into place that defends one 
set of assumptions of how to look at/make sense of things and ignores the other ones 
(“housing is this, a mortgage is that, and nothing else”). 
 
Legitimation is nothing else than the instalment of a structure of intersubjective 
meaning (Bieler 2001, 95), acting from the basis of naïve theories that promotes 
certain worldviews over others. Some scholars have even talked about “cognitive 
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legitimacy” in this respect (Suchman 1995; Jensen 2003, 524; Gordon et al. 2009, 
16) to refer to the psychological bases of such a notion. In this sense, legitimation is 
the process by which individuals collectively agree with a certain interpretation of 
the material, or human, environment, and with the type of actions that consistently 
(in their eyes) follow from it. The concept of legitimation must thus be located at the 
individual level, i.e. in naïve theories. At the same time then, naïve theories are also 
at the basis of how people make sense of the general housing and mortgage 
conditions and their individual practices within them.  
 
This should however not be interpreted as a theory that denies agential capacity to 
the individual Indeed, individuals are assumed to possess artifice, “the capacity to 
respond imaginatively to social and natural conditions” (Germain 1996, 202) or 
human „fantasia‟ (Alker 1990, 164). Even though certain interpretations of the world 
are predominant, that does not mean that all others are unable to be accessed through 
thought processes (Myers 2003, 27). As the subject is always a subject in the making, 
it can never be fully determinate. Contingency (Butler 2000, 31) and resistance 
(Lefèbvre 2002, 26; Streeck 2010a, 11) are inherent features in his/her constitution 
just as is the capacity to imagine alternative worlds. Human agency thus can always 
think of alternative ways of how to conceptualise housing, but it might be that people 
behave according to the predominant logic because that one makes more sense to 
them. The possibility of resistance however always exists. What I want to be clear 
about is that the thesis is not denying agents their capacity to run counter to the 
political assumptions about economic regimes, but this is not the main focus here. 
The open-ended ontology is concerned with the human mind and the ways that 
people make sense of the world, and that always means that „play‟ between the 
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institutional level and the individual one exists (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 11), but 
before an analysis of such patterns can be assessed, the cultural process of 
civilisation needs to be investigated (Ferge 1999, 219), to use the words quotes in 
chapter one. 
 
As shortly mentioned before, a theory is not only a description of how things are, its 
judgements about good and bad also constitute a prescription of how things should 
be, hence they function as guides to action (Lukes 1974; Cox 1981, 128). Based on 
moral conceptions, the constructed conceptions promote certain types of behaviour, 
those that are consistent with the explanation at hand. In other terms, naïve theories 
not only interpret the world, they also construct it in material terms in a way so as to 
fit the theory (MacKenzie 2006). The normative aspects of societal conceptions of 
good life are hence larger than could be expected. Constructivism is not only about 
the interpretation of reality, it is also about the (re)production of it, about everyday 
practice (Soeffner 2004, 23), hence about the definition of economic agency that is 
political in itself (Bourdieu 2000, 15). To come back to the individual, even though 
certain worldviews get naturalised (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 77) through sets of 
more or less consistent ideas, there is always the potentiality of internal 
contradictions in a symbolic order (Germain 2007, 128) that never fully changes the 
condition of indeterminacy of the mind. The empirical cases also highlight these 
internal frictions. 
 
This chapter introduces „axio-rationality‟ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007, 17; 
Seabrooke 2007, 403) as a method of challenging a naturalist view of things that 
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considers people as interpreting economic affairs according to one particular logic 
(Hay 2002, 8). But before going over to the discussion of economic rationality, it is 
important to highlight the political character of constructed naïve theories. Indeed, 
when a collectivity is formed through the elimination of potential conceptions of the 
world, the constitution of a community is inevitably political as it excludes 
alternatives. „Original violence‟ is inevitably performed in the very act of setting up 
this very community (Butler 2000, 29-31). The act of closing down potential spaces 
of thought is a political manoeuvre as it attempts to cut off potential avenues, even if 
they are only conceptual. But because interpretation of the world also creates it in its 
own image, the exclusion of certain reflections and conceptions must be considered 
here. In other words, the moral constitution of a set of subjectivities itself leads to 
particular distributional outcomes. As different worldviews come with different 
normative baggage (Strange 1994, 1-6), they not only favour certain groups over 
others, but favour them differently according to the underlying moral assumptions. 
This is hence an example of how ideas shape policy (Clift 2012), a topic that is 
theoretically explored in chapter four and showcased throughout the case studies 
(chapters five to eight, and annexes). Every conception of how things are and should 
be hence plays into the hands of some people and not of others. This then links what 
I call the ontological and the distributional elements of the political features of 
comparative capitalisms. 
 
The exclusionary effect is thus double, once at the conceptual/ontological level, once 
at the material/distributional level. Hence the very process of setting up a community 
is a political act. Indeed, it means that conceptions of what housing and mortgages 
are, and who they are for, create a common set of shared assumptions, but at the 
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same time exclude others (violence at the conceptual, theoretical, ontological level). 
Moreover, by putting forward a certain interpretation of what housing is, who is 
entitled to which tenure and who is entitled to a mortgage that enables him/her into a 
certain type of housing, every conception of housing favours some behaviour and 
socio-economic groups and marginalises others (violence at the material, practical, 
distributional level). At the same time then, these markets are hence likely to be sites 
of potential contradictions, in conceptual and practical terms, as they try to cover up 
their political character. Again, that is to be seen in the empirical chapters. 
 
To finish off this section, this approach also points towards the ambiguity of the 
political character of collective life. On the one hand, the arrangement of a certain 
mode of social and economic organisation around commonly shared moral principles 
and patterns of interpretations are the necessary condition, if not the essence, of a 
political community. In other words, it is inclusionary as it forms a community out of 
individuals. On the other hand, it is this very action that draws internal lines between 
certain groupings of its members, through the marginalisation of alternative 
conceptions of good life. It is this dual characteristic that is essential in the concept 
of the „political‟ as is demonstrated in the case studies. To put it in a concise way, the 
initial openness of the mind posits the exclusion of alternative potential moral 
conceptions of good life in order to make sense of the lived environment and to 
hence form a community. In order for a collectivity to acquire an internal identity, it 
distinguishes itself from what it is not (Bourdieu 1979; Myers 2003, 41; Lefèbvre 
1991, 169). In relation to the empirical cases, housing and mortgages markets can 
thus be understood as “some thing” and not as something else. The empirical 
investigations bring out how some conceptions are legitimated and what arguments 
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are set forward to de-legitimate others. Simultaneously, it also entails efforts in the 
form of specific state policies what ideal-typical individual the good homeowner and 
mortgager are supposed to be.  
3 Axio-Rationality: Means and Ends 
Now that the previous section has outlined how naïve theories act as tools that reduce 
uncertainty (Béland 2008, 148) and bring out the political through the narrowing of 
windows of conceptualisations, the argument looks at the implications for the notion 
of economic agency. The question that is to be answered here is how naïve theories 
revisit the concept of unique rationality that does not allow for variation. Indeed, 
rationality is often taken to mean the selection of the optimal means to an end, with 
there existing only one perfect solution (Zafirovski 1999). Additionally, it is also an 
issue of how they can inform an additionally political view of housing and mortgage 
markets, and more generally of economic regimes. The discussion about an 
alternative ontology above is being built upon to demonstrate the contingency of 
rational thought and action. Such a move follows logically from an ontology that 
places the production of specific legitimation regimes under particular social 
conditions in its centre. 
 
The indeterminate mind and the process that leads from the potentially many 
conceptions of the good individual to one relatively (temporarily) uncontested moral 
worldview are taken as points of departure to show how economic agency is 
necessarily embedded into a context of moral judgements about the ends of human 
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activity (Seabrooke 2007, 404-5). This is no different in housing and mortgage 
markets. I claim thus that the multiplicity of normative environments logically entails 
the possibility of varieties of rationalities, and subsequently possibilities of varieties 
of facilitated conceptions of agency in relation to housing/mortgage markets. This 
section helps shift the focus away from the firm towards the individual in order to 
discover an additional layer of the political in varieties of capitalist forms of 
economic organisations. Indeed, it sets out a review of the concept of human 
rationality and argues that while the traditional rational choice perspective, as 
exemplified in VoC with firms only reacting to external incentives (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Hay 2005; Hancké at al. 2007, 7), is worthwhile starting from, it does not 
engage in a discussion about the limits of its domain of applicability because it sees 
itself as self-sufficient, or universally true. Rationality as a calculated method to 
maximise utility is a valuable heuristic tool, but only in clearly delimited cases where 
the wider social context in insignificant to the researcher. 
 
In order to go beyond those boundaries, the more general notion of axio-rationality, 
built upon the Weberian concept of axiological rationality (Boudon 2001, 93), offers 
a more refined understanding as it puts economic rationality into a domain of moral 
values. Of course, in their own eyes, people behave rationally in the 
housing/mortgage market when they take decisions about the renting, purchasing, 
moving and about which loan to take out. That is only to say that people act 
according to what they think is right, a statement that has been made here already. 
The question must be put into a larger context in order to explain market behaviour 
in a more complex way, in a way that explains how and why people conceive of a 
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certain type of rightfulness in the first place. This section then follows very much the 
constructivist method operationalised in the first section. 
 
Textbook rationality is defined as a mode of action that tries to maximise the utility 
that an actor retrieves from his activity and decisions (Frank 2002, 82 and 97; Blyth 
2003, 696). A classical example is the way a person can make sure he/she attains the 
highest level of satisfaction from buying apples and pears, in a context of fixed prices, 
fixed resources (Frank 2002, 63; Besanko and Braeutigam 2011, 106) and fixed 
preferences, ceteris paribus (Hey 2003, 73). Utility curves (Besanko and Braeutigam 
2011, 84) derived from preferences and the income line hint at the one optimal 
combination of apples and pears to buy. In other words, rationality and the models 
developed around it answer the question of how? How can I get maximal satisfaction 
in a certain situation, assumed the parameters are given? The question is an 
allocative or distributive one. What is at stake are the means of achieving a certain 
target, it is about the way to achieve something very specific: maximising 
utility/minimising dissatisfaction. 
 
In a case where the parameters are externalised and given (Yee 1997, 1010), rational 
choice theory is applicable and acts as a technical tool. Examples here include a 
game of chess where rules are predefined and do not change over the course of action 
(Fierke and Nicholson 2001, 20). The aim is fixed (win the game), the rules are fixed 
(those written in the chess handbook) and preferences are fixed (each player wants to 
win the game). Observe that all those parameters are externalised, hence are not 
influenced by the progress of the game per se. Rational choice theory is able to offer 
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answers to questions internal to the set of rules, in this case in relation to how to 
move the pieces to win the game, hence pragmatic issues. The technicality of rational 
choice derives from its externalisation of parameters that would otherwise need to be 
handled in relation to a social and moral i.e. moral/metaphysical context. Or as it has 
been put, it is “an approach that assumes away most of the complexity of political 
actors” (Olson 2001, 191). 
 
As rational choice leaves these questions to other disciplines with its methodology 
(methodological individualism) not attempting to answer them, its conception of 
rationality is instrumental (O‟Hagan 2001, 58). It is possible to predict the optimal 
choice of housing if the preference of the person in question and the offer of houses 
are known. Hence rational choice scholars are not concerned with moral elements, 
they take them as externally given and stable, hence unworthy of analysis (Satz and 
Ferejohn 1994, 74). The analysis is valuable, but only in a context where this 
assumption is valid. If the aim is to look into the meanings of housing and mortgages 
over time, such an approach however becomes less useful. 
 
It is also in this sense that rational choice it is a toolkit under the conditions that the 
analytical limits are acknowledged (Watson 2007, 1). Scholars that see rationality as 
a concept to be valuable under all conditions of investigation do however not always 
recognize the latter (Levitt and Dubner 2005). Just like a hammer is a tool to drive in 
nails, rational choice is a tool to maximise utility (in the eyes of the analyst and the 
individual person). The question of why? is not dealt with in either case. To 
exemplify this I go back to the chess game once more. There may be reasons for 
making specific moves, so the why? is not entirely excluded at first sight, but it only 
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relates to the internal rule setting, and could be reframed into a how? question. “Why 
do I move the tower by two positions to the right?” would typically be answered by 
“because that way you will shield off your queen and win the game!”, so the actual 
question is: “How do I need to move the tower in order to shield off my queen, as 
doing the latter will minimise my dissatisfaction, hence allow me to win the game?” 
 
The rational answer is always subject to the overarching aim that is to minimise 
losing one‟s own pieces and to maximise stealing one‟s opponent‟s pieces. Concerns 
of the external why are taboo, like “Why are we playing this game now? What is 
good in us playing this game here?”. Meta-technical issues cannot be discussed 
because the rational choice model relies on those parameters to be fixed, hence 
externally given. Inside such a tightly held model, it is theoretically easy to account 
for rational behaviour, as one can always posit new aims that make actions appear 
rational. In this sense, it has been claimed that  
much of what is ordinarily described as non-rational or irrational is merely so 
because the observers have not discovered the point of view of the actor 
(Coleman 1990, 18 quoted in Abell 2003, 255-6) 
If such an approach is taken, the whole approach runs into the danger of becoming 
tautological, of explaining everything an nothing at the same time. Finally, the limits 
of the domain of applicability of this approach (Bates 1998, 23) are related to two 
conditions, given preferences fixed in time and given aims fixed in time. In this 
context, the theory is able to come to one and only one optimising conclusion (Nash 
1950). Looking back at the notions of indeterminacy of the mind and of uncertainty, 
such an approach to rationality constitutes a limited heuristic tool. 
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I have stated that the human mind cannot be seen as imposing a single path on how 
to make sense of the everyday environment, hence potentially leading to varieties of 
behavioural patterns. The moral and political judgements that are necessary to form a 
community can differ. The latter answer the question of why? as they provide a sense 
for which ends are good and which are bad. “Objective rationality” as described 
above must thus be complemented with “subjective rationality” (Boudon 1989, 173). 
The concept integrates the conceptions of actors themselves. People act because they 
follow what are in their eyes “good reasons” (Boudon 1989, 174). And even if 
Boudon rejects that such a conception contains elements of morality (Boudon 1989, 
177), this is exactly the claim that I put forward. What a morally defendable aim, 
hence a good reason or end, is involves a contest over different conceptions of good 
life, just as presented in the previous section (Dryzek 2000, 74). It involves processes 
of exclusion as violence is performed against some conceptions of what is ethical and 
what not. In other words, it is the aims of the community that are reflected in certain 
naïve theories. In this sense, rationalities mirror specific subjectivities, specific 
conceptions of the world that come with a specific understanding that promotes 
certain sets of action over others. In short, rationality, or better axio-rationality is 
political. The question to be asked in the empirical chapters is thus not whether 
people are rational, i.e. optimising agents, but what they are trying to optimise, hence 
what moral/political aim is depicted to be worthwhile trying to archive. At the same 
time, this plays into the question of which „collective man‟ is depicted in a particular 
individual-state relationship. 
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It is only once that the moral ends are agreed upon that the technical issues of how to 
get there (aims) are posed, and where rational choice can come in. Contrary to 
textbook rationality, this approach starts from the indeterminate mind that posits 
open-ended preferences and aims, both being concepts of the moral domain. 
Preferences are judgements about what is good and bad behaviour or „taste‟ 
(Bourdieu 1979) or „manners‟ (Smith 17596) at the individual level, ends are moral 
convictions about desirable collective outcomes (Screpanti 1998, 67). None of those 
can be explained by rational choice approaches, they can only be understood with 
reference to a wider body of morality (Watson 2005b). Consequently, it is necessary 
to integrate the wider social issues that prescribe ends, that answer the why? 
questions. The following set of questions arises: what are the overarching ends and 
values of a certain community, and how do they come about? 
 
The concept of axio-rationality is a step towards corresponding answers, as it embeds 
„rationality‟ i.e. a particular technical procedure of maximisation (cf. the chess game), 
into a context of the moral i.e. naïve theories that make sense of the world (Campbell 
1987, 25). As such, it points towards the contingency of „rationality‟, towards its 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) into a moral and political order of ends. This 
applies to whole economic regimes as well as to housing/mortgage markets in 
particular. Textbook rationality cannot be seen as sufficient an explanation when it 
comes to societal questions as it delimits itself from the social world through an 
externalisation of parameters of moral ends. The really interesting question is hence 
not if people are rational or not but what the overarching reason, or end, for their 
                                                        
6
 Boudon considers Adam Smith to have applied the concept of axio-rationality (Boudon 
2002, 24-5). 
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behaviour is. The latter can be found in naïve/everyday theories about the economic 
phenomena analysed, in this thesis definitions of economic agency in housing and 
mortgage markets. 
 
Indeed, axio-rationality turns towards the social conditions of economic action (axio-
bit), so that economic textbook rationality is only one possible „rationality‟ among 
others (Hamdouch 2005, 245). I hence extend the concept without denying the 
heuristic usefulness of rational choice theory (Grafstein 1997), under the specific 
conditions stated above. Axiology, a term that means the philosophical study of 
value and that comprises ethics and aesthetics as studies of the „good‟ and the „bad‟ 
(Hart 1971, 29), is used here to describe the moral context of human activity. As the 
indeterminacy of the mind looks for specific conceptions of morality or ethics, the 
notion of axio-rationality takes up just those and integrates human activity into a 
social (see „sociality‟ as developed in section two) and moral context (Jacobsen 2003, 
43). Whereas rational choice rationality takes this environment as fixed and hence 
reduces its field of operationability, axio-rationality is open to a discussion of ends 
and morals that inform individual preferences and collective aims (Jupille 2003, 13). 
 
Such a conceptualisation matches with the constructivist departure as it introduces 
contingency and the possibility for multiple rationalities, an element that is used in 
the thesis to enlarge the notion of „varieties of capitalism‟ with the notion of micro-
macro complementarities. Instead of dropping institutional differences upon firms 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, 9), this approach opens up the possibility of differences in 
constructed worldviews, might this be in housing/mortgage markets or any other 
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economic domain, and uses these to connect to differences in institutional design and 
policy outcomes (in chapter four). Models of capitalism are hence partly “choices of 
societies” (Lorenzi 2008, 71). Hence, once the thesis moves on to the empirical cases, 
it does so with an eye to the wider social structures and understandings of housing 
and mortgage markets. Depending on which moral principles are seen to be most 
valued in a community, individuals try to maximise different objectives. The notion 
of axio-rationality caters for this as it includes the topic of meta-technical ends into 
human agency. The empirical chapters thus investigate the most salient ends for 
homeowners and mortgagers. 
 
Apart from failing to acknowledge the social dimensions of behaviour, a unique 
concept of rationality depoliticises the study of economic regimes by stating that a 
de-socialisation approach accurately describes social realities (Burham 2001). Again 
a look back at classical economists gives a much more careful account as they have 
performed this move to separate the domain of morality from the study of economics 
in a conscious attempt (Watson 2007). This is especially relevant as the concept of 
economic rationality is often depicted as offering a complete explanation of 
economic processes per se (Rule 1992; Zafirovski 2000, 168). Such claims then 
extend the claim of technicality and value-freeness over the moral environment in 
which it takes place, thus implicitly denying its relevance and political character 
(Bourdieu 2000, 16; Burnham 2001). If placed in the context of housing/mortgage 
markets, it is not difficult to see how certain conceptions could be naturalised as they 
could foster the reproduction of certain macro-economic regimes through the 
legitimation of specific types of economic agency (Gurney 1999b; Beckert 2010). 
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These links are theoretically explored in chapter four and then applied in the 
subsequent pages. 
 
To sum up, the contingent character of axio-rationality posits various things. First it 
enables variants in rational behaviour, the concept of rationality being one that is 
influenced by the ideational sphere (Blyth 2002, 10). Second, contingency also 
means that the sense-making environment constructed in time and space, and 
represented in naïve theories, can lead to a change in the precise meaning that 
rational action takes on. Naïve theories can change over time, because they are 
constructed and because agents possess the capacity to imagine alternative futures. 
There is thus a more or less implicit struggle over the conceptualisation of good life 
(Martin 2002, 17). It is in this sense that some institutions might be able to exercise 
power over the moral bases of a community (axiology) and influence the mode of 
interpretation and action of individuals (axio-rationality). This possibility is explored 
in the following section. 
 
Finally, it becomes obvious that rational choice theory is blind towards the wider 
context of economic agency and that by stating that it is applicable to the study of 
whole economic regimes it implicitly depoliticises it. Indeed, the VoC depiction of 
the economic systems analysed tends to avoid the notion of power (Hancké et al. 
2007, 8). In contrast, a constructivist perspective that blends in with an ontology that 
enables for varieties of the evaluation of various moral principles (Cisar 2003, 11) 
provides the notion of axio-rationality that still allows for textbook rationality but 
that is better positioned to take into consideration the social and moral conditions of 
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human agency. The possibility of varieties of capitalism and housing/mortgage 
markets can be traced back to the possibility of varieties of conceptions of good life, 
opened up by constructivist strands of reflection. Moreover, it introduces additional 
elements of the political into the equation by pointing towards exclusion. 
 
In the next section the argument goes further in explaining how this degree of 
indeterminacy, combined with sociality, invites state facilitation upon axio-rational 
behaviour. As stated beforehand, the openness of the mind is closed through a 
process of privileging a certain understanding of good life and marginalising others. 
Once this is a contingent process, state interventions play a role in this regard. As 
policy-makers have interests in housing and mortgage markets because they are 
fundamental institutions of modern capitalism and as they relate to the individual, it 
is interesting to see how and why the British and German rationales for state 
intervention played out in relation to the definition of economic agency. 
4 The State as a Facilitator of Moral Economic Guidelines 
Once the introduction of axio-rationality has described the possibility of variations in 
rationality through setting economic agency into a wider political and social context, 
the attention of the argument turns towards the state. As a central and recognized 
institution in most developed economies it is acting in the field of economic axiology 
(Bell and Hindmoor 2009) i.e. the facilitation of moral values related to the economy, 
through its policy making and accompanying discourse, the state plays a crucial role 
in the contingency of axio-rationality (Liebermann et al. 1995, 438). Here state 
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policies are most important, but also the constitutive nature of the state as an 
institution. However this aspect is further studied in the subsequent chapter. As has 
been considered in the literature review chapter, current contributions to the field of 
comparative capitalism either side-line the state due to their productionist focus or 
integrate the state per se without relating such a move back to ontologically prior 
elements. As such, they do not explore the individual-state relationship and hence not 
the facilitation efforts that state policies can have on what counts as proper economic 
agency, in consumer markets like housing and mortgage markets for instance. As 
highlighted, such an approach addresses the realm of the moral and political, as it 
raises the question of the ends of social action and thus of the very definition of 
economic agency. 
 
With the detour of a discussion of ontological concepts about the individual and the 
outlining of how a certain mode of maximisation is inevitably embedded into a field 
of moral conceptions about good and bad, the thesis integrates state concerns in a 
way that brings additional features of the political into the study of capitalist forms of 
economic organisation. These characteristics go beyond the distributional elements 
showcased in the literature review. If the human mind is indeterminate and that 
people look for moral guidance (which ends/why?) in the social world, then it is 
logical to suggest that state policies play a role in setting the agenda for potentially 
legitimated codes of conduct. Streeck has been talking about the “rule-maker” and 
“rule-taker” in this context where state policy produces sets of interpretation for 
economic phenomena but where their enactment is always open to contestation 
(Streeck 2010a, 12; also Streeck and Thelen 2005, 11 and 13). 
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Another way into this is by looking at the state culture and the beliefs of policy-
makers about the morality of policies (Jensen 2003, 527), especially those that 
concern the social and political management of economic matters, housing and 
mortgage markets for instance. Indeed, in the current era, one of the main functions 
of the state is the management of the economy (Thompson 2001, 597) and hence also 
of the exact moral definition economic agency. On the one hand, this can be more or 
less self-proclaimed through state channels
7
. The exact way in which this is done 
depends on the interactive and discursive (Becker 2010, 254) individual-state 
relationship that is introduced in this section and developed in fuller details in the 
next chapter. What is important to outline here is how exactly the state comes into 
the study of economic regimes once a constructivist ontology is adopted. Or as it has 
been put, why “(T)he state is now built upon daily life; its base is the everyday” 
(Lefèbvre 2005, 123).  
 
Naïve theories are the basis of action for individuals as they provide the individual 
with a consistent account of the why? of his/her behaviour. It is only once the ends 
have been accepted through a particular legitimation regime, that technical 
maximisation concerns come in. The sociality of the human mind looks for hints of 
moral guidance outside itself, hence in its human and institutionalised environment. 
It is here where institutions come in as contextual constellations in space and time 
(Laville 2003, 190; Damart and Roy 2005, 21; Freeman 2007, 21). Indeed, this 
guidance can be procured through state channels, hence through a (more or less) 
coherent rationale for state intervention. Unlike firms, the state is a player in the 
economy that directly relates to the mass of the population and hence establishes a 
                                                        
7
 I do not refer to the communication channels between state actors and the general public 
only here, but also those internal to the state as an institution. 
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more or less direct relationship with the general public (Steffek 2003, 250). The state 
not only legislates over the economic activities on the national territory, such action 
also sets out normative judgements about the ends of individual economic agency, or 
about the “good reasons” (Boudon 1989, 174) of economic behaviour.  In democratic 
settings, the state is meant to represent the population and guard them against 
potential dangers. This is exactly what the term „management‟ of the economy, by 
the state, is meant to imply in relation to the thesis argument (Hall 1986).  
 
Because of this conception, that is itself contestable, the state as an institution is 
looked upon as the public provider of sense that filters through into naïve theories. 
As such the individual expects state policies to give hints about what constitutes 
appropriate and legitimate economic behaviour (Seabrooke 2010). Because the state 
is such a highly institutionalised actor and is regarded as the overseer of the economy, 
individuals turn to the state for moral guidance (Becker 2010, 256). A consequence is 
that all state activity is value-laden, just because the individual understands it as 
facilitating moral direction on economic behaviour (Soeffner 2004, 35). It prescribes 
moral and political messages by narrowing the domain of the conceptually possible 
(Langley 2008; Watson 2008a). However, this also means that what is central here 
are not merely the utterances that state officials proclaim in official speeches, but the 
deeper understandings of the ways that policies are set up. In methodological terms, 
this entails a focus not so much on what Schmidt calls „communicative discourse‟, 
but on „coordinative discourse‟ (Schmidt 2005), on the discussions that policy-
makers have between each other in relation to a particular rationale for state 
intervention. Indeed, it is here that the interpretation of the moral ends related to 
economic issues plays out. 
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As stated, state interventions and statements inevitably carry political weight. Even if 
legislation might be technical, it comes with connotations of good and bad. This is an 
element to analyse when it comes to observe the ways in which the economic agent 
was depicted (in parliamentary debates) in relation to housing and mortgage markets. 
State policies are understood as promoting desirable (i.e. good) conceptions and as 
rectifying deviant (i.e. bad) behaviour. The material nature of state interventions is 
interpreted as carrying moral weight because, as an institution, the state is understood 
as the moral/political leading actor. The ways that state aid is allocated when it 
comes to housing for instance puts forward certain propositions about who deserves 
support, which behaviour is needed in order to be a successful mortgagee, and what 
ends a home owner should pursue. When it comes to economic matters then, 
households are confronted with policies that more or less directly influence their 
financial situation in the form of taxes, allowances and various regulations in all of 
the existing markets. As such, the outcomes of state legislation acts as guidance for 
how the ideal-typical consumer is to behave.  
 
Now that individuals look to the state for moral guidance as far as economic 
practices go, it becomes apparent that the latter has influence over their 
conceptualisation of everyday life in relation to economic matters and of the latter 
themselves. However, that does not mean that individuals blindly follow the 
behaviour the state prescribes through moral depictions of good and bad, also as 
those prescriptions are very likely to feature internal contradictions (Germain 2007, 
128). Even though its institutional status is rarely put into question, state 
interventions need to be legitimated in one way or another. This process can happen 
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through discourse towards the broad public (Chadwick 2000, 289) but does not need 
to operate through in this way as the next chapter highlights. What is important for 
the moment is how all state action relates to the depiction of an adequate model of 
ideal-typical economic subject in relation to end that is not explicitly discussed as it 
is taken for granted (Eriksen and Fossum 2004, 436). What exactly is to be 
legitimated are two different but interconnected things: first the institutional order, 
hence the state as an institution, and second the state interventions themselves. 
 
As far as the institutional setup is concerned, this can only be answered by an 
investigation into national state developments and understandings of the state and its 
role. The thesis takes institutional settings as historically constructed and transferred 
in the longue durée (Braudel 1980, 27). The reproduction of institutions is then 
always subject to change and reinterpretation, even if historically transmitted 
conceptions can only change slowly (Steinmo 2008). However, at a certain point the 
everyday person and the scholar can understand the institutional setup in a specific 
way. It is this very way by which a certain structure is interpreted and hence 
legitimised. But because of its constructed character, such a regime can only be 
understood in relation to the naïve theories that the individual as well as policy-
makers hold about those structures. Indeed, institutions always mirror moral 
understandings of collective organisation at a certain time in the past that have then 
been institutionalised and transformed to variable degrees (Scharpf 2009). The state 
as an institution hence derives its legitimacy not only from current policies but also 
from historical processes because of the temporal dependence between legitimation 
regimes (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 77). 
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As regards the legitimation of the form and content of the policies enacted, the 
institution of the state enters into a more or less formal relationship with the 
individual through state policies. The aim is to gain the legitimacy from the wider 
public for its interventions (Schäfer 2006). The exact way by which policies are 
legitimated depends on the setup of the individual-state relationship but in either case, 
state action inevitably acts upon the axio-rationality inside an existing setting. In this 
sense, the legitimation of policies occurs if the current naïve theories are able to 
integrate the arguments of the incoming/new state interventions in a way to keep the 
body of justificatory theories consistent, i.e. if the new elements can fit with the 
existing ones to produce a modified naïve theory (Sikkink 1991, 2; Zelditch 2001, 9). 
In other words, for the individual the new policy needs to make sense, in relation to 
his previous conceptions and his lived experience of the issue that the intervention 
targets. It needs to match with a certain mental model of how the world works (Abell 
2003, 268), for instance with existing conceptions of housing or the mortgage sector. 
However, this process also depends on the assumptions held about the role of the 
state as an institution i.e. the institutional setup. In other words, the legitimation of 
the state as an institution and as a set of policies are linked together. But before 
digging deeper into institutional arrangements of states and the consequences for 
policies and state-individual relationships in the next chapter, I would like to outline 
the aspects of the political of the framework set out so far.  
 
Traditionally, politics is defined as all the concerns related to the distribution of 
power, or with the question of “who gets what, when, and how?” (Lasswell 1936). 
This is also the case for much of the VoC literature and its critics as has been 
outlined in the previous chapter. I argue that the integration of a constructivist 
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ontology of the individual extends the concept towards a level of analysis that has 
often been neglected so far (Schmidt 2005; Hay 2006). Normally, comparative 
political economists conceive of a group of actors that compete over the 
interpretation of a particular problem, with the power being distributed in a more or 
less unequal way. This leads to an outcome that represents the interests of some 
factions better than those of others. The thesis goes beyond this definition of politics 
in distributional terms as it claims that the elements of such debates involve 
assumptions about moral values about what policy-makers are to achieve that are 
biasing the debates. In other words, there may be elements that are not debated as 
they are taken for granted (Lukes 1974; Hay 1997; Hussein and Le Galès 2010). The 
institutional setup is hence not neutral, but ontologically constitutes a political 
domain as it does violence to certain state policies, just as naïve theories do violence 
to other conceptions of good economic agency. As such, just as naïve theories are 
necessarily political by setup, all state interventions are political as they promote 
some axio-rationalities over others. The political hence plays at both, the ontological, 
theoretical and the policy, distributional level. The state as an institution as well as 
state policies are thus political. 
 
Following from the concepts of naïve theories and axio-rationality, this section has 
tried to unpack why and how the state matters as a political actor. Political is 
understood as having influence over the very way individual agents make sense of 
their economic environment and their own behaviour within it. In other words, what 
is at stake is the exact definition of economic agency, the type of axio-rationality, 
and its integration into market structures. The question that is raised here is about the 
what that people are trying to maximise, not that they are attempting to put 
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themselves in a comparatively „better‟ position in their eyes. The determination of 
the „better‟ is what comes into the focus of the argument here. What is it that 
economic activity should lead the individual to? It becomes obvious that this is 
question that is not to be answered by economic theory but by philosophy (Watson 
2005b). And as such, the thesis is back to Gramsci‟s statement that all men are 
philosophers. As state policies in the form of a coherent rationale for state 
intervention set forth certain conceptions of how to make sense of the „collective 
man‟ and of markets, state interventions are inevitably political in the sense that they 
promote certain subjectivities of morality over others. This shows that once the 
individual is fully brought into focus, the political needs to be located in the very 
naïve theories that he/she holds about the world, and not only in the strategies of 
policy-makers or distributional issues following from both. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter is the first one of two to outline the theoretical framework that is 
subsequently operationalised in the case studies. As such it has started to picture the 
kind of perspective that is characteristic of the thesis. In the attempt to set forward an 
alternative rationale for a differently political account of capitalist diversity, it has 
centred upon a constructivist approach and the notion of the indeterminate mind. An 
ontology of the individual has been developed that opens the possibility of human 
rationality to take on various forms. By exposing how the mind is malleable towards 
various interpretations of the lived environment, the latter displayed its deeply social 
characteristics. This outline has hence drawn attention to the importance and 
contingency of the moral context to human behaviour. The chapter has introduced 
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the concept of axio-rationality that integrates moral considerations of ends. The 
notion still leaves space for the economics textbook conception of rationality and 
links behaviour to wider societal considerations. It thus adds an additional aspect of 
the political notion of human activity into the comparative capitalisms literature by 
providing it potentially various understanding of the individual (Screpanti 1998). 
 
Once the mind can accommodate diverse naïve theories of the inhabited world, the 
historically constructed institution of the state comes into the framework as an 
institution but also as a body of policies that acts upon the axiological meaning of 
understandings and practice as regard economic phenomena. The political elements 
of economic regimes are hence inherent in state interventions upon individual 
subjectivities. In other words, the malleable character of the mind can accommodate 
various conceptions of good life, the latter being acted upon by state facilitations. 
Such a perspective complements the accounts of the comparative capitalisms 
literature by reassessing the role of the individual and of the concrete individual-state 
relationships that entail the legitimation and reproduction of economic orders. This 
can be captured by the concept of micro-macro complementarities. Indeed, the naïve 
theories promoted need to make sense with the accepted meanings of wider 
characteristics of the economic regime at hand and upon which the latter is based. 
This is also the reason why both housing and mortgage markets cannot be studied on 
their own, but are investigated in relation to debates to broader economic issues, like 
the questions of how markets operate or how savings relate to efforts to acquire a 
own home.  Consequently, this chapter offers the basis to carve out the different 
political characteristics of economic regimes, at the ontological and distributional 
level, as regards the individual and the state (as institution and as a set of policies). 
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In the next chapter, I go beyond a introduction of the significance of the state and 
look into varieties of state conceptualisations, in the eyes of policy-makers and 
policy-takers alike. Not only are state policies facilitators of moral guidance as far as 
economic behaviour goes, their action upon axio-rationalties varies according to the 
concrete individual-state conception at hand. Through a categorisation of different 
forms of these interactions, the political aspects of institutional state setups are 
explored in more detail.  
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Chapter 4: Which individual-state relationship? The Politics of 
Polities 
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1 Introduction 
The literature review chapter has revisited the comparative capitalism literature and 
pointed to three main criticisms: its lack of engagement with the constitutive features 
of the individual, its incomplete notion of the political as relating to distributional 
issues only, and its lack of concerns with consumption issues. Centrally, it has been 
argued that the current approaches to varieties of capitalist regimes are characterised 
by a superficial depiction of their inherent political elements, this being related to 
their limited treatment of the individual, especially in relation to the state. Whereas 
various strategies have been put forward to achieve a more complex description of the 
political elements of comparative capitalisms, the chapter has argued that such 
accounts intent to bring the state, and hence politics back in, without investigating the 
deeper causal mechanisms that render the state an appropriate unit of analysis. 
Chapters three and four follow this logic and present subsequent arguments for how a 
more complex framework that focuses upon the concrete individual-state relationships 
can provide an account of capitalist variety that is able to add a layer of the political to 
the study. 
 
As such, the previous chapter has started to introduce an open-ended ontology that 
lays the bases for an alternative viewpoint on individuals and the context in which 
they act in relation to the state. Such a proposition is favoured as it locates the 
constitutive sources of differences in capitalist organisation within the naïve theories 
held by the individual, not merely in institutional variations as the current literature 
tends to suggest. The concept of axio-rationality has been developed in order to 
provide a framework that distinguishes between the technical means and the morally 
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loaded ends of economic agency (Boudon 2002, see also Habermas 1970, 64), and 
hence allows for variety in the ways that the individual makes sense of economic 
phenomena, housing and mortgage markets being relevant examples in this regard. 
The notion of „naïve theories‟ points towards the moral assumptions that people hold 
of their own behaviour in certain economic markets, and upon which they rely as 
guides for action of what end to achieve. 
 
The debate has then turned towards institutions that can potentially influence the 
moral ends that guide agency. It has been explained why the state can be seen as an 
institutionalised source of behavioural guidance and hence facilitation of naïve 
theories. As people construct their worldviews and actions on the basis of moral 
doctrines and that state policies take action upon the normative environment into 
which individual economic rationality is embedded, the latter has influence how 
humans conceive of the moral ends of economic activity. For the case studies on 
housing for instance, the question then becomes which conceptions of the house and 
of this market have been put forward in a particular rationale for state intervention 
and state legislation. As such, state interventions are inevitably political as they come 
with moral claims about proper patterns of behaviour. 
 
Indeed, policies and legislations set out a certain conception of how to interpret the 
housing market, hence they facilitate specific understandings of the individual as an 
economic agent. With state policies legislating in those markets, it also depicts some 
practices as more legitimate than others, hence making normative statements about 
good and bad, proper and improper ends. The latter must be seen as deeply political, 
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but also as offering variation between economic regimes. Capitalist diversity is then 
not limited to institutional features but also includes specific definitions of economic 
agency. In other words, what housing and mortgages are, how people are supposed to 
use them and for what ends, these are questions that the empirical chapters attempt to 
answer in relation to particular state policies. This can happen more or less explicitly 
as becomes clear in the next pages. The cases of housing and mortgages then seem 
relevant for this type of analysis as they are locations where state interventions, moral 
claims and everyday economic agency come together. 
 
Once it has been explained why the state matters relative to „daily life‟ (Lefèbvre 
2005, 123), the question of how it matters arises, what the exact mechanisms are by 
which a rationale for state intervention is significant in relation to the naïve theories 
and axio-rationalities pointed out previously. These are the questions that this chapter 
turns towards. Indeed, in order to fully grasp the nature of individual-state 
relationship, the argument looks into institutional features of the state (the state as 
institution/polity (1)) and its interactive relationship with the wider public (state as a 
body of policies (2)). As outlined before, this distinction is heuristic, meaning that it 
offers insights into how states operate, but that is not to say that the two sides of the 
state are ontologically separate. Actually, this chapter claims that once the rationale of 
individual-state relationship has been outlined, the focus can switch to the 
institutional design of states. However, against the tendency of the current literatures, 
this chapter highlights the institutional features not of the state per se, but of the 
individual-state relationship. As shortly described in the previous chapter, the reason 
is that the institutional features of the individual-state relationship influence the 
content of state policies.  
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Not only are there potentially different modes of interpretation of economic agency, 
but there are also different arrangements according to which state intervention take 
place. Indeed, I claim that the state policies depict the position of the state as an 
institution with relation to the economic system in various manners, hence 
introducing variety into the structure, or form, of the individual-state relationship. The 
variation originates from the way in which the state functions, first internally and 
second in relation to the general public, hence the individual (Schmidt 2006a, 248), 
and how policy-makers themselves make sense of their role. Both of these factors fall 
into the larger domain of how regimes and policy programmes are legitimated, in 
relation to policy-makers and policy-takers (Streeck 2010a, 12). If the state policies 
facilitate moral assumptions in relation to economic phenomena, the way in which 
policy-makers and the public perceive this ability plays a role in how state 
interventions actually look. In other words, the concept of individual-state 
relationship is itself a constructed one, once that state policies help foster. What the 
proper relationship between the individual and state is hence becomes an issue of 
legitimation, relating back to the legitimation of the polity as presented at the end of 
the previous chapter. 
 
The thesis then argues that historically constructed and transmitted structural 
differences in institutional settings and individual-state relationships (i.e. their form) 
are political in themselves as they induce diverse policy settings and focal points (i.e. 
their content). In other words, the institutional features of individual-state 
relationships themselves narrow the windows of opportunity for which naïve theories 
can be regarded as acceptable and can then be legitimised (Surel 2000). Indeed, just 
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as legitimation efforts are targeted at both the policies themselves (content) and at 
their institutional features (form), the political plays out on two domains, on the 
policy level and on the polity level (Schmidt 2008c, 303). What is investigated then is 
the theoretical possibility for differential individual-state relationships and the exact 
differences in legitimation regimes and individual-state relationships. The empirical 
chapters five to eight (and the annexes) are showcases and offer differential readings 
in this regard. The distinctive legitimation processes are tracked back in the cases of 
the British and German housing and mortgage markets, their political characteristics 
are highlighted on the two levels: the policies that have been enacted relating to 
housing and mortgaging behaviour (policy level), and the structural windows of 
opportunities that policy-makers and the general public internalised at a certain point 
in time when confronted with policy initiatives (polity level).  
 
Because this interconnection is central, the method to investigate the cases selected is 
focussing onto the „background ideational abilities‟ much more than on the 
„foreground discursive abilities‟ (Schmidt 2008a, 303). Indeed, what is important in 
relation to an understanding of the political in polities and differential individual-state 
relationship is that they are entailed by the narrowing down of a whole variety of 
potential policy interventions onto a limited number. Hence, again the political is 
located in the act of doing violence to an originally much larger position. This is the 
crucial contribution of this chapter to the larger arguments about highlighting 
different political features of comparative capitalisms. 
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As the references show, this chapter borrows from the recent developments in the 
institutionalist literature (Schmidt 2006b) that has seen the emergence of a so-called 
forth institutionalism coming under the names of „discursive institutionalism‟ 
(Schmidt 2005) or „constructivist institutionalism‟ (Hay 2006). Such an approach 
matches with the view expressed here that institutions are historical contexts into 
which particular understandings of economic axio-rationality is embedded (Watson 
2012). This literature is tapped into to demonstrate how individuals relate to the wider 
social/institutional environment that provides sense to their economic activities. In 
other words, it presents elements of reflection that have been argued for in the 
chapters before already. I indeed, the focus on the interactive and differential relation 
between the state and the wider public fit with my perspective into economic regimes 
(Blyth 2004, 622). The inclusion of the ideational domain is also welcomed in this 
regards (Schmidt 2008a; Clift 2012). At the same time however, the chapter also 
criticises such scholarly work for leaving significant questions unanswered. One of 
these concerns being the lack of concerns with the treatment of the individual in 
ontological terms, and thus an incomplete exposition of the concrete relationships 
between the ideal-typical individual and such institutions. Also, I claim that some of 
the terminology around types of discourse is unfortunate as it excessively limits what 
is recognised as political. Moreover, I fall back on insights from the sociology of 
policy instruments in order to gain insights into the way policy-makers relate to the 
individual in different, and themselves political, ways.  
 
This chapter proceeds in five steps. The next section introduces the concepts of polity 
and discourse as laid out by constructivist institutionalist scholars. Following on from 
the indeterminacy of the mind and the state as an institution and a set of policies with 
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potential influence over the definition of economic agency, the interactive character 
of the state-individual relationship is set out. Discourse is central here as it 
communicates naïve theories in more or less direct way and relates to the legitimation 
of polities and policies alike. At the same time the discourse between policy-actors 
gives indications about how economic agency is made sense of in a specific rationale 
for state intervention. Thereby I explain how this existing body of literature speaks to 
my concerns, but also how I am using it in the thesis. In short, I show how it can be 
taken as a tool towards providing a vision of markets and comparative capitalisms that 
opens the space for the political in an alternative way. Part three turns towards how 
policy issues stand in relation to the wider public, and what kind of legitimation 
processes different polities imply. The exact relationship between the individual and 
the state is central here, focussing on form and content of policy interventions 
simultaneously. The political implications of polity structure upon policy design are 
underlined with recourse to the literature on the cognitive aspects of policy-making 
(Surel 2000). 
 
Building upon what has been said about the inevitably political nature of state activity, 
I make the claim in the penultimate section that even though some polities display 
legitimation mechanisms that seem to be less normative than others, it would be 
uncritical to think that they were outside the realm of the political. It is here where 
some of the denominations from the constructivist institutionalist literature are 
reviewed. In doing so, I logically follow on from statements made in previous about 
an alternative and constructivist understanding of the political, based upon an 
ontology of the individual. The conclusion recapitulates the main points and bridges 
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over towards the case studies in chapters five to eight by exposing the implications of 
the theoretical framework for the empirical analyses. 
2 Constructivist Institutionalism Explained: Polities and Discourse 
Before going into the details of the concept, a short note on the terminology of the 
approaches is necessary. The concepts of „discursive‟ and „constructivist‟ can be used 
interchangeably in relation to this type of institutional analysis. As my approach here 
focusses on the constructivist account of varieties of capitalism, this term is more 
adequate here. Even though different scholars have set out slight variations in this 
regard (Hay 2001; Jabko 2006), these differences are a matter of emphasis, not one of 
essence (Schmidt 2008a, 304). 
 
The denomination of polity (Cherry 2009) comprises the „formal institutional context‟ 
(Schmidt 2008a, 303 and 312) in which state activity takes place, hence historically 
constructed patterns of state composition and activity that are unable to change in the 
short-term (Schmidt 2008b, 9). Aspects here are the degree of state centralisation 
(Schmidt 1999, 142), the organisational structure of firm collaboration with the 
decision-makers (Schmidt 1999, 143), business-government relations (Schmidt 1999, 
153) and the way interest group can access policy-making (Schmidt 1997, 135). In 
short, polities are about the structural patterns of how certain groups in society can 
talk to the state as a political institution and how much leverage they have over the 
policy process. To use the terminology from above, the concern here is with the form 
of the individual-state relationship, with the state as an institution. In this sense, 
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institutional settings come with certain communication channels in relation to the 
individual that then influence what kind of axio-rationalities can be prevalent in a 
certain regime (Howarth 2005, 343). Again, the latter are partly engrained in historic 
trajectories (Steinmo 2008; Streeck 2009), just as certain state traditions more 
generally are (Dyson 1980, 3). 
 
Schmidt distinguishes between „simple‟ and „compound‟ polities (Schmidt 2006a). 
The first type are often 
„single-actor‟ systems, with the concentration of power in the executive, a 
unitary state, a majoritarian electoral system, and „statist‟ policy-making 
process in which governments tend to formulate policy largely absent outside 
input (Schmidt 2001a, 251). 
In other words, these states tend to be governed by governments in a way that the 
responsibility in respect to the individual solely lies with the members of this party 
(Levy 1999, 288). This design is „simple‟ as it identifies two clear sides, the state in 
the form of the official organisms that are involved in the policy-making process, and 
all the other actors such as firms, labour and the wider public. There is hence a clear 
division between policy-makers and policy-takers (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Streeck 
2011). Civil parties can voice concerns and issues with the state, but they are not 
properly co-opted, at least not through institutionalised procedures. In such a 
configuration, the state, defined in narrow terms of policy-makers, is perceived as 
leading the task of economic governance (MacKinnon 2000). From here onwards, I 
then extend or re-interpret the constructivist institutionalist framework in relation to 
the individual. Even though the approach implicitly assumes particular individual-
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state relationship, they are not outlined in a discussion. What is of importance to this 
chapter then is that in a simple polity, the responsibility of shaping the economy lies 
with the state in its limited form. This is central when the debate turns towards forms 
of legitimation regimes, in relation to the polity and policies, as put forward in the 
previous chapter. 
 
In a compound polity by contrast, the line between state and extra-state actors is more 
complicated to draw as some peak organisations are picked by the state apparatus to 
consult it (Schmitter 1977). In other words, there is an intersection between policy-
makers and policy-takers, with some actors playing on both sides. The policy process 
involves closer relationships with privileged access to the state being granted to 
selected group. The design is said to be „compound‟ or mixed as certain interest 
groups benefit from direct channels towards policy-makers, and are actually more or 
less formally embedded into the decision-taking procedure (Schmidt 2001a, 252). As 
access is not fought for but attributed, the policy-logic is smoother in the sense that 
too radical demands would not have been granted access in the first place (Meineken 
2000). As some of the civil voices are integrated, the policy responsibility is shared. 
Because the state has reached out towards the general population and selected several 
representatives of the civil society, policy is seen as being in the interest of the wider 
society, by definition (Scharpf 1997). Again, these lines of thought are taken up when 
differences of legitimation regimes (Foucault 1984, 72) and individual-state 
relationships are explored in the next section. 
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The Schmidtian notions of „policy sphere‟ and „political sphere‟ (Schmidt 2006a, 
254) are useful tools to clarify the distinction between various types of polities. In a 
simple setup, policy-making refers to the process of collective decision-making that 
only comprises narrowly defined state actors. In a compound polity, there are 
additional actors in the process, like co-opted peak organisations. Schmidt defines the 
institutional locations where policy-making takes place as the „policy sphere‟. The 
sphere of the „political‟, according to Schmidt, only opens once these policies are 
presented to the wider public, to the individual. Communication is hence reduced to 
take place between the state and the individual („arguing‟), whereas the „bargaining‟ 
process is excluded from constituting discursive utterances (Risse 2000; Schmidt 
2008a, 312). This denomination in the form of an opposition between „policy‟ and the 
„political‟ is somewhat unfortunate I argue as it suggests that internal state decisions 
are free from political content (Schmidt 1997, 137) and that they are not facilitating 
particular naïve theories. This is a point that runs counter to the arguments and 
methodology of the thesis and are addressed in more detail with the literature in the 
„sociology of policy instruments‟ in this chapter. 
 
Furthermore, in a compound setting some civil groups are part of both arenas 
rendering the distinction even more complicated to operationalise (De Vries 2010, 97). 
However, Schmidt builds upon this dichotomy when she defines different types of 
„legitimating discourse‟ (Schmidt 2000, 278; Wagenaar and Hartendorp 2000, 147) 
by referring to Habermas‟ concept of communicative action (Habermas 2001; see also 
Dryzek 1990; Scharpf 2003). Thus a somehow artificial dichotomy arises. I use the 
concepts here as heuristic tools, and as such they are useful tools to highlight elements 
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of the theoretical framework of the thesis, as well as of the findings in the empirical 
chapters.  
 
„Coordinative discourse‟ is found internally to the policy sphere, the „public sphere‟ 
(Schmidt 2008a, 309). Hence it occurs when different policy-makers talk to each 
other and try to put together a plan of action. These utterances are coordinative as the 
different sides come to a certain agreement, or not. They coordinate state policy 
among each other (Risse 2000). The notion here is not concerned with the distribution 
of power among interests groups, it merely draws attention to the discursive 
dimension of language in the policy arena. This is important to mention as certain 
interpretations of economic agency are produced and reproduced among policy-
makers (Grube 2010). The literature of „sociology of policy instruments‟ (Lascoumes 
and Le Galès 2007; also Etzioni 1975; Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998) explores how a 
certain setting leads to a narrowing down of the „policy instruments‟ used as some 
appear more legitimate to the policy-makers than others (Howlett 2011, 41). Again, I 
use this approach this strand in relation to specific individual-state relationships. 
 
Then in the political sphere, to use Schmidt‟s terms, the relationship between the state 
and the wider public, „communicative discourse‟ takes place when the policy circle 
justifies, or legitimises, its decisions to the public. This is what some scholars in 
discourse theory look into (Swedlow 2002; Béland 2009). These utterances are 
communicative as the decisions taken are meant to be accepted by the wider public, 
hence the individual as framed here. The acceptance of policies is most likely if the 
ideas promoted can be liked to existing policies, programs and philosophies, or 
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„policy legacies‟ (Schmidt 2002b, 899; also Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, 187; Schmidt 
2008a, 303), hence naïve theories. It is a matter of rhetorically persuading the public 
of the soundness of the economic programme laid out (Finlayson 2006). Here, policy-
makers act towards policy-takers, the latter being the recipients of discourse. In this 
sense, communicative discourse always displays top-down features. Even though 
Schmidt underlines that her framework allows for two-way-interaction (Schmidt 2000, 
285), she works her way down from the policy arena towards the wider public as 
policy-making comes temporarily before its communication. 
 
Both types of discourse are constituted by cognitive and normative elements (Schmidt 
2006a, 255). Cognitive if they try to make a technical argument about why a policy 
measure is appropriate (Desrosières 1998, 6) and normative if such an argument 
involves ideas about how the economy or economic agency should look like 
(Raymond and Olive 2009). Here it is explicit that policy-makers try to push the 
system into a certain direction, in a way that is based upon certain world-views 
(Chadwick 2000). Schmidt argues that coordinative discourse i.e. between actors 
internal to the state apparatus, is mostly characterised by its cognitive content and that 
communicative discourse i.e. between state actors and the wider public displays more 
normative features (Schmidt 2006a, 255). 
 
Constructivist institutionalism hence assumes that policy-makers are on the same 
level as they can discuss matters in a technical way, and that the wider public needs to 
be convinced by the programmes enacted. Schmidt does not deny that certain policy-
actors are more powerful than others, but she highlights the political aspects of 
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communicative discourse over the coordinative one. This is done in a way that tends 
to explain away centrally political features from intra-regime discourse, not so much 
the politics of the „arguing‟ process itself, but its outcome. In the end, the decision 
made collectively is also political in relation to the individual as it depicts some 
conceptions of economic life as more appropriate than others. In other words, it is in 
the coordinative phase that varieties of what constitutes good economic agency are 
marginalised, where certain policy instruments and interventions are delegitimated. 
 
In sum, by distinguishing between the technical aspects of intra-state discourse and 
the moral elements of individual-state discourse, Schmidt inadvertently misses out on 
two sets of political elements of coordinative discourse. However, the latter are 
central to the attempts of thesis to present additional political features of varieties of 
economic regimes. First, it is here that various legitimation strategies are debated in 
relation to a particular issue. For the case of housing policy for instance, various 
arguments are presented for and against supporting state initiatives to promote home 
ownership. In other words, it is here that it is decided upon which sets of naïve 
theories to be facilitated in relation to the individual, and which ones are excluded 
from the rationale for state intervention as they are deemed inadequate. As outlined in 
the previous chapter, this narrowing down of the potentially many varieties of axio-
rationalities to promote takes place not so much in the communicative but in the 
coordinative phase of discourse. Second, such a distinction is blind towards the taken-
for-granted conceptions of policy-makers themselves (Hussein and Le Galès 2010). In 
the debates of what naïve theories to facilitate, policy-makers might have a bias 
towards certain types of interpretation of economic phenomena. This is also captured 
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by the notion of „state traditions‟ (Crouch 1993) but is also influenced by the concrete 
features of the individual-state relationship.  
 
This is also the reason why the empirical cases studies mainly use parliamentary 
debates as they are sources of coordinative discourse. In the case of home ownership 
markets, what is important to focus on are the legitimation arguments brought forward 
by various policy-actors as they close off certain understandings of the homeowner 
and of the market. At the same time, such a discourse also outlines a larger framework 
of accepted meanings, the latter constituting the taken-for-granted conceptions about 
what home ownership is supposed to be, and how markets are supposed to work. In 
other words then, the silences in parliamentary debates are as important as the 
utterances as the both give hints at which views are heavily discussed and which go 
unchallenged as they are taken-for-granted. These moral assumptions then translate 
and are reflected in the concrete policy interventions. Put differently, the taken-for-
granted conceptions influence which naïve theories are facilitated though state 
policies. 
 
For the sake of illustration, the following picture emerges when the three dichotomies 
are taken together. The table below is meant to constitute a heuristic guide, not to be 
interpreted as displaying ontological dichotomies. Indeed, these terms are used to 
bring out additional political features in the case studies, not to set out a back-and-
white theory.    
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Simple polity     Compound polity 
Limited policy circle    Extended policy circle 
Mostly communicative discourse  Mostly coordinative discourse 
Mostly normative content   Mostly cognitive content  
3 Relevance and Critique of Constructivist Institutionalism 
At this stage I would like to explain in more detail why and how this approach is 
embraced with regard to the argument by discussing the notions developed in earlier 
chapters in relation to the constructivist institutionalist perspective. At the same time I 
point out the elements this chapter adds. 
 
First of all, I have argued in chapter two that most of the comparative capitalism 
literature tends to turn a blind eye to the individual-state relationship. The framework 
outlined here adds to this point by putting polities and their relationships with the 
wider public into the centre of the analysis (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, 192). But 
what is just as important is the way in which the political is integrated here. The state 
is not seen as an agent that is at the periphery of economic activity and acts through 
setting the legal framework to markets as some contributions to VoC have suggested 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, 2), but as an organism that is constitutive of economic life 
through its interactive relationship with the individual (Becker 2010). State legislation 
should be regarded as constitutive rules, not only regulative ones (Searle 1996). Also, 
against the constructivist institutionalist strand that just posits the importance of the 
state and then goes on with the individual in a rather superficial way or turns towards 
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the firm (Schmidt 2008c, 306), the approach here is different. As the previous chapter 
has outlined, the relevance of the state in this analysis logically follows from an 
ontology of the individual, and not from an analysis of state outputs as such.  
 
Secondly, I further turn the spotlight towards the individual. Even though the 
literature here does not build the ontological bases for all its claims, constructivist 
institutionalism does integrate the individual into the domain of economic activity, 
even though this is done more or less implicitly. By stressing the embeddedness of the 
policy sphere into a larger arena of legitimation and discourse (Schmidt 1999, 142), 
the theory introduces the wider public, and hence the individual in a way that is 
unseen in either VoC or the comparative capitalisms literature. Indeed, it links the 
individual to (discursive) state activities. It implicitly states that economic regimes 
rely on popular acceptance (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, 187; Schmidt 2008a, 303). 
Without making those links explicit, constructivist institutionalist scholars still link 
macro-issues with micro-processes (Scharpf 2000; Mabee 2007). How households 
interpret and make sense of their economic environment matters to the functioning of 
an economic regime, a point that I have made throughout, especially with the notion 
of micro-macro complementarities. The reproach formulated to the institutionalist 
body of literature here is that it is too cautious and implicit in fully revealing the 
deeper theoretical stances it makes.  
 
Thirdly, just as I have explained in the previous chapter, the inclusion of the state and 
of the individual opens the spectrum to go “beyond politics as usual” (Schmidt 2009a, 
1). It is at this point that the concept of the indeterminate mind comes back in to 
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consolidate the discursive analysis. As a reminder, the thesis posits that the human 
mind is not a universal constant and thus allows for variations of interpretation of the 
material and human world. Even she is not explicit about this, this also forms the 
point of departure on which Schmidt starts from when she introduces the notion of 
discourse and legitimation. Focussing on communicative discourse as a locus where 
governments convince the public about the rightfulness of certain policies, she 
assumes that there are different ways of interpreting the lived environment, and that 
certain polities come up with different discourses of legitimating their actions. In a 
sense, this argument as such presupposes an indeterminate mind, one that is open to 
potentially various modes of sense-making, hence sets of naïve theories. As I have 
argued before, once the ontologically prior elements of the individual are set out, the 
state becomes a relevant unit of observation, it is just that such an exposition rarely is 
proceeded with. 
 
Another connection with my approach can be established. By enacting a specific 
discourse towards the individual, communicative but also coordinative, state policies 
try to achieve a modification of the axiological context into which economic agency 
takes place. It hence acts upon the ideas and interests held by everyday people 
(Schmidt 2008a; also McLennan 2004). The normativity of these efforts manifests the 
desire to change the interpretative frame of private agents towards their economic 
behaviour. In this sense, facilitations act upon the social environment of good and bad, 
the context into which economic rationality is embedded. Even though Schmidt does 
not talk about rationality, the links to previous discussions in the previous chapter are 
straightforward. In line with what I have argued, she tacitly implies that there is no 
such thing as fixed political ends but that they are fought over. Indeed, when she 
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makes claims about more or less successful normative statements (Schmidt 2002b, 
899; Schattschneider 1960), she assumes that economic rationality can have various 
ends.  Indeed, normativity has been defined as being about the why? of action, about 
the good and the bad options for a society to head towards. 
 
I have thus displayed how the constructivist institutionalist setup fits with the 
framework developed so far, and how it adds new notions upon it, such as the 
concepts of polity, policy arena, and cognitive and normative elements. At the same 
time, I have foreshadowed how the concepts of axio-rationality and moral ends can be 
integrated into institutional settings. Most importantly though, what this exposition 
has demonstrated is how a recourse to constructivist theories such as constructivist 
institutionalism is able to start drawing out additional political aspects of varieties of 
capitalism. In the empirical chapters then, I operationalise the theoretical innovations 
developed in the framework in the comparative context of state interventions into 
subjectivities prevalent in housing and mortgage markets. For now, the argument now 
turns towards the question of how different polities influence the relationship between 
the individual and the state, and asserts that the state design has deeply political 
consequences for economic agency.  
4 Polities and the Individual-State Relationship 
Now that it has been explained why the constructivist institutionalist literature is 
tapped into, the argument develops in more detail how the individual can be brought 
into the analysis of economic regimes in a way that highlights the political features of 
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individual-state relationships more explicitly. This section thus combines the elements 
of the ontology of the individual, developed in chapter two, with those taken from the 
institutionalist approach outlined just above. I use the notions of individual-state 
relationships and legitimation regimes to set out differences in the way that state 
policies and definitions of economic agency interact in the (re)production of a specific 
variety of capitalism. As outlined before, it is crucial to consider how the individual 
relates to the state (as an institution and as a set of policies) and vice versa to better 
understand the features of state actions upon economic subjectivities and facilitation 
efforts in relation to a particular axio-rationality. This is mainly done through the 
operationalization of the concept of legitimacy (Weber 1918; Zelditch 2001). The 
issues raised hereafter attempt to shed light into differences in the institutional setup 
of the state and in the policy instruments employed. At the same time, the 
implications for the type of individual-state relationship observable in the case studies 
are set out.  
 
As has been presented above, the distinction between certain polities is concerned 
with the extent of the policy arena. With compound polities falling back onto the 
advice of peak organisations and simple polities isolating the policy-making process 
to a much smaller set of actors, the positioning of the individual-state relationship 
differs considerably. These institutional features lead to a certain „justificatory 
message‟ of an economic regime and are a „device for legitimation‟ of particular state 
action and state setup (Obradovic 1996, 191). For the moment, I am concerned with 
the systemic legitimation (polity level), not the legitimation of precise policies (policy 
level; Gourevitch 1986, 17; McKay 2000). In a simple setup, the delimitations of who 
is in and who is out of the decision-process are clearly established. In other words, 
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there is a demarcation between the „in‟ and the „out‟, between policy-makers and 
policy-takers to use the previously used terms (Streeck and Thelen 2005; also see 
Maloney et al. 1994). Apart from leading to different power configurations in the 
policy-making process, it entails a direct connection between the state and the 
individual. In this case, responsibility for running the economy lays with the state, in 
its narrow form, and the wider public is the recipient of the programmes and the 
discourse that the state decides upon. The legitimacy of the regime then also needs to 
be generated directly in relation to the individual. In methodological terms, this means 
that the framing of policies in the parliament should feature direct attributions to the 
individual. 
 
The feedback mechanism hence takes place outside the policy sphere itself as it 
passes though the individual (Alexander 2000). Not only is the policy sphere reduced, 
but it is the discursive interaction between the state and the individual that decides 
how popular and successful a policy intervention is (Wallner 2008). In the context of 
the human mind being open to normative schemes of interpretation, it is assumed that 
it is the state‟s task to present a consistent theory of which ends economic agency is 
meant to achieve. The individual expects the state to come up with an explanation of 
how it considers economic subjectivities and that it communicates this through direct 
channels (Seabrooke 2010). State policies are then concerned with persuading the 
individual of the decisions enacted. 
 
Consequently the communicative effort by state actors to convince society about the 
appropriateness of its policy agenda is at the forefront, just as the constructivist 
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institutionalist approach suggests. Moreover, the normativity of such action is 
acknowledged in the very attempt to convince. Indeed, the state needs to make clear 
in which ways its policy recommendations are „good‟. However, and this presents a 
break with the constructivist institutionalist literature, even though the communicative 
channel is referred to here, the thesis is more interested in the political aspects of 
parliamentary debates as they highlight the deeper taken-for-granted assumptions of a 
particular rationale for state intervention. Indeed, the arena where different sets of 
naïve theories are fought over is the coordinative discourse. To use Schmidtian 
terminology, the „background ideational abilities‟ play out in this arena (Schmidt 
2008a, 303), the communicative channel relating the latter. As described, it is these 
taken-for-granted conceptions of policy-makers that structure state interventions in 
particular ways, hence facilitating particular sets of naïve theories. 
 
In a compound polity then, it is harder to clearly delineate the policy arena as some 
groups play in both camps, being involved with policy-making and policy-taking. 
Logically extending the constructivist literature to the individual-state relationship, 
this blurred line has consequences for the way in which the individual relates to the 
policy process and its outcomes. Indeed, as the party system in simple polities tends 
to be more consensus-based with coalition governments, sanctioning the parties in 
power is harder (Lijphart 1999, 31). At the same time, the co-opting of peak 
associations integrates civil concerns into the policy-arena so that there exists a 
bottom-up channel of communications that attenuate the potential radical demands 
(Meineken 2000). In a sense then, the individual plays a lesser role in a compound 
polity as it is difficult to make out a small circle of actors that are responsible for 
unpopular policies. In other words, the design per se accommodates for legitimate 
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policy-outcomes (Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 518). Outputs are seen as legitimate 
because the process by which they are formulated are deemed legitimate. 
 
This also influences the kinds of discourse used. As the feedback mechanism for the 
design of policies is internal to the policy sphere, the coordinative discourse plays a 
bigger role, just as noticed in the constructivist institutionalist literature. The 
responsibility is mixed and at times unclear as the policy process involves a wider 
range of actors. Political actors and the everyday person assume that peak 
organisations have better knowledge about how the economic regime works, and that 
hence the policy output is „better‟. As policy-makers integrate the demands of 
(particular parts of) civil society when designing the policies, the outcome is meant to 
benefit the collectivity. State policies then have less need to convince the individual 
about the appropriateness of a programme, as the form of policies itself act as a 
legitimation tool. Also, the arguments are less normative as they have already been 
approved by some selected parts of society. Again, the thesis is not so much interested 
in the communicative side of discourse, but highlights these differences to explain the 
positioning of the individual-state relationship in different polity environments. At the 
same time, these differences translate into the coordinative discourse and the way that 
state policies are legitimated in such utterances. 
 
This chapter demonstrates bit by bit how an explanation engrained into an ontology of 
the individual is able to expand the constructivist institutionalist literature and to bring 
out the political aspects of individual-state relationship, more particularly as far as 
polities are concerned. This subsequently allows for the inclusion of additional 
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political elements into the comparative capitalisms literature. The concepts of 
indeterminate mind, axio-rationality, technical means and moral ends are now applied 
to the individual-state relationship read through an extended version of constructivist 
institutionalism. It has been explained how varieties of interpretation of moral ends 
are possible, and how state discourse plays a role in the fixing effort of the human 
indeterminacy, itself an inevitably political move. The detour presented above embeds 
this discussion into a set of particular institutions that influence how the individual 
and his/her agency are addressed by policy-makers. The final part of the argument 
claims that policy outcomes in terms of the facilitated subjectivities are influenced by 
institutional design (Goodin 1996). In methodological terms, apart from the 
parliamentary struggles over a certain interpretation of economic phenomena, the 
polity context needs to be explored to shed light into comprehend the form and 
content of the naïve theories facilitated. 
 
In simple polities, the state has the objective to persuade the individual about the 
appropriateness of its policies. The content of such policies not only needs to be 
framed in individual terms in the communicative discourse (Schmidt 2007, 993), but 
the coordinative discourse also needs to take this into account. Indeed, the policy 
needs to be designed in a way as to feature elements that benefit the individual 
directly, independently of the socio-economic standing of the particular person. As 
such, because state policies try to appeal to as wide a population as possible and 
explain why the path it has chosen is the right one for the individual per se, the target 
of policy tends to be the individual directly (Frank et al. 1995). The individual is 
understood in abstract terms without distinguishing between the various social 
categories that such an individual comprises in practice. In such a simple setup, 
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individuals form the basis of policy-making as the legitimation regime attempts to get 
as many individuals as possible on its side in relation to a specific programme (Smoke 
1994). Again, legitimacy is only gained in the interaction between the state and the 
individual though state outputs. The concept of output legitimacy is hence relevant in 
this regard (Scharpf 1999; Schaefer 2006), just as is the „delegate model of 
representation‟ (Miller and Stokes 1963). 
 
In compound polities however, the logic is that the state calls upon specialist 
knowledge in order to analyse the economic situation and takes the measures required 
(Bader 2008). This technically-framed approach emphasises coordinative discourse in 
the sense that it is about how to maximise the general benefits of the policy field, the 
economy for instance (Bressers et al. 2011). The policy-target is the collective 
wellbeing, and the policy-process includes organisations from civil society that bring 
particular issues onto the table. However, as those groups have been selected to 
represent large economic issues for the economy, they are often linked with macro-
concerns that state policies also support (Heise 2008). The individual per se does not 
form the basis of policy-making. Less openly normative elements find their way into 
both types of discourse as the state is concerned with finding the „best‟ solution over a 
certain time horizon. That means normative elements are often covered in technical 
language. As the state has already concerted parts of society, the policy output is 
legitimate by procedure. In contrast to simple polities, the notion of „input legitimacy‟ 
applies in this case (Scharpf 2004), just as the „trustee model of representation‟ does 
(Kay and Silberton 1995) This reflections are hypotheses that are logically drawn 
from an extension of the constructivist institutionalist literature, and against which the 
empirical cases are tested. 
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Differences in legitimation regimes then also play into the framework policy-makers 
adopt (Hall 1993). This is where the argument reaches its final stage as the 
institutional setting acts upon which policy instruments are most probable to be 
implemented (Hood 1991 and 2006; De Vries 2010, 103). The sociology of public 
policy instruments literature is central in regard to types of legitimacy (Lascoumes 
and Le Galès 2007, 12). The policy-actors inside the enlarged policy arena, 
legitimised through the procedures of their own selection (Howlett 2000), regard 
themselves as the manager of the macro-economy, the agents that have an overview 
of the regime and are hence able to adjust its constitutive elements into a functioning 
whole. The relationship with the individual as a policy recipient is only indirect.  
 
Again, logically following from a constructivist institutionalist framework, this leads 
state policies to be more concerned with macro-issues than with addressing the 
individual subjectivities directly. However, even though the state might not undertake 
explicit action to temporarily fix the indeterminate mind by making openly normative 
claims about proper economic behaviour in general, the way it deals with the 
management of the economy still produces certain moral frames of interpretation. The 
depiction of the economy as a whole system where the individual can trust the state 
institution to successfully manage socio-economic outcomes still entails assumptions 
about individual agency. According to the line of thought pursued, the individual is 
regarded as a rather receptive part inside a larger community that is taken care of 
rather than an active entrepreneur of his/her own destiny. In short then, varieties of 
economic regimes come with differences in definitions of economic agency. This is 
captured through the notion of micro-macro complementarities.  
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5 The Politics of Polities 
Once the differences within features of the individual-state relationship have been 
highlighted, it becomes obvious how the term political, as discussed throughout the 
thesis so far, can be applied to these differences of design. Again, picking up on the 
literature on the sociology of policy instruments (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007; Clift 
and Tomlinson 2012), I argue that the differential individual-state relationships entail 
different state perspectives about the economy that are then narrowing the window of 
potential types of policy interventions (Kingdon 1984). This relates back to the taken-
for-granted conceptions of policy-actors alluded to earlier. Again, my approach goes 
beyond the constructivist institutionalist account as I offer a deeper discussion of 
individual-state relationships that is relates to the ontological reflections earlier, and 
that locate the political not only in the „policy arena‟ (Schmidt 2000). Indeed, a 
depiction of coordinative discourse mainly being cognitive or technical is challenged 
in favour of coordination being a deeply political phenomenon (Watson 2005b; 
Thelen and Hume 2006).  
 
As the thesis highlights the effect of state policy upon economic subjectivities, this 
section displays the ways in which this takes place with reference to various 
legitimation processes. The direct relationship between the state and private 
individuals (in a simple setup) entails a model of legitimation that is unmediated. 
Phrased differently, the economic regime can only be justified if a rationale for state 
intervention appeals to the individual. The legitimation process focuses upon output 
legitimacy. For Schmidt, the politics of polities is identifiable in the communicative 
domain between the state and the individual, and links it to the democratic character 
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of a society (Schmidt 2006a, 258). What is considered to be legitimate is fought over 
in the public domain, between state actors and civil society. Such a perspective 
matches with the literature on the „democratic gap‟ of the European institutions as 
they do not perform a unified communicative discourse (Héritier 1999). Not going 
into discussions of which polity is more „democratic‟ as such a debate is beyond this 
thesis, I however claim that Schmidt‟s conceptualisation of the political is limited as it 
is unable to see how the very design of the polity carries political elements (Hall 
1993). Instead, I argue that different polities constitute political entities not only for 
the distributional implications of policies, but also for their setup limits the policy 
instruments chosen. In other words, the ontological bases of polities are political 
themselves. 
 
In a simple institutional setting, following the immediacy of the legitimation regime, 
policy-makers regard private individuals as the core constituents of the economy and 
hence use policy instruments that reflect such an understanding. A general tax break 
in the VAT for all members of society might be an example here. The economic 
system is seen as a collection of individual agents that all act according to a 
calculative rationale that tends to maximise individual well-being. Such conceptions 
lead policy-makers to concentrate on micro-economic issues in the sense of modern 
economic theory (Fourcade and Healy 2007), as being related to individual behaviour. 
The individual per se is seen as the constitutive part of the economy. In order to 
produce macro-economic change, it is the individual that needs to change its 
behaviour. And here we are back to naïve theories of everyday people and the notion 
of axio-rationality. The way to act upon the definition of human agency is to modify 
the meaningful context of interpretation surrounding economic behaviour, as 
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explained in chapter three. In other words, state policies tend to infuse certain moral 
ends into the subjectivities while modifying the naïve theories held. The latter are 
then performed in the practical terms, when it comes to making economic decisions 
(MacKenzie 2006; Langley 2010). The cases of housing and mortgage markets 
analysed later on are economic phenomena that present such loci of individual-state 
interaction. 
 
If state policy acts upon the way the individual makes sense of his own activity, then 
it is able to influence his/her behaviour (Marsh and Tilley 2010). As the economy is 
regarded as the accumulation of a vast number of rational individual agents, policy-
makers might conceive of their action as potentially manufacturing economic 
outcomes through policies that focus on the individual level (Rose 1999). Such efforts 
are targeted at the individual itself, not as a member of a particular social group. An 
immediate legitimation regime thus narrows the window of potential policy 
instruments as it regards those that target the uncategorised individual directly as most 
appropriated (Zahariadis
 
2008). This statement must be seen as carrying political 
content as it marginalises for example policy instruments that act upon the economy 
as a totality made up of various groups of individuals. Such taken-for-granted 
conceptions bias the policy content towards the individual as such, and against the 
collectively as a totality. The example of the tax break for all thus stands against one 
where policies grant such a break only to doctors for instance as they are believed to 
enhance the health, and hence the reproduction, of the whole society.  
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As compound polities derive their legitimacy through a channel that is internal to the 
policy arena, not only is the relationship with the individual more indirect, but the 
way policy-makers themselves see the individual also plays out differently in the 
policies enacted. Policy actors are legitimate representatives of the community 
because they have been selected to be in such a position. Their legitimacy is derived 
from their leadership in society because they know best (Headrick 1992). Policy-
makers in the extended sense regard the economy as a whole, not so much the 
individuals that make up for it (Desrosières 1998, 178). Economic outcomes are not 
simply the aggregation of individual rational behaviours but are the results of a 
complex structure of various trends in society. In contrast to the state in a simple 
polity then, policy-makers here do not use policy instruments that speak to the 
individual per se in the sense that they try to act upon changing his/her incentive 
structure, but that are framed in terms as to produce benefits for the whole of society.  
 
Indeed, a rationale for state intervention identifies certain socio-economic categories 
in the overall economy and attempts to maximise the well-being of each of those 
groups according to their own principles. This is meant to benefit the society as a 
whole. Policy success is then measured in how far society and its subgroups evolve in 
a way that is deemed socially and economically desirable by policy-makers. This can 
be done through the use of statistical analysis as a technical tool of objectifying, hence 
depoliticising, underlying assumptions of good macro-economic performance 
(Habermas 1970; Hecken 2010, 153) that are transmitted throughout time. The 
societal good is hence seen to be of such an importance that it needs to be managed by 
a technocratic elite (Rahman 2011). State actors then address the individual as a 
member of a certain socio-economic category that is deemd to deserve public support. 
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Just as in the case of a simple polity, certain views of the state and of the management 
of the economy in the eyes of policy-makers limit what policies can be enacted. In 
such a meaningful context, a tax break for doctors only makes more sense as they are 
supposed to entail a general rise of health standards. 
 
As a note, it is worth clarifying that what is central here is not only the exact content 
of state policies but also their legitimation. An analysis of the argumentations between 
various policy-makers highlights not only the positions of each, but also the common 
stream of understandings within the latter. Indeed, I argue that in various individual-
state setups, the justificatory narratives presented significantly differ between regimes 
even though that does not undermine the disputed nature of policy-making. In the 
empirical analyses, what is important is to bring out the arguments for why a certain 
kind of state intervention is appropriate, as these utterances are facilitating certain sets 
of naïve theories, in addition to the material aspects of policy directly. At the same 
time, it is also central to look into the assumptions about the economic and of 
conceptions of economic agency that are taken-for-granted, that are not discussed but 
still enacted into legislation. The depiction of who should be granted housing support 
for instance matters, just as does the rationale for why certain households receive 
interest relief on mortgages, to name only a few examples. 
 
Differences in legitimation regimes bring with them different conceptions of the 
individual by policy-makers and hence different state interventions. These differences 
are political per se as the polity structures conceal various policy instruments that are 
the not put into practice when it comes to policy programmes. Again there is violence 
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being performed against some conceptions of how and why to intervene into the 
economy. There are two sets of reasoning here. First, the very observation of 
differences in policy approaches shows that certain kinds of rationale for state 
intervention are more prevalent in some economies than in others because policy-
making is understood in different terms (Hood 2007). Hence, polities exclude 
alternative conceptions of how the individual fits into markets and the economic 
system, they marginalise other naïve theories or even state traditions that have a 
different understanding of the role of the economic agent in society. A more macro-
based perspective that addresses individuals only as a member of a social group 
(compound polity) favours more paternalist state interventions and excludes more 
individualist perspectives of economic agency. In simple polities where individuals 
are considered to be the core constituents of the economic make-up, social groups 
play a less direct role in the policy determination ad the individual per se is seen as 
central. These differences can be denominated as political as institutional setups do 
violence to some policy interventions for the sake of others in an a priori way. 
 
Second, polities are also political as different conceptions of policy instruments entail 
different outcomes for different groups in society (Aninat et al. 2006). In other words, 
they imply distributional consequences. Indeed, a focus upon the individual is likely 
to come with policies that favour the immediate interests of private people, especially 
those that follow state prescriptions about good micro-economic behaviour i.e. in line 
with the moral ends depicted as appropriate (Watson 2008a). As the economy is seen 
as the aggregation of individual capabilities, the state is likely to focus its efforts on 
the maximisation of individual wealth (Watson 2011a, 3). That is not to say that 
macro-concerns are absent from policy reflections, but the means to achieve them 
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pass directly through economic agency. Logically then, private consumers should 
benefit more in relative terms from such an institutional setting than producers do, as 
they are the targets of policy measures. As a reminder, this is due to the legitimation 
regime that is centred on a direct individual-state relationship. 
 
On the other hand, a state that closely consults with peak associations and acquires its 
legitimacy through its self-declared knowledge on what is best for its citizens, hence 
economic agents, is more likely to produce results that are favourable to the 
organisations that advise it. Firstly because it tends to follow their suggestions as they 
can organise their consultancy effort collectively (Lowery 2004). Secondly the latter 
are regarded as central intermediary actors in the successful management of the 
economy (Xiarchogiannopoulou 2010, 21). The targets of policies are social groups 
but also the peak organisations and economic sectors they represent, not individuals 
directly. It is thus likely that, relatively speaking, those associations that are best 
organised are able to move policy outcomes into a direction that benefits the 
economic parties they represent (Boll 1994). Unless there is a strong policy player 
that defends the interests of individual consumers, the producers should be privileged 
in such a setup. Again, these are hypotheses that the cases in the next chapters test. 
 
I have outlined two dimensions to the notion of the political here, one is conceptual, 
the other one that logically follows from the first is material in terms of the 
distribution of power and outcomes. It is noticeable that this is a translation of the 
principles that have also outlined the political characteristics of naïve theories set out 
in the previous chapter. Indeed, it is the policy-makers‟ conceptions of how the 
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individual relates to the economy and to the state that influences which interventions 
are to be performed. The concept of naïve theories has just been re-applied to policy-
makers themselves. At the same time, the notion of state traditions (Dyson 1980, 3) 
entails that the state displays an institutional memory (Stein 1997, 732). Consequently, 
whatever the motive, state interventions are political to the same degree as naïve   
theories are, ontologically and in distributional terms.  
 
In relation to coordinative discourse, caution needs to be applied when analysing 
policy argumentations. Indeed, however objectified policies might be debated about, 
they always bear a political character (Swanson 2008). First they are always carriers 
of normative or prescriptive statements about certain socio-economic groups, either 
loaded with positive or negative connotations. That is also why this thesis is more 
oriented towards coordinative discourse in its empirical studies than to the 
communicative discourse. Indeed, parliamentary analyses are investigating the 
debates internal to the state apparatus, and hence those that infiltrate a particular 
rationale for state intervention. The very way of how policy-makers talk to each other 
carries normative weight as it reproduces certain views of how to conceive of 
economic agency and the individual-state relationship. It is this weight that inevitably 
is also carried through in the material aspects of the policies themselves and hence 
facilitates certain naïve theories. Again what is central are the justificatory narratives 
employed to legitimate certain policy interventions. As such a technical approach to 
collective issues is as political as an openly normative one as both represent their way 
of dealing with them as appropriate and delegitimize the other one (Habermas 1970, 
48).  
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To sum up the novel forms of the political that the theoretical chapters have outlined, 
I have first come back to the ontology of the individual developed in the previous 
chapter. The framework has started to make a case for the indeterminacy of the 
human mind and for the central role that naïve theories play in our understanding and 
reproduction of the world around us. By exposing the concept of axio-rationality that 
shifts attention towards the moral ends of human agency, the thesis has opened the 
possibility of varieties of interpretations of economic life. And as some 
conceptualisations are adopted over others, naïve theories themselves are political, 
first because they exclude other understandings of the economy (1) and second as 
they lead to behaviour that is relatively more beneficial to some actors than to others 
(2). Then, once we agree that the state, as a modern institution that is regarded as 
being a managing actor of contemporary economic processes, acts upon the moral 
ends of behaviour through state policies and upon the way economic agency is 
defined, a second layer of the political is added. There are varieties of how the 
individual-state plays out through policy-making in relation to the individual 
indeterminacy. On the one hand, certain taken-for-granted assumptions and state 
traditions influence which policy instruments are judged to be adequate, and which 
interventions are deemed improper. As such, they marginalise alternative policy 
interventions (3). On the other hand, the political also lays in the content more 
directly as they influence what socio-economic groups benefit most from them (4). 
In addition to the distributional aspects of policies as understood in the literature 
review chapter and as captured by Lasswell (Lasswell 1936, what has been 
conceptualised here under (4)), this theoretical framework offers three additional 
feature to accounts of comparative capitalisms. The politics of naïve theories, per se 
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(1) and in their distributional implications (2), and the politics of polities in 
ontological/theoretical terms (3). The table below schematises such a contribution. 
 
The Political Aspects in Capitalist Diversity 
        focus 
 
level of analysis 
Ontological level, 
theoretical 
Policy level, distributional 
micro 
„good‟ and „bad‟ naïve 
theories (1) 
naïve theories: „good‟ and 
„bad‟ individual behaviour (2) 
macro 
Polities: „good‟ and „bad‟ 
political systems, taken-
for-granted conceptions (3) 
„good‟ and „bad‟ policies: 
material implications (4) 
 
 
Before moving on to the application of the theoretical framework developed in the 
last two chapters, I introduce the rationale behind the case selections. I shortly explain 
why the economies of the United Kingdom and Germany are chosen, as well as their 
respective housing and mortgage markets. 
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6 Conclusion: British and German Housing and Mortgage Markets 
As the second part of the theoretical framework that underlies the thesis, this chapter 
has opened the black box of the individual-state relationship and explored the 
implications of differences in such relationships. The aim was to link together the 
concepts of the individual and the state developed in the previous chapter in a more 
detailed way, and to present the politics of state traditions. After having gone over the 
essential elements of the constructivist institutionalist literature in the form of a 
discussion of the delimitations of the policy-arena and of coordinative and 
communicative types of discourse, the chapter has developed an argument about 
varieties of individual-state relationships based upon differences in legitimation 
regimes. The central point is that the different polities imply different justificatory 
narratives. The form/targeting and content of the latter influence the way policy-
makers depict the individual, and hence how legislation is legitimated. As far as the 
political elements are concerned, the setup of the individual-state relationship must be 
seen as political as it narrows down the window of possible state interventions, and 
hence the sets of naïve theories that can potentially be facilitated. To use 
Bourdieusian language (Bourdieu 1980, 88), naïve theories are structuring and 
structured at the same time, structuring interpretations of the lived environment, and 
structured through particular individual-state relationship and polities.  
 
In the following chapters the British and German polities and policies directed 
towards home ownership and mortgage markets are analysed in line with the literature 
review and the framework presented here. The case selection follows from the overall 
argument. As presented in chapter two, the British and German economies have been 
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classified as displaying different, if not opposed, characteristics on a whole range of 
factors from internal firm structures to their banking system (Anderton 1999; Gospel 
et al. 2011; Hall and Soskice 2001, 19). As the argument is concerned with showing 
how differences in capitalist economies, more specifically in taken-for-granted 
perceptions, naïve theories, policy interventions and polities play out in practice, these 
cases have been picked to carve out what amount of difference can be found in these 
areas. From the literature, the UK is taken as the example of a simple polity whereas 
Germany is assumed to be a compound polity (Schmidt 2002a, 113). I thus follow the 
same logic than the VoC literature and the works in constructivist institutionalism, but 
apply a novel method to demonstrate that the political aspects of varieties in economic 
setups are more complex and layered as the current literature suggests. 
 
The rationale is to demonstrate that not only do these varieties of capitalism feature 
different firm-specific variations, but that they are also characterised by differences in 
the way the individual, the state, and the economy are conceptualised in both 
economies. These variations then entail different approaches to policy-making when it 
comes to housing and mortgage market intervention, but also different political 
outcomes (Smith 1990). What is investigated is not only which conceptions of 
economic agency have been facilitated in the cases selected, but also which political 
consequences such differences had. Indeed, the central argument of the thesis is that 
once a particular constructivist framework is set out, it allows to investigate variations 
of socio-economic organisation that come with different positionings of the individual 
within them. As the individual-state relationship differs, so do its political features. 
However, the definition of the economic subject in relation to the state is always 
political, as developed in these chapters. The home ownership and mortgage markets 
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then not only differ in how home owners and mortgagers are made sense of as agents 
within such market mechanisms, but also how such naïve theories are political in 
themselves. 
 
For these two countries, the housing market has been opted as it displays very 
different price trajectories, especially as owned houses go (OECD 2005). But most 
importantly, the housing market is a space where the individual and state policies 
come together in a discursive way (Marston 2002). On the one hand housing 
decisions are taken by all of the citizens at some point in their lives, on the other hand 
due to the high amount of financial assets involved in this market, it plays an 
important role in the overall economy (IMF 2011). The very existence of housing 
policy is an indicator of a rationale for state intervention addressing the moral ends of 
the good home owner and good mortgager. Furthermore, there is potentially a 
reasonable degree of uncertainty in how to conceive of such a good as 
accommodation. Also, as housing is a domain that has traditionally been conceived of 
as a good that features at the edge of the private-public dichotomy, it is a topic that is 
susceptible to justificatory narratives as far as state interventions are concerned 
(Mortensen and Seabrooke 2008).  
 
An investigation according to the concepts described here is therefore plausible, 
especially in the context of these economies displaying very different house price 
trajectories over the last decades. In other words, various types of accommodation 
have been valued according to different logics over time in the UK and Germany. The 
thesis argues that those differences cannot be explained without a closer look at the 
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individual-state relationship in both countries in the context of state policies 
addressing the economic subject/self. As the most recent house price boom gained 
momentum in 1997, that is the start of the time frame under investigation. The end 
date is 2007 when British house price dropped rather dramatically in the midst of 
what is now called the credit crisis (Lanchester 2010). 
 
The respective mortgage markets were added to the analysis as most of the 
explanations of the British house price bubble lay with the credit regulations around 
mortgages that fed into the housing market (Crouch 2009; Young 2009; Brassett et al. 
2010). The connection between the two spheres is not only purely economic (Miles 
2011), but also relates to the naïve theories held about them. Indeed, as a mortgage is 
often a tool to enter the housing market, the individual potentially sees the two 
domains as closely linked. Indeed, mortgages or loans are products that most of the 
households come across in their life at some point. This means that they have some 
conceptions of what they are and how and why they can be made use of, for 
themselves and as products in specialised markets. At the same time, if mortgages are 
essential to the economy, then state policies could address them as well. In other 
words, mortgage markets are a place where the individual-state relationship plays out. 
The same observation period is taken here so to analyse state interventions and 
households behaviour in the two markets in parallel. The hypothesis then is that 
similar naïve theories and legitimation regimes are found for the two economic 
spheres within the same economic setting, and that differences are observed between 
economies. 
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Chapter 5:  Naïve Theories of the British Housing Market 
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1 Introduction 
After the theoretical chapters, this part of the thesis is looking at the empirical cases in 
order to apply the framework laid out beforehand. The next two chapters are dealing 
with the political aspects of state interventions into the meanings of the owned home 
and of the mortgage in the British context of a particular individual-state relationship. 
The two analyses follow each other as the hypothesis is that the naïve theories about 
the definition of economic agency and of market mechanisms display similar features 
between these two spheres of economic activity. This follows from the notion of axio-
rationality as set out in chapter three where the meaningful context shapes the ways in 
which the human being makes sense of what an economic agent is supposed to be. As 
a reminder, the notion of naïve theories refers to the explanations that everyday 
people have about the interpretation of their lived environment and their position 
within it. As such, they are naïve as they represent a simplified narrative about the 
economic roles of the individual. As such, the thesis is interested in what Gramsci has 
called the „collective man‟ (Gramsci 1971, 242), meaning the ideal-typical human 
being in an abstract sense. The notion of „agency‟ then also relates to this individual, 
not the agential features of the individual taken on its own, as a single person. Again, 
the thesis in interested in exactly this normative, and hence political depiction of a 
certain kind of economic agent, or „economic man‟ (Watson 2011b). 
 
After these analyses the same method is applied to the German cases. Indeed, as the 
previous chapters have mentioned, the additional political characteristics of models of 
capitalism are discovered through a comparative method, comparing the actual 
conceptions of economic phenomena either to other theoretically imaginable ones 
(Soeffner 2004, 28), or other observed ones. As mentioned earlier, the very discovery 
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of varieties of economic regimes assumes the possibility for variations of how to 
make sense of the world, the latter having been explained in some detail in chapter 
three and four.  Whereas these chapters have proceeded in the first way and have 
hence laid the theoretical foundations, the following are drawing comparisons 
between actual differences between varieties of naïve theories about how to make 
sense of this „economic man‟. All of these chapters act in two interconnected ways in 
relation to the earlier expositions. 
 
Firstly, they demonstrate how the theoretical developments can be operationalised in 
a way as to bring out differences in socio-economic models of economic organisation 
that have been hidden  from the literature so far as explained in chapter two. I have 
argued in the review chapter that not only does VoC tend to shy away from a deeper 
look into concrete individual-state relationships (and that it can learn from the 
constructivist institutionalist literature), but also that merely bringing back the state 
into comparative capitalisms is a move that does not go far enough in order to unravel 
different political aspects in capitalist diversity. In chapters three and four I have then 
outlined an alternative framework to more fully integrate the individual and the state 
into an analysis of contemporary capitalist regimes. The individual is understood as 
this „collective man‟ and the state being seen as an institution as well as a set of 
policies that act in relation to the making of such an economic agent. The empirical 
contributions showcase this approach by focusing on the exact individual-state 
relationships with respect to specific markets, the British and German home 
ownership and mortgage markets in this case. They then link back to the concepts of 
naïve theories, axio-rationality, means and ends, legitimation regimes, polities and 
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most importantly, the various notions of the political as summarized at the end of the 
previous chapter. 
 
Secondly, the chapters ahead should also be considered to be contributions in their 
own rights as they offer empirical findings about a field of study that the comparative 
capitalisms discipline has not fully engaged with for now (see Schwarz and 
Seabrooke 2009, 1 as an exception here). Indeed, not only are most housing studies 
separate from current endeavors in political economy as a discipline, but more 
generally so are also investigations into consumer markets (Saunders 1990). It is true 
that some scholars have started to explore similar paths of enquiry (Langley 2007; 
Watson 2010), but none of them has linked their efforts to models of capitalist types 
of organization. Indeed, their reading of the individual is in one sense deeper in 
sociological terms as they are more directly interested in the agential features of the 
individual taken individually. On the other hand, this level of analysis is rather 
difference to the attempts here in terms of the ´collective man´. The following insights 
into state policies as regard housing and mortgage markets, and hence with economic 
agency per se can be seen as an attempt to bring in consumption concerns into the 
study of comparative political economy (Iles 2006). 
 
The following chapter investigates the meanings of the owned house facilitated in the 
British rationale for state intervention and the conceptions of economic agency that 
such efforts were accompanied by. The central question to be answered is which 
naïve theories state policy was depicting as adequate in the ownership market over the 
period 1997 to 2007, a time that saw significant property price hikes (Cutler 2002). In 
other words, what is the axio-rationality that was linked to economic agency, and 
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which moral ends was home ownership supposed to have in the British context 
(Forrest and Murie 1994). In other words, which naïve theories were promoted 
through particular state policies, in terms of legislation and shared conceptions of 
such an economic man discussed in the British polity. These conceptions are related 
to three more specific enquiries. First and foremost, I am interested in the economic 
subjectivities of the home owner, in the moral baggage that was attached to this 
notion and what political dimensions they comprised. The notion of the political 
refers back to the discussions in earlier chapters in the sense of distributional 
outcomes but also in terms of the side-lining of alternative definitions of economic 
agency. 
 
Second, and this follows from the developments in chapter four, I also investigate the 
depiction of the role of the state by policy-makers themselves, the ways in which the 
individual-state relationship was understood by policy-makers and how such 
understandings were stating to engage with in regards to this stereotyped home owner 
though legislative initiatives. This relates back to the political aspects of polities and 
the taken-for-granted notions of policy-makers themselves as outlined in the previous 
chapter. Indeed, the thesis argues that the features of the individual-state relationship 
themselves as well as the exact depiction of the moral ends of state policies are deeply 
political. Third, this chapter also investigates the relationship between economic 
agency, markets, and state policies more generally. Which were the assumptions 
about economic agency that the state policies were depicting as most adequate in the 
case of the home ownership market? Overall then, questions relating to the making of 
the market participants are at the core of the chapters ahead, combined with insights 
into the particular understandings of market processes (Clift and Woll 2011). These 
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developments follow on from the theoretical explanations in the previous three 
chapters that have demonstrated the political features of the method suggested in this 
thesis. Indeed, policies are seen to be political as they do violence to alternative axio-
rationalities but also as they influence distributional outcomes. Indeed, by breaking 
with universally valid definitions for the relevance of states as put forward by 
comparative capitalist scholars, and providing a framework that focusses on the 
concrete individual-state relationship as well as their variations, these chapters 
demonstrate the political aspects behind such specific conceptions (Clift 2012). What 
becomes central are the differential understandings of economic phenomena such as 
home ownership and the market for owned homes in the cases analysed hereafter
8
. 
 
In order to present the argument, the chapter operates in a series of steps. After this 
introduction, I first present the housing programmes implemented by the British state 
policies to set out the general policy approach. I also start highlighting the underlying 
assumptions that such policies were making and what contradictions they were 
subject to.  The exact economic and social terms in which the home owner as well as 
the housing market were legitimated also come into focus. This then relates to the 
moral ends facilitated, as well as to the political aspects of such policy interventions. 
Second, the chapter moves on to investigate depictions of the state by policy-makers 
in its capacity of „market-enabler‟. I explain what such conceptions meant in terms of 
the relationship between the individual, the state, and the housing market. It is here 
                                                        
8
 Even though the thesis makes no explicit claims about what is now denominated by the term 
„sub-prime crisis‟ (Brassett et al. 2009), the argument puts forward that state action has 
contributed to the generation of conditions that have then sustained particular developments 
in the housing and mortgage markets. As those developments are now largely being accused 
of causing the crisis (Rajan 2010: 37), this thesis can be read as an investigation into a state 
project in the run-up of the said crisis (Ötsch et al. 2010). However, it is not the intent of the 
author to present a comprehensive review of the causes of the current situation, nor are the 
claims made in relation to the crisis. 
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where the topic of the making of a particular type of economic agency, hence axio-
rationality, comes to the forefront as I underline how certain state initiatives were 
contributing to build a specific understanding not only of the home owner, but also of 
the individual as a market participant more generally. Third, the argument turns 
towards macro-economic implications resulting from the micro-economic 
subjectivities enacted. More particularly, I investigate how the British policy-makers 
interpreted rising house price trajectories, and what actions or non-actions were 
undertaken as a reaction to them. Again, I come back to the economic but also 
political tensions in the policies outlined. The conclusion sums up the main findings 
and links over to the subsequent chapter on mortgage market interventions. 
 
As far as the methodology goes, I have looked at the most relevant parliamentary 
discussions as far as housing and home ownership are concerned. The rationale for 
such a focus stems from the theoretical discussions in the last chapters. As the thesis 
is interested in the making of the „collective man‟, the main channel for state policies 
to facilitate certain sets of naïve theories (in relation to housing) is discourse (Jacobs 
and Manzi 1996). The data gathered are hence utterances from policy-makers 
themselves in order to shed light into their conceptions of economic agency that then 
translated into policy initiatives. Again, this relates back to the discussions of chapter 
four and the taken-for-granted conceptions of policy-makers. Even though Schmidt 
tends to focus on the communicative part of discourse as these statements are directly 
addressed toward the individual (Schmidt 2008a, 309), the thesis focuses on the 
coordinative side for reasons related to the previous chapter. Indeed, the arena were 
various interpretations of economic phenomena are fought over is not so much the 
public one, but the domain of policy-making itself (Piscopo 2011). It is a space where 
 
 
153 
 
the justificatory narratives of state interventions become apparent as they are 
explicated in relation to wider spheres of the economy (Vanderbeck and Johnson 
2011). 
 
In other words, it is here where the normative elements of a particular rationale for 
state intervention shine through, as characteristics of interventions that are (at least 
momentarily) shared among the policy-makers. At the same time, an analysis of such 
debates is best suited to reveal the taken-for-granted assumptions of policy-makers 
themselves that then limit the range of policy tools deemed appropriate, also in 
housing policy (Mandic and Clapham 1996, 86; Ruonavaara 1996, 90). As such, 
attention to communicative discourse does not allow highlighting the political 
features of polities as developed here (Schön 1979, 255; Gurney 1999a). Furthermore, 
such a methodology entails a more rounded view on the rationale for state 
intervention instead only taking into account very specific policy programmes as 
parliamentary debates tend to embed the discussions into larger schemes of state 
interventions. The overall rational for state policies is hence drawn out. As such, the 
„state projet‟ refers to an overall logic of state intervention that is common to the 
various policies taken on their own. This implies a method that gathers information 
from the legislative details of the various initiatives and carves out the common 
features that were put forward in parliamentary discussions to legitimate such state 
interventions. 
 
Relevant parliamentary debates have also been accumulated into a data base. Using 
the online search tool in Hansard (House of Commons Daily Debates), I have looked 
up all documents recorded between January 1997 and December 2007 that contained 
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the following words or parts of words: „home‟ (for home owner, home ownership), 
„hous‟ (for housing, house), „own‟ (for home ownernership, ownership), „mort‟ (for 
mortgage, mortgager) and „sav‟ (for savings, save). I have then narrowed down the 
documents to filter out those that are relevant in answering the research questions. 
This process has been done using the software packages of „Nvivo 8‟ and Nvivo 9‟ as 
well as some pen and paper work. The software was especially helpful in coding the 
data in a way that follows each of the sub-arguments made in the following two 
chapters. Instead of reading the data along the lines of the different debates in the 
House of Commons, the coding process allowed to read the data according to the 
recurring themes that ran across all these debates. This method relates back to the 
notion of „rationale for state intervention‟ as is allowed me to draw out the main 
topics that were mentioned in order to legitimate policy interventions. The main lines 
of enquiry are those reported upon in this and the following chapter. As such, even 
though the housing theme was given, the separate arguments made in relation to home 
ownership policies emerged from the data itself. Also, the use of a computerised 
method allowed me to relatively easily illustrate the arguments put forward as it 
arranged the data thematically. 
2 British Housing Programmes: Who is a Home Owner? 
Between 1997 and 2007 British house prices for owned properties saw considerbale 
increases (in real terms), this being the reason for chooosing this particular time 
frame, especially in a comparative perspective. Indeed, house prices in Germany were 
flat over the same period (Scanlon and Whitehead 2004, 7; Ahearne et al. 2007, 44; 
Goodhart and Hofmann 2008, 187). The investigation of differential moral depictions 
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of the home owner and their political aspects hence becomes much more than solely 
an attempt to demonstrate the purely theorertical points explored thoughout the last 
three chapters. It also constitutes a way to help make sense of the normalisation of the 
social phenomona underlying such market evolutions (Gurney 1999b).  
 
Even though such price trajectories are not untypical for the British case as the market 
has been characterised by high long-term volatility more generally, that is not to say 
their modelling can explain the underlying socio-political conditions upon which such 
developments took place (Merrett 1979, 235). Indeed, there is now a considerable 
literature on explanations of house prices, mostly written from an economics point of 
view (Aoki et al. 2004; Benito et al. 2006). Other scholars adopt a more historical 
perspective and at times highlight the political tensions of such price processes 
(Merrett 1982; Malpass 2005). Still, these contributions tend not to explicitly focus 
the individual-state relationship and the facilitated understandings of the home owner 
in relation to models of capitalist organisation. In either economic or historical 
investigations, economic agency is not considered to be a political topic as it is not 
allowed to take on multiple forms. At least such a discussion is not explicit. Again, it 
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is only once the mind is taken as indeterminate that the individual becomes a political 
unit on his/her own. This chapter breaks with such a view by focussing on the 
contingency of the very definition of agents and markets, building on a framework 
that is able to account for varieties in naïve theories and legitimation regimes. Indeed, 
the economic agent should not be taken as an independent variable, but as a factor 
that itself is influenced through state action. 
 
Even though British policies have a tradition of favouring home ownership, this alone 
is unable to shed light into the developments between 1997 and 2007, might it be for 
the sole reason that intellectual concepts always need to be adopted to contemporary 
economic and political contexts (Hamnett 1994, 281). As an example, when the 
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Skelton first coined the term of „property-
owning democracy‟ in 1924 (Evans 2010, 338), the main element was not centrally 
related to a nation of home owners. The notion was more closely linked to how labour 
and capital could be brought together and how their interests could be mixed in the 
industrial efforts of the time. Co-partnership was crucial to Skelton‟s thoughts as he 
believed that directly integrating the workers into the profit-making motive of the 
firm was the most adequate way of minimising the chances of social unrest (Terrance 
2010, 39). In 1945, MP Eden revived the concept that later became the hallmark of 
Margaret Thatcher‟s policy framework with a much stronger focus on the home 
ownership motive (Terrance 2010, 175). Indeed, ownership figures have seen steady 
increases over the last century (Lund 1996, 52). 
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This chapter then is interested in offering a context-specific account of the 
mechanisms that were in place in the period between 1997 and 2007, especially in 
relation to individual-state relationship. It is also from such reflections that the focus 
on legitimation regimes is deducted, the question arising of which social 
argumentations were put forward by policy-makers to endorse such a move. From the 
very start, the thesis has highlighted that because the human mind allows for varieties 
of axio-rationalities in line with the interpretative patterns in the social and economic 
environment, it is necessary to engage into further analyses of naïve theories. Indeed, 
the wider justificatory narratives put forward in the sphere of coordinative discourse 
are carved out through the study of parliamentary debates and enacted legislation. 
 
When it comes to 1997 and onwards, the most dominant feature of British housing 
policy was its drive to include further people into the market of owned houses (King 
2010, 89). Two observations can already be made here that are further developed and 
illustrated throughout the following paragraphs. First, this reflects a conception of 
home ownership as being a quasi-universal right as the policies conveyed a view that 
the state needed to help or support needy individuals into home ownership 
(Mortensen and Seabrooke 2008). As such, ownership was implicitly depicted as the 
tenure most desired as an end in itself that needed no further legitimation. Second, the 
means by which such an objective was to be achieved were market mechanisms 
(Nanda and Parker 2011). What exact conception of the market this was meant to be 
is of central importance to this chapter as it gives clues about what roles state policies 
and the individual were supposed to play when it came to the provision of 
accommodation. These are two features that I explain in more detail when going 
through the different policy initiatives, or attempts “to ensure that people are able to 
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buy and sustain their own homes” (The Minister for Local Government and Housing, 
H. Armstrong, Labour: HC Deb 1998-1999 319 col. 733: 171198). 
 
In 1996, the circular 13/96 „Planning and Affordable Housing‟, together with the 
„Planning Policy Guidance note 3‟ from 1992 (HC Deb 1997-98 298 col. 699: 
240797), set the basis that influenced taken-for-granted assumptions of what housing 
was supposed to be. Indeed, it provided precise thresholds, later revised in the light of 
local concerns (HC Deb 1997-98 310 col. 307: 080498), for the amount of affordable 
housing to be built by local authorities. The logic was hence to encourage the building 
of owned houses at the lower end of the market so as to minimise the barriers to entry 
(Bramley and Morgan 1998). Such a strategy however was not always welcome by 
local authorities, highlighting the political side of such policies. The latter were 
concerned with the exact execution of these orders as they had issues with available 
land, green fields, and the quality of living in towns on their agenda (HC Deb 1997-98 
305 col. 475: 280198). Also, they seemed sceptical about the appropriateness of such 
efforts in relation to the local and national environment as massive building efforts. 
Local authorities were not directly accountable for the making of housing policy and 
were reluctant towards massive building programmes as this could potentially lead to 
a situation where “(T)he electorate will not forget that betrayal at the next general 
election” (A. Steen, Conservative: HC Deb 1998-99 327 col. 300: 100399) where they 
would be accused of mismanaging the local natural environment. 
 
It is significant that the argument presented against massive investments into 
affordable housing referred to the individual as a voter. This hinted at a direct 
individual-state relationship and legitimation regime where state policies were 
directly accountable to the individual as such. Policy interventions could only be 
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undertaken if they benefited the individual voter in his/her capacity of an economic 
agent. The British policy-makers thus aimed at maximising individual well-being for 
all members of society, hence of the „collective man‟. The form and content of the 
instruments were chosen on the basis that they would be able to be presented to the 
electorate as beneficial for them as individuals. Local criticisms had to be taken into 
account to make sure the policies were actually enhancing the individual‟s position. 
The main source of legitimiation however lay in the individual and his/her 
legitimation of the state as an institution and as a set of policies. Indeed, the direct 
approach applied to the legitimation of the polity as well as the policy output. 
 
This then relates to the two points made earlier. The conceptions of the owned home 
as a quasi-universal right was one that considered this tenure as superior in the sense 
that it enhanced the individual‟s standard of life (King 2003). This right was read in 
individualist terms as a way to ensure adequate housing (HC Deb 1999-00 354 col. 
946W: 280700). At the same time however, such an interpretation also downgraded 
all other tenures to morally inferior levels. If the individual was seen as the central 
entity around which to build housing policy, such a belief did not necessarily imply 
that a market solution was to be adapted (HC Deb 1999-20 347 col. 811: 040400). 
Indeed, theoretically housing allocation could still be centred on the individual 
through direct state benefits for instance. Such reflections demonstrate the political 
nature of such taken-for-granted assumptions on the part of policy-makers. As I show 
in more detail in the next sections, the reasons for the adaptation of market 
mechanisms shed more light onto what kind of economic agent a home owner was 
meant to be. For the policies here, this supposed that the British rationale for state 
intervention reflected conceptions of economic agency that followed the naïve 
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theories of an active economic subject that plays the market in order to position 
himself at the frontier of the economically possible in terms of wealth accumulation. 
Such subjectivities were in line with standard neo-classical economic theory about 
utility-maximising behaviour (Snowdon et al. 1994, 198). 
 
One way to ensure adequate housing supply at the lower end of the income 
distribution was “to use previously developed sites for housing. This helps regenerate 
our towns and cities and helps to protect our countryside.” (The Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions, J. Prescott, Labour:  HC Deb 1997-98 
305 col. 825: 030298). Such a strategy was deemed able “to increase the supply of 
affordable housing secured through the planning process” (The Minister for Local 
Government and Housing, H. Armstrong, Labour: HC Deb 1997-98 319 col. 477: 
171198), especially in combination with extensive housing investments programmes 
(HC Deb 1997-98 303 col. 159: 161297). The rationale for state intervention, even 
though concerned with overall housing supply, was eventually about enhancing the 
individual‟s material position. Again, this pointed towards a direct individual-state 
relationship. In terms of policy instruments, this meant that only those were 
conceivable that targeted the individual agent as such in a direct way. As I show later 
in relation to market conceptions, the policies did not provide direct benefits to a large 
section of the population, but the logic was more one of allowing the individual to use 
his/her own economic rationality to accumulate wealth in the intermediary sphere of 
the market. As such, what the thesis is interested is not only the depiction of the home 
owner but also of the exact definition of the market as a social construct. Indeed, the 
constructivist lens opens the analysis to the possibility of differential ways to make 
sense of what is called „market‟. 
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In the context of democratising the availability of home ownership (Denton 2001, 
232), the British policy-makers launched a series of programmes, mostly targeted at 
lower-income individuals (HC Deb 1997-98 319 col. 191: 111198). This became 
obvious in 2000 in the Housing Green Paper „Quality and Choice: A Decent Home 
for All‟, a document that was warmly welcomed by members of Parliament (HC Deb 
1999-20 347 col. 811: 040400) as it put significant investment into housing. Other 
moves into this direction followed with mortgage interest payment support for low-
income households (HC Deb 1997-98 308 col. 12: 230398) and the extension of 
schemes under the „Low-Cost Ownership Schemes‟ banner (HC Deb 1999-00 354 
col. 946W: 280700). „Right to Buy‟ may have been the best known of these support 
schemes (HC Deb 2002-03 402 col. 84W: 240303; Munro 2007) and also the one 
whose name best represents the idea of ownership as a quasi-universal right. Even 
more explicitly, the programme initiated under the name of the „Home Ownership 
Task Force‟ in 2003 looked into further options for „potential home owners on low or 
modest incomes and identify the most effective ways of promoting home ownership‟ 
(The Deputy Prime Minister, J. Prescott, Labour: HC Deb 2002-03 401 col. 38WS: 
180303). 
 
Again, such initiatives pointed at policy actors conceiving of the state as an actor 
facilitating the enhancement of individual standards of living through market 
mechanisms9. But such policies also promoted certain political messages about the 
social value of ownership. As the policy openly targeted low-income households to 
help them move into ownership, this socio-economic group was singled out as the 
                                                        
9
 This conception of the state has come under the banner of the „enabling state‟ as New Labour 
politicians were referring to (Bevir 2005, 46). 
 
 
162 
 
problem, and this particular tenure as the solution. The normativity of such 
propositions was relatively unhidden, even if not always clearly expressed. As such, it 
forms part of the effort to side-line a conception that saw all tenures as equally 
valuable. Combining the two points made earlier, ownership as the end in itself and 
the market as the means, the coordinative discourse between policy-makers presented 
the state as the institution that could support individuals in helping themselves in a 
market context, supposed they were behaving according to the respective naïve 
theories of active economic agency. 
 
We are also giving new help to unemployed home owners who are moving 
back into work. We are helping them to pay mortgage interest for the first four 
weeks after they start a new job. Some home owners, especially the elderly, 
are unable to maintain and modernise their property. We propose a range of 
new options to help more people to make essential repairs. (The Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, J. Prescott, Labour: HC 
Deb 1999-20 347 col. 813: 040400) 
 
(…) new starter home initiative to help key workers, such as nurses and 
teachers and first-time buyers on modest incomes. The initiative will help 
them to buy their own homes in areas where housing is costly, in the town or 
in the country. (…) (The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions, J. Prescott, Labour: HC Deb 1999-00 347 col. 813: 040400) 
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Again, the relationship between the individual and the state was direct, every 
individual being judged on the degree to which he/she was able to act and perform in 
the ownership market. Other social features were deemed irrelevant as the only 
legitimate entry barriers into the home ownership market were regarded to be of 
monetary nature (S. Webb, Liberal Democrat: HC Deb 1997-98 315 col. 498: 
010798). Such an understanding normalised ownership as the natural tenure for all 
individuals in society, independent of their social standing (Gurney 1999b). The 
problem then was only of how to make each individual participate in this market. The 
language of „helping‟ clearly reflects a taken-for-granted conception by policy-makers 
that identified non-owners as problematic cases to be minimised. However, one of the 
contradictions was that even though the aim of extending housing property to all 
members to British society could be considered a morally worthy intention, its was 
this very expression that created a moral rift between those who owned and those who 
do not, a rift that was to be eliminated though the democratisation of market access 
and home ownership. This distinction becomes more manifest with further upwards 
house price evolutions as the latter did not equally benefit all groups in British 
society. In other words, the depiction of these naïve theories was carrying political 
weigh, first in an ontological way as it did violence to alternative conceptions, and 
second in the distributional sense of the term as they favoured some members of 
society over others. As such, the rationale for state intervention of a united community 
of home owners featured internal tensions from the start even if these were not 
obvious back in 1997. 
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3 The State as Market-Enabler and Protector of Economic Agency 
The British policy-makers regarded the state as an institution that was not only 
supposed to helped individuals enter the home ownership market, but also to play it in 
a way as to generate wealth for themselves (J. Cousins, Labour: HC Deb 1997-98 308 
col. 211: 110398; see also Murie 1991, 201). Those members of society that saw 
financial hardship disable them from accessing home ownership and those deemed to 
deserve an owned house due to their public profession were supported by public 
spending and adequate regulation10. The „market‟ hence figured as the intermediary 
vehicle through which socially legitimate outcomes could be produced. This finding 
is important in relation to the definition of economic agency as regard market 
processes. One characteristic of such policies was the assumption that free economic 
agency constituted the sine qua non condition for desirable market outcomes. In other 
words, if individuals conceived of markets as domains where they could actively 
manage their economic, and hence social situation, then what followed as an overall 
result was desirable by definition, on the micro-level, but  equally at the systemic 
level. Even if direct, the individual-state relationship was thus mediated through 
market processes in a way that the state was depicted as an enabler of market 
mechanisms more than of as an institution that allocates resources immediately 
(Hamnett 1999, 167). 
 
In such efforts, the function of the British state policies was seen as guaranteeing 
beneficial micro-economic conditions that allowed individuals to play out their 
agency in a way to maximise their individual wealth (HC Deb 1998-99 323 col. 92: 
120199). Economic outcomes were hence not directly engineered, but the means for 
                                                        
10
 See earlier quotes in this chapter. 
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such ends were favoured through transforming an increasing number of individuals 
into active market participants. The rationale was that if behavioural changes could be 
brought about by the facilitations of particular naïve theories, the result to be was 
beneficial by mere construction. As such the end of the realisation of the quasi-
universal right to home ownership could be achieved. The role of state policies was to 
design an economic environment in which market mechanisms would lead to entail 
socially legitimated outcomes on their own right (HC Deb 2001-02 387 col. 403: 
200602). Whereas the market was considered to be functioning on its own terms, state 
policy had to provide the right input for it to design the appropriate output. The 
financial literacy programmes undertaken by the state at the same time reinforce such 
an interpretation of British policy initiatives (Finlayson 2009). They also demonstrate 
that the British state policies attempted to facilitate a particular understanding of 
economic agency, one of active management of wealth through the participation and 
active exposure to market mechanisms. 
 
In terms of naïve theories, the economic self was depicted in terms of sovereignty, 
independence, and individual responsibility (Bröckling 2007, 108). State interventions 
were limited to „help‟ to put individuals in a situation where they can play out this 
agency to their own advantage. What was provided was an opportunity, not a benefit 
directly (Rohe et al. 2002). In order to do so, individuals still had to adopt adequate 
behaviour in the housing market. Market participants were incentivised to engage in 
economic transactions to position themselves at the efficiency frontier and thus 
constantly maximise their utility.  In other words, „the state helps people to help 
themselves‟. Once the policies had made sure that entry barriers were lowered, market 
participants were supposed to take advantage of the conditions and play the market so 
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as to ensure their own economic success in terms of housing. The logic of the state 
intervention was to provide the initial impulse, afterwards entering individuals had no 
reason not to use their „financial freedom‟ to improve their own well-being (G. Mudie, 
Labour: HC Deb 2005-06 441 col. 176WH: 170106). Of course, as the state policies 
ensured a constant incoming stream into the ownership market through its 
investments at the lower end of it, the economic laws of supply and demand tended to 
produce phenomena of asset appreciation (King 2010, 124). Interestingly enough then, 
state action helped people not only by bringing them into the market, but also by 
boosting demand for owned housing and hence by entailing price pressures, an 
intervention that was not mentioned as such as it ran counter to the facilitated naïve 
theories of the role of individual-state relationship.  
 
The belief in the rightfulness of market mechanisms in the eyes of policy-makers, 
once the market was properly fed, was evident in the installation of the so-called 
„Home Seller‟s Packs‟ (HC Deb 1999-00 340 col. 206W: 011299; HC Deb 2001-02 
378 col. 576W: 210102), introduced under the name „Home Information 
Packs‟(hereafter referred to as „HIPs‟) on June 1, 2007 (HC Deb 2005-06 445 col. 
1678W: 030506).This requirement for additional market information, mostly relating 
to energy efficiency of properties, was meant to reduce the number of failed housing 
market transactions, hence to optimise market outcomes. The argument here was not 
about a potential market failure in itself, but the market performing sub-optimally due 
to the unsatisfactory conditions under which it was operating. The role of the state 
was conceived as to minimise information asymmetries that hindered market 
processes to work out in the interest of the everyday market participant. Once more 
complete information was provided, the market would produce more desirable 
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outcomes on its own. Such conceptions of market were consistent with neo-liberal 
economic theories (Grossman and Hart 1983) whose core assumption is an active 
understanding of agency.  Indeed, such understandings of markets match with the 
focus on opportunity highlighted above and the notion of the „economic man‟ chasing 
profit in the market, in this case the home ownership market. 
 
What state interventions had to do then was to optimise market conditions so that 
individuals could take fully informed decisions as to maximise their utility (HC Deb 
1998-99 337 col. 770: 111199). This was to be achieved through additional legislation 
in terms of information dissemination. Policy-makers hence saw themselves not only 
as enablers of economically responsible agents through the provision of economic 
opportunity, but also as technical market optimiser so to produce socially legitimate 
ends. Again then, the role of the state as an institution had to be extended into the 
regulatory aspects of markets in order to give the individual the opportunity to raise 
his standard of living through appropriate use of market dynamics. In other words, 
even though state policies first assumed that market mechanisms could be left 
untouched (HC Deb 2001-02 387 col. 403: 200602), they later had to intervene in 
order to make sure the individual was benefiting from them in a way as the policy-
makers had conceived on in the first place (HC Deb 2006-07 453 col. 176W: 171106). 
This also meant that the very notion of the rightfulness of markets was relativised in 
purely theoretical terms, even if that was not acknowledged in practice. Indeed, 
optimal market outcomes were considered to be dependent on state intervention and 
facilitation. These comments are reminiscent of Polanyi´s double movement where 
the installation of liberal market processes entails a move for more state intervention 
(Polanyi 1957, 76). 
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Nevertheless, the logic was that the individual could only make fully rational 
decisions under conditions of perfect information (Maclennan et al. 1999, 18). In this 
sense, state policies made sure that individuals could make informed decisions, hence 
those that were supposed to led to beneficial micro- and macro-outcomes. This 
conception of the individual not only demonstrated a strong belief in market 
mechanisms, but also highlights the assumption that public help was to come under 
the form of more market information, not in the form of direct benefits (HC Deb 
2001-02 387 col. 402: 200602). So even though the individual-state relationship was 
direct in legitimation terms, it was mediated by market mechanisms when it came to 
policy-interventions. It was believed that complete information would lead to socially 
benefited market outcomes as consumers were thought to act rationally as utility-
maximisers. References to consumer sovereignty were then inherent in British 
housing policy, matching with the direct legitimation regime (HC Deb 1999-00 347 
col. 821: 040400). As the state was considered to be directly accountable for 
economic performances to the individual, its policies targeted the individual but in a 
sense as to be consistent with the assumption of individual freedom and the 
rightfulness of markets.  Indeed, through the actions taken, the policy-makers 
demonstrated a belief in policies that maximised the freedom of the individual in the 
sense that they made available more choice in the form of better market information. 
In the end it was still the individual who had to take the final decision of what house 
to buy. Indeed, it is this freedom that was thought to be at the very basis of market 
mechanisms delivering socially acceptable outcomes (HC Deb 2005-06 449 col. 
13WS: 180706). 
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Apart from ensuring a socially beneficial operationalisation of the market, this 
programme also made a moral statement about ownership as a form of 
accommodation (HC Deb 2005-06 445 col. 1678W: 030506). By deploring the 
apparently numerous cases where house transactions were unsuccessful and 
highlighting the acts of buying and selling property in positive terms, it promoted the 
naïve theory that ownership was a tenure whose entry barriers were still excessively 
high. Even if individuals had the financial means to access the market, limitations in 
the availability of information potentially hindered them to do so. Again, state 
interventions had to step in to make sure such additional barriers were minimised as 
they ran counter to the conception of home ownership as a moral end in itself. For 
home ownership, this meant that ever step was taken to facilitate the entrance into this 
tenure (Ronald 2008, 48).  
 
The HIPs initiative highlights another facet of the British individual-state relationship 
as far as home ownership is concerned, one of state action being needed to protect 
economic agency against certain malicious market processes such as gazumping (HC 
Deb 2000-01 359 col. 154W: 131200). Indeed, policy-makers expressed concerns 
about insufficient consumer protection in the British housing market that led to an 
excessive number of house purchases failing. 
Research carried out in 1998 showed that 28% per cent of home sale 
transactions failed after terms have been agreed, costing buyers and sellers 
about £350 million each year in wasted expenditure. The Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister expects home information packs to reduce significantly this 
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failure and waste. (Minister for Housing and Planning, K. Hill, Labour: HC 
Deb 2003-04 419 col. 1649W: 010404) 
Earlier issues with insufficient protection of homebuyers through insurance cover and 
inspection service had been raised (HC Deb 1997-98 311 col. 10: 270498). There also 
seemed to be problems with communication between potential homebuyers and house 
builders (HC Deb 1997-98 298 col. 281: 170797) as well as with the powers of the 
building industry more generally (HC Deb 2001-02 383 col. 164W: 160402).  Low 
quality standards were another topic that was raising complains at times (HC Deb 
2003-04 418 col. 1754: 110304). 
 
As the quote highlights, the main solutions adopted in regard to the concerns were the 
testing and subsequent introduction of HIPs. As a response to all the problems 
mentioned, the overall reply was to provide the consumer with more transparent 
information so they could enact his/her agency more fully. This was consistent with a 
logic of „self-help‟ where state policiy mediated between the market and its 
participants but was not formally interfering with its functioning mode (HC Deb 
1999-20 347 col. 813: 040400), even though that depiction was more complex than 
the British state acknowledged. It was also in line with the document „The Key to 
Easier Home Buying and Selling‟, published end of 1998 and focussing on the 
delivery of ownership through market mechanisms (HC Deb 2001-02 391 col. 290W: 
221002). As such the British rationale for state intervention was very much based on 
the conceptions of the policy-makers that even though state intervention was needed, 
the market was the means to the end of home ownership, and that combined with an 
active, hence profit-seeking, definition of agency, such policies could be successful be 
legitimate the polity and the particular set of policies at the same time. 
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Again, the individual stood at the centre of the economy by using the abilities to make 
rational decisions and thus bringing about beneficial collective outcome, state 
interventions making sure that all market participants, individuals and companies, 
played according to „fair‟ rules. The taken-for-granted-assumption behind such a 
conception was that consumer sovereignty was a necessary condition to ensure market 
processes were delivering socially acceptable ends such as high levels of home 
ownership. The axio-rationality was one where the individual engages in market 
mechanisms through a calculative approach. However, state policies were needed to 
referee and hence optimise the functioning of the market so as to guarantee the 
achievement of the end of mass home ownership. 
(...) so that the information needed by buyers and sellers is available when the 
property is marketed, and abortive costs on the buyer are reduced (The 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, T. McNulty, Labour: HC Deb 2002-
03 402 col. 41WS: 310303) 
 
Such comments underline the taken-for-granted beliefs in the rightfulness of market 
mechanisms. Indeed, the market per se was still thought to operate efficiently, just as 
individuals were, but because some actors were unable to access full information on 
the owned house they were acquiring, this lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Again, it 
was the role of state interventions to make sure that all relevant pieces of information 
were presented to market participants. An analysis of coordinative discourse 
highlights the tensions inherent in such assumptions as the principle of the 
rightfulness of markets and that of state interventions were coming together in a more 
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complex way than the state at times depicted it (HC Deb 2005-06 436 col. 288: 
060705). 
 
One issue however remains to be discussed in relation to the HIPs initiative, one that 
was typically related to the price mechanisms at work. Debates mentioned concerns 
that the introduction of the requirement to provide buyers with more information 
would present costs that would be added to the price of the property, the latter 
potentially having the effect to drive prices up, especially for first-time buyers (HC 
Deb 2005-06 449 col. 354: 190706). This demonstrated that state interventions, in 
terms of the facilitation of naïve theories and of material investments implied effects 
that potentially nullified some of the initial policy goals. Expert bodies like the Royal 
Institute of Chartered Surveyors then also warned against the introduction of such 
information packs (HC Deb 2006-07 464 col. 362: 101007). These critiques emerged 
when the contradictions with increasing asset prices were becoming progressively 
more visible as economic processes were elevating entry barriers, which ran counter 
to the very policy goals in the first place. In other words, the division between market 
participants and market outsiders had considerably different distributional effects 
upon these socio-economic groups. Again the uniting, and hence depoliticising 
discourse was attacked as the policy was attached to play into the hands of one group 
of individuals (home owners) against the interests of another portion of the population 
(potentially future home owners) (HC Deb 2001-02 378 col. 702W: 220102). 
 
In the end, the argument dominated that HIPs were no element of extra cost but one 
that helped the market adjust to prices that reflected underlying evolutions. In this 
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sense, it was limited information that was seen as the main culprit of excessive house 
price increases, not the market as such. 
No specific research has been commissioned on this, as there is no reason to 
believe that the introduction of home information packs will have a significant 
effect on house prices. The only new cost being imposed on the system overall 
is the cost of a home condition report in a proportion of transactions. Together 
with the rest of the information in the pack, this will help to ensure that house 
prices are set more realistically and buyers are not faced with unexpected 
repair bills and other commitments they cannot afford. (Y. Cooper, Labour: 
HC Deb 2005-06 440 col. 2823W: 201205) 
Generally, in this relationship between the individual and state was lingering a certain 
ambiguity. On the one hand, the independent and entrepreneurial character of the 
subject was supposed to make market mechanisms lead to socially desirable 
outcomes. On the other hand, such agency needed to be supported and defended 
against malicious features of this very housing market. In other words, the individual-
state relationship, as explained in the theoretical chapters, was itself a space that was 
filled with political tensions in terms of the exact rationale for state interventions into 
markets. On the one hand, the market was depicted as self-sufficient and independent 
entity, on the other hand it was also clear that the policy-makers were aware that 
policy interventions were necessary to uphold the direct kind individual-state 
relationship. 
 
Indeed, state intervention then helped the individual enter the market, helped him/her 
play the market by guaranteeing his/her full agential capabilities against the market as 
well as by offering economic conditions that made such market participation 
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beneficial to the individual. What was curious was that at the same time that 
individuals and markets were considered to be sovereign and functioning on their own 
terms, the state was heavily involved in not only the management of market 
outcomes, but also in the making of the economic subject itself. The policy 
instruments clearly pointed towards a direct legitimation regime. In other words, the 
taken-for-granted assumptions of policy-makers lead them to think of the economy as 
the accumulation of individual, rational actors. It is on this basis that such beliefs 
limited the domain of appropriateness of policy instruments as explained in chapter 
four. As mentioned, the policies reviewed put forward ambivalent naïve theories in 
relation to economic subjectivities as they simultaneously tell stories of independent 
and responsible market actors and of the state helping these same individuals to play 
the market in order for it to produce socially legitimate outcomes. This is an example 
of how naïve theories can be conflicting in themselves. The denomination „naïve‟ 
refers to this everyday and loose character of such explanations.  
 
The political character of such an economic regime then played out on various levels. 
First of all, and I am falling back onto the denomination presented towards the end of 
chapter four, the facilitation of an active definition of economic agency marginalised 
conceptions of the individual as a much more passive actor in relation to housing, one 
that is much more concerned with the home at such, not with its marketised features 
such as its value. Second, such an understanding then entailed that only those agents 
following such a financially rational method were benefiting from house price 
inflation (Hay 2009) as they were playing the ownership market tom their advantage. 
Third, this particular type of individual-state relationship was based upon specific 
readings of how a rationale for state intervention was supposed to act in relation to the 
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individual, in terms of the form and content of policy instruments. A direct focal point 
onto the individual as an economic agent not only set aside a more overall focus on 
societal groups but also acted upon the instrument selection. The latter fourthly 
created a set of policies that materially attributed resources to lower-income 
households and home owners and not those that had decided against following the 
type of axio-rationality facilitated. 
 
As seen, the tendency of rising house prices was opening new issues for the British 
state. It seemed that it had been successful in the facilitation of conceptions of active 
economic agency as well as in feeding the market with favourable conditions in a way 
that still became problematic.  
Do the Government have any plans to introduce legislation to help people who, 
having been encouraged to do so, buy properties--such as high-rise flats--and 
then discover that those properties are worthless? (D. Naysmith, Labour Co-
operative: HC Deb 1998-1999 319 col. 732:171198) 
4 Making Sense of House Price Trajectories 
One of the most iconic instances to look into in order to understand the taken-for-
granted conceptions of the state-market relationship and the naïve theories propagated 
in the housing market is how policy-makers were making sense of rising house prices. 
In other words, by investigating the explanations, and hence justifications, debated in 
parliament in relation to skyrocketing asset prices, this section analyses how the 
political tensions described above were managed once they became obvious. It is in 
these utterances that conceptions of the functioning of markets as well as of the 
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perceived role of the state become most obvious as differential understandings are 
discussed and discriminated against. This also relates back to the methodological 
issues mentioned in chapter four, especially those about the political aspects of 
coordinative discourse. Indeed, upward price evolutions were progressively 
undermining not only the effectiveness of housing investments at the lower end of the 
market but were also starting to be in conflict with the very naïve theories that had 
help generate them. As such, the growing concerns and measures to tackle 
affordability eroded the rationale of the economic man as a responsible and active 
economic subject as it became harder for individuals to enter the market in the first 
place. At the same time, there were doubts of how much longer such house price 
appreciation trends could be sustained that enabled individuals to play their agency in 
a way as to accumulate wealth on the back of those asset prices (HC Deb 2003-04 415 
col. 34W: 091203). 
 
When projected housing supply figures appeared in 1999, they were extensively 
discussed in parliament (HC Deb 1998-99 326 col. 419: 250299), and the tensions 
between the interests of current owners and non-owners came to light. Indeed, when 
already in 1998 the Office of National Statistics came up with a number of 4.4 million 
houses to be built between 1991 and 2016, the parliamentary reaction ran along the 
following lines. 
If we build 4.4 million units of housing, they will be occupied sooner or later. 
What about the effect on the housing market of all that building? Will it not 
erode the value of existing properties, again creating negative equity for some 
householders? (A. Steen, Conservative: HC Deb 1998-99 322 col. 280: 
091298). 
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On the one hand, only more extensive supply initiatives could address the policy aim 
to extend home ownership towards lower-income individuals. On the other hand, such 
interventions into market mechanisms would potentially undermine the very price 
dynamics that enabled current owners to act according to the facilitated theories of 
active market subjects. Indeed, the price dynamics were central to housing debates, 
again underlining how essential price evolutions were for the state interventions to be 
successful. This situation was then an outcome consistent with the general tendency to 
invest extensive sums into the lower end of the housing market, as seen above (HC 
Deb 1997-98 303 col. 159: 161297). As such, state interventions that had acted in the 
name of the economic agent as such, on the premise to allows every member of 
society to benefit from rising asset prices, they themselves had contributed to 
conditions that were deeply political and problematic now. 
 
Under such conditions, the two roles attributed to the state as a market-enabler and a 
market-optimiser came to represent conflicting positions. The function of policy to 
create the conditions for further influx into the home ownership market was becoming 
contradictory to attempts to protect owners from mechanisms that would diminish 
their equity (HC Deb 2003-04 418 col. 1754: 110304). On the one hand, asset price 
appreciation was a by-product of state programmes and investments as they pumped 
funds into the lower end of the ownership market. By giving a growing part of the 
population the opportunity to enter the market, policy-makers had tried to engineer 
socially beneficial results through market mediations. On the other hand, these efforts 
had to be accompanied with supply-side policies as far as affordable housing went 
(HC Deb 2005-06 436 col. 289: 060705). However, such interventions were running 
contrary to the state‟s function of protecting market participants from potentially 
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detrimental evolutions as more houses on the market also constituted a risk to the 
equity of existing home owners. As simultaneously upholding both conceptions 
became incrementally more complicated while prices went upwards, it is of special 
interest to investigate the meanings conferred by policy-makers to them
11
. 
 
The reaction of policy-makers was to follow the existing logic of state intervention, 
and as such higher asset prices entailed even more extensive funding efforts towards 
the individuals excluded from the ownership market (HC Deb 2006-07 458 col. 85W: 
280307). The policies thus persisted in ensuring the conditions upon which a majority 
of individuals could access home ownership. Even though the affordability issue 
became more prevalent with time (HC Deb 2002-03 407 col. 141W: 190603), free 
and active individual agency combined with the state granting favourable economic 
conditions were still believed to be the key to maximising not only individual wealth. 
Against the fact that the policies became harder to legitimise over time as the entry 
barriers into the market began to raise, their underlying rationale was pursued. No 
regulatory interventions into the market were undertaken as they would have 
undermined the very belief in the rightfulness of market outcomes, themselves the 
result of individual action (HC Deb 2006-07 457 col. 465W: 190207).  
 
At the beginning of 2005 then, the British policy-makers addressed the growing 
affordability problem and launched „Sustainable Communities: Homes for All‟ (HM 
Government 2005). It was an attempt to solve the affordability gap that was debated 
at the time in relation to first-time buyers (HC Deb 2003-04 420 col. 1481W: 040504) 
                                                        
11
 The thesis does not claim that state interventions had direct influence over asset prices, but 
it does argue that they (more or less advertently) instilled particular understandings of home 
owners that contributed to particular price evolutions. 
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through added supply. Even though the document talked about choice and social 
housing and about those excluded from the ownership market, the main focus lays 
with the ownership market. Indeed, Homebuy initiatives were mostly stressed when 
social tenures were mentioned (HC Deb 2006-07 455 col. 366W: 080107). Also, the 
extensive attention given to first-time buyers underlined that ownership was still seen 
as the tenure that most individuals should be able to access, possibly through state 
aids. Apart from the language used, the policy content demonstrated that British 
policy-makers saw their previous efforts in a positive light, interpreting further 
interventions as additional fixtures. In other words, they stood by their conceptions 
and rationales for the state policies undertaken. 
 
At the same time however, the tensions between ownership market participants and 
those at the edge of it also became more visible as the rationale for state intervention 
still played into both hands of enabling individuals become active home owner and of 
guaranteeing asset accumulation for those already in the market. 
 
We are increasing the supply of housing in a responsible way, and offering 
thousands of tenants the chance to buy a stake in their home – narrowing the 
wealth gap between those with housing assets and those without. (HM 
Government 2005, p.2) 
 
It offers people opportunity and choice – to own their home, to meet their 
aspirations and to build up assets: 
- Helping 80,000 first time buyers, in part by making better use of vacant 
public land to provide new housing, and driving down building costs 
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- A new Homebuy scheme to offer up to around 300,000 council and housing 
association tenants the chance to buy a stake in their home. (HM Government 
2005, p.3) 
 
In other words, the phrase „Homes for All‟ indicated that policy-makers took little 
issue with the contradictory elements of British housing policies as they stuck to the 
democratisation of home ownership that was hiding the deeply political tensions 
highlighted here. By emphasising the benefits to all individuals in society, the focus 
was on national unity, coupled with an extensive funding programme to cover up the 
tensions that such initiatives only deepened. Indeed, the reactions went on to 
emphasise the same developments that it was supposed to be addressed (HC Deb 
2004-05 431 col. 641W: 230205). As has been seen, heavy investments at the lower 
end of the home ownership market was exactly what was partly responsible for the 
price tendencies that later policies tried to tackle, the affordability gap being the main 
issue here. 
 
In terms of economic subjectivities, housing policies depicted a logic of individual 
choice and hence responsibility. Once again, the problem with affordability was that it 
limited the capacity of potential home owners to act as active market participants (HC 
Deb 2006-07 455 col. 1349W: 190107). Through investments, state policies acted 
against this, in a way as to enable more individuals to access ownership and 
accumulate wealth on the back to upward price dynamics. The rationale was again 
that once individuals were able to access the market, they could use their rational 
utility-maximising capacities to improve their economic situation. This then supports 
the claim that the naïve theories promoted had the rightfulness of the market at their 
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centre. At the same time, it was still the individual per se who needed to engage with 
market processes in order to „help him/herself‟, the individual hence being at the core 
of British housing policy. As such, it is also easy to see how much such an economic 
regimes was relying on proper individual market behaviour, proper in the sense of 
reproducing the active and profit-seeking definition of economic agency. Thus, even 
though the policy-makers reacted to the affordability issues, that was not a reason to 
relativise or even revise its policies at bringing more people into the ownership 
market through investments and liberal conceptions of agency. The direct individual-
state relationship in terms of legitimation was holding. 
 
The Government expect one million people to enter home-ownership over the 
next five years. This is based upon analysis of recent trends in house-building 
and new owner-occupiers. It also takes into account the impact that the 
domestic economic stability delivered by the Government's macroeconomic 
framework will have had on numbers entering into home ownership. (Minister 
of State for Local Government, J. Healey, Labour: HC Deb 2005-06 435 col. 
1548W: 290605) 
There were voices in parliament concerned with skyrocketing house prices (HC Deb 
1999-00 346 col. 640W: 230300; HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 458WH: 140704). 
However, various justificatory narratives were adopted to legitimate the persistence 
with the policy approach and with the naïve theories facilitated in relation to the 
ownership market and economic subjects. First policy-makers doubted the figures 
presented and rejected their technical accuracy (HC Deb 2002-03 397 col. 164W: 
070103). They hence side-lined the voice of expert groups in favour of it being 
directly accountable towards the individual voter. As the relationship between the 
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individual and the state was direct, it was possible for policy-makers to disregard the 
numbers presented by the major mortgage providers and the Land Registry on 
relatively easy grounds. Again, this can be taken as evidence for the state actors being 
deeply convinced by the approach to the housing market and the affordability issue 
more specifically. At the same time however, negating the correctness of house prices 
provided by expert groups laid bare the degree of sensitivity that such prices 
presented. Denying them was indicative of policy-makers being unwilling to engage 
in a critical assessment of the policy framework. At the same time, it was an equally 
clear side-lining of alternative approaches to the management of the affordability 
issue and the home ownership market more generally. As such, this rejection is 
political as it does violence to different naïve theories of how to interpret the 
economic „collective man‟ and markets alike.  
 
Ironically then, state organs ordered an expert review into the housing supply 
mechanisms (HM Treasury 2004; HC Deb 2003-04 415 col. 949W: 171203). In one 
sense, this presents a position in contradiction to the earlier rejection of expert 
knowledge. The logic with the former was that  
(t)here is a bizarre aspect to housing in this country. We have high house 
prices, but often the market does not respond to them quickly by producing 
new houses. (Liberal Democrat Shadow of the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, E. Davey, Liberal Democrat: HC Deb 2003-04 415 col. 34W: 
091203).  
Stated differently, the housing market was seen as not adjusting as the state actors had 
predicted in order to bring prices down, or in economic terms, prices were not 
fluctuating back to their long-term equilibrium level, they were „downward sticky‟ 
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(HC Deb 2005-06 435 col. 341W: 140605). Policy-makers then relied on the 
experience of an acclaimed economist to gain insight into these unusual market 
mechanisms. It was only once policy-makers had run out of explanations of how to 
make sense of the developments in the ownership market that external assistance was 
sought. The logic then was that aid was needed in order to explain to the everyday 
subject why its definition and conception of markets was not playing out in practice. 
In a sense then, the fall backing on extra-state knowledge demonstrated not only the 
inability of the actors internal to the decision-making process to make sense of market 
outcomes (as with the instance when it denied the significance of statistical figures), 
but also the deep belief in the naïve theories it had been advocated. 
 
Indeed, if micro-behaviour entailed desirable market outcomes, if state interventions 
had optimised agency to be as rational as possible and minimised unfair market 
behaviour, and that market processes in themselves could not be blamed by definition, 
then extreme house price were hard to be attributed (HC Deb 2006-07 457 col. 465W: 
190207). This insight was proof that in general British housing policy was consistent 
with neo-classical beliefs in the self-equilibrating mechanisms of markets. Just as 
with the information issue in the HIPs programme, state policies were enquiring into 
the nature of sub-optimal market outcome. Indeed, the Barker report advised to 
massively invest into social housing (HC Deb 2006-07 457 col. 463W: 190207). It 
hence advocated an even stronger market intervention into apparently independent 
market processes, even if the market of social housing was supposed to act against the 
price tendencies in the ownership market. What is important is that it appears as if the 
belief in the rightfulness of markets was unbroken. The recommendations were 
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largely followed hence further promoting the active and sovereign definition of 
market participants.  
  
 
The reluctance of the British policy-makers to change course can partly be explained 
by the setup of the individual-state relationship as explained in the theoretical 
chapters. As the legitimation regime was direct and that the policies were focussed on 
the individual as to ensure the well-being of the general public, it became 
progressively harder to take actions inconsistent with the conceptions of market 
rightfulness and consumer sovereignty. Falling back on the insights of the literature 
on constructivist institutionalism, I argue that the particular sets of background 
ideational abilities (Schmidt 2008a, 303), or taken-for-granted conceptions to refer the 
literature on the sociology of policy instruments (Hussein and Le Galès 2010), excluded a 
change in the rationale for state intervention as it was regarded as inconsistent in theory 
and in time. In other words, such a U-turn would have equalled a public acknowledgment 
that the naïve theories facilitated beforehand were dysfunctional. Once the state policies 
had put extensive discursive and material efforts into pointing out the benefits of such 
a policy setup, a change would have been politically inconsistent. Even though prices 
were acknowledged to be high, that was not to imply that such an evolution was 
problematic. 
A discussion regarding the long-run house price to earnings ratio can be found 
in paragraph A76 of the 2004 pre-Budget report (Cm 6408). This included the 
statement that, "The consensus view is that house prices exceed sustainable 
levels, though there is a wide range of opinion on the extent of disequilibrium. 
However, the common method of assessing this by comparing the current ratio 
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of house prices to earnings (or some wider measure of income) with its long-
run average can be highly misleading. There is no economic law to dictate that 
this ratio must revert to some constant level over the long term." (Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, J. Healey, Labour: HC Deb 2005-06 435 col. 341W: 
140605) 
 
This was also why policy-makers later still interpreted those trajectories as indicators 
of the success of its macro-economic policy as it was delivering wealth to the 
majority of the population as the statement below highlights. The following quote is 
an illustration of post-hoc legitimation of house price trajectories that summarises 
some of the central elements in the market subjectivities that the state policies had 
been facilitating. At the same time, it demonstrates that legitimation was achieved by 
policy-makers explaining to other members of parliament how the individual was 
benefitting from state interventions.  
The Government's macroeconomic framework has delivered stability and 
rising prosperity. More people have had the confidence to become home 
owners, with around 1.8 million more home owners since 1997. (Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, J. Healey, Labour: HC Deb 2006-07 457 col. 463W: 
190207) 
What could potentially be detrimental in more people being able to afford their own 
home? In the end then, the British state paid more attention to the short-term effect of 
its policies, which were overly successful in that regard, but neglected longer-term 
(Watson 2011a) issues with economic macro-stability. 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter has first exemplified how an ontology focusing on concrete individual-
state relationships can set the focus on the multiplicity of political elements in a 
certain economic regime. By focussing not only on state activity per se, but by linking 
a particular rationale for state action with the definition of the „collective man‟, the 
chapter had demonstrated an additional layer of investigation when it comes to studies 
of comparative capitalisms and pointed to the deeply political aspects of state policies 
in relation to naïve theories. Throughout this exposition, the main issue was to carve 
out how state actors were legitimising certain policies and which assumptions such 
initiatives were making in relation to understandings of the „economic man‟. As such, 
it has empirically shown that such a focus is able to bring about a reading of markets, 
of economic agency, and of the perceived roles of the state that are context-specific. 
Such an approach that is heavily based in a constructivist account of the human being 
hence adds a perspective that complements the productionist focus that VoC tends to 
follow (Campbell 2005, 7; Hancké et al. 2007, 7) as it open the analysis to issues of 
the private individual and of consumption. 
 
In other words, before presenting a meaningful explanation of the social mechanisms 
and interconnections that have led to specific historical economic outcomes, a study 
of the naïve theories of basic economic notions held by policy-makers, revealed 
through parliamentary discussions and facilitated through state policies is beneficial. 
Instead of taking the concepts of the state, the economic agent and the market for 
granted and hence as universally constant, this exposition has demonstrated that all of 
these notions are themselves social constructions (Woll 2008, 10) which are subject to 
political struggles. This is exactly what the ontological aspects of the political in 
 
 
187 
 
chapter four were referring to, that the definition of the terms used in the policy-arena 
are themselves already imprinted with political features, either as limiting the choice 
of policy instruments or as narrowing down the understanding of economic realities 
from an everyday point of view (Jabko 2006, 32). This chapter has showcased that 
once the comparative scholar takes a step back and allows for variation in the 
meanings of economic concepts themselves, as understood by the actors analysed, the 
focus of the political shift towards the process of the meaningful (re)production of 
these notions, that in a second stage in distributional terms. As a further example that 
is historically documented (Terrance 2010) is the case of the concept of „property-
owning democracy‟ as referred to before, as it represents a notion that cannot be taken 
as universal in space and time. Indeed, various policy-actors have loaded the concept 
with different meanings, in relation to the term itself but also as far as the legitimation 
of it goes with respect to a particular individual-state relationship. This chapter is the 
first one here to replicate such an analysis for the understandings of economic notions 
in relation to home ownership issues.  
 
 
In relation to the literatures reviewed, such an approach is novel as it goes beyond 
„bringing the state back in‟ (Schmidt 2009b; see also Skocpol 1979; Evans et al. 
1985). Indeed, such an approach as exemplified here gives room to the data of the 
case-study itself to define what such a concept is supposed to mean, especially in 
relation to the economic agent. Through such a perspective, the very domain of the 
establishing or institutional reproduction of the notions of „the state‟, „the market‟ and 
„the economic agent‟ is seen itself through a political lens, the lens of naïve theories. 
It is this epistemological break that introduces the additional political features that the 
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theoretical chapters have been alluding to. It is only once the more specific meanings 
of how the state and the individual come together in a marketplace have been grasped, 
that is it possible to give detailed insights into the processes entailing certain 
outcomes. It is not only the latter that are political in distributional terms, but the very 
subjectivities that allow results to come about must be seen as political as well. 
Indeed, these conceptions are at the centre of what is possible to get transposed into 
policies and hence facilitated in relation to the individual. 
 
In relation to this case more particularly, the illustrations here have demonstrated the 
ambivalent nature of the British state interventions into the economy, but also upon 
the understandings of economic notions by its citizens. Even though policy-makers 
saw the state as an actor that enabled individual agents to play out their agency as 
ownership market participants, state policies were simultaneously supposed to fulfil 
the role of the protector of this active kind of economic agent in order for market 
processes to imply socially legitimate outcomes. The tensions in the policies indicate 
the political characteristics of state interventions, i.e. their inability to produce the 
same degree of benefits to all members in society. In addition to previous treatments 
of the state in the comparative literature, I argue that such a perspective is better 
suited to investigate national economies and to understand specific policy issues in a 
more genuine way as the very content of economic notions is given by the case itself, 
not imposed by the scholar. Whereas the Hall and Soskice piece does not offer any 
discussion on the context-specific meaning of the notions it uses (Hall and Soskice 
2001) and instead quietly opts for the rational-choice definitions (Hay 2005, quoted in 
Clift 2012), the comparative capitalisms literature offers little debate on the subject 
(again see Clift 2012 as an exception).  
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To come back to the example referred to in the literature review, Jackson and Deeg do 
not allow for the economic concepts to take on different meanings that could 
themselves hide political features. I copy in the extract again. 
State action is also a deciding factor in explaining the different trajectories of 
change of otherwise seemingly similar types of national models. (…) compare 
Denmark and Germany (…) which nevertheless followed markedly dissimilar 
paths of change since the early 1990s. This is attributed largely to the differing 
roles of the state. In Denmark, a large state (…) provides state actors with both 
an incentive and the capacity to sustain macro-level corporatist bargaining. 
Public sector workers find a strategic political ally among low wage workers 
and together are powerful enough to induce workers and employers in the 
export sectors to sustain national bargaining. (…) In Germany, a much smaller 
state with less capacity could not sustain macro-level corporatism under 
similar conditions, and German firms maintain institutions of coordinated 
capitalism mostly for the manufacturing sector. (Jackson and Deeg 2008a, 
699-700) 
Indeed, the state is seen as an entity as such whose meaning is independent upon the 
German or Danish context. Whereas the scholar allow for a quantitative difference in 
the size of the state, they do not account for the possibility of „the state‟ to take on 
qualitatively different meanings for German and Danish policy-makers and final 
consumers.  
 
To sum up the findings, the British analysis has highlighted how home ownership 
policies have conveyed an economic understanding of the state helping individuals 
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play the market in order to gain financial benefits (Crouch 2009). Policy-makers 
positioned the state as a benevolent actor on the side of the individual by enabling 
him/her to access markets and by securing socially legitimate outcomes through 
market mechanisms seen as financial opportunities. Home ownership was conceived a 
quasi-universal right that an ever larger share of the population should aspire to 
(Whitehead 2012, 108). Policies were legitimated as they guaranteed the micro-
economic conditions upon which sovereign market participants could then accumulate 
wealth. The naïve theories facilitated assumed markets that, once made accessible by 
state policies, allowed individuals to personally benefit from price trajectories. The 
directness of the individual-state relationship has not only entailed policy instruments 
focussed on the immediate wealth effect of individual agents, but has also contributed 
to the persistence in readings of self-adjusting markets and active utility-maximising 
agents. 
 
The British set of state policies in respect to the ownership market then put forward 
both free market principles and those of state intervention (Lund 1996: 179; see 
Polanyi 1957, 76). On the one hand individuals are meant to take initiative and act as 
free agents in a market where offer and demand alone ought to determine prices and 
hence the allocation of housing. On the other hand, state programmes had to fulfil 
functions in relation to this very market and the economic agent alike. On the one 
hand, state initiatives were open about their desire to offer easier access to the 
ownership market by investing considerable amount of public money into its lower 
end. The whole rationale of affordability assumes that policy-makers have a duty to 
bring people into this particular market. On the other hand, interventions also had to 
ensure that the market itself was able to operate accordingly. Legislation had to be 
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adopted to exclude unfair practices and the information had to be disclosed that would 
otherwise not have been. One intermediary conclusion to draw here is that markets 
ought to be seen as complex loci of interplay between the state and the individual, and 
not so much as institutions on their own terms. Such a statement follows the 
comments above in relation to the benefits of a constructivist approach to economic 
regimes. Market outcomes ultimately depend to a large extent upon specific state 
interventions, into the market themselves and upon the naïve theories of its 
participants as consumers in this case.  
 
Now that the housing market has been explored, the attention shifts to the social 
processes that enabled individuals to actually buy property and access the market. The 
notion of affordability is indeed closely linked to the amount of sources the individual 
can fall back upon when engaging with market practices. I thus analyse how 
conceptions that the rationale for state intervention were facilitating in relation to 
proper financial micro-management behaviour, as well as with regard to the 
understandings of mortgage markets on their own.  I can take as a hypothesis that the 
same conceptions of agency hold in other domains that are embedded into similar 
socio-economic contexts as far as taken-for-granted conceptions and naïve theories 
go. 
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Chapter 6: Naïve Theories of the British Mortgage Market 
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1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has empirically highlighted which subjectivities were promoted 
in the British home ownership market and which political implications such naïve 
theories had in economic and political terms. At the same time it has shed light onto 
the nature of the British individual-state relationship. It has also underlined the dual 
role of the state policy in helping individuals access the home ownership market, and 
in protecting the wealth that these same individuals had been able to accumulate on 
the back of rising asset prices. These objectives have become progressively harder to 
reconcile to a point where skyrocketing house prices have been interpreted as good 
market governance and where additional resources where needed to sustain the stream 
of new market entrants and hence the price levels observed. The chapter has also 
shown how an active type of economic agency was depicted through the material 
legislations and the coordinative discourse. This conception of the „economic man‟ 
was seen as sufficient to ensure socially acceptable economic outcomes as markets 
were seen as adjusting in an unhampered fashion. In other words, apart from certain 
naïve theories, hence everyday understandings about the market participant, state 
policies also facilitated specific notions of how the market operated, and what ends 
they were to serve. 
 
These findings follow from the theoretical developments in chapters three and four, 
themselves being a reply to the literature review offered in chapter two. This chapter 
then aligns itself in the argumentation of the thesis as it applies the suggested 
framework to a field that is closely linked to the definition of the economic subject 
(Rose 1999; Bröckling 2007) as well as to the housing market: financial markets. As 
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the mortgage market constitutes another market in which potential home owners 
operate, the latter is analysed according to the suggested framework (Miles and 
Pillonca 2008). As highlighted, as the social-political context i.e. the policy, is similar 
to the one for the home ownership market, the hypothesis stands that the findings here 
about the definition of economic agency, the market and the roles of the state are in 
line with the ones in the previous chapter. 
 
As the purchase of an owned house constitutes a considerable financial burden, 
pecuniary aspects play an essential part in relation to the housing market (Hardt 
2003). These elements have been set aside so far as they are treated in a separate 
chapter here. Once the theoretical parts of the thesis has proposed the human 
individual as being fundamentally characterised through its state of under-
determination, it follows that an analysis of the depiction of the economic agent with 
regards to housing ought to be accompanied by an investigation into the naïve 
theories of the financial features of such an ideal-typical agent. Indeed, the individual 
that engages in the housing market is very likely also to enter into contact with 
financial products that enable the purchase of an owned home (Stephens 2007). The 
current chapter figures as a necessary addition to the last one as it raises the same 
questions more specifically for the monetary side of how individuals were supposed 
to act in their quality as home owners described beforehand (1997-2007). These 
explorations are meant to add further insight into the ways that British policy-makers 
depicted the individual-state relationships in relation to the market, but also to 
illuminate how central the financial elements have been in this regard. An analysis of 
the financial aspects of the aforementioned rationale for state intervention is then 
suggested here. 
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It is important to remember that such concerns can be more or less relevant according 
to the economic and social definition of home ownership in the first place (politics of 
naïve theories (1) and (2)) and the legitimation regime of the state polity (3) and 
public policies (4)
12
. In the context of the starting point of human indeterminacy, the 
very finding that monetary aspects are seen as crucial in relation to housing market is 
to suggest a specific context-specific reading of the latter. The (coordinative) 
discourse around the relationship between the home ownership and the mortgage 
market then becomes political as such efforts facilitate certain naïve theories and side-
line others. Such naïve theories are concerned not only with how these markets relate 
to each other, but also how the economic agent is supposed to make sense of them, 
separately and jointly. These understandings per se are political as they do violence to 
alternative conceptions of the economic phenomena involved (1) and entail different 
distribution effects (2). 
 
As such, the underlying legitimation practices, of the policies and the polity alike, are 
investigated. In order to do so, the individual-state relationship is positioned at the 
centre of the investigative efforts. Indeed, it is the latter that is essential in answering 
the questions about the political features of the financial agent in this thesis. From the 
very start I have argued that the current stream of studies into varieties of capitalist 
regimes lacks a comprehensive conceptualisation of the variety of definitions that the 
individual can potentially take on, and hence tends to offer a context-independent 
definition of the state (Bevir et al. 2003). It is thus the logical consequence when 
looking into the housing policies that the argument also sheds light into the 
                                                        
12
 See table towards the end of chapter four. 
 
 
196 
 
differential setups of individual-state relationships in the British (and German) 
context as far as financial conceptions go. As such, this chapter makes the same 
double contribution as the previous one. First it pushes forward the argument in 
relation to the literature critiqued beforehand and commenced in the last chapter in 
terms of applying the theoretical framework to an empirical case. Second, it also 
relates to the literature of comparative capitalisms as it adds another layer of the 
political as it points to the politics of the everyday understandings of economic 
concepts, such as „the mortgage‟, „the mortgage market‟, „saving‟. It does so through 
an individual-state perspective that is concerned with consumer issues, hence that is 
not merely interested in the production side of economic diversity.  
 
As regards the structure, the chapter is built in three parts. After this introduction, I 
first offer an overview of the key financial programmes that British state policies have 
introduced in the period under investigation (1997-2007). At the same time as it 
shortly describes their functioning I highlight the arguments mobilised in their support 
and the links that were drawn by policy-makers with the housing market in order to 
facilitate certain sets of naïve theories. Macro-economic framing techniques are often 
found here, something that has been less pronounced for the policies more directly 
related to home ownership. The subsequent section puts the individual-state 
relationship at the centre and investigates the moral assumptions about economic 
agency that the programmes came with. It also explores how coordinative discourse 
depicted the state as an intermediary between the individual and market mechanisms 
in order to achieve socially accepted outcomes. The topic of regulation is brought up 
in this regard as it highlights some of the tensions with market governance 
mechanisms. Subsequently, the argument moves on to the exact relationship between 
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these financial features and the housing market. I investigate how financial markets 
were seen to fit into the larger picture of asset accumulation through the housing 
market. The macro-economic implications of such subjectivities are also explored. 
Tensions between flexible and the fixed rate mortgage products are especially 
interesting as they bring out the contradictions that were arising between two different 
functions the rationale for state intervention had been set up for. The conclusion sums 
up the main findings for the case of British state interventions into financial markets 
in relation to housing. 
 
An identical methodology as for the previous chapter is operationalised. Again, 
parliamentary debates are explored to shed light not only onto the policy initiatives in 
their own right but also onto the legitimation context justifying the form and content 
of the policies enacted. Again the software packages Nvivo 8 and 9 have been made 
use of to filter through the relevant policy utterances that relate to the financial 
aspects of housing markets such as savings programmes and discussions about 
product mis-selling. 
2 Financial Programmes and Macro-Economic Concerns 
In British politics, it was openly acknowledged that the financial side of the housing 
market in its form of mortgages was essential. The amount of references to this topic 
in this section is an indication for such a statement. Financial choices and those made 
in the housing market were closely knit together at the individual level, hence 
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demonstrating the relevance of an analysis of the mortgage market in relation to that 
of housing. 
A mortgage is the biggest single financial commitment in most people's lives. 
For most of the British people, more of their money is wrapped up in 
mortgages than in anything else. Ours is a country with a high percentage of 
home ownership. (B. Blizzard, Labour: HC Deb 1998-99 329 col. 460: 150499)  
As the previous chapter has shown, the very framing of the housing market as being 
characterised by an affordability issue was an indication of the centrality of financial 
dimension of the latter. This chapter is especially useful in analysing this relationship 
under a constructivist perspective. To start with, it is important to note that such 
conceptions implied a discourse in which the financial aspects dominated the material 
qualities of the properties traded.  Indeed, financial connotations were vastly present 
in parliamentary discussions about the housing market. The quotes selected in this 
chapter only underline this fact. This in itself is a finding worth reporting, and one 
that is picked up upon when comparing the British regime to the German case. As 
such, such a strong linkage is political as it marginalises conceptions of mortgages for 
their own ends, not as a means to feed the housing market. 
 
This then also suggests that the home owner was not only regarded as an agent in the 
housing market, but one that was looking to maximise his/her wealth by falling back 
of various financial products in the parallel mortgage market. 
That is even more the case when they realise that the value of their house has 
increased substantially since they bought it, perhaps only a short time ago. In 
those circumstances, people will inevitably get into personal debt that they can 
manage. (T. Harris, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 632: 050704) 
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Individuals are depicted as making active use of the conditions in the mortgage 
market to bring assets into the home ownership market (Ertürk et al. 2005). In other 
words, differentials in returns between both markets were considered as opportunities 
for households to accumulate wealth (Longley et al. 1991). The very different social 
natures of these markets became insignificant in such a context as the central aim was 
to acquire equity in one place and get a return higher than the servicing costs in 
another. This was nothing else than asking individuals to make rational decisions as 
investors (Watson 2010). The target of such policies were individuals in their capacity 
as utility-maximisers who exploit the potential for financial enrichment. As such it 
played into the hands of those households that were comfortable with such an active 
definition of economic agency, in other words that followed the financial literacy 
programmes enacted (Finlayson 2009). At the same time, the issue of debt was also a 
constitutive element in the relationship between the mortgage and housing market as 
becomes clear shortly (Burrows 1998).  Indeed, specific conceptions of economic 
agency and personal debt were set in various savings programmes. 
 
Indeed, in 1998 the government launched the „Individual Savings Account‟ (ISA), a 
scheme that was replacing two previous saving initiatives (TESSAa and PEPs; HC 
Deb 1997-98 306 col. 33: 090298). The rationale of such state intervention was to 
“develop and extend the savings habit” (HC Deb 1997-98 314 col. 614: 250698; 
Watson 2008a). But contrary to the efforts in the housing market, macro-economic 
issues played a much more considerable role with the savings policies. 
The personal sector saving ratio was 11 percent in 1997. A modest cyclical 
fall in the saving ratio is expected over the next three years. But over the 
longer term the introduction of ISAa and policies to promote economic growth 
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and stability will increase the incentive to save for investment (H. Liddell, 
Labour: HC Deb 1997-98 310 col. 697: 230498). 
More generally, the introduction of ISAs was preceded by a debate around the saving 
ratio of British individuals. Even against concerns of the costs of the scheme (HC Deb 
1998-99 329 col. 467:150499), it was defended on grounds that  
(T)he Government are aiming to promote economic stability and part of this 
strategy is to avoid large cyclical swings in the saving ratio such as those seen 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (P. Hewitt, Labour: HC Deb 1998-99 326 col. 
862: 040399). 
 
There was indeed a string of concerns to “avoid periods of boom and bust” (HC Deb 
1997-98 306 col. 892: 170298; Clift and Tomlinson 2007) through the promotion of a 
„savings culture‟ (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, A. Darling, Labour: HC Deb 1997-
98 308 col. 209: 110398). The key variable held responsible for the volatility of the 
British economic performance were private savings. Such a conception was consistent 
with a strong focus on individual behaviour as determining the overall socio-
economic outcome, hence affirming the hypothesis in relation to the similarity 
between the policies in the housing and the mortgage market, pointing to the topical 
consistency of the rationale for state intervention. As developed in the previous 
chapter, the British policy-makers conceived of markets as of the summation of 
individual agents only. The assumption was that once the economic agent could be 
incentivised to save a more considerable part of his/her income, boom and bust could 
be made a concept of the past. 
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However, and this was also in line with the British perception of the market, the state 
interventions had to play their part in facilitating such patterns of behaviour in the 
first place. The institution of the state was again perceived by policy-makers as a 
market enabler in this instance, hence legitimating the individual-state setting though 
the offering of financial opportunities. ISAs were judged to be only one part of these 
efforts among the “tough decisions necessary to create a climate of low inflation” 
(Economic Secretary to the Treasury, P. Hewitt, Labour: HC Deb 1998-99 329 col. 
362:150499). The state policies were to help the individual save by engineering 
beneficial macro-economic conditions that allowed for such behaviour. Just as with 
the case of the housing market where policy-makers also adopted a discourse of 
„helping‟ people into the market, so they had to “encourage people to save more” (HC 
Deb 1998-99 329 col. 363:150499) by falling back on economic policies that would 
render saving financially more viable. 
 
Apart from the ISA initiative, the other main savings programmes were the Savings 
Gateway (Collard and McKay 2006) and the Child Trust Fund (Finlayson 2011). In 
2001 both of these initiatives were presented in „Delivering Saving and Assets‟ (HC 
Deb 2001-02 386 col. 664W: 240502). The focus on the first scheme was that low-
income savers were “able to access to their financial assets in order to meet 
unexpected needs” (R. Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2001-02 386 col. 664W: 240502). 
Therefore, the formula of a cash-based account was put forward to ensure that the 
savings were liquid and could easily be fallen back upon „without restriction‟ (R. 
Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2001-02 386 col. 664W: 240502). The state policy supported 
such making use of savings through a „matched contribution‟. The Child Trust Fund 
was more specifically addressed at “children from the poorest families” that received 
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an initial endowment of up to £500 (Ruth Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2002-03 404 col. 
798W: 080503; see also HC Deb 1997-98 318 col. 614: 041198). 
 
There thus existed policies to educate
13
 the individual into his/her role as active 
economic agent, one that is independent and takes opportunities throughout life 
through the management of private finances (HC Deb 2002-03 401 col. 131W: 
110303). These savings policies were regarded by policy-makers as “empowering 
individuals with financial information” (HC Deb 2002-03 404 col. 798W: 080503, 
Ruth Kelly), again very much in line with the findings of the previous chapter. What 
is important at this stage of the argument is that initiatives were taken to raise the 
saving ratio among the population, especially within the lower-income groups, as a 
means to prevent economic instability. Even though the focus was on macro-
economic stability, the legitimation regime was still direct as the individual was also 
presented as being the beneficiary of such saving efforts as they enabled him/her to be 
„empowered‟ as an economic agent. 
 
Indeed, even though such efforts had been engineered for macro-economic reasons, 
they were also thought to provide “individuals with security, opportunity and 
independence throughout life” (R. Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 424 col. 1199W: 
070904), pointing towards the directness of the legitimation regime and the 
individual-state relationship. Actually, the latter entailed the first. As the individual 
was regarded as the central element in the economy, micro-behaviour was perceived 
to constitute the means to end boom and bust (HC Deb 1997-98 306 col. 892: 
170298). In terms of policy instruments, the economic agent per se was targeted as 
                                                        
13
 Compare with the Gramsci quote in chapter one, section two. 
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macro-economic change could only happen when its constitutive parts were behaving 
differently. Just as for housing policies, policy-makers saw economic outcomes as 
nothing more than the cumulation of individual decisions. The coordinative discourse 
of empowerment was indicative of a particular kind of individual-state relationship. 
State policies addressed the individual directly as crucial units of the British economic 
regime, pointing toward the direct nature of its legitimation setting (Lister 2003). Not 
only did the mass of the people carry such an essential significance for economic 
success, but it also constituted the channel through which economic policy was to be 
enacted. In other words, micro-economic concerns were always functional for the 
attainment of macro-economic rationales in the British context. 
 
As mentioned, in the ISA programme personal debt was depicted as to be avoided, or 
at least as only acceptable if savings were existent as well. Indeed, such was the moral 
basis behind the legitimating rationale for increasing the saving ratio. As negative 
equity was seen as a possible source for macro-economic instability, savings were 
incentivised. After the millennium however, the coordinative discourse about such a 
reading of indebtedness slowly vanished in favour of a much more positive 
interpretation of debt (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, A. Smith, Labour: HC Deb 
2000-01 361 col. 1070: 250101).  
Surely that is not a problem, provided that people can finance their debt (K. 
Hopkins, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 607: 050704) 
I agree that a given amount of debt is not a problem for those who can easily 
manage it. (O. Letwin, Conservatives: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 607: 050704) 
It appears that people are capable of dealing with such debt and spreading it 
out. (V. Baird, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 608: 050704) 
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At the same time, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury concluded that “most household 
debt remains affordable”, still simultaneously rejecting “the boom and bust economic 
policies of the past” (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, P. Boateng, Labour: HC Deb 
2003-04 423 col. 619: 050704). In a context of rising house prices, the initial worries 
with low saving ratio were said to have been exaggerated in 2004. In 2007, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer voiced a similar position. 
With debt repayments as a proportion of income at 8.9 per cent, in contrast to 
15 percent at the peak in 1990, the International Monetary Fund and the Bank 
of England have both said that the impact on macro-economic policy is small 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. Brown, Labour: HC Deb 2006-07 455 col. 
1533: 250107) 
The reason for such a turn in the interpretation of the savings issue laid in the 
economic the policy-making that had been successful in creating conditions under 
which low savings did not constitute a concern worth addressing as house prices were 
pushing individual equity upwards. This matches the later interpretations of house 
price inflation as the reflection of good economic governance, as well as affirming the 
hypothesis about the similarity of the definition of market mechanisms as sen in the 
previous chapter. 
 
Whereas low savings were first seen by policy-makers as a potential cause for 
instability, later on the same figures were reinterpreted as being in line with the 
historical trend. This is a good example of how the same concepts cannot not only 
take on different meanings in different polities, but also that such conceptions of 
economic notion can change over time within the same institutional setting. 
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I refer them to an analysis of the savings ratio carried out by the Bank of 
England, which concluded that, when inflation is taken into account, the 
savings ratio since 1998 is significantly higher than the average over the 
previous 40 years. (Financial Secretary to the Treasury, R. Kelly, Labour: HC 
Deb 2003-04 423 col. 648: 050704) 
Even though state policies had previously pushed forward the „savings habit‟, 
similarly low numbers were now regarded as indicators of successful economic 
management of the mortgage market, and of the health of the economic regime more 
broadly. 
 
Whereas before the causal mechanism was running from the individual to the 
economy, this logic was now reversed. As the savings programmes had outlined 
before, policy-makers had considered prudential private savings to be the basis of a 
stable economy (Ertürk et al. 2005). Now however, the latter was seen to open 
opportunities for the individual to use his/her resources in ways that were perceived to 
be more efficient than saving. It was because state interventions had successfully 
produced a context of beneficial economic conditions that people were so confident 
with their futures and were keen to maximise the opportunities that such conditions 
offered. Again, this replicates a very similar interpretation to that one adopted in 
relation to house price trajectories. 
 
In this sense, the House of Commons declared 
that a strong and stable economy is the foundation of families' confidence in 
their own finances; notes that economic stability has delivered low and stable 
inflation, interest rates have been at their lowest since the 1950s (…), further 
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notes that as a result households are better able to judge their long-term 
commitments as macroeconomic stability has reduced the risks to household 
finances of sudden and sharp rises in interest rates as seen in the past; (…) 
allowing people to save with confidence (…). (HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 651: 
050704) 
In other words, in a context of low inflation and interest rates, the need for savings 
was overdue, even sub-optimal in relation to expected returns. If individuals decided 
that they had no need to save more extensively, then that was a sign of how well-off 
they must be. Again, such a reading assumed that individuals were free and informed 
enough to be able to make the economic decisions that reflected actual market 
conditions. The sovereignty of the individual agent in its judgement was seen as 
superior in a way as to produce optimal macro-economic resultants. Even though the 
rationale was inversed, it was still based very much onto the same conceptions of how 
markets come to produce outcomes and what a constitutive role individuals were to 
play within them. 
 
The underlying economic evolution between the pre- and post-millennium period was 
that house prices had gone up significantly so to foster household wealth. It was only 
because of the housing market policies undertaken that the policy-makers were now 
in a position to disregard savings concerns. 
(…) the fact that the asset side of the household balance sheet today remains 
strong. Household net wealth, taking account of the recent fall in equity prices, 
is more than 50 per cent higher than at the beginning of 1997. So this debate 
has to be placed in the framework of a thriving economy. (Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury, P. Boateng, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 621) 
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Such a move was deeply political as it was able to do violence to the sets of naïve 
theories held earlier. At the same time, it was also playing into the hands of different 
population sub-groups. Whereas before the households that had enacted a savings 
strategy were depicted as the ideal-typical „economic man‟, now a much more active 
and strategic attitude was promoted that required financial literacy in order to benefit 
from economic policy-making. As such, this shift also entailed a change in the 
distributional consequences of naïve theories. 
 
This then reveals the relevance of studying mortgage and housing markets in parallel 
as the thesis has proposed to do. This section highlights that the incentivisation 
towards particular models of private asset management have to be linked to the home 
ownership market. In other words, policies enacted in the mortgage market acted as 
functional elements in facilitating naïve theories upon which upwards trending house 
price trajectories were sustained. To use the terminology introduced in chapter three, 
the mortgage market was the means to the end of home ownership whose exact 
meaning was framed in benefits to the individual. As such, the individual-state 
relationship was direct in the British context.The mortgage-housing connection might 
be obvious as far as the economics go, but what this chapter is interested in are the 
moral depictions of savings and investments. That is also why the next section 
explores in more detail the taken-for-granted conceptions held by policy-makers in 
relation to the British financial subject.  
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3 The Making of the Financialised Subject 
Once the general context of the savings programmes has been set out, the analysis 
moves on to the very definition of the economic agent through state interventions and 
discourse. I have already outlined that the individual per se was considered to the 
cornerstone of the British economic regime, this also held in relation to the mortgage 
market. The naïve theories associated with proper private behaviour, and the links of 
those conceptions with specific macro-economic outcomes in the housing market, 
deserve more attention now. Stated differently, this section investigates the interplay 
between the particular understandings of state intervention, the definition of the 
individual, and the market, seen though the eyes of British policy-makers. The 
example of mis-selling of mortgages and the subsequent issues of consumer 
protection is taken as a starting point from which more general conclusions are drawn.  
 
The previous section on savings initiatives has shown how state actors interpreted the 
role of the state as creating beneficial conditions upon which individual utility-
maximising behaviour could then accumulate wealth. The case of mis-selling of 
mortgages (HC Deb 1998-99 337 col. 640: 101199) is particularly interesting in 
relation to the questions of this chapter as it offers an instance where policy-makers 
had to explicitly formulate their positions when explaining why such a practice was 
unacceptable. 
 
In technical terms, 
borrowers had taken out their mortgage at a time when the lender had only one 
standard variable rate. (…) The lender in each case introduced an additional 
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variable rate and claimed that the reference point for the deal was the higher of the 
two variable rates. Each lender tried to dress up its new rate in a different name. 
(B. Gardiner, Labour: HC Deb 2001-02 381 col. 55WH: 050302) 
The lending industry, and corporation within it more precisely, were thus using their 
powers to change the terms and conditions of financial products once they had be 
launched, especially as far as mortgage-based equity release schemes were concerned 
(HC Deb 2003-04 415 col. 676W: 151203). This was done without letting customers 
know and thus raised corporate profit margins. Such a practice was judged to be 
against standards of the „fair play‟ principle (B. Gardiner, Labour: HC Deb 2001-02 
381 col. 54WH: 050302). The institutional reaction was to extend the regulatory 
controls of the „Financial Services Authority‟ (FSA) towards this area of financial 
activity (Pannell 2006). A first observation thus was that it was not a state department 
directly that regulated, but a politically independent body that was charged with 
overseeing the sector (Moran 2001). 
 
But more centrally, the main method to avoid mis-selling was not a solution framed in 
terms of regulation at all, but one based upon further disclosure of information to the 
individual. As in found in the previous chapter, the logic was not that the industry had 
misbehaved, but that the consumer was unable to adequately react against its practices 
by sanctioning such practices. The reason for mis-selling was located in the 
insufficient amount of information that individual agents had in order to take 
informed decisions. Agents were unable to discriminate against the ingenious 
methods of mortgage lenders and hence opted for out-of-line market processes as they 
did not know the implications. In all the utterances in relation to the methods of how 
to minimise mis-sellings, the logic was one of an uninformed and thus irrational 
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economic agent. In other words, certain industry practices were able to persist 
because of a lack of consumer sovereignty (HC Deb 1998-99 329 col. 461: 150499). 
The solution then was to further „empower‟ the consumer as described above so that 
he/she was put into a position to sanction unsound procedures. 
(…) to help borrowers make better informed, confident mortgage choices and 
avoid products which have in some cases caused detriment in the past. (M. 
Johnson, Labour: HC Deb 1999-00 345 col. 518W: 060300) 
The proposals announced by the Government were designed specifically to 
address these problems and put the consumer in control. (M. Johnson, Labour: 
HC Deb 1999-00 353 col. 441W: 100700) 
 
The dominant naïve theory was that an active definition of agency was only effective 
and possible with a high degree of accessible information. It was not the role of the 
state intervention to protect consumers by forbidding certain financial practices 
directly, but it was the responsibility of the individual to make sure he/she opted for 
the financial product that fitted its needs best. The belief was held that once 
information was freely available, the market would be self-regulatory (G. Mudie, 
Labour: HC Deb 2006-07 453 col. 176W: 171106). As seen, policy-makers were 
reticent to actively regulate the mortgage market and were happy to stick to a policy 
where it “will place on mortgage providers a duty to inform customers” about any 
changes in its terms (HC Deb 1998-99 335 col. 181:130799). Just as in the case of 
British housing policies, the problem was framed in terms of limited information, and 
once the state policies pushed for more generous disclosure schemes, the rational 
choices of private agents would lead to economically efficient and socially legitimate 
outcomes. 
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There was again a belief in the rightfulness of market mechanisms and a strong sense 
that the public policy needed to “make the market work better for consumers” (R. 
Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 424 col. 1203W: 070904) by tackling “confusion 
caused by lenders presenting information in different ways” (K. Howells, Labour: HC 
Deb 1998-99 328 col. 364: 250399). As reported in the previous chapter, the state 
policies, in both the home ownership and the mortgage market, only helped the 
economic agent to take informed decisions when it came to financial issues, again 
underlining the principles of consumer sovereignty. The individual was still the 
central element in the economy. This also matched with the taken-for-granted 
conception of the state acting as a market-optimiser. As for the legitimation regime, it 
was direct even though it passed through market mechanisms as policy interventions 
were firmly targeted at the individual. In the end, economic outcomes were always 
reliant on proper individual patterns of mortgage behaviour. 
 
However, information only was not sufficient in producing optimal market outcomes. 
On top of referring to all available data, the individual needed “the basic financial 
awareness and skills” to handle the latter (M. Wicks, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 424 
col. 1120W: 070904). Indeed, a set of initiatives was taken under the name of the 
„Informed Choice Programme‟ that helped the economic subject to take full 
advantage of the financial products on offer, in the mortgage market but also as far as 
pensions went (HC Deb 2003-04 424 col. 1120W: 070904). This then related back to 
financial literacy programmes. The right planning strategy and long-term outlook 
were necessary to transform a market under conditions of informational transparency 
into one that lead to economically and socially acceptable results (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2007). Only if private agents were playing the market according to rational 
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optimisation principles, was it performing at full efficiency. But that also meant that 
the process of helping people went further as it actively attempted to shape the very 
rationales according to which financial transactions were judged upon (Finlayson 
2009; Langley 2009). The market-optimiser role of state intervention then extended 
into the making the an economic subject that processed information is a way as to 
make sure he/she gets the best possible return in technical terms. It is here that the 
notion of the making of the „financial citizen‟ (Leyshon and Thrift 1995; French et al. 
2011; Parker 2012) was most evident. At the same time, it was also an illustration that 
the British financial markets could not be considered as a natural and independent 
entity, but that the state heavily interfered with it in order for it to produce certain 
political ends. As such, it has to be seen as a space of the political, in terms of the 
facilitation of particular naïve theories and as distributing outcomes towards the 
„financially literate‟ households. 
 
At the same time, these utterance are indicative not only of the way in which the 
individual subject was regarded as the constitutive element of market dynamics, but 
also that in the end the latter had to benefit those very market mechanisms. Markets 
were thus understood as black boxes that magnified the inputs in a way as to lead to 
economic benefits for all in case the state official managed them adequately. 
I think that everyone agrees that mortgage regulation will benefit millions of 
consumers. The FSA has approached the matter in line with its statutory 
objectives, on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, to introduce a process that 
will benefit everyone. (Financial Secretary to the Treasury, R. Kelly: HC Deb 
2003-04 419 col. 1746: 010404) 
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Just as with the case of housing policies where everyone was supposed to have a right 
to possess their own house, the rationale for state intervention did not show any signs 
of differentiating between economic agents according to their financial or social 
position. This is a finding that comes back when the comparison with the German 
case is proceeded with. 
 
To go back to the concept of legitimation regimes, this was consistent with a direct 
individual-state relationship in which the state addressed all individuals directly. The 
naïve theory promoted was that market mechanisms were the appropriate means for 
all of Britain‟s population to access credit and accumulate wealth. Certain initiatives 
in this line of thought were captured under the name of „financial inclusion strategy‟ 
(Economic Secretary to the Treasury, E. Balls, Labour: HC Deb 2006-07 458 col. 
85W: 280307; see also Gregg et al. 2005, 251) hinting at the universal character of 
financial practices. Again then, policy-makers regarded the state as a market-enabler 
in the role to bring individuals into the market, and as a market-optimiser as making 
sure the relevant level of information as well as financial management skills were 
present. The focus on making all market participants disclose a maximum of 
information was the way through which such a belief was operationalised (HC Deb 
1999-00 345 col. 518W: 060300; HC Deb 2002-03 410 col. 1095W: 061003). 
 
In such a setup, it was significant to observe a specific kind of mortgage regulation 
(Stephens 2007). I argue that it was a type of regulation that was necessarily on the 
side of the industry itself (HC Deb 1998-99 327 col. 768: 180399; HC Deb 2003-04 
423 col. 627: 050704). As mortgage providers were at the very centre in their role of 
suppliers to market products, regulation was assessed according to a double standard. 
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On the one hand, state interventions had to make sure consumers were protected in 
their function of market-optimiser. On the other hand they also had to ensure that the 
mortgage market was offering the very services that enabled the market to produce 
positive results for all, in their function of market-enabler. The FSA was hence in 
charge to “prevent the cowboys from exploiting that market” (HC Deb 2003-04 415 
col. 275W: 171203), at the same time taking into account that “regulation leads to 
increased costs being imposed on providers. Those costs are recovered from their 
clients“ (M, Hoban, Conservatives: HC Deb 2006-07 453 col. 187WH: 171106). In 
other words, an independent body was asked to monitor mortgage lenders and flag up 
„black sheep‟. The problem was hence depicted as marginal, not as structural.  
As he knows, FSA mortgage regulation will benefit millions of consumers by 
ensuring that they receive clear and comparable information and appropriate 
advice about mortgages. He points to the record of the Mortgage Code 
Compliance Board in raising standards, and it is right to pay tribute to its work 
in that regard. I believe that the board also managed to improve the reputation 
of the industry, as a result of which the FSA has said that it can grant due 
credit to the firms that have been in good standing with the MCCB. (Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, R. Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 419 col. 1746: 
010404, Ruth Kelly) 
 
It was here where it became clear that regulation was supposed to benefit consumers 
and the industry alike. Indeed, the issue with mis-selling had shown that public 
concerns with industrial standards had lead to lenders being more conservative in 
their loans, in a way as to undermine the very effectiveness of the savings and 
mortgage markets.  
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It is terrified of mis-selling, appropriately, and is therefore increasingly not 
aiming to sell savings policies to a group of people whom it knows will 
typically lose a large part of income from savings later in life. (O. Letwin, 
Conservatives: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 617: 050704) 
The centrepiece that had to be preserved, even under the context of regulation, was 
the capacity for financial operators to drive forward financial innovation (Engelen et 
al. 2010). Only if a large range of products were on offer were all individuals able to 
have access to credit (HC Deb 2005-06 438 col. 52W: 241005) and hence benefit 
from market processes. 
 
On the one hand then, industrial players were necessary to individual asset 
accumulation, on the other hand they were potentially detrimental to it as the benefits 
of such a process were concentrated in the hands of the industry itself as the case of 
mis-selling had shown. There was thus a contradiction in which state interventions 
had to manage the suppliers of financial services. In this sense, it is understandable 
why state actors fell back onto the FSA as a technical and regulator in order to 
downplay the politics of any regulatory regime. Also, the reliance on codes of 
conducts was a possibility to regulate undesirable behaviour away without enforcing 
rules that hampered the market to offer the products that enables credit access to all 
(HC Deb 1997-98 310 col. 149: 070498). As explained in the theoretical chapters, this 
chapter confirms that the definition of the mortgage market in the British case here is 
one that itself carries already political features. 
 
Parliamentary debates also demonstrated an ambiguous stance as far as the 
complexity of financial products went. On the one hand, the industry was expected to 
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come up with new methods to enable low-income households to access credit (HC 
Deb 1997-98 309 col. 13: 230398), on the other hand state policies had to protect the 
consumer from an extreme vast range of complicated products that people could not 
understand (HC Deb 1998-99 329 col. 463: 150499). In other words, the very tools 
that drove mortgages were incompatible with the type of economic agency and axio-
rationality facilitated. Financial innovation was closely connected to raising 
complexity in the services on the market which made it even harder for the individual 
consumer to make this informed choice (Bookstaber 2008). It then became obvious 
that such a situation was unsustainable in the long-run, as it was impossible to 
simultaneously hold up the principles of financial innovation and consumer 
sovereignty. 
 
As seen, the same principles of the making of economic agency also applied to 
savings more generally (Berry and Serra 2012). Once state interventions had ensured 
“macroeconomic stability and an efficient and well-regulated market in financial 
services”, the strategy was with “empowering individuals with financial information, 
improved access to advice, and simpler and easier to understand savings products” 
(Financial Secretary to the Treasury, R. Kelly: HC Deb 2002-03 404 col. 789W: 
080503). The logic of consumer sovereignty was assumed as “household are best 
placed to decide on the level of debt that they should hold” (Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, R. Kelly: HC Deb 2002-03 401 col. 21W: 100303). So even though the 
state intervention was “helping people to progress up the savings ladder” (HC Deb 
2002-03 401 col. 131W: 110303, Ruth Kelly) though access to information and 
„financial literacy‟ programmes (HC Deb 2001-02 392 col. 222W: 051102; Froud et 
al. 2006), it was still the individual‟s responsibility to do so. The premise to „make the 
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market work better for consumers‟ (Kemp 1999, 135) was always one where the 
individual was in charge of his/her own financial wealth. This was a taken-for-granted 
assumption held by British policy-makers that influenced the form and content of the 
enacted programmes and that was supposed to entail beneficial marco-economic 
outcomes. The particular conceptions of how markets worked best, and for whom 
they should so listed in this section highlighted how the British policies were 
facilitating a set of naïve theories that put the individual at the centre as the driving 
element behind economy prosperity. As such, they also side-lined alternative 
understandings of the economy as a more collective entity, as the German case 
presents in the subsequent chapters.  
4 Financial Conditions of Housing Markets 
The financial programmes and the corresponding depictions of economic agency set 
out in the previous sections affected the state capacity beyond its interventions in the 
mortgage market. Indeed, they created pressures on policy-makers to uphold a regime 
in which the access to credit filtered into the home ownership market, and in which 
individual agents were able to accumulate wealth on the back of raising housing 
prices (Toussaint and Elsinga 2009). This is a central consequence of the direct 
individual-state relationship as policies were aligned to benefit the individual, even if 
that was to be achieved through market mechanisms. This section then examines in 
more detail the additional polices that were understood as making the market work for 
the people. It first looks into the policy links between the financial markets and the 
housing market, especially how the mortgage market was meant to feed into the latter. 
It then explores the tensions arising from keeping mortgage interest rates at low 
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levels.  Consequently, it highlights the contradictions between attempts to incentivise 
flexible and fixed mortgages, concerns that lead to the commissioning of the Miles 
report into the causes for the low share of fixed-rate mortgages (Dudleston 2001). By 
exposing these tensions, it exploits the deeply political nature of the rationale for state 
intervention, especially in terms of the naïve theories facilitated. 
 
There are more than 1 million extra home owners since 1997 as a result of the 
low inflation and low interest rates that have been achieved in this country. 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. Brown, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 426 col. 
908: 111104) 
(…) real disposable income has risen every year under this Labour 
Government. (…) That is the mark of a successful policy. (…) I remind the 
House that the leader of the Conservative party has said that "the British 
economy appears to be doing pretty well. Unemployment is low. Inflation is 
low. We're growing faster than many other European countries". That was the 
Leader of the Opposition's comment. (Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. Brown, 
Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 426 col. 909: 111104) 
As these quotes demonstrate, there seemed to have been a conception in 2004 that the 
British economy was doing exceptionally well, due to the beneficial conditions that 
state policies had been able to achieve over the years in the financial markets, and that 
allowed individuals to access them. It was also obvious that high demand in the home 
ownership market was interpreted in terms of policy success. Relating back to the 
previous chapter, these comments also underline that the mere fact of entering home 
ownership was considered of moral end in itself that needed no additional explanation. 
The tone suggested that the government was to be applauded for its economic policies 
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that enabled economic agents to take advantage of low inflation and low interest rates 
to build up wealth (Taylor 2007). 
 
When beneficial financial conditions were seen as the cause for increasing numbers of 
home owners, upward trending property prices were also taken to mean that more 
debt could be taken on. 
That is even more the case when they realise that the value of their house has 
increased substantially since they bought it, perhaps only a short time ago. In 
those circumstances, people will inevitably get into personal debt that they can 
manage. That is a fact of life and we should not necessarily be afraid of it (…) 
(T. Harris, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 632: 050704) 
It hence seemed that the access to credit and house price trajectories were pushing 
each other in a way that was judged to be economically adequate and politically 
successful in relation to the individual. Both then came to legitimate not only the 
policy output and the British polity as such, but also the very naïve theories about 
proper economic behaviour, in relation to savings, debt and mortgages. 
 
Indeed, policy-makers were arguing to have managed the market in way as to offer 
the opportunity for the higher standards of life to a very large part of its population. 
At the same time however, some voices highlighted sustainability issues with such 
evolutions and thus pointed to the political aspects of excessive house price 
trajectories. 
What has the Governor said? In effect, he has said that the very large rise in 
household indebtedness, and the very large rise in house prices that is 
intimately linked with that, have not come about by accident. They are 
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associated with the activities of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in enlarging 
Government. We have a bigger Government, more spending and more 
borrowing. (O. Letwin, Conservatives: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 609W: 
050704) 
 
 
Just as outlined in the previous section, due to the ambiguous position of state policies 
in between promoting innovation in the financial industry (market-enabler) and 
protecting the consumer against practices of mis-selling (market-optimiser), the 
nature of the regulation was loose, giving cause for concern. 
(…) the so-called property investment clubs, whereby many people are 
seduced into parting with large amounts of money as a result of totally 
specious arguments about the endless appreciation of the property market. All 
kinds of scams will emerge, and people will lose large amounts of money. It is 
a completely unregulated market, and the FSA is reluctant to take 
responsibility for it. (V. Cable, Liberal Democrat: HC Deb 2006-07 453 col. 
183W: 171106) 
In other words, the very elements of distribution of economic outcomes to a wide 
population that were praised in the quotes just above were attacked as being unable to 
be sustained, pointing to contradictions in state policies. Even more relevant in 
retrospect was the fact that just a year after these utterances, the situation outlined 
here was to happen, undermining the seriousness of all attempts to insure consumer 
protection through market processes (HC Deb 2003-04 419 col. 1746: 010404) and to 
keep the innovative character of the mortgage industry intact (Soros 2008, 100). 
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As most explicitly outlined towards the end of chapter four, the political aspects of 
public policy were then closely related to the way that they depicted not only the 
economic agent but also the functioning of the market. As these state interventions 
reflect taken-for-granted assumptions about economic life in the eyes of policy-
makers, they are political as they limit the policy instrument selection process. Again 
I am referring back to the discussion on the literature on the sociology of policy 
instruments (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007; also Etzioni 1975; Bemelmans-Videc et 
al. 1998) Combined with the directness of the legitimation regime, they side-lined 
wider issues with the macro-economic situation of the economy. In other words, they 
did violence to alternative way of state interventions that are less focussed on the 
provision of opportunity to the economic agent and maybe more directly with the 
creation of macro-economic outcomes though state redistribution (3). As developed in 
the previous chapter, the policies themselves played into the hands of those market 
participants that were able „financially literate‟ enough to take advantage of the 
beneficial economic conditions (4). 
 
As far as naïve theories go, it is important to stress that the latter were constitutive of 
the very socio-economic mechanisms developed here, bringing back the concept of 
micro-macro complementarities as the matching between a particular definition of the 
economic subject and of the market. The definition of economic agency as the 
calculative individual that attempts to maximise wealth accumulation not only 
marginalises more passive conceptions of what proper behaviour in mortgage and 
savings markets was supposed to be (1) but also at the basis of how the distributional 
outcomes were justified (2). However, the chapter has also outlined instances where 
the consistency of such naïve theories can be questioned, hence spaces where it 
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becomes obvious that such understandings are always only socially constructed and 
are hence interpretations, no economic facts. To come back to the constructivist 
contribution of the thesis, it is only when economic notions are allowed to be 
interpreted according to a variety of naïve theories that such an additional layer of the 
political comes to light. As the theoretical chapters have outlined, it is this open-ended 
nature of the human mind that ultimately constitutes the additional reading of political 
features presented in the thesis.  
 
Another issue debated in parliament was with the trajectory of house prices directly. 
The previous chapter has dealt in detail with how policy-makers have reacted to 
skyrocketing housing prices. Concerns with the latter within discussions about 
mortgages were indicative of how closely these two elements were connected in state 
policies. 
However, all that has a dramatic effect on the market. As yesterday's Evening 
Standard reported on its front page: "House prices in the south east of England 
are predicted to rise by 8 per cent next year." That phenomenon is not 
restricted to London. The front page of The Western Mail today predicts that 
prices in Wales will rise by an astonishing 14 per cent next year. (B. Gardiner, 
Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 415 col. 274WH:171203) 
Indeed, as we have heard from the Governor of the Bank of England, house 
prices are "well above what most people would regard as sustainable in the 
longer term". (P. Goodman, Conservatives: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 646W: 
050704)  
(…) bodies that are technically competent to make such judgments, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, are extremely worried and are arguing that 
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on most plausible measures house prices are probably 20 to 30 per cent above 
what we would expect them to be on some economic test. Many others in the 
City see the problem as a good deal worse. (V. Cable, Liberal Democrats: HC 
Deb 2003-04 423 col. 630: 050704) 
This chapter argues that the reasons for policy inaction in relation to skyrocketing 
house prices can be found in the terms of regulation on the one hand, and on the other 
hand in the taken-for-granted assumption and naïve theory that, in the end, individual 
agents were best positioned to decide on their own levels of debt they could afford 
(Kitson and Wilkinson 2007). 
 
With market information being widely accessible to the consumer, the financial skills 
of the latter were conceived to produce not only optimal decisions from the single 
person, but also that the cumulation of these individual actions would reflect the 
appropriate pricing levels in the market. In other words, the price of the market was 
always the correct one, one that took into account the underlying factors and was thus 
in line with the long-run equilibrium. In the final resolution of a lengthy 
parliamentary discussion on personal indebtedness and savings, it was exactly this 
understanding that was adhered to. 
(R)esolved, That this House believes that a strong and stable economy is the 
foundation of families' confidence in their own finances; (…) further notes 
that as a result households are better able to judge their long-term 
commitments (…) (HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 654: 050704) 
Individual empowerment went hand-in-hand with a belief that markets would self-
adjusting, and that once beneficial conditions were in place in terms of low inflation 
rates, utility-maximising agents would produce sound macro-economic outcomes. 
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However, British policy-makers were also aware of the tensions that were building up 
to keep mortgage rates at low levels in order to keep the legitimation regime on track. 
 
Even though the British monetary policy had been delegated to the independent Bank 
of England in 1997 (Elgie 1998), that was not to say that state officials had no interest 
in the level of interest rates. On the one hand the government praised itself about how 
successfully the beneficial environment had opened opportunities for its population to 
acquire wealth. 
Inflation is 3 percent. Average inflation under the Conservatives was 6 percent. 
Inflation in the United States of America has risen as high as 4.3 percent, and 
it has been above 3 percent in the euro area. (…) Our record of keeping 
inflation low throughout the past 10 years is the reason why we have had 
lower interest rates than other countries, along with 10 years of unparalleled 
sustained growth. (Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. Brown, Labour: HC Deb 
2006-07 455 col. 1535: 250107) 
On the other hand, the discussion also recognised that such growth was only 
sustainable in a context of low levels of interest rates. 
Does my right hon. friend agree that it is important that we have low mortgage 
rates, as low interest rates are essential to ensuring that we continue the 
stability that we have enjoyed over the past seven years under his stewardship? 
Will he ensure the House that he will keep up the pressure to maintain low 
mortgage and interest rates? (B. O'Brien, Labour, question to Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, G. Brown: HC Deb 2003-04 426 col. 908: 111104) 
Indeed, the self-proclaiming assumptions about successful market management 
created pressures upon state interventions to continue in a similar line, especially in a 
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direct legitimation regime. As the majority of mortgages in the UK were flexible and 
repayments were thus sensible to the Bank of England setting of interest rates, they 
became a centrally political topic (HC Deb 2001-02 387 col. 705W: 240602; CML 
2004, 11). 
 
When in 2004 the base rate was increased and that the Treasury was asked what the 
effect on the housing market of such a move would be, the status quo was defended in 
relation to disposable income (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, P. Boateng, Labour: 
HC Deb 2003-04 425 col. 421: 141004). In other words, rising house prices were used 
to ensure the public and policy-makers themselves that the recent evolutions in higher 
mortgage repayments should not entail any change in patterns of individual and 
public behaviour alike. Still, it was also acknowledged that with “very high multiples 
at work” any increase in the base rate could lead to a situation where many 
households would spend “30 or 40 percent” of their disposable income on mortgage 
repayments (O. Letwin, Conservatives: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 612: 050704).  
One need only look at what is happening in the forward markets, which expect 
interest rates to rise significantly and are factoring that into market 
expectations. Once interest rates move up by 1.5 or 2 percent, many of the 
comfortable assumptions about the ability of debtors to sustain their 
repayments become very questionable. (V. Cable, Liberal Democrat: HC Deb 
2003-04 423 col. 630: 050704) 
 
Such concerns were to be taken even more seriously as a situation of higher interest 
rates would have negative effect on the housing market because “large numbers of 
people (would be) finding themselves in negative equity” (V. Cable, Liberal 
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Democrat: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 630: 050704). Against the prospects of 
evolutions that would effectively undermine all the naïve theories described in this 
chapter and the previous one, British state policies persisted in maintaining interests 
rates low, even in a context of overheating housing markets that were led to an „asset 
bubble‟ (HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 631: 050704) and „increased gearing‟ from 
“relatively high levels of debt” (M. Hoban, Conservatives: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 
638: 050704). 
 
 Such a scenario would bring the British economic regime back to an era of boom and 
bust that had been wished away earlier on (HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 654: 050704). 
There is nothing in his mandate that tells him that he [the Governor of the 
Bank of England] is responsible for house prices and personal debt, but he has 
taken responsibility for that because no one else is doing so and because he 
can see the dangers. The problem is that he has only one policy instrument: 
interest rates. The danger of using interest rates to deal with such a scenario is 
that the British economy will become even more imbalanced. (V. Cable, 
Liberal Democrats: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 631: 050704) 
Overall then, the state policies had manoeuvred the policy-makers into a position 
where the success of their own efforts had reinforced the underlying naïve theories to 
a degree where it was impossible to turn back because it was serving as a legitimation 
tool of state activity itself. As such, the facilitated naïve theories themselves became 
the largest obstacle to political change. This needs to be related to the specific type of 
individual-state relationship observed in this case, one where state policies were 
supposed to enable the individual to achieve economic wealth through market 
mechanisms. At the same time, this situation is reminiscent of the one described in the 
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previous chapter, again affirming the similarities of state policies, in terms of content 
and implications.  
 
However, British policy-makers did look more closely into the features of the 
mortgage market according to the flexibility and fixedness of the rates of the products 
bought. Indeed, interest rates would not have been on top of the political agenda were 
flexible rates mortgages less popular (Miles 2004: 6). Again, an external expert was  
asked to give his qualified expert opinion as the market evolutions were unable to be 
explained by the existing taken-for-granted conceptions of policy-makers. In 2003 
the Chancellor [of the Treasury] has asked David Miles, Professor of Finance 
at Imperial College, to undertake a review of the UK's fixed rate mortgage 
market to establish why the share of fixed-rate mortgages, particularly long-
term fixed rates, is so low compared to the United States and many other EU 
countries. (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, P. Boateng, Labour: HC Deb 
2002-03 408 col. 371W: 050704). 
The tensions that had been observed within the savings programmes resurrected with 
mortgages. On the one hand, flexible products had been functional in offering 
opportunities to lower-income households by making credit more accessible through 
financial innovation (Doms and Krainer 2007). On the other hand, fixed rate 
mortgages would ensure that the British regime was more resilient against shocks 
originating from external shocks like changes in the base rate (Miles 2004: 3) 
 
Even though the mortgage market was praised for its innovative character (Miles 
2004: 97), the observation was made that under optimal conditions, fixed rate 
mortgages should be more popular. As with the Barker report, a market anomaly was 
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observed that was unable to be explained with the sets of conceptions held by policy-
makers. Such an observation then undermined the rationale of the rightfulness of 
markets for the sake of certain economic outcomes. Whereas the housing market was 
considered to correctly determine prices, the mortgage market was seen as being 
biased for reasons related to its constitutive agents themselves. As such, the Miles 
report replicated very much the discourse on the limited availability of information 
and the inhibition of market mechanisms through unnecessary costs that lead 
consumers to take sub-optimal choices. In other words, economic agents were unable 
to take fully rational decisions (Miles 2004: 97). 
I believe that this would be a consequence of the market working better – a 
consequence of people better understanding the risk and cost characteristics of 
mortgages, of those mortgages being priced in a sustainable, transparent and 
fair way and of obstacles that might exist to the most efficient means of 
funding such mortgages being removed. (Miles 2004: 3) 
 
The report also mentioned that such changes would facilitate monetary policy directly 
(Miles 2004: 97) and recommended two sets of actions to be taken in order “to make 
the market work better for consumers in a number of areas”. (Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury, R. Kelly, Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 424 col. 1203W: 070904). 
(…) first, those that are aimed at improving the advice and information that 
borrowers receive and at creating a fairer and more transparent pricing 
structure (…); second, those that are aimed at helping lenders fund mortgages 
and handle risk in the most cost-effective way (…). (Miles 2004: 98) 
Even though “urgent reform” (Financial Secretary to the Treasury, R. Kelly, Labour:  
HC Deb 2003-04 424 col. 1203W: 070904) was desirable, that was not to mean a 
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considerable change in the policy direction. What it did imply were further roles for 
the state policy to optimise market outcomes according to the conceptions of pure and 
perfect competition as well as the introduction of additional market mechanisms in 
order to dissipate risk in a more efficient way (market-optimiser). 
 
Such observations demonstrated the extent to which particular definitions of markets 
and agents were held by British policy-makers. Even though there was a degree of 
party politics in the discussions about how relevant certain economic issues were, 
they still shared the same conceptions of the individual agent as the ultimate 
determinant of economic outcomes and of the market as a rightful way through which 
benefits for the large majority of the population were supposed to be achieved. In 
addition to the current contributions to the literature (Martin 2005), these 
examinations of the definition of economic notions themselves not only offer a more 
complex picture, but most centrally adds a layer of political analysis as it does not 
take „the market‟ and „the state‟ as universal notions, but as social constructions. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the naïve theories put forward in the context of the 
British savings and mortgage markets. The thesis has done so as financial concerns 
were not only apparent to homebuyers but also to policy-makers that were 
implementing interventions into the housing market. Even though macro-economic 
issues with economic stability were invoked in the beginning to justify programmes 
that incentivised higher saving ratios, once property prices were upward trending, the 
latter were used to legitimate a less prudent vision of economic agency. When the 
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market was seen to underperform, the faults were remedied through the disclosure of 
more market information. Once individual agents were able to make better-informed, 
and hence more rational, choices it was believed that market mechanisms would 
reflect the economic fundamentals. The janus-faced mode of regulation adopted 
mirrored a conception that even though improper practice had to be avoided, the 
industry was at the centre of the innovation process that allowed a democratisation of 
credit, notably through flexible products. In other words, the roles of state policies as 
market-enablers and market-optimisers became hard to reconcile. This then created 
political tensions upon the state actors to ensure low mortgage interest rates in order 
not to threaten the apparently so successful British path of growth pursued earlier on. 
 
To sum up, the naïve theories facilitated mostly related to an entrepreneurial and 
active economic man who takes initiative to exploit market information in order to 
accumulate wealth (Bröckling 2007). Through state interventions the economic 
conditions were engineered for such mechanisms to benefit a majority of market 
participants whose access to credit spilt over into the housing market. At the same 
time, rising house prices were also regarded as playing into the hands to additional 
mortgages. As such, there was a considerable amount of state intervention into the 
market in its role of market-optimiser. State policies were not only acting upon the 
financial industry to offer certain products that sustained the coordinative discourse, 
but they also acted directly upon moral understandings of what constituted proper 
private financial management. In other words, the constructivist approach has not 
only allowed a focus on how a certain ideal-typical type of economic agent was 
depicted, but also how state interventions were set out to execute a particular mode of 
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market-making (Clift 2012) through specific conceptions of how markets are 
supposed to function. 
 
In this sense, based upon a constructivist method developed in the theoretical 
chapters, this part has highlighted the political nature of naïve theories and policies 
alike. Indeed, all the conceptions either taken for granted by policy-makers or 
facilitated in the form of naïve theories are political as they side-lined alternative 
interpretations of economic life. Whereas this is mostly theoretical for now, the 
comparative method and the German case study bring other conceptions of the 
economic subject and of the market to light. At the same time, the subjectivities found 
in the British home ownership and mortgage markets were fundamental not only in 
the policy-making arena but also in the way that the socio-economic phenomena 
developed. As such,the concept of micro-macro complementarities can be applied 
here as it points towards the way that economic regimes, or their sub-spheres as 
examined here, present institutional features and matching definitions of the 
individual. Indeed, in the two cases observed for now, the economic mechanisms in 
the form of markets were sustained by particular conceptions of the latter, and of the 
position of the economic subject within. The thesis then firstly adds the dimension of 
the making of the individual to the literature on comparative capitalism (as outlined in 
chapter three) and secondly points to the political features of such a level of analysis. 
  
To finish off then, it is worth mentioning that the efforts to make the market create 
economically and socially legitimate outcomes in both markets analysed here were 
related to the role of the welfare state (Schwartz 2012). Indeed, in a regime where 
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legitimation was direct and hence where the mass of the population needed to be 
convinced in their role of individual agents and voters, state actors turned towards 
markets to distribute economic benefits (Fahey and Norris 2009). In their role of 
ensuring economic conditions that enabled individuals to access the mortgage and 
housing market, the policy-makers perceived themselves as benevolent actors. 
All of that was necessary to give people a sense of confidence in saving, and 
to create the context in which our strategy for promoting saving and asset 
accumulation can succeed. (…) Those principles address opportunity, security 
and responsibility, and I see no reason why they should divide us across the 
Floor of the House. We embrace those principles because they underpin the 
very notion of the welfare state. (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, P. Boateng, 
Labour: HC Deb 2003-04 423 col. 622: 050704) 
Even though there were disagreements about the actions to take, there seemed to have 
existed a consensus that, when handled correctly, markets could deliver economic 
benefits to all members of society. In this sense, the welfare function of the state was 
understood indirectly, as passing through market processes. As explained throughout, 
in the end state interventions were legitimated as working best for the people. 
 
At the same time, there was also a naïve theory that was coherent with an active 
reading of agency that was sceptical about the more classical forms of the welfare 
state. As individuals were seen as not only sovereign, but also that their behaviour 
were the building blocks of the British socio-economic regime, all ways by which 
economic agency could be hampered were to be limited. As reported throughout the 
two chapters, the policy-makers conceived of the state as only being allowed to help 
individuals access markets and take advantage of them, not to procure direct benefits. 
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The Government is committed to reforming and modernising the welfare state 
to fulfil the objectives of promoting work incentives, reducing poverty and 
welfare dependency, and strengthening community and family life. 
(Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security, K. Bradley, 
Labour: HC Deb 1997-98 296 col. 567: 250697) 
In order to optimise market outcomes in social terms, the state policies not only 
interfered through regulation, but also consulted directly with the industrial players to 
make sure the products offered did correspond to its political ends promoted. It has 
been shown that such a perspective came with particular contradictory features, but in 
the British case financial innovation was synonym with social progress, at least for 
the time that such a model was sustainable (Doling and Ronald 2010, 168). 
We made it clear in the Green Paper on welfare reform that we are working 
with the industry to provide better protection for all home buyers, including 
the unemployed. (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security, 
K. Bradley, Labour: HC Deb 1997-98 311 col. 10: 270498) 
 
The hypothesis that the British housing and mortgage markets presented similar 
rationales in terms of naïve theories, policy instruments and policy contents has thus 
been affirmed. The next two chapters apply the framework developed in the 
theoretical parts of the thesis to the German case, for the housing market (chapter 
seven) and the financial market (chapter eight) alike. As the logic of this thesis is 
comparative, the second case is studied according to the same principles and methods 
than the first one. As a reminder, from the literature review onwards, the thesis has 
not only claimed to introduce an additional level of the political into the perspective 
on models of capitalist organisation, but also that such a point of departure brings to 
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light variety in the way economic agents and markets are made sense of. The 
hypothesis is thus that the German case exhibits divergences with its British 
counterpart analysed so far.   
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Chapter 7:  Naïve Theories of the German Housing Market 
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1 Introduction 
The British case analysed in chapter five has demonstrated the applicability of the 
framework developed out of the critique of the VoC literature that attempts to bring 
additional dimensions of the political into the domain of comparative political 
regimes (chapter two) through a constructivist lens. The theoretical arguments put 
forward in chapter three in relation to the indeterminacy of the human mind and the 
inevitability to close the interpretative void through naïve theories have been 
showcased with the empirical exploration of British state interventions into home 
ownership and mortgage markets. The research also displayed how specific 
legitimation regimes in the form of concrete individual-state relationships (developed 
in chapter four) entailed particular choices with regard to the policy instruments and 
targets, as well as its content in relation to the definition of  economic agency and 
markets alike. However, the additional political features take their origin in this very 
possibility of variety of naïve theories, in the potentially different conceptions of the 
ideal-typical „collective man‟. Such variety is explored through a constructivist 
framework that pays particular attention to the ways in which economic notions have 
come to acquire certain meanings, and how such understandings do violence to 
alternative conceptions. This refers back to the ontological aspect of the political in 
naïve theories (aspect 1, as developed in chapter four). 
 
If such variety is at the centre of the thesis, two ways are used to illustrate its political 
nature. Theoretically, the mere awareness that naïve theories constitute one 
interpretations of a wider domain of the „possible‟ (Soeffner 2004, 31) allows the 
human mind to imagine alternative conceptions due to human „fantasia‟ (Alker 1990, 
164) as described in chapter three. Additionally, the comparative method can illustrate 
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such differential conceptions of the same economic concepts through case studies, as 
proceeded with in the subsequent two chapters. What is then presented is a study in 
parallel of the depiction of the same themes, the home ownership and the mortgage 
market as well as the definition of economic agency within the latter, for two different 
socio-economic contexts, the British and German one. As such, the hypothesis now is 
that the naïve theories observed in the German case are significantly different from 
the ones found in the British analysis. As the main contribution is in relation to the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature, the alternative workings of individual-state 
relationship are highlighted through concrete case studies that highlight the additional 
layer of the political to economic notions. Again, the concept of micro-macro 
complementarities takes into account that variety is not only a matter of institutional 
features (Hall and Soskice 2001) but also of variety in the underlying conceptions of 
what economic mechanisms are supposed to mean, as such and in relation to the 
economic subject.  
 
In chapter three, the reference to Vico‟s notion of the indeterminate mind was not 
only used to put forward the constructivist point that what people take for real is made 
or produced, but also that such conceptions can display differential i.e. political 
features. Chapter four went on to explain how and why state interventions contribute 
to the (re)production of differences in economic conceptions, hence varieties of 
subjectivities. The logic was to show that the understanding of economic agency, of 
markets and of the functions of state policies cannot be taken as given over time and 
space, but that they are context-dependent. This hence requires a constructivist 
method first and then a comparative one to demonstrate the concrete differences 
through case studies. Such an argument follows from the literature review in chapter 
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two that highlighted the treatment of the state by some scholars as a quasi-universal 
institution, hence not dependent upon the specific meaningful context. Additionally, if 
the human mind is open to various interpretative schemes and that policy 
understandings limit such variability, then the facilitated naïve theories are political as 
they do violence to alternative conceptions of everyday life (aspects 1 and 2). At the 
same time the institutional features of this relationship, characterised by a certain 
legitimation regime, is political as specific taken-for-granted assumptions held by 
policy-makers limit the policy instruments judged to be adequate as explained by the 
sociology of policy instruments (aspects 3 and 4). 
 
In relation to these theoretical claims, the thesis is only able to back them up in their 
full scope once it engages in a comparative analysis so as to showcase the differential 
conceptions of central economic notions between capitalist systems of social 
organisation. As the VoC distinction locates the German economy at the opposite end 
of the British case (Hall and Soskice 2001, 19), the hypothesis is that the naïve 
theories found in German housing and mortgage markets display significant 
differences to the British case. As such, the thesis does not reject the findings of VoC, 
it merely complements them with an analysis of the different understandings of 
economic agency in these two economic regimes. Also, as the German housing 
market displays a very flat, hence different price trajectory for the period under 
investigation (1997-20007; Demary et al. 2009, 76; Voigtländer 2009), it is especially 
interesting to look into the social mechanisms, driven by state interventions and 
particular understandings of market processes, upon which such differences were able 
to arise (Iacoviello and Minetti
 
2008). Also, the German banking system is often 
described as displaying different features to the British one, which are then listed as 
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the cause for their specific model of capitalism (Deeg 1999) even though the German 
system is changing in this respect, possibly converging towards the British one (Cioffi 
2006, 560; Howarth and Hardie 2009). Differential findings in naïve theories and 
subjectivities would not only highlight differences between capitalist economies that 
go beyond those traditionally described, they would also empirically validate the 
theoretical framework by exposing the additional political character of capitalist 
diversity. 
 
Indeed, bringing out the comparative characteristics of the case studies also underline 
the political nature of the argument of the thesis. By highlighting the differences in 
how the ideal-typical individual relates to the state as an institutions and as a set of 
policies, of how economic agency per se is understood, and of what role the market is 
depicted to play in delivering the outcomes that satisfy these individual-state 
relationships, the thesis explains how different naïve theories are facilitated in a 
concrete comparative way. Juxtaposing these differences underlines the political 
violence done to alternative conceptions of the economic subject. If this chapter finds 
a significant difference in the German understandings with its British counterparts, 
then the thesis has to conclude that these differences cannot be natural, but that first 
they are the product of social constructions, and second that they carry political 
weight in the sense that they discriminate against other sets of naïve theories. On top 
of the already demonstrated feature of economic subjectivities being constitutive to 
the distributional effect in economic regimes (aspects 2 and 4), the comparative 
component also concretely exemplifies a reading of the political as marginalising 
certain interpretations of economic reality over others (aspects 1 and 3). This then 
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leads back to the very start of the theoretical argument when chapter two mentioned 
the possibility of different ways of how to make sense of the lived environment. 
 
This chapter then investigates the meanings of the owned house facilitated in German 
parliamentary debates and the conceptions of economic agency that such state 
interventions were accompanied by. Again, the central question to be answered is 
which conceptions were held by policy-makers and which naïve theories were 
promoted in relation to the ownership market over the period 1997 to 2007. In order 
to do so, the key features and evolutions of the German ownership policy context are 
explained. Just as a reminder from chapter five, these conceptions are related to three 
more specific enquiries. First, I investigate the economic subjectivities of a certain 
model of ideal-typical home owner, which individuals qualified for an owned house 
and what the legitimating reasons were for why state support was granted to a 
particular population subset. Second, I also look into the depiction of the function of 
the state by policy-makers, and the relationships that were mentioned with regards to 
the individual home owner. Third, this chapter explores the relationship between the 
German understandings of economic agency, markets, and the rationale for state 
intervention more generally. Overall then, questions relating to the making of the 
market participants are at the core, combined with insights into the particular 
understandings of market processes. 
 
As for the methodology, I have again looked at the most relevant parliamentary 
discussions as far as housing and home ownership are concerned. However, finding 
the relevant material was a bit more tedious a process than in the British case as the 
German online counterpart to Hansard („Dokumentations- und Informationssystem, 
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Deutscher Bundestag‟) was less easy to navigate and information was harder to be 
exported in a digital form. For these reasons, I had to rely on the traditional methods 
of pen and paper here more extensively. The „Bundestag‟ is the lower German 
chamber with directly elected representatives. As this chamber comprises 
significantly more representatives, and hence offers more insight into the content of 
parliamentary discussions (Schmidt 2003, 85; Conradt 2009, 182), only this 
coordinative discourse has been screened. On a technical note, all the translations 
from German to English are my own. 
2 German Home Ownership Policies: the ‘Eigenheimzulage’ (EHZ) 
For the period under investigation of the thesis (1997-2007), the central housing 
policy in Germany was the „home ownership allowance‟ (Eigenheimzulage, hereafter 
referred to as „EHZ‟), active between 1996 and 2004 (Färber and Renn 2003). The 
chapter looks into the debates in the process of setting up the programme, but also 
reviews the arguments raised when it was progressively modified over the years. Such 
an enquiry highlights the conceptions of ownership held by relevant policy-makers. 
By investigating in more detail the steps taken by policy-makers and the statements 
put forward to legitimate the latter, the chapter attempts to reconstruct what 
definitions of economic agency, of the market, and of the state policies with regard to 
both were facilitated into naïve theories. 
 
In 1994, a report under the direction of Prof. Sinn who led the „expert commission on 
housing policy‟ was handed over to the German parliament that had been 
commissioned in autumn 1992 in order to “inspect the housing policy instruments 
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with regards to their timeliness, their economic efficiency, their social accuracy, their 
flexibility and their fairness” (HC 13/159, p.3: 301294)14. The analysis under this 
liberal chief economist claimed that home owners were disadvantaged against renters 
in economic terms due to arrangements in the German tax law, following tax 
legislation from 1987 (HC 13/159, p.197: 301294). The rationale was then to remove 
the discriminatory effects by bringing down entry barriers to the home ownership 
market, just as in the British case. 
The extremely high building and land costs in the federal republic - in 
comparison with other countries - which mostly political factors account for, 
have blocked the creation of a market of cost-efficient ownership houses. 
Strategies for the enlargement of the supply of land, for the examination of 
inflated living standards in relation to cost-efficient building methods and for 
the build-up of a market for good value ownership should be supported. Such 
strategies could enhance the functioning of housing markets and open access 
to ownership especially for families with children. (HC 13/159, p.14-15: 
301294). 
On the one hand, the home ownership market was characterised as a domain where 
state interventions were asked to be reduced so that free market processes could find 
back to an equilibrium that minimised accessibility issues (HC 13/159, p.1: 301294). 
This approach followed a strong micro-economic focus where state policies were 
depicted as limiting the self-adjusting function of market processes (HC 13/159, p.14: 
301294). On the other hand, the housing market was also framed in larger terms, as a 
                                                        
 
14
 Even though this is a commissioned report and thus is not part of the central coordinative 
discourse in parliament, it is still informative in the way that the latter reacted against it, especially so 
as such reactions bring out the taken-for-granted assumptions of home ownership, markets and 
economic agency.  
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domain where a rationale for state intervention was legitimated on distributional 
grounds. Indeed, the commission stated that  
(…) trusting the market does not mean to give up distributional and socio-
political intents (…) the intervention-free market has its most significant 
deficits in relation to the will of the people, so that it might be an illusion to 
demand restriction from the state here. Still, such restriction still needs to be 
recommended. (HC 13/159, p.13: 301294). 
It hence included a limited social role of state intervention, reduced to only provide 
aid to the mentally ill, to big families that rely on state income and to young people 
with disordered socialisation backgrounds. The reason was that these individuals were 
unable to access the market on their own terms even though they qualified for an 
owned property due to their social position (HC 13/159, p.59-60: 301294). As such, 
this discourse was in line with what Lehmbruch denominated under „discourse of 
embedded capitalism‟ when he retraces the origins of the German model of capitalism 
(Lehmbruch 2001, 39). At the same time, such a concept demonstrates the 
constructivist lens adopted here. 
 
Ownership was strongly portrayed as a tool of family policy, as an instrument for 
policy-makers to compensate for the additional costs that families were incurring for 
the mere fact of constituting such an entity (Kirchner 2006, 167).  Indeed, the report 
recommended a targeting towards families with children (HC 13/159, p.14: 301294) 
as  
(…) an alignment of housing policies towards minimal standards for the size 
and the quality of accommodation as well as a focus towards the family 
aspects can be drawn from the special meaning that housing space enjoys inn 
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relation to the development of children and adults alike.  (HC 13/159, p.58: 
301294) 
Families that should have been able to access ownership on social grounds but were 
not, were to be helped move into the tenure that suits them best according to the 
German state. Ownership made sense for families as it helped them accumulate 
wealth (HC 13/7841, p. 3: 050697). The ultimate reason for such an argument was not 
explicitly stated, which itself points to the taken-for-granted character of such 
conceptions, but together with the focus on children it can be assumed that the 
rationale was that  equity was to be passed on to the next generation through family 
mechanisms. Also the notion of „one-family-house‟ („Einfamilienhaus‟, HC 13/8802, 
p. 34: 221097) was revealing of the additional protection that families had to be 
granted in the German context. 
 
More generally, the report highlighted a central function of state policies as ensuring 
the right to housing, in contracts to the quasi-right to own a house in the UK.  
Apart from ensuring the framework for a market economy (…) the state also 
pursuits interests of provision in the domain of the housing market. This 
results already from the core duty of the social state to cater for the existential 
minimum of the human being, and therefore more specifically to satisfy the 
basic need for desire to accommodation. Consequently, a humane housing is 
to be safeguarded out of socio-legal reasons. (HC 13/159, p.58: 301294). 
Overall, such linkages with family policies were however ambivalent with the report 
alternating between the more economistic market approach and a more socially-
framed rationale. It even noticed that not all members of the commission agreed with 
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one specific reading of the role of the state in the housing market (HC 13/159, p.21: 
301294).  
 
It was then not surprising that even though the policy discussions were based upon the 
report by Prof. Sinn, they did not take over all its recommendations (HC 273/95, p.8: 
090595). Very quickly, the parliamentary actors strongly endorsed the social 
principles quoted above (HC 273/95, p.2: 090595), stating that markets ought to be 
regarded as mechanisms of allocation that the welfare state can potentially utilise to 
ensure social rights (Häussermann and Siebel 1991, 127).  In this vein, they stated that 
“the federal government is turning against attempts to let the market and the state play 
against each other in opposing directions”, and that it preferred a “dialog for housing 
policies that are economically and socio-politically efficient” (HC 273/95, p.3: 
090595)
15
. Especially young families tended to be perceived as being in special need 
of low-priced accommodation and that hence they suffered most from the identified 
affordability gap (HC 273/95, p.4: 090595; Bentzien et al. 2012). Even though the 
economistic focus was partially dropped, the rationale was still one of addressing 
unfair individual disadvantages. As such, the policy was legitimated through the 
individual channel. However, it is important to mention that it was also 
institutionalising a categorisation of individuals according to their social status, 
something less pronounced in the British case (Behring and Helbrecht 2002, 165). 
Such a notion goes back to the concept of „classes of provision‟ 
(„Versorgungsklassen‟; Lepsius1979). 
 
                                                        
15
 Against a potential critique that a change in government in 1996 from the CDU to the SPD 
better explains the framing of the home ownership state project than the conceptions of 
policy-makers, I argue that the quotes here from 1995 already show a rejection of a purely 
economic and financial reading of the market. 
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Such a perspective was then reflected in eligibility criteria. The ownership market was 
made sense of as a sphere that some groups were more entitled to enter than others, 
and that state policy hence limited its support to a sub-set of the overall population. 
Against the British case, the economic subject in Germany was not only judged upon 
his/her financial capabilities to enter the market, but also on the social characteristics 
that entitled him/her to do so in the first place. In other words, some individuals had a 
right for state-aid whereas others did not qualify for such public support. In the end, 
as the owned tenure was seen to satisfy the special requirements of families, single 
people did not qualify for such benefits. This distinction was central not only in the 
way that German policy-makers understood the home ownership market, but also 
implied that the naïve theories facilitated with regard to the ownership market only 
applied to a specific, hence limited „group of people‟ (13/8802, p.40: 220197). 
 
In this sense, the introduced distinction between singles, and married couples and 
families with children was very significant, even if not new in the German policy-
making context (Kreibich 1991, 74). Such a split was never challenged in any of the 
later policy debates (HC 273/95, p.5: 090595), demonstrating that all policy-makers 
agreed with such a taken-for-granted assumption about which sub-group of the 
population was deemed eligible for state aid. This distinction was regarded to be 
„socially fair‟ even by the otherwise critical party PDS (HC 13/2357, p.5: 200995). 
The proposition set forward in the report for the number of children to be factored 
into the policy design (HC 13/159, p.19, 171: 301294; also HC 13/8802, p.17: 
221097) was adapted with no further discussions. The term of „children allowance for 
building‟ („Baukindergeld‟) was used in this regard (HC 291/95, p. 5:180595), 
showing the strong links between housing and family policy (Bahle 1998). The 
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affordability issue was hence regarded to be limited to families on low incomes and 
did not pose a serious general issue for all individuals below a certain financial 
threshold (HC 13/1501, p.2: 290595). Such a reading was also linked to a highly 
developed renting market in Germany that was seen as offering a large range of 
accommodation opportunities (HC 273/95, p. 18: 090595; Busch-Geertsema 2000, 5; 
Bachofner 2008, 60). Ownership per se was hence not considered to be the most 
favourable tenure for all members of society, but only for families with children. The 
individual was measured on two dimensions, a monetary one and one of marital 
status. 
 
The arguments in parliament did not mention purely economic reasons for supporting 
families, instead the rationale for state action was based on moral values in relation to 
the wider community (HC 13/4712, p.2: 230596). The logic was not only one of 
housing but one of solidarity and social justice for families that were deemed to 
rightfully benefit from the accumulation of wealth than came with ownership (HC 
273/95, p.18: 090595). Indeed, the expression of „social obligations of ownership‟ 
(„Sozialpflichtigkeit des Eigentums‟) was used by policy-makers to express that 
property was a „social good‟ (HC 13/1312, p.1-2: 100595).   
It is a downright element of home ownership to be faced with a relationship of 
tension between the overcome notion of ownership on the one hand and the 
requirements of the communal al life on the other hand. (HC 13/4712, p. 2: 
230596, government statement) 
It is here that the perspective included long-term concerns with the reproduction of 
the social order that could not solely be left to the aggregation of individual actions. 
Even though the EHZ was framed in relation to housing with its “aim to facilitate 
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access to the ownership market especially for households on the threshold” (HC 
273/95, p.9: 090595), the policy was also seen as covering much larger concerns of 
German policy-makers than just those confined to ownership figures. The concept of 
„social good‟ was not only evoked to grant special rights to certain individuals, but it 
did so in relation to their position within the wider socio-economic regime. 
 
Even though it were individuals who were entitled to the benefits, the reasoning 
behind were not only based on purely individual rationales. In terms of market 
understandings then, the ownership market was not depicted as a space that needed to 
be managed by the individual, but one where state interventions were legitimated on 
terms of common goods (Bandelj and Sowers 2010, 31). Once individuals decided to 
marry and have children, they fully qualified for the home ownership market. 
Entering this market was hence not seen as a choice in terms of maximising life-time 
earnings, but one that followed from wider personal decisions about how to set up 
one‟s life. The market was not a place whose outcome in relation to the individuals 
was to be optimised through rational strategies. More accurately, it was only a market 
in the sense that the supply was privately produced, but the demand in terms of entry 
criteria was socially limited through a particular rationale for state intervention.  
Home ownership is especially well suited to facilitate family-suited housing 
supply and the accumulation of assets. (Federal government: HC 273/95, p.12: 
090595). 
But what may be rational from a private point of view [discrimination against 
families in the renting market] is deemed unacceptable as a societal outcome. 
(expert commission on housing policy: HC 13/159, p.25: 301294). 
 
 
 
249 
 
The fact that the EHZ benefits were progressively handed over in a time window of 
eight years (HC 291/95, p. 13: 180595) and were limited so each individual could 
only be granted once in their lifetime (p.17) was indicative that the conception of 
policy-makers about the housing market was not one of active utility-maximising 
agents. It was rather the case that they understood state interventions as acting in line 
with a role of classical welfare provision to make sure the financial aid was spent in 
the way it had envisaged it to be (Kofner 2004, 65). Splitting the money into eight 
slices meant that individuals were limited in their financial and strategic opportunities 
of how to make use of the allowance. In other words, the message was that the funds 
were to be channelled into the national building sector, hence promoting a definition 
of economic agency as passive. These characteristics already hinted at the upcoming 
micro-macro tensions in the EHZ, at the time it was being designed. 
 
The policy was set up in summer 1995. The declared rationale for state intervention 
was the opening up of accessibility, better targeting of families and the enhancement 
of saving conditions (HC 498/95, p.1, 29: 200995; Eekhoff 2002, V). The amount 
distributed was linked to the costs of acquiring with a higher cap for new buildings 
than for stock, as building was deemed more expensive (§9). Children raised the 
amount paid out, as well as the maximum income cap. Marriage doubled the latter. 
The maximal income limits were calculated based on the summed income of the two 
years previous to acquisition (§5). As mentioned, the amount was paid for eight years 
after the acquisition. The final law (HC 716/95: 031195) slightly heightened the 
support for the renovation of stock and introduced an extra bonus for the installation 
of a heat pump (§9). Ecological concerns had been raised very early on and were 
supported by all political parties alike (13/2357, p.3: 200995). A neutral influence on 
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price levels was predicted (HC 13/1501, p. 31: 290595). Housing markets then 
constituted loci of state allocation of direct benefits, whereas in the UK the logic was 
solely one of „helping‟ the individual help him-/herself through market mechanisms. 
Even though the initial rationale was based on the observation of unequal treatment 
between renters and home owners and that the identified affordability gap was kick-
starting the debate, subsequent discussions about the exact implementation of the 
EHZ infused more general concerns into it, social and economic.  
3 The Role of State Interventions into the Housing Market Economy 
As the theoretical chapters have highlighted the centrality of individual-state 
relationships, it is important to investigate in more detail the naïve theories of 
economic agency that German policy interventions were putting forward with the 
introduction and subsequent changes to the EHZ. In terms of legitimation, state action 
was not justified as benefiting the mass public, but the coordinative discourse 
mentioned how interventions were supporting a very specific category of individuals, 
selected according to social criteria, not merely financial ones (Holtmann and 
Voelzkow 2000, 3). The concept of individual-state relationship in relation to German 
housing policies in the period under investigation then only applied to households as 
(future) families. For the definition of economic agency, this entailed that even 
though individual trajectories were taken as legitimating factors, it was not the 
individual person per se that was targeted as constituting an essential entity of 
economic life, but the individual as a member of a family, more specifically as a wife 
or a husband, a mother and a father. Housing policy then strongly linked financial 
benefits to social standing, a proposition that could be argued to be fundamentally 
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unfair in terms of individual opportunity, when an alternative understanding was 
applied. However, this was not the case in the German legitimation context. By 
introducing social variables into the funding equation, policy-makers enacted state 
interventions that wer not only facilitating a vision that the economic and social 
domain of individual agents were separate, but also that his/her social features acted 
as conditions of specific patterns of economic behaviour (Hacke et al. 2005, 43). 
However, such a conception also entailed potential contradictions between individual 
financial concerns and collective social outcomes. 
 
In this regard, the chapter explores subsequent developments of the EHZ that 
underlined the conceptions of economic agents as elements in a wider system that the 
state interventions had to manage. The tensions between micro- and macro-concerns 
became apparent and unsustainable with time, even though they had been present 
earlier on. At the same time, various macro-objectives were themselves hard to attain 
as they represented divergent policy logics (HC 13/3446: 090196). Such effects had 
been pointed out at the time the EHZ had been designed, for instance that cost-
effective building methods could be undermined by quality concerns (HC 13/2506, p. 
1: 270995). As features of the policy were modified, and others were extended over 
the years to better target the aid distributed, these developments were important 
indicators highlighting a shift away from the initial rationale of closing the 
affordability gap, especially for young families, as identified in 1994. Overall, what 
was visible was a move away from helping individuals as economic agents towards a 
rationale for state intervention that promoted issues outside the narrow boundaries of 
the housing market itself. With time, the whole notion of the market as being made up 
by individual actors became undermined by discussions about how state funds could 
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achieve the best result in a specific political context. These evolutions confirm the 
feature of output legitimacy for the German case as discussed in chapter four (Scharpf 
1999; Schaefer 2006). This hence also represented the facilitation of specific 
understandings of markets. Again, this is central to the thesis as the variability in 
markets conceptions, held by policy-makers and housing consumers alike, are 
constitutive for a certain variety of capitalism (Carrier 1997, 24).  
 
The first observation related to the inclusion and subsequent extension of a strong 
ecological component. The discussions were particularly interesting in this regard, as 
they were acting counter to the initial principles that the EHZ was supposed to 
address, first its micro-focus, and second the issue of affordability and cost-effective 
building. Already in the very first statement about the report of the commission, the 
German government had underlined that 
Housing policies and those relating to the building of cities are also applied to 
environmental policies. Building must be in harmony with ecological 
requirements. The federal government thinks that it is especially necessary to 
enforce energy- and space-saving building methods as well as the use of 
ecologically compatible building materials. (HC 273/95, p. 9: 090595). 
Already at this point, the language used pointed towards an understanding of the state 
as giving priority to issues that were relevant for society as such, not only for the 
narrowly defined economic agent as an individual (Schuppert 2004, 25). As such, the 
individual was not the only constitutive element of market outcomes as was seen in 
the British case. The linking of housing policy to public infrastructure was indicative 
in this context. At the same time, it was never developed how the promotion of state-
of-the-art technology was compatible with the initial ends of offering home ownership 
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to more families. In other words then, technological progress was taken as a moral 
taken-for-granted end in itself (Habermas 1970). Such discussions were not raised, 
not even by the otherwise rather critical PDS (HC 13/2357, p. 3: 200995). It looked as 
though there existed a naïve theory that once the state could successfully manage the 
economy as such, individual destinies would be taken care of as well. Such a view 
underlined the indirect character of the German legitimation regime based on 
outcomes. 
 
Even though voices were concerned with the effect of such policy elements on the 
aim of cost-effective building (SPD fraction: HC 13/2506, p.1: 270995), the 
ecological component was largely discussed in its technical details and adopted (HC 
13/2784, pp.11, 52: 261095; HC 716/95, p. 21: 031195). Even when concerns with 
the public deficit crept into the discussions, a concern that came to dominate the EHZ 
later on, the ecological elements were never challenged (Greens fraction: HC 
13/10788, p. 1: 260598). One explanation was that at the same time, these ecological 
features were also related to the current state of the building industry, and had been 
before (HC 273/95, p.34: 090595). The exact same terms were even used when 
describing future directions in this industrial sector: „energy and space-saving 
building methods‟ (HC 13/6318, p. 2: 211196) were seen as helping the industry to 
sustain employment (Bischoff and Maennig 2012). It was thus clear that the EHZ was 
also a method to boost the order books of the building and impede employment 
figures to drop (HC 174/471, p. 2: 040398). In relation to the individual-state 
relationship, such findings meant that the individual was not regarded as the essential 
unit of analysis when it came to conceptions of how the economy was functioning. 
Policy-makers were not looking through the eyes of the single economic agent, but 
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acted in the self-declared interest of the whole society. Again, the link to the delegate 
model of representation‟ (Miller and Stokes 1963) is obvious here. The rational 
individual agent was regarded as never being fully sovereign anyway (Martini 2004, 
169). Such an approach was consistent with the legitimation regime centred on output 
legitimacy and hence an indirect legitimation regime as described in chapter four. 
 
A second development explored here for its indicative value in relation to taken-for-
granted conceptions of German policy-makers is the progressive lowering of the 
income limit of the EHZ and the related shift to fund stock more extensively than new 
buildings. Indeed, it was argued that as acquiring stock was comparatively more 
expensive, it should be adequately funded (HC13/8802, p. 33: 221097), a proposition 
that went against the rationale of previous legislation, and hence was partly off-line 
with the rationale for state intervention. The targeting objectives through the setting of 
various income limits had been raised beforehand in the discussion of the policy 
design (HC 716/95, p. 2: 031195). But when the PDS proposed to reduce the income 
limits by a third, as well as to extend the unmarried couples (HC 13/10295, p.1: 
010498), its suggestions were rejected (HC 13/11013, p.1: 170698). The 
argumentation ran as follows: 
There was a 22.2% increase in the amount of one-family-houses built in 1996 
against 1995, which private banks attributed to the introduction of the EHZ. 
(HC 13/11013, p.3: 170698). 
However, if such targeting was not supposed to be necessary, then the logic of the 
shift towards the promotion of stock was hard to be explained. Indeed, it was argued 
later on that such a move would be a way to keep the policy financially viable in the 
context of increasing worries with public deficit (Federal government: HC 14/1835, 
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p.2: 211099). It looked as if there were other concerns that explain such a refocusing 
effort then.   
 
Indeed, desires were formulated to renew the city centres in the new federal states 
(HC 13/8802, p.39:  221097), but also to strengthen the building industry (HC 
13/5960, p.2: 051196; HC 14/163, p.15883: 040401) through a „building culture 
initiative‟ (HC 14/8966: 290402; Weeber et al. 2005). These macro-objectives indeed 
did entail the limitation of income levels and a shift of more beneficial conditions 
from newly built to stock houses (HC 13/8802, p. 33: 221097). Again, the housing 
market was not conceived of as a space where free agents would interact to determine 
general levels of prices. In general, discussions rarely mentioned economic agency as 
such, as the individual focus was now lowered amongst various other macro-
objectives the EHZ was supposed to achieve. The market was considered as a tool for 
state actors to channel funds into certain sectors of the economy they judged 
appropriate to support, not as a playing field of active and profit-seeking individual 
agency. The rationale was that such efforts would benefit the society in its entirety, 
with such arguments being the foundation of legitimation claims. 
 
However, as this push was promoting expensive renovations and modernisation, it 
acted counter to the initial accessibility objective (HC 14/6637, p.1: 030701) and  was 
undermining the micro-concerns that had been put forward when the policy was 
introduced, especially as outlined in the report submitted by the commission. Indeed, 
such initiatives were taking cheaper property off the ownership and the rent markets 
(HC 13/7710, pp.2-5: 160597).The coordinative discourse in relation to the rationale 
for state intervention then advanced a naïve theory that economic agents themselves 
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were not asked to make their own choice in terms of tenure, but were supposed to 
follow the option that state policy had selected as the most adequate for their socio-
economic situation (Herit 2009, 12). However, the findings here demonstrate that 
even though the political aspects behind such policy choices were not debated, they 
clearly existed. In distributional terms, they favoured the construction industry against 
the general population (aspect 4). At the same time however the naïve theories about 
economic agency and markets advanced in the German context marginalised 
conceptions of the economic individual as a being essentially constituent of the 
economy, and of the market being a legitimate policy tool in its own terms (1) as has 
been seen in the British case. This is then an example of how the comparative method 
illustrates the political aspects of particular economic regimes. 
 
Consistent with the developments explained beforehand, the housing market was 
regarded as an institution that distributed tenure among individuals, not a space where 
economic agents could decide on their own which type of accommodation they 
preferred to live in. As state policy implemented the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
policy-makers and hence set the entry criteria for various housing markets, such 
intervention took all aspects of individual financial utility-maximisation away. It was 
argued that as the market allocated too many young families into the renting section, 
and as that such an outcome was contradicting the principles of the German version of 
welfare state, state policy had to intervene to correct or rectify such developments. 
Again, markets were read in a macroeconomic fashion, housing markets were 
regarded to perform social functions of welfare services (Münch 2010). 
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Even though the delivery of goods occurred through private market mechanisms, the 
output was monitored according to a mix of social and macro-economic lenses. For 
young families then, this meant that state intervention corrected the market in a sense 
as to allocate them an owned house, so they could be parents that were able to offer 
conditions proper for the development of their child(ren). Once an individual fell in to 
this social category, policy intervention was adequate to help him/her in their socially 
legitimate endeavours to create a family. It were thus state policies that set the 
„framework requirements and limiting factors‟ („Rahmenbedingungen‟, HC 13/8802, 
p.1: 220197) upon which the market could then operate, indicating that markets were 
fundamentally perceived to be arenas of state intervention. The concept of market-
optimiser then applies here, but in a very different sense to the British conception. 
Whereas in the UK the term covers state interventions in order to bring market 
processes closer to a state of pure and perfect competition that then enhances social 
outcomes indirectly, the German conception was more focussed in the delivery of 
social goods. 
 
Again then, a constructivist focus on the meanings of economic terms can draw out 
differences in capitalist diversity that have not been highlighted so far. At the same 
time, such differences are political, first in themselves as they side-line alternative 
conceptions (aspect 1) and second as they translate into conceptions of „good‟ and 
„bad‟ economic agency (2) as well as leading to distributional consequences (4), 
legitimated on the back of such specific naïve theories. At the same time it allows for 
a more historical perspective, in connection with the state tradition of the „social 
market economy‟ in the German case (Nicholls 2000; Ryner 2003, 202). 
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At the same time, “functioning housing markets are also a precondition for successful 
social policies” (expert commission on housing policy: HC 13/159, p.3 : 301294), 
meaning that markets were not themselves the tools to achieve social goals, but a 
condition that needed to be fulfilled before state interventions could work. The 
rationale here was that the redistributive features of state action were only able to be 
operationalised on the grounds that markets were generating revenue for the state in 
the first place. It was hence not the case that state policies were to engineer a 
particular market that would then produce the outcomes it desired. Instead, markets 
were believed to produce outcomes, upon which the policies could only then act to 
improve the legitimacy of the polity and the policies themselves. Policy-makers were 
thus not actively interfering into the market as far as the production of outcomes was 
concerned, but were making sure it served the values deemed appropriate in the 
German rationale for state intervention. Those norms related to social principles that 
the polity had decided upon (Martini 2004). 
 
As the individual-state relationship was indirect, the political implications in 
distributional terms from the EHZ did not have to be „sold‟ to the general public. This 
became obvious when no explicitly concrete legitimating rationale was presented for 
why married individuals and households with children were targeted by state support, 
and others not. Even though it was possible to reconstruct the underlying reasoning, it 
was not argued in such open fashion (HC 498/15: 110895). It seemed as if policy-
makers had no need to explain such a move because it assumed that its underlining 
values were carried by its population (Rasl-Brandl 2010). 
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This also meant that policy-makers were in a dominant position to facilitate the 
policies themselves had deemed appropriate. As seen, such a policy-process 
marginalised other forms of life like people that lived together but were not married 
and homosexual couples (HC 13/2784, p.29: 261095), and denied equally generous 
support to disabled member of society (HC 13/3605, pp. 1-2: 010296). Indeed, 
whereas the traditional heterosexual union was depicted in positive terms, other 
unions were not (number 2 of the political aspects of comparative capitalism). The 
legitimation regime focussed upon the general good of society hence allowed 
differential treatment on potentially anti-social grounds (HC 940/96, p. 4:041296). 
Indeed, this violence was even accused to be anti-constitutional (HC 13/8802, p.81: 
220197). These insights demonstrate that the politics of the EHZ, in its initial form 
and its developments were never rendered explicit as they were informed through 
strong taken-for-granted assumptions of policy-makers. 
 
As seen, the parliamentary discussions suggested that the rationale for state 
intervention in relation to the home ownership market promoted economic 
subjectivities that were judged to be beneficial to the German economy broadly 
spoken. This then lead to a situation where certain individuals were granted financial 
assistance not so much for their individual merits, but for their social position. It can 
thus be argued that such a policy was not only highly conservative as it advocated the 
form of life of the traditional family, but that it was also allocating public resources 
according to criteria that were not fully in the hands of the individuals themselves, 
hence were not legitimate according to a reading of input legitimacy (Scharpf 2004). 
In other words, the German state policies were utilising public money not only to 
support a subset of its population (political aspect 4) but also to facilitate the 
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reproduction of certain forms of life policy-makers deemed essential to the long-term 
sustainability of a particular socio-economic model. The enmeshment between micro- 
and macro-concerns was thus obvious to the German individual. Indeed, the ultimate 
rationale for supporting future home owners was found in their contribution to the 
community, not in their intrinsic qualities per se. As such, the naïve theories 
themselves not only lead to justify certain moral depictions of good citizenship 
(Parker 2012) (2) but they were also at the very basis of how the German housing 
market came to be understood in one specific way and not another, by policy-makers 
(3) and everyday housing consumers alike (1). 
4 Ending the EHZ:  Micro Arguments Overturned 
The previous sections have highlighted how the legitimation methods around macro-
economic issues were progressively undermining the initial aim of the EHZ to bridge 
the affordability gap that had been identified to be an issue especially for young 
families. This means that the form and content of policies was inconsistent with 
earlier claims. Apart from running counter to a logic centred on the individual per se, 
these general concerns were conflicting between each other (Matzig 2005), with one 
of them finally leading to the cancellation of the EHZ: the concern with the public 
deficit. Issues with the financial sustainability of the massive budget of the policy 
were raised from 1996 onwards. The latter were only fully taken into account by the 
„committee for land use planning, the building industry and town planning‟ when it 
related them to demographic outlooks predicting a raising number of single people for 
2010 (HC 13/4533, p.7: 070596). At this point however, its motion was however 
rejected by members of parliament (HC 13/4533, p.8: 070596). The Green party was 
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also denominating the German housing policies as following the principle of „mass 
creates mass‟ („Gießkannenpolitik‟, literally „watering pot politics‟, HC 13/7710, p. 3: 
160597) and was urging targeting efforts to avoid houses being transferred into the 
ownership market. In this line of thought, it also called for a limitation of all property-
related policies „in times of tight cash boxes‟ (HC 13/7710, p. 5: 160597). These 
policy themes were developed over time, pushed for the progressive lowering of 
income levels, and finally legitimated the cancellation of the policy. 
 
However, before such concerns were taken into account, further macro-issues were 
addressed through the EHZ. The employment issue in the building industry was an 
example of how the policy, set up out of a partly micro-economistic reading of 
housing markets, was taken over by much more political topics on the macro-level. 
When discussing changes to slim down the EHZ (HC14/471: 040399), members of 
parliament were pointing out that it supported the economic activity in the building 
sector especially in the „new‟, hence „Eastern‟, federal states (HC 14/36, p. 2937: 
230599). The extension of the ecological components of the policy (in 2000) was also 
considered to boost to the German economy at large (HC 14/6542, p. 2: 030701). 
Implications on prices, individual companies and consumers are possible. 
However, general negative effects on the German economy are not to be 
expected. On the contrary, the construction of energy saving devices and low-
energy-houses is stimulated by the lengthening of the additional allowances. 
(HC 14/4130, p. 2: 260900, SPD and Greens). 
 
In other words, potentially detrimental effects on consumer prices and hence higher 
entry barriers into the home ownership market were accepted on the grounds that the 
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overall economy, and more particularly the construction industry benefited from the 
introduced changes. As such, the taken-for-granted assumptions were not only 
depicting the building in a positive light (aspect 2), but they also led to concrete 
benefits for the sector (aspect 4). Such statements made it hard to take the policy aims 
in relation to the affordability gap seriously even though the Green party had 
expressed concerns with cheaper housing only three months before (HC 14/3664: 
270600). Such debates still acknowledged a very limited status to an active 
conception of economic agents as has been seen in the British context. Indeed, some 
policy suggestions mentioned “additional funding for the installation of heat pump 
equipment, of solar collectors or devices to recover heat” (HC 14/4131, p.1: 260900; 
HC 14/4379: 241000), playing on the technicalities of such measures. Such a 
coordinative discourse was not only silent about the role of the individual, but also 
about the political elements of such moves (HC 14/5596: 150301) apart from 
mentioning their beneficial effect on a very specific section of the labour market (HC 
14/6542, p.2: 030701). 
 
 Again, the logic was to secure „employment‟ and hence help individuals indirectly, 
instead of directly handing financial resources over to them for them to decide how to 
best invest them. This language is then indicative of a macro-economic approach to 
the German markets and the economy more generally where individuals are not seen 
as rational decision-makers whose actions lead to a particular economic outcome. 
This is then an example of how the constructivist approach highlights the ways in 
which particular conceptions of the economy entail differential policy-targeting 
efforts. At the same time, this example illustrates the political aspects of coordinative 
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discourse and hence offers a critique of current trends in the constructivist 
institutionalist literature as developed in chapter four (Schmidt 2000). 
 
In relation to the definition of economic agency then, this meant that the policy was 
progressively undermining its initial focus on the individual in favour of becoming 
one tool among many in the management of the overall economy. Whereas the 
commission report had offered a reading that was very much focussed on fair 
treatment between individuals, the reasons that policy-makers then adopted were 
strongly relying on social arguments about the long-term reproduction of the German 
socio-economic model, not on the benefits of individuals per se. The naïve theories 
were depicting economic agency as secondary to larger macro-economic issues. The 
form of axio-rationality was limited in the sense that economic utility-maximisation 
was only allowed for the individual once polices have created such a space. This 
example highlights how the social context can limit textbook rationality. Indeed, the 
constructivist perspective does not take rationality as a universal concept, but locates 
it in a meaningful context (cf: axio-rationality) and hence allows for a variety of how 
economic behaviour is made sense of in diverse socio-economic environments. 
 
 At a time where the building industry was seen as facing a crisis (HC 14/163, p. 
15883: 040401), it was only the PDS that was openly addressing the deeper 
underlying issue. 
Secondly, I have to tell you that a house gets built for somebody to life in it, 
und not to sustain jobs in the building industry. This goes without saying, but 
during your government the priorities were set exactly the other way round. 
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(PDS, HC 14/163, p. 15904: 040401; see also Behring and Helbrecht 2002, 
158) 
This quote sums up the line that the German policy-makers had been taking since 
very soon after the introduction of the EHZ when it was progressively subjecting 
individual concerns to issues of socio-economic management
16
. It is also an indication 
for this line of thought presenting taken-for-granted assumptions for policy-makers. 
 Even though the initial discussions were centred on pricing that claimed that quality 
objectives should not be overpowered (HC 273/95, p. 11: 090595),that was exactly 
what happened. As the order books of the industry were on a downwards path (HC 
13/159, p.333: 301294; HC 13/6318: 211196). 
 
Over the years, discussions about the differential promotions of new and existing 
stock and about the lowering of the income limits had acted in a way to keep the 
policy budget constant in a time when public deficits had to be kept an eye on (HC 
13/4533, p.7: 0070596; HC 13/6318, p.2: 211196; HC 159/03, p.5: 060303; HC 
612/03: 280803; Streeck and Mertens 2011). The usual legitimation argument was to 
allocate more resources into the promotion of stock and to narrow down the 
population targeted. Such moves were supported by a parliamentary debate revealed 
that a considerable amount of the aid was allocated to households that would have 
accessed ownership anyway (HC 14/1198, p.3: 210699). Hence, at the same time 
when macro issues were mobilised to legitimate incremental changes, micro 
arguments were presented as running directly counter to the uselessness of the EHZ 
(HC 13/8802, p. 86: 221097). Indeed, individual benefits were seen as going against 
the larger collective good. Such a move must be seen as inconsistent with the very 
                                                        
 
16
 Even though the SPD government under Schröder was replaced by the one under the CDU 
and Merkel in 2005, this has only marginal significance here as the decision to end the EHZ has been 
taken before this change in power.   
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reasons for the establishment of the policy in the first place. Again then, this shows 
how political coordinative discourse is, but also how a constructivist approach digs 
out such additional political aspects. 
 
From 2000 onwards, the EHZ was then presented as a policy that had been so 
successful in minimising the affordability issue that it was no longer of importance 
(HC 14/8297, p.2: 200202; HC 14/9344: 110602; HC 14/242, p. 24296: 130602; HC 
15/8, p.423: 071102), especially as interest rates were now so low that the 
acquirement of the owned house could be achieved by the classical financial means 
(HC Bundesrat, p. 50: 140303). The critics of the EHZ hence showed that even if the 
macro-concerns were not convincing enough, the arguments in favour of the EHZ in 
the ways it could benefit individuals were biased.  
 
The initial focus on individuals, even if only partial as targeted towards families with 
children, was now turned against the policy upon more general grounds. The rationale 
was that as public money was involved, it was inefficient, even unfair to target a very 
particular group with additional benefits. It was even seen as running counter to the 
principles that the collective benefits needed to be catered for in the first place. 
Phrased differently, the underlying rationale for why parents were fulfilling central 
roles in the reproduction of the social order fell away as justificatory mechanisms (HC 
13/8802, p. 86: 221097). In the wake of major changes in the socio-economic 
structure of the German model identified by policy-makers, they allocated resources 
away from individual benefits. From 2000 onwards, it were only macro-issues that 
were driving the discussions of how to modify the policy so as to reconcile the 
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objectives of supporting the industry with the increasing pressures on the budget as 
state tax income was shrinking (HC 15/129, p. 11695: 300904). 
 
As demographic outlooks showed diminishing fertility rates (HC 13/4533, p.7: 
070596; HC 14/242, p.24283: 130602) and a high level of vacancies, especially in the 
new federal states (HC 14/6055, p.2: 160501; HC 14/163, p.15902: 040401), the need 
to support families was considered to be overdue. The very reason for why the EHZ 
had been designed was now unimportant, or at least that was how German policy-
makers interpreted the situation. Macro-economic figures had lead to the conception 
that the affordability gap was not an issue worth of public funding as it was to be 
disappear over time even without state intervention. The reasons were related to 
„demographic and social changes‟ (HC 14/242, p.24283: 130602) that entailed  
An individualised and much differentiated society that comes with different 
forms of housing and of life. We need to adjust politics to these. (Greens, HC 
14/242, p.24284: 130602) 
The decrease in population (HC 14/8297, p.2: 200202; HC 14/242, p.24283: 130602) 
predicted by the „housing prognosis 2015‟ (HC 15/459, p.2: 180203) and the local 
inequalities in housing demand and supply (HC 14/242, p.24284: 130602) were the 
main causes put forward against the EHZ. However, it still took policy-makers a 
couple of years to decide to scrap the policy altogether. This was due to the 
contradictory objectives and interests of continuing to support the building industry 
and to restrict public finances. 
 
Only a little more than three years into the policy that had been hailed among policy-
makers (HC 14/471, p.2936: 040399), macro-economic concerns had undermined the 
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arguments to close the affordability gap (HC 14/4422, p.3: 251000). Even though it 
was incrementally admitted that the subvention of ownership had been overdone, 
numerous debates between parties took place to decide on what action to take. In 
autumn 2000 the „initiative architecture and building culture‟ was adopted to promote 
quality awareness among the larger public (HC 14/8966, p.9: 290402) because 
“planning and building have an essentially social, ecological and cultural relevance 
that goes well beyond its economic aspects”. As “the built environment reflects the 
self-understanding and values of a society”, the quality of the latter was seen to 
deserve special care (HC 14/8966, p.1: 290402). These lines suffice to demonstrate 
that the rationale for state intervention acted counter to the efforts to support the 
lower-cost end of the ownership market. At the same time, these developments were 
not conceived of as constituting contradictory rationales as they were mentioned in 
the same instance (HC 14/8297, p.13: 200202). It is important to highlight that 
German policy-makers did not conceive of quality issues as being in opposition to 
bringing entry barriers into the home ownership market down. As such they limited 
the array of policy instruments under consideration. Again, such a narrowing down of 
the domain of the „possible‟ is political (Laclau 1990, 34) as it does violence to 
alternative policy approaches (aspect 3) and distributional outcomes (4). 
 
When it came to the discussion on how to best reconcile the objectives of state 
support to the building industry and of restricting public finances, the FDP was in 
favour of keeping the EHZ unchanged on the explicit grounds that a cancellation 
would lead to between 200,000 and 400,000 job losses (HC 14/242, p. 24286: 130602; 
HC 15/33, p.1: 061102; HC 15/8, p. 419: 071102). On the one hand, the CDU 
repeated that the EHZ should not be used to create jobs (HC 14/242, p. 24279: 
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130602), on the other hand it was also clinging to only introducing minor changes to 
the policy (HC 15/3714: 210904). Hence efforts were again undertaken to 
additionally target the EHZ and channel more funds into the renovation of stock (HC 
612/03, p. 3: 280803) even though this was further threatening to undermine the 
renting market. Indeed, it had been argued that the EHZ had already led to lower 
investments into rented houses as the return was lowered (CDU/CSU fraction: HC 
14/6637, p. 1: 030701). There was no consensus on the figures of potential job losses 
as the numbers of 100,000 (HC 15/8, p. 427: 071102) and 50,000 were now 
mentioned (HC Bundesrat, p. 42: 140303). 
 
In summer 2004 the German the members of parliament decided to replace the costly 
EHZ with a “law for the financial support of the innovation offensive through the 
annulment of the home owner-allowance” (HC 620/04: 130804). Indeed, this 
document depicted the EHZ as “expensive and inefficient” (p. 1) as the aim of the 
promotion was said to be already reached and that more resources would endanger it 
(p.2). Policy-makers now believed that the state intervention into the functioning of 
markets had been detrimental as it had interfered with market mechanisms (p.3). As 
the demographic evolution was now stagnating (p. 2), a continuation of the policy was 
seen as counterproductive. It was even mentioned that the EHZ had entailed an 
inflationary effect (p.2) and that it was now mostly used by rather wealthy households 
(p. 3). In other words, the policy approach that the commission had set forward in 
1994 and that had been rejected now in favour of a more social reading of markets 
now reappeared in order to de-legitimate the very interventions that had been 
proceeded with over the last decade. This not only points at the temporal tensions in 
the depiction of markets (as self-sufficient on the one hand, and as mere conditions 
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for state interventions), but also at the importance of taking into account the wider 
interpretational context of naïve theories. This then relates back to the discussion of 
axio-rationality and to the constructivist method as outlined from the very beginning 
of chapter three. 
 
In the context of the Lisbon strategy (HC 15/129, p. 11694: 300904) and the 
mentioning of the Maastricht criteria (HC 15/8, p. 422: 071102), fiscal discipline 
(Clift and Tomlinson 2004) combined with a programme to long-term support to the 
German status as an knowledge economy with high human capital was seen as more 
appropriate and incompatible with the expensive and de-legitimated EHZ (HC 15/129, 
p. 11706: 300904). These steps were supposed to set Germany on a trajectory of 
additional growth and additional jobs (HC 620/04, p.3: 130804; HC 15/129, p. 11696: 
300904). Also, it is argued that low interest rates have been beneficial to access 
ownership anyway so that the EHZ was overdue (HC 15/129, p.11709: 300904), 
again more closely following the approach to markets as laid out by the Sinn report. 
Still, what is important in relation to the individual-state relationship is that all of 
these discussions were mentioning macro-economic arguments with no reference to 
the individual. Again, this points towards a legitimation regime that is centred on 
output, in the sense that policy-makers were supposed to care for the good of the 
entire society, not for the individual per se. 
 
Indeed, the coordinative discourse of economic growth combined with infrastructure 
investments was indicative that for German policy-makers economic patterns of 
micro-agents were not seen as the key variables to act upon. Instead state 
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interventions had to ensure that the correct policy decisions were made now in order 
to guarantee the competitiveness of the German economy in the future (HC 15/129, p. 
11694: 300904). As seen, economic growth and prosperity was not measured in terms 
of the wealth that individuals were able to accumulate on their own, but in terms of 
macro-economic indicators such as unemployment figures and state deficits. People 
were assumed to agree with such a view that policy-makers were actively steering the 
economy through good and bad times without critically challenging the political 
nature of such a regime, in terms of the naïve theories facilitated (aspect 1) and their 
distributional outcomes they entailed (aspect 2). The indirect individual-state 
relationship following from such a legitimation regime came with a conception of 
„economic man‟ as playing no significant role in economic outcomes. Indeed, the 
German state was depicted as a paternalist institution, and that the individual only 
needed to follow the social roles attributed to him/her. The very mentioning of the 
notion of the market per se was then also comparatively rare in any of the discussions 
mentioned. 
 
Against the British case where the market was seen as delivering socially legitimate 
outcomes in its own right, the German taken-for-granted assumptions were depicting 
market mechanisms as requiring redistributive interventions. Such differences in the 
polity setup can be defined as political as they influence of how everyday economic 
rationality is defined, each conception marginalising other approaches. The same is 
true for the concrete definitions of economic agency (aspect 1). Still, both come with 
distributional consequences as well (2). In the German case, the categorisation of 
households into categories limited the choice in relation to forms of tenure, hence 
benefiting married families and children against individuals that had decided to life on 
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their own. Again, a constructivist analysis of the concrete individual-state 
relationships has highlighted differences not only in terms of institutional features of 
housing markets but also in the very ways that everyday people were supposed to 
make sense of such economic phenomena (Toussaint et al. 2007). As such, micro-
macro complementarities are also observable in this case as a particular evolutions at 
the level of markets were sustained by specific social constructions of the notions of 
markets themselves, but also of the role of the state and of the definition of the 
economic subject. 
5 Conclusion  
After chapter five had investigated the conceptions of the individual economic agent 
and particular market understandings for the British case, this chapter has applied the 
same framework and questions to the German case. Utilising parliamentary debates, it 
has operationalised the theoretical elements developed in chapters three and four in 
order to point towards an additional level of varieties of models of capitalism. This 
has been achieved through an analysis of coordinative discourse and utterances that 
have constructed particular meanings of the state as a set of policies, of markets and 
of economic agency itself. In other words, it has addressed the issues highlighted in 
the literature review that has claimed to provide an additional level of political 
readings of capitalist variety. By investigating the concrete individual-state 
relationships that were prevalent in the German home ownership policies at the time, 
this investigation  has showcased the ways in which the individual was integrated into 
a larger set of economic processes. 
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As developed in the introduction, the comparative logic was introduced to illustrate 
the political nature of naïve theories as constitutive to economic regimes and as side-
lining alternatives accounts of markets and economic agency. Whereas this chapter 
could also be read on its own terms, the main interest in the thesis is constructivist in 
nature by carving out how in two different individual-state setups, very similar 
economic realities were interpreted in rather diverse ways. By exposing the diverse 
form of economic rationality facilitated through naïve theories, it has also exemplified 
the concept of axio-rationality. Indeed, this can also be captured with the term of 
micro-macro complementarities, meaning that the ways that economic phenomena are 
organised in a certain socio-economic context entail sets of specific understandings of 
such modes of organisation. As the thesis introduces the political aspects of naïve 
theories, this chapter has been investigating the relationships between the individual 
and the state in relation to the reproduction of particular understandings of economic 
mechanisms such as market processes. 
 
In terms of contents, the German „home ownership allowance‟ (Eigenheimzulage, 
EHZ) has brought to light naïve theories about the ideal-typical individual, the market 
and the rationale for state intervention that significantly differ from those outlined in 
the British chapter. Ownership was only supposed to be the preferred choice of tenure 
for a limited sub-set of the population, for families with children. Because market 
mechanisms of housing supply were hindering families to move into the ownership 
market and that the state officials judged that they were entitled to do so due to 
reasons of social positioning, the policies identified this affordability gap. State 
interventions were targeting aid from the beginning, with the underlying rationale 
being one of quasi-direct provision of home ownership. An owned home was meant 
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to offer more appropriate conditions for family life in terms of its materiality and its 
ability to transfer wealth to the next generation. Hence public support was conditional 
upon individuals contributing to the reproduction of social conditions, not so much 
upon their purely financial capabilities. 
 
The concept of the market as such was not an essential element in such an 
argumentation. It was only seen as being inadequate in fulfilling all the functions 
German state policies and society expected it to do. Overall then, state policies were 
much more concerned with intervening directly than using the market as a mechanism 
to reach socially acceptable ends. As individual agency was depicted in passive terms, 
the ownership market was not seen as a domain for individuals to maximise wealth 
through rational choices, but only as a way to distribute housing. The technical details 
of building regulations and features in the form of the ecological bonuses within the 
EHZ were seen by policy-makers as a way to popularise the desires for a quality built 
environment (Habermas 1970, 120). The materiality of tenure was hence valued over 
their financial aspects. Such naïve theories matched with interpretations of markets as 
spaces for state intervention to achieve macro-economic concerns like supporting the 
lagging building industry.  
 
Indeed, the economy and the cycle of economic activity were concepts that ranged 
high in parliamentary debates. Very quickly after its initial design, the EHZ moved 
away from serving the specific interests of a particular socio-economic group and 
shifted to sustain the level of employment in the building industry. Even though such 
introductions undermined the very affordability focus, German policy-makers 
consented to them on the grounds that they were necessary to keep the economy in 
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good health. The political implications that state support was actively re-channelled 
away from families and into the hands of construction workers were not discussed, 
neither within policy-makers not with the general public. The same applied when the 
EHZ was cancelled in favour for an investment programme that was deemed to set the 
German economy on a steeper growth path that bypassed any version of active 
economic agency. Overall then, the German individual-state relationship can be 
characterised by a high degree of state authority and state management of the 
economy in the name of the collectivity. 
 
As the financial aspects of home ownership were marginal in relation to the EHZ 
when discussing the individual, the next chapter investigates how the German 
rationale for state intervention entailed a way of how individuals could access 
ownership. An analysis of parliamentary debates and policies in the mortgage market 
highlights the specific ways in which individual was depicted as financial subjects. 
Again, such an investigation, based on constructivist premises, brings out not only a 
certain understanding of the mortgage market but also comes with political content. 
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Chapter 8: Naïve Theories of the German Mortgage Market 
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1 Introduction  
The previous chapter has explained in some detail how in the German case initial 
affordability issues framed in individual terms became compromised with the 
introduction of macro-economic concerns. These then undermined the very individual 
financial focal points set out in the first place. To link back to the theoretical parts of 
the thesis, the way in which economic agents were addressed in parliamentary debates 
was influenced by conceptions or taken-for-granted assumptions of what housing 
markets were supposed to achieve, and of what role the economic subject was meant 
to play within them.  In the beginning, the affordability concerns were generated out 
of a reasoning that all members of society where equally entitled to access the tenure 
they preferred, renters and home owners alike. However, very quickly it became clear 
that the German state officials were not interpreting the ownership market in these 
terms, effectively adopting a definition of affordability that was significantly different 
from that one put forward by their British counterparts. In other words, once this 
alternative definition of affordability was enacted, policy-makers were able to justify 
the introduction of macro-economic issues as they were not directly seen as in 
opposition to the affordability criterion, even if they partially were. It is also worth 
remembering that the micro-economic logic reappeared in arguments to end the EHZ. 
In the German case, home ownership was only seen as the default tenure for married 
couples and families. This chapter is then concerned more thoroughly with the 
financial aspects of German home ownership policies between 1997 and 2007. 
 
The rationale for state intervention not only addressed the openly acknowledged 
social dimensions in the notion of affordability by restricting the whole debate to 
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families with children when it came to the distribution of funds in respect to its 
ownership programmes. At the same time, the housing market was understood by 
policy-makers as fulfilling functions outside the realm of the provision of shelter 
(Bachofner 2008, 19), in terms of the reproduction of the wider social order. This was 
also true in the British case where the latter was regarded as a potential mechanism to 
accumulate wealth, but in the German context the additional roles had little 
relationship with such financial issues of end consumers. The introduction of a strong 
ecological component and the worries with employment figures in the building 
industry were exemplary as such macro-economic concerns (Hecken 2010, 59) that 
came into a policy designed to reduce the affordability issue. Such observations 
highlight some of the deeply political features of the exact individual-state 
relationship in relation to German housing policies. As outlined in the theoretical 
parts of the thesis, the previous chapter has depicted particular understandings by 
policy-makers, of the state as a legitimated institution and as a set of policies, of the 
market and of the economic agent within this context.  
 
As outlined in chapter four, as individual-state relationship plays out in a larger field 
of legitimation regimes, similarities between naïve theories in relation to the 
individual between the housing and the mortgage market are assumed. Such a 
statement has been validated for the British case where the logic of accumulation of 
individual wealth has been a feature of the way policy-makers have conceptualised 
economic agency in the sphere of housing and of mortgages. Indeed, financial issues 
formed the conditions upon which housing markets were functionally successful. For 
the German case then, the legitimation rationale of the EHZ has shifted from helping 
individuals to overcome the financial barriers to access the home ownership market to 
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supporting the building industry and catering for more general needs of societal 
reproduction. The justificatory discourse of this change has been traced in the 
previous chapter and is in line with the notion of output legitimacy as discussed in 
chapter four. However, that also meant that issues of financial affordability were 
rephrased. Indeed, when it comes to the financial sides of the ownership policies, it is 
important to highlight that in such a context where state action was framed in terms of 
output and not to the individual per se, the very notion of affordability changed in 
definitional nature.  
 
This chapter hence explains the ways in which financial issues in the housing market 
were addressed and made sense of, both in relation to the conceptions of the German 
home ownership market and the British case as well. Indeed, the differences with the 
latter are also underlined as the comparative method is used to empirically 
demonstrate the political nature of naïve theories as excluding alternative patterns of 
interpretation. Basically, the German conceptions excluded the British ones and vice 
versa, even if that was not always a conscious process. To relate back to the 
ontological and methodological framework here, the open-ended nature of the human 
mind as well as the constructivist approach to analysing the closure of this 
indeterminacy are able to bring out such additional political sides of how (parts of) 
comparative capitalism work. At the same time, they also point to the micro-macro 
complementarities, as a certain regime being based on set of naïve theories coherent 
with economic outcomes. 
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In the British example, the housing efforts were with democratising market entry 
criteria to lower-income households. The notion of affordability was hence interpreted 
in terms of accessibility, in relation to the amount of assets individuals were holding 
allowing them to overcome the entry barriers (Milner and Madigan 2001, 77). The 
discourse of “helping people into ownership” is exemplary here as it provided an 
explanation, or naïve theory, of how  state intervention could entail the financial 
means that then allowed the individual to play out his/her agency in a market setting. 
The drive to include further agents into property-owning, independently from their 
social status, only made sense once a particular set of naïve theories in relation to 
ownership was adopted, one that depicted the latter in positive financial terms for all 
members of society (Malpass 2005, 109). However, as has been outlined in the 
previous chapter, the German policy-makers took an approach to housing that was 
based on social categorisations where they depicted ownership as the preferred tenure 
for a limited group only, mainly families with children, not as a tenure that all citizens 
should attempt to enter (Behring and Helbrecht 2002, 165). In such a context of 
restricted demand through social delimitations imposed by the moral depictions of 
coordinative discourse, the relation between housing per se and its financial arm took 
on a different role. It is the latter that this chapter investigates and finds a language 
that is considerably different from the one that made up the British policy story found 
in the previous respective chapters. 
 
These initial comments start to draw out the social and moral conceptions of wealth 
accumulation related to the home ownership market in Germany, hence underlining 
the individual subjectivities inherent in mortgage market policies between 1997 and 
2007. In line with the varieties theme outlined from the beginning of the thesis, this 
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chapter investigates how conceptions of market mechanisms and of state interventions 
were differently framed in a setting where housing itself was not seen as a central 
economic variable for individual households. Following a constructivist account, this 
again points to micro-macro complementarities in the sense that specific socio-
economic environments of individual-state relationships entail particular individual 
subjectivities. As such, the concept relates back to how taken-for-granted assumptions 
narrow down the policy field and hence do violence to alternative policy tools and 
alternative naïve theories. A conception of affordability as conceptualised in the 
British case would be impossible in the German context as it does not match with 
either the conceptions of policy-makers of what the owned house is meant to be, 
neither with the axio-rationality of the economic agent that was put forward. Again 
then, the meaningful context is central to then way that actors rationalise i.e. make 
sense of economic phenomena. 
 
More generally, in terms of the contribution to the literature, the exploration of the 
theme of German mortgage policies in opposition to those in the UK can be read in a 
double way. On the one hand, it empirically addresses an economic issue from the 
point of view of the individual-state relationship. As such it is once again another 
exposition of how the suggested constructivist framework can be operationalised and 
how it delivers empirical results that do actually highlight the additional political 
aspects of economic regimes. Second, this chapter can also be read on its own as 
investigating the understandings of financial issues in German mortgage markets in 
relation to the ideal-typical „economic man‟. This chapter then comes in three parts. 
First it explores the issue of saving incentivisation and revisits parts of the EHZ as 
being part of a wider savings programme. This also feeds into an alternative notion of 
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affordability as was hinted at already. The next section focuses on the individual and 
highlights in which ways it was (or not) financialised according to certain principles 
that follow from macro-economic concerns. As in the British chapter, the exact 
definition of markets comes in here. Finally, the conditions for a successful housing 
market are highlighted in a way that goes beyond those that are strictly financial in 
themselves. 
2 Social Aspects in German Savings Conceptions 
Drawing from the reflections on affordability presented above, this section shortly 
reviews the initial definition of affordability as presented by the „expert commission 
on housing policy‟ led by acclaimed economist Prof. Sinn (13/159, 301294). First of 
all, it is noticeable that the report acknowledges that 
(I)nvestments into housing markets, as regards the building of new homes and the 
modernisation of dwellings, are often much less influenced by strict calculations 
of profitability as might be assumed. (13/159, 301294, p.27) 
At the same time it also mentions that “the financial burden on the household 
oftentimes becomes the touchstone” (p. 27), meaning that in the end financial 
considerations do play a considerable role in the decision to enter the ownership 
market. The situation hence described is one where individuals do not calculate their 
financial returns from a housing investment, where they do not use it as a way to 
accumulate wealth, but where their financial situation limits the acquisition of the 
good in the first place. Such a conception followed from the perception that housing 
was a consumer good (p. 198), one whose value slowly vanishes as it is used. This is 
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in direct opposition to investment goods that allow for financial returns beyond their 
primary functions, and even appreciation (Wiedemann and Walsh 2000). 
 
But even with such a conceptualisation of housing, the commission went on with a 
comparative analysis between the costs that renters and home owners faced (p. 31) 
before coming to the conclusion that renting was the favoured tenure once tax 
considerations were taken into account (pp.197 and 207). This was then interpreted as 
the result of a political involvement into market processes that such created 
distortions, hence hindered the free adaptation of flexible price mechanisms (p. 37), 
just as in the British case with house prices. These distortions were interpreted as 
being unfair. The issue with affordability was limited to the mere accessibility of 
ownership as a mode of tenure, not as a way to accumulate wealth. That is also why 
the arguments presented were depicting existing policies as socially unfair (13/1312, 
100595, p.1), in the sense that they rendered it unnecessarily hard for families with 
children to access the tenure that matched best with their needs (Sigismund 2003). 
The problem was not that the home ownership market was perceived to operate in an 
unfair way for its financial outcomes, but for its social resultants in terms of the 
distribution of housing as such. As has been described in the previous chapter, the 
logic for bringing additional people into their owned homes was not linked to purely 
monetary terms but to the social positioning of the individuals in question (Behring 
and Helbrecht 2002, 161). 
 
But even though social considerations were interjected into the discussion, the central 
starting assumptions about economic agency were comparable to the ones promoted 
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in the British case. The analysis started with a model of individual preferences and 
utility-maximising agents that take the decision between renting and owning 
according to a larger set of reasons, their financial situations being one of them 
(3/159, 301294). In this case, the report was putting forward an investigation that 
regarded the individual as the central element in housing choices. This was a reading 
that was only partly taken on by the German government when it was designing its 
version of the EHZ, as seen in the previous chapter. Indeed, I argue that such a strong 
version of economic agency was incompatible with views of policy-makers that state 
policies had the ultimate function to manage economic outcomes, hence limiting 
active agential behaviour as seen in the British case (Mayntz and Scharpf 2005). 
However, the legitimation mechanism in relation to affordability deserves additional 
attention. 
 
Indeed, what is essential here is the definition, and hence the political construction of 
the meaningful content of the notion of the affordability issue. In the British context 
with its direct individual-state relationship, each individual was regarded as a 
potential home owner. Phrased differently, there was only one form of economic 
agency applicable to all members of society as each of them was assumed to 
maximise financial wealth over their lifetime. However, in the German environment 
where the arguments were framed according to social positions, multiple rationales 
were operationalised. As home ownership was depicted as a way to cater for the 
special social needs and desires of families, only the latter fully qualified for state aid 
with accessing this class of tenure. Affordability then was only circumscribed to those 
individuals that fell into the social category of family households. Sure, the notion 
also carried financial elements at its core, but the reasons for supporting certain 
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individuals were different from those in the UK. It is in this sense that the rationale 
for state intervention in the mortgage market was still linked to the home ownership 
market, but it was legitimated in a different way (Raffelhüschen and Schoder 2004, 
11). Again, these differences are political as each of them excludes the other from its 
domain of what is possible in policy terms. 
 
Indeed, in the conclusion about the perceptions of the German ownership market, a 
major comparative study mentioned that  
The decision about the creation of proprietary is a matter of social status and 
style of living. Consumers not only optimise their saving ratio or engage in 
asset-management. They primarily wonder who they are and how they would 
like to live. Those who are ready to allow themselves the own four walls needs 
to be able to constantly save in other areas. (Behring and Helbrecht 2002, 169) 
Hence, financial concerns might be very different according to diverse social groups 
in Germany, something that the report under Dr. Sinn was not picking up on as it was 
advancing a perspective more focussed upon the individual independent of his/her 
social standing. It becomes obvious that the German rationale for state intervention in 
the home ownership market, through the financial features of its housing policy, was 
reproducing social distinctions, categorisations that were legitimated in relation to 
issues of societal reproduction. 
 
Following from such perceptions, the state policies were seen as helping those 
individuals who qualified for ownership on a social basis but did not have the 
financial means to access it. Ultimately, it was a “question of fairness” (13/159, 
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301294, p. 199) and one where state interventions into the market were proceeded 
with in order to produce a “correction to the lack of fairness” (p. 200), a fairness that 
had been defined in the terms of policy-makers themselves but had filtered down into 
the naïve theories of economic agents. But as housing was not seen in terms of a 
marketplace where returns on investments could be executed, the public policy simply 
provided a service for disfavoured individuals in the tradition of the German welfare 
state (p. 172; Kleinman 1996; Ryner 2003, 202). The German policies were then not 
intervening into the market as was the case in the UK, but it was simply complying 
with the social duties of the welfare state (Briggs 2006, 21). The market logic was 
disbanded from the housing domain in the first place through the categorisation effort, 
so that it was not purely financial seasonings that led to the definition of affordability. 
More generally, the policy rationale of the EHZ then was not one of marketised aid, 
but one where state resources were directly allocated without passing through 
economic mechanisms of additional wealth generation (13/4712, 230596 p. 2). 
 
Indeed, even though the Sinn report was in favour of a market-approach, German 
policy-makers were also warned by the commission that such market procedures and 
price trajectories would inevitably be characterised by differential interests, hence 
would display political aspects. 
Households that live in attractive houses with affordable rents (…) have 
interests that scarcity translates as slowly as possible into price increases. 
Current home owners that want to move into bigger or qualitatively better 
houses (…) need the expansion of houses offered. (13/159, 301294, p.36)  
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In its reply to the report, the German government side-lined such openly political 
issues in terms of publicly giving priority to some groups over others by not explicitly 
stating the deeper social argument for its categorisation at all when it came to access 
to housing. In other words, the categorisation effort was not challenges as being a 
political move. At the same time, as it was not interested in acting upon price 
trajectories. Praising its strong renting market, it did not question the distinction 
between families and other members of society that did not qualify for home 
ownership (273/95, 090595; Demary et al. 2009, 76) and hence the affordability issue 
was not highly politicised in general. 
 
Again in its response to the report of the commission, the government did not frame 
any of the issues in individual terms, and it is here where it crucially diverted from the 
micro-economic approach as set out by the commission. The language used was 
indicative of the fact that even though housing was ultimately about people, policies 
were to be handled as a top-down approach (273/95, 090595, p.2). Instead of 
mentioning the individual as such, he/she was seen as constitutive of a member of a 
larger social group. 
The federal government sees itself reinforced to declare the promotion of 
housing ownership – above all for families with children – as an eminent 
aspect and to work towards cost-efficient building. (273/95, 090595, p. 4). 
The focus was on how state intervention could meet the social demands of the 
population and of specific categories within it. At the same time, considerable 
attention was paid to the building process, hence not so much on how the individual 
was supposed to contribute to the solution of the problem. This matched with what 
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has been investigated in the previous chapter as far as the introduction of the strong 
building industry component went (14/36, 230599, p. 2937; 14/4379, 241000). Again, 
taken-for-granted assumptions of policy-makers did not only influence the selection 
of policy instruments but were also integral to the German individual-state 
relationship. Indeed, the targets as well as the content of policies were influenced by 
the conceptions of the state as an institution and of its role in relationship with the 
ideal-typical individual. As such, the constructivist approach highlights the varieties 
in individual-state relations and does not take the state as a universal concept. 
 
This also entailed that families were meant to save more than other groups in society. 
As the acquisition of an owned house was estimated to be a considerable financial 
burden (13/159, 301294, p. 157 and 160; Demary et al. 2009, 109), pre-saving and 
post-saving were issues that families had to get to grips with (13/159, p. 160 and 171; 
273/95, 090595, p.13). In this sense, the EHZ was itself a savings policy, targeted at 
families with children.  
Independent of the fact whether the aid facilitates the „pre-saving‟ or the „post-
saving‟, it entails an enhancement of the disposition to save and a change in 
the attitude towards ownership. It should in all cases take into account the 
precautionary motive when acquiring home ownership as well as the necessity 
of a minimal amount of the borrower‟s own resources (expert commission on 
housing policy: 13/159, p. 171) 
The theme of financial prudence and of avoidance of debt were central here (291/95, 
p. 14; Ertürk et al. 2005), especially as regards the necessity to save before acquiring 
housing property. The concept of „Ansparphase‟ („pre-saving-period‟) was central 
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here, meaning a long phase of time where the individual saves for the very purpose of 
accessing an owned home (291/95, 180595, p. 1 and 12; Baur 2000). The German 
coordinative discourse was open about households being required to bring a certain 
amount of savings to the table when either building a new house or acquiring one 
from the stock (13/15001, 290595, p. 2; 14/8687, 220302, p. 8). 
 
In other words, financial considerations came second to the desires of the individual, 
identifying him/herself as a member of a particular social group first and hence 
entitled to the owning of accommodation (13/2771, 261095). In this regard, financial 
speculation was a practice that the German policy-makers prevented though 
legislation in the sense that it introduced three requirements for the policy aid 
(291/95, 180595, p. 18; 13/2506, 270995, p. 12; Schulmeister 2009). First, the 
acquired home had to be used by the person who had benefited from the policy, 
second it could only be sold after a longer period of time (498/95, 110895, p.3), and 
third the building promotion could only be granted once in a lifetime (498/95, 
110895, p.29). At the same time, parliamentary debates were explicit in their 
reticence against high debt ratios and the requirements for considerable down-
payments to be made (498/95, 110895, p.30; 13/2784, 261095, p. 31). Again, the 
topic of financial prudence was underlying these discussions. Interesting in this 
context, especially as compared to the British case, is that whereas the savings rates of 
UK households significantly dropped between 1997 and 2007 (from a bit over 9% to 
close to 2%) , the German ratio stayed stable at a much higher level at over 16% 
(Eurostat 2009, 2).  
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The instance where financial issues did shine through was the so-called 
„Wohnungsbau-Prämiengesetz‟ („house-building premium law‟), again regarded as a 
direct social service (498/95, 220995, p. 17; 13/159, 301294, p.168) with a strong 
focus on savings. Indeed, first legislated in 1952 (Wohnungsbau-prämiengesetz, p.1), 
it supported the renovation of the German housing context and was very much 
focussed on the building side. In this regard, it guaranteed additional funds to those 
individuals that fell below a certain income limit and contributed to the rebuilding 
effort. The version of 1997 highlights these traits, and supports potential home owners 
with their financial burdens (291/95, 180595, p. 22; 498/95, 110895, p. 1). However, 
the conditions attached to such aid were that the savings plan was envisaging constant 
saving holdbacks („Sparrate‟; Wohnungsbau-prämiengesetz, p.1). At the same time, 
the accumulation of capital had to be immediately used for the very purpose of 
building houses. As with the EHZ, the bonus could only be granted once in an 
individual‟s lifetime (p.2). Also, the intermediary financial institution had to be a 
building association, hence reinforcing the link between housing and the actual 
building effort (p.3). 
 
What is important to the argument here is the way in which these financial issues 
were framed in relation to the individual-state relationship. Affordability was not so 
much seen as an issue that individuals face, but as a concern to the overall state of the 
economy. The end pursued was of general centrality to the way German society 
operates. Indeed, the requirement to create enough buildings to accommodate its 
population was an objective of historic importance in the German context (Behring 
and Helbrecht 2002, 159). Individuals were incentivise to contribute their part to such 
a goal that was not only significant to themselves, but that affected the more general 
 
 
290 
 
macro-economic outcome as well as the reproductive capacity of the German society 
(13/159, 301294, p. 199, 209, 217). Compared to the British case where housing was 
regarded as a playing field for individuals to accumulate wealth in their own name, 
the German rationale was embedded into a larger context of social concerns that the 
state managed (14/163, 040401, p. 15907). Again, this matched the „discourse of 
embedded capitalism‟ found to be at the origins of the German model of capitalism 
(Lehmbruch 2001, 39). 
 
At the same time, such findings are also in line with the commentary on the indirect 
individual-state relationship as state interventions were not legitimated in relation to 
the individual him/herself but as regards the social groups that constitute its 
population. The target of policy-making was hence different from the British case, but 
the content of state policies also differed. These observations then highlights the 
political nature of naïve theories as they demonstrate that the same economic 
phenomena can be interpreted very differently to the indeterminate mind as developed 
in chapter three. At the same time the political features also extend to the legitimation 
regime of the individual-state relationship. The next section investigates the type of 
economic agency that followed from such a reading and looks at how the market was 
operationalised in such a meaningful environment. Overall, the notion of „meaning‟ is 
central to the thesis as it allows for the construction of different interpretations of 
economic phenomena (aspect 1 of the political) that then come with particular 
understandings of „good‟ and „bad‟ (aspect 2; Abdelal et al. 2010, 6). The variability 
of meanings not only justifies the approach set out in the thesis, but more importantly 
also points to additional layers of the political in economic regimes. 
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3 The Making of the Non-Financialised Subject 
In its reaction to the report that offered some room for an active understanding of 
economic agency as it started from the individual as taking decisions on his/her own, 
the German government was most eager to reiterate points about the social relevance 
for helping families into ownership as a one-off exercise (273/95, 090595, p. 4) even 
if it spent relatively little effort in explaining the mechanisms of how it would 
pragmatically “help to overcome difficulties with raising credit” (p.7). Instead it was 
focussing on underlining the social legitimation for the aid in the first place. This was 
again done with reference to larger societal issues. 
The federal government sees the house building policies as an expression of 
an active family policy as well as of consequently applied policies in the 
domains of ownership and private wealth for large population strata. (p.9) 
Thus, apart from reinforcing the special needs of families in terms of housing, it such 
a coordinative discourse connected the latter to their more extensive financial 
requirements (Statistisches Bundesamt 2002). If the EHZ was partly a policy to 
support families, then it also reinforced certain naïve theories in how the latter should 
ideal-typically behave, especially as far financial practices went. Even though these 
prescriptions were not explicit, the policy discussions still linked certain patterns of 
behaviour with the subgroup of families. Interestingly, these were also carried over 
into a discourse of help, however significantly different from the British one 
described beforehand. 
 
Even though the report was mentioning „savings incentives‟ (13/159, 301294, p. 199), 
it also stated the principle of „equality of burden‟ in the sense that all individuals 
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should only bear the financial charge they deserve in relation to their social position 
(p. 217). The logic for state intervention was related to the socially unfair conditions 
that some families were undergoing. As the latter were judged to have additional 
needs in terms of retirement arrangement (p. 214), an owned house would help them 
accumulate wealth that could be transferred to the next generation (13/159, 301294, p. 
159; 13/1501, 290595, p. 2; 15/33, 061102). It is important to notice though that this 
rationale of deserving was not full explicit, it was hence taken for granted and 
unchallenged. Again, this was an indication that the social terms upon which German 
policy was handling the financial aspects of housing policy were engrained not only 
into assumptions of policy -makers but also into the naïve theories that was to be held 
by economic agent him/herself. This was the case to a degree that did not require 
further legitimation (273/95,090595, p.12). The rationale of helping individuals was 
direct, not an opening of opportunities for self-help as in the British case. Again, as 
the market was dismissed as an unfit policy tool in this case, state aid was targeted at 
solving the identified affordability concerns in an unmediated process. As seen in the 
last chapter, this was only the rationale for state intervention in the very beginning of 
the EHZ.  
 
Indeed, the discourse of help in the German parliamentary debates was one of “help 
with negotiating accessibility issues”, not one of “help to negotiate” them. It was not a 
method to make individuals fit to play market dynamics to their own profit, but one 
where state policies directly provided services, not mere opportunities. As has been 
seen before when the report was highlighting the deeply political tensions that market 
processes would entail, the latter were deemed unfit for the matter of housing, as 
housing was too important a societal issue to be distributed through the market 
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channel. Indeed, the notion of a home ownership market made no sense in relation to 
the naïve theories in the German context where the financial elements were not 
framed in individual terms either. This is then an example of micro-macro 
complementarities, where a particular definition of the „economic man‟ is only 
compatible with a specific mind of state interventions that are in line with such an 
understanding. It is exactly in these issues that a focus on the individual-state 
relationship is most relevant.  
  
As affordability issues were only seen as an issue for a particular group of people who 
the state could then come in for, the very concept of prices was one that was to be 
controlled from above (498/95, 110895, p. 31). As such, house prices were never a 
topic that was openly discussed in terms of the individual, if it was it was related to 
other macro-economic issues like the building industry (13/11013, 170698, p. 3; 
14/7124, 091001). In terms of the way in which economic agency was depicted then, 
the very conceptions of home ownership hindered the development of a strong focus 
on individual pro-activity in the mortgage market. As seen before, the only thing that 
potential homebuyers were asked to do was to save up money that they could then use 
to finance their acquisition. As such, financial concerns as well as elements of market 
processes were deliberately kept away from the individual (13/8802, 221097, p. 83). 
This perspective was very different from the British one where market mechanisms 
were seen as giving people the opportunities to generate wealth for their own good. 
This is then an example where the constructivist method is able to not only carve out 
differential definitions of the economic subject and of the market, but also where it 
hints at the political aspects of such varieties. Indeed, on a mere theoretically level 
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each of these sets of conceptions excludes the other (aspect 1), but also lead to 
differences in distributional outcomes at the macro-economic level (aspect 4). 
 
In terms of naïve theories though, this is not to say that German state policies did not 
promoted certain patterns of behaviour. I have argued beforehand that families were 
supposed to save in higher quantities. Policies actively supported them in such 
pursuits, also in the form of the EHZ that hence was itself a financial policy. 
The „Eigenheimzulage”-law is a steering norm. Especially young families 
with children should be motivated to create home ownership. The EHZ should 
appease the financial burdens that are linked to the construction or the 
acquisition of a dwelling. (498/95, 110895, p. 3) 
By directly helping potential home owners in their saving efforts, the German policy-
makers reflected a strong connotation between ownership, certain forms of life and 
the financial practice of saving. However, they also limited this naïve theory to 
families, or married individuals that were thinking of creating their own family. As 
such, the financial resources were surely allocated for housing purposes. The 
coordinative discourse was explicit in its social component. At the same time, once 
again the focus on the materiality of the dwelling was apparent as well, matching the 
way in which housing was linked to the construction industry (13/6318, 211196). 
Again, social and material aspects were overpowering immediate interests of the 
individual per se, financial or other. In other words, even though the individual was to 
be helped, this was only a particular individual and one that chosen according to its 
social and marital status, not for its personal achievements in terms of labour for 
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instance. In this sense, the fact of creating a family was seen as a personal 
achievement indeed. 
 
The chapter then argues that the naïve theories in relation to the financial behaviour 
carried weight that went beyond the economic sphere and impacted upon the social 
organisation of society. More specifically, it claims that high entry barriers into the 
ownership market and relatively conservative mortgage conditions were acting as a 
reinforcing the moral standards according to which state policy was categorising 
individuals to be worthy of support (Luo 2010; Helbrecht and Geilenkeuser 2012). 
Indeed, a mortgage was calculated in a way as to figure in potential downward 
fluctuations in the price of housing property (Demary et al. 2009, 109). In other 
words, keeping ownership hard to achieve then provided more leverage to the 
discourse of aid enacted through housing policies. Just as in the British case where 
state interventions into the market were justified as helping the latter to perform in the 
interest of the individual, the German rationale for state intervention influenced upon 
the distribution of home ownership by helping only some individuals into this tenure, 
and not others. In general, the focus on macro-economic issues (13/5960, 051196) and 
on outputs was taken as a justification for the social categorisations in relation to the 
collectively (14/1198, 210699, p. 3). Such a policy approach also fed into a limited 
understanding of free and active agency at the individual level (Hecken 2010, 120), at 
the same time that it made explicit links between the sphere of mortgage and housing 
markets. In sociological terminology, the EHZ must be investigated as not merely 
having the manifest function of closing the affordability gap, but also of covering the 
latent function of reproducing a particular social order (Merton 1957, 68).  
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This perspective was extended when state policies were protecting the financial 
wealth of families that wanted to enter ownership from interest rate volatility (13/159, 
301294, p. 172). As such, public funds were used to decouple individuals from the 
market, whereas the British discourse had hailed the market and active and well-
informed agency as a matter to achieve its social ends. In Germany, market processes 
were then kept away from the wider functions that ownership was supposed to fulfil. 
In this sense, the state policies were protecting the individual from market processes 
by minimising the agential qualities that it was inferring into potential home owners. 
This matches with the earlier comments on how markets necessarily come with 
political tensions. Against efforts to make individuals fit for the market, as observed 
in the British case, German agents were presented with a conception that when it 
comes to housing, the sole pursuing of private interests was not in line with wider 
societal ends that German policy-makers had in mind (Beckert 2002). As such, the 
kind of axio-rationality offered was one that placed the individual financial desires in 
opposition with society, not in line with it as in the UK. 
 
As demonstrated by the constructivist approach operationalised here, the framing of 
economic issues that relate to the financial side of housing policy was exemplary in 
this regard. Instead of expressing financial issues in terms of problems that are 
directly related to the everyday life of the individual, they were regarded as variants 
of macro-economic concerns. In general, parliamentary discussions were reporting 
conceptions of economic man in relation to wider macro-economic resultants, 
underlining the output-driven features of the German individual-state relationship 
(Leung 2004). The strong focus on the creation of „housing space‟ (498/95, 110895, 
p. 2) instead of on the financial constraints that households were facing in realising 
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their own preferences was just one instance. In a discussion about the „taxation 
aspects of the promotion of building of housing‟, the main issues that were raised 
related to the building industry and the type of houses built (13/3446, p. 3), as well as 
to the specific period in the economic cycle (13/3446, p. 10). These represent 
examples of how the initial micro-focus was set aside for a framing of financial issues 
through a top-down lens. As such, a question about financial elements linked to the 
insurance industry was answered with a short “no” (13/3446, 090196, p. 13). It was 
almost as if individual concerns of housing credit availability were irrelevant when 
they were not connected to more general points on the agenda (de Bandt et al. 2010, 
213)  
 
At other times, the top-down approach of the German policy-makers inhibited a 
micro-focus. Instead they were more interested in managing the overall housing 
situation by making sure the different sectors, among them the ownership domain, 
were functioning properly as such (13/4533, 070596, p. 7) than in the exact results 
this implied for the individual and his/her financial situation. Indeed, as the question 
of the public deficit was growing with time, individual concerns were even more 
marginalised (13/7710, 160597, p. 5). At best, financial concerns of individuals were 
seen as an add-on that had to be dealt with as a last point, but not as central to the 
policy design (13/8802, 220197, p. 3). As regards the enhanced savings objective of 
families for instance, it was related to macro-economic stability and as a way to 
protect the economy against crises (273/95, 090595, p. 14). Progressively then, state 
finances became to dominate private concerns, especially as statistics of shrinking 
demographics pointed towards the inadequacy of a costly home ownership policy 
(13/8802, 221097, p. 17; HC 14/9344: 110602; 14/242, 130602, p. 24280). As regards 
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the individual-state relationship, it was not legitimated through a desire of members of 
parliament to maximise the wealth of the individual agent, but to ensure the efficient 
workings of the economic socio-economic system in its totality. As such, the making 
of the individual was only rarely mentioned in policy debates. 
 
At the same time, it was argued (by the PDS) that a reduction of income limits of the 
EHZ, 
 would not entail any accommodation or owned house to be built less (…). To 
the very contrary, an increase in the children component (…) would benefit 
the building industry that is in crisis at the moment. (13/10295, 010498, p. 3) 
Again then, discussion points that had no link with the wealth of the individual took 
over in relation to the savings incentives in the first place. Instead of discussing the 
ways in which concrete households could be helped, macro-economic topics de-
legitimated further attention upon the individual (14/1835, 211099, p.3). 
 
Even if a theme was opened in a micro-light, it still ended up as being framed in terms 
of a macro problem, as the following quotes show. 
The citizens in the East mostly want  -  just as the citizens in the West - to live 
in their own four walls. Here exists a considerable catch-up potential before 
the average Western ratio will be attained. (14/6055, 160501, p. 2) 
Since some time do we have an individualised and very differentiated society 
that produces very different forms of accommodation and living. We need to 
adjust politics to that. (F. Eichstaedt-Bohlig, 130602, p. 24284) 
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Even though individual concerns came up at times, they were very much regarded 
from an analytical perspective in order to manage them in collective terms (14/8966, 
290402). In such a context of taken-for-granted conceptions of housing, parliamentary 
debates did not put forward an exact definition of the individual. But by failing to 
address such issues, they highlight how economic agency was not a concern to be 
included into the policy-design. Policy-makers did not consider the matter as being 
crucial in the way the German economic system was performing, something that was 
very different in the UK. 
 
To come back to the affordability issue, it was framed in such a way as to depict 
economic agency in a passive light, one that did not attribute primacy to the 
individual itself but that left space for externally imposed categorisations (15/459, 
280103, p. 6; Bachofner 2008, 72). This relates back to the ways in which state 
policies facilitate certain understandings, or how they (temporarily) close off the 
indeterminate features mind in humans. As such, the German coordinative discourse 
promoted a subjectivity according to which it was not the individual him/herself that 
decided how to best play market volatility, but it were state initiatives that minimised 
the latter through a classification that depleted the ownership market from 
considerable price fluctuations in the first place (Kim and Renaud 2009). It is here 
where individual naïve theories and market outcomes come together. As housing was 
regarded as a right, not so much the right to ownership, and as policy-makers 
understood the state as an institution providing adequate accommodation to the 
population, there was no drive to inflate the number of market ownership market 
participants. Once housing was framed in terms of supplying the service of shelter 
and not of financial investment (13/2357, 200995, p. 4), the very notion of the 
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democratisation of ownership was not applicable to such a set of naïve theories as it 
was in the UK. At the same time, the moral connotations of such a discourse not only 
restricted the choice of financial products and of tenure for the population, but also 
limited the level of agential capacity desired (Demary et al. 2009, viii; Berry 2010, 
140). Contrary to what has been observed in the British case, German housing 
policies had a very limited discourse on individual choice and responsibility.  
 
The differentials in the making of economic agency were possibly the main difference 
between the cases analysed in this thesis, and it relates back not only to the theoretical 
chapters but also to the literature review. It has been argued that current accounts of 
capitalist diversity tend to present the notion of the state as universal, the exact 
definition of what such a state is supposed to be not being fully considered. That is 
why the notion of individual-state is so central to the thesis. It allows the scholar to 
draw out differential relationships between the ideal-typical individual and the state, 
in form and content. This method has shown how differently the British and German 
rationale for state intervention positioned the role of policy-making and of the market 
in relation to the members of the respective economic orders. 
 
These differences in the treatment of the individual as an economic agent are political 
in the sense that they present two options of how to make sense of economic 
mechanisms according to diverse sets of naïve theories. They both offer coherent 
explanations but are still very different in the way of how they close the 
indeterminacy of the mind, hence one excluding the other of the domain of the 
possible (aspect 1). At the same time, the notion of the political then also relates to the 
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ways in which life styles are depicted in moral terms (aspect 2) and how they are 
functional in the distribution of state aid between certain individuals or groups as in 
the German case (aspect 4). Indeed, the strong focus on social positions instead of a 
more close analysis of individual criteria makes German housing policy vulnerable to 
claims that it is acting counter to liberal ideals of individual social progress by 
imposing the requirements of social reproduction above individual opportunities for 
all.  
4 The Non-Financial Conditions of Housing Markets 
The German understanding of the individual-state relationship and of economic 
agency subsequently was consistent with the steering analogy, where state policies 
help individuals in a way that furthered the macro-economic ends that policy-makers 
had decided would best serve the overall interests of its population (Mayntz and 
Scharpf 1995). As this section describes in more detail, the cancellation of the EHZ 
was the result of changes in the economic priorities of state intervention (620/04, 
130804, p.2). Before that however, the example of the “energy identification pass” 
(„Energieausweis‟) is especially interesting in regard to the British information policy 
on housing transfers (HIPs). It demonstrates again how very similar policies can be 
framed in very different ways, depending on the concrete individual-state 
relationship, and how financial aspects were secondary in the German context. 
 
The German policy-making motive for enacting a way to certify the energetic features 
of buildings had nothing to do with market procedures that were deemed inefficient, 
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but was related to the signing of the Kyoto protocol (15/4506, 141204, p. 1, also 
14/4075, 120900; Weglage 2010). In line with European Union legislation, the 
parliament argued that it was necessary to invest into building innovations in order to 
minimise the emission of greenhouse gases (p. 2). Just as in the UK, a version of the 
energy certification pass had been tested before it was introduced, but the aim was to 
make sure the method to measure the energy needs was adequate. As such, the pass 
was a technical tool to ameliorate building quality, unrelated to the ways in which 
individuals enter ownership. In the end, the pass was meant “not only to cover a 
European guideline, but to achieve significant progress” (15/5849, 290605, p. 4), 
progress in environmental terms, not in how well-off individuals would be. This 
example highlights again how different individual-state relationships translated into 
different conceptions not only of how markets were supposed to work, but also of 
what public policies were meant to deliver for the individual. Whereas the policy was 
framed in individual terms in the UK, in Germany it was made sense of in relation to 
wider societal objectives. At the same time, this exposition also displays how the 
German economic agent was not approached as an active decision-maker in relation 
to its assets (Barasinska et al. 2012). Instead German action followed a rationale 
where outcomes were best served through a process of state management itself (15/8, 
071102, p. 423) in line with the notion of output legitimacy. 
 
A macro-economic focus went hand in hand with the motive of individual prudence 
(Watson 2008b), embedded into a discourse that suggested that financial aspects of 
the housing market involved socio-economic elements that were too important for 
society to be only handled though individuals operating in a market context.  As such, 
strong attention on savings was instrumental in keeping loan-to-value ratios 
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comparatively low (Bachofner 2008, 143). At the same time, the way that properties 
were evaluated according to German law was conservative, making sure that even if 
the market value drops the individuals is still able to replay the mortgage (Münchau 
2008, 81; see also Zysman 1983;  Pollin 1995). Contrary to the British case, 
precautionary mechanisms were built into market processes to protect the subject if 
he/she had misjudged future price evolutions (Demary et al. 2009, 116). As such, they 
did not assume individual economic sovereignity. There were thus subjective and 
structural factors that reinforced the conceptions that saving was the most appropriate 
way to enter home ownership. Whereas in the British case, consumers had to be 
protected from particular market actors, the German mortgager has to be protected 
from the market per se. 
 
But even though financial issues were discussed, the conditions for a functioning 
housing market were not seen in its financial underpinnings, but with its 
embeddedness into the overall economy (Chiuri and  Jappelli 2003).  In a very 
different way from the UK, the demand and supply of housing, and of home 
ownership, was not regarded to be a matter of individual choice in the final instance, 
but of state policies that had few links to private financial issues (13/2653, 111095, p. 
2). As such, a “foresighted approach to housing and city policies” (14/6048, 150501, 
p.1) was more important than the ways in which individuals would play their role in 
realising them. Instead of giving priority to individual preferences that translated into 
free-floating market prices, statistical figures were predicted about which housing 
needs Germany would face in the coming years (14/6048, 150501, p.2; Desrosières 
1998, 179). As home ownership fell into the logic of housing as a public good, the 
starting point was the general state of accommodation, not the individual (Kemeny 
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1995, 11). Financial concerns were of relatively minor importance as the link between 
finance and individual choices was not one that mattered in a context where the 
rationale for state intervention entailed a classification individuals into groups for 
their most appropriate tenure. 
 
What came to the forefront in terms of the assumptions of ownership was an 
understanding that was much closer connected to the materiality of the buildings than 
with finance. This was best illustrated with the “building culture!” programme 
elaborated from 2000 onwards (Baukultur!, 2005). What is relevant for this chapter is 
that in this “initiative architecture and building culture”, the individual focus did shine 
through much stronger than in the case of the financial behavioural patterns, at least 
apparently. Building culture was seen as an “entitlement” or “standard of society” 
(„Anspruch‟), as a requirement not only for the working of the housing market, but 
more generally for the reproduction of the societal order. However, such a 
requirement could only be achieved once a certain cultural awareness about building 
methods was present (14/8966, 290402, p. 2). Such an awareness of quality (14/8966, 
290402, p. 2) related to potential homebuilders but also the professions involved in 
the process like architects and city planners (14/8966, 290402, p. 3). The report also 
recommended that questions about the built environment be included as a module into 
the educational system and that teachers would be qualified in these domains 
(14/8966, 290402, p. 3 and 5; Baukultur!, 2005, p. 134). In general, 
fundamental are the consolidation and diffusion of the quality awareness and of 
questions relating to the utilisation of quality-oriented techniques (14/8966, 
290402, p. 4) 
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as they directly influenced upon the quality of life of the individual (13/7841, 050697, 
p. 2; 14/8966, 290402, p. 4; Baukultur! p. 6). But even though it looked like 
individual interests were at the forefront, and that the discourse was also mentioning 
everyday concerns of the individual (p. 6), it was also clear that such a focus was not 
the endpoint of the initiative. 
 
Indeed, the notion of culture was to be understood as a collective form of awareness, 
not only one that was limited to the individual as a single being. 
Building culture is not simply a private matter or a personal concern of the 
respective agents, but a distinctly public matter! (…) The enemies of building 
culture are disinterest, and particularistic thinking and acting that only refer to 
the own means” (Baukultur!, p. 7)  
This quote exemplifies how outspoken the German policy-makers were in putting 
societal interests above those of individuals. At the same time, it also demonstrates a 
certain reticence against personal accumulation of wealth for the sake of it (Hecken 
2010). For political goals to be achieved, relying upon free individuals in a market-
context was not an option as it was in the British case. The logic was that once the 
overall society was in order, all individuals therein where satisfied. The rationale for 
state intervention then did not run from the micro to the macro level, but vice versa.  
 
Private financial aspects then had only a little role to play as they put forward a 
flawed causal relationship between levels of analysis. The same applied to financial 
arguments. 
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Are there possibilities of resistance [to the building culture]? Does the 
argument of saving needs protect, or the statement that one can discuss about 
taste? No: culture is least of all a question of money, it is always a question of 
priorities. (Baukultur!, p. 7) 
Individual finances were not essential in the strategy to help certain individuals as the 
logic was social and not bases on financial criteria in the first place. Unlike in the 
British case, the mechanisms that were supposed to make the policy succeed were not 
linked to the monetary capacity of households. As the strong and equilibrated renting 
market providing good quality housing (Kemp and Kofner 2010), home ownership 
was only a more privileged form of tenure that additionally allowed for wealth 
accumulation (Tedeger and Helbrecht 2007; Elsinga et al. 2012). As state policies 
managed the supply and demand of owned houses to a certain extent, and as naïve 
theories were promoting a passive form of economic agency, this also meant that 
public policy took into account the financial requirements that different groups 
encountered. As such, once individuals accepted the social justifications for various 
tenure groups through arguments about the general good of society, individuals as 
such were taken out of the formula that determined policy success (Lepsius 1979). 
Again, this matched with the indirect individual-state relationship as far as 
legitimation went.  
 
Another instance where private financial issues were seen to be secondary was in the 
coordinative discourse in relation to the cancellations of the EHZ. Again, what is 
central to the thesis is the framing of the reasons for why the policy was to be 
stopped.  
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(…) as regards the law of the EHZ. Two aims have been pursued since 1995 
with this law: first a considerable activation of the creation of home 
ownership. That has been a success. (...) The second point was a socio-
political objective, the promotion of families with children. This has also been 
enacted to a high degree. (W. Spanier, SPD, 15/8, 071102 p. 432) 
Contrary to the British case where individual expectations (Seabrooke 2010) of 
financial accumulation could never reach an end point, the German policy was 
considered to be overdue because it had achieved the set aims. Even though such a 
statement in terms of policy success was debatable according to the arguments 
presented in the previous chapter, this was the way the German discourse framed the 
desire to end the EHZ. Such an end point was only able to be reached as the decision 
of terminating the policy was not framed as a policy tool to enrich everyday people 
but as a tool for the state to accommodate various social objectives. 
 
Indeed, this kind of framing demonstrated how the legitimation process was focussed 
on outcome and macro-economic perspectives. First, justifying the termination of a 
policy that affected a large amount of individuals in terms of what it had done reflects 
a strong belief in the rightfulness of policy-making in outcome terms (15/1731, 
151003, p.1). In other words, policy-makers were complimenting themselves for how 
successful they had been in designing and implementing the programme, actually 
something also seen in the British case. It was not about opening up financial 
opportunities for individuals, but about the state apparatus having redistributed 
resources towards a specific social group. Second, such a legitimation technique 
underlined the indirect individual-state relationship and reinforced the understanding 
of the state policies as delivering results that benefited those members of society that 
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deserved them according to their social positioning, not according to their capacity as 
an economic agent (14/8297, 200202, p. 2). In this sense, these understandings 
sustained the naïve theory of the individual as a recipient of public support that 
directly enhanced his/her situation, when deemed socially appropriate. Again, market 
mechanisms were absent from such a logic. Also, because the discourse was framed 
in macro-economic themes, an active role of the individual was denied. 
 
In relation to the financial situations of households, such a justification could 
potentially be read as deeply unfair, hence political, when the British definition of the 
individual was adopted. This is where the distributional aspects of the political come 
in (aspects 2 and 4). For instance, why was it fair to support one generation of 
families more strongly than the next? As the rationale to allocate resources to certain 
households was based upon macro-economic considerations, such questions were not 
to be answered (Pfeiffer 2002). Personal interests were secondary, even running 
counter to the overall policy-making rationale. Again then, this demonstrated that 
through a prioritisation of the collective above the individual, financial concerns were 
not put onto the policy agenda in the same way that they were in the British context. 
Ultimately then, differences in economic taken-for-granted conceptions related back 
to various ways of how to define fairness and unfairness. As state intervention 
presented a rationale that evaluated fairness in terms of social groups, the fading out 
of a policy was not challenged upon individual terms. 
 
This then also relates to the way that German policy-makers interpreted the concept of 
financial affordability. It was linked to differentials between social groups, not within 
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a group over time. Indeed, one argument against the EHZ was that it distributed an 
excessive amount to individuals that had no children at their charge (B. Hendricks, 
SPD : HC Bundesrat, 14/03/03, p. 50). Implied was that such an allocation was unfair 
and even inefficient. Claims about individual wealth were thus used against the 
policy. One could imagine that the counterargument to keep the EHZ in action had 
pointed against such a strict categorisation, but instead it did focus onto structural 
factors in the housing market (15/3714, 210904). As such, macro-economic figures 
were mobilised to sustain the logic of social differentiation imposed by coordinative 
discourse whereas claims about individuals more directly were again used to present 
the policy in a negative light (612/03, 280803). It is noticeable that while the topic of 
individual saving requirements was not mentioned in this debate, the way in which a 
cut in the EHZ was contributing to a reduced public budget was (612/03, 280803, p. 
5). Again, state policies had set out priorities with little regard to the actual financial 
situation of its individual citizens. 
 
Before coming to the conclusion, I shortly outline the political features of the findings 
here. I refer back to the four aspects of politics in Comparative Capitalism that have 
been outlined through a constructivist point of departure. First, ontologically the naïve 
theories about markets and economic agency that were forwarded in the coordinative 
discourse show that German households were not supposed to want home ownership 
at all costs, that only families with children were supposed to really own their own 
house, not on purely financial grounds, but for social reasons that related to the 
reproduction of the German social order. Such a categorisation, in terms of tenure and 
savings behaviour, was itself political as it rejected the principle of ownership 
democratisation (aspect 1). Indeed, it implicitly refused to justify larger state support 
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to all members of society. These conceptions, facilitated through coordinative 
discourse and actual programmes, were functional to the way the individual-state 
relationship as well as the legitimation regime of policies was operating. The notion 
of micro-macro complementarities comes back in again here. Second, this then lead to 
distributional differences of the moral value of married couples and families against 
non-married people or even households. In other words, the second aspect of the 
political is concerned with the normative implications in terms of the distribution of 
moral legitimacy. 
 
Third, the German tradition of the welfare state entailed a focus onto macro-economic 
issues. The historical context of the provision of housing after World War II is 
indicative here (Kirchner 2006, 97). At the same time, such taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the role of financial aspects of housing (aspect 3) entailed policy 
tools that were focussed on the socio-economic management of the German society 
more than on the making of individual axio-rationality per se. Again then, 
conceptions about good governance were disallowing state policies to depict an active 
kind of economic rationality as was the case in the UK. Fourth, such focal points lead 
to a sidelining of financial aspects of households in the accession of the home 
ownership market and finally to the allocation of funds away from family households 
into companies that cater for the building of infrastructure (aspect 4). As with the 
hypothesis that both the German home ownership and the mortgage market would 
present similar rationales in terms of the legitimation of the naïve theories facilitated, 
this chapter has affirmed the hypothesis, but also how the financial aspects of housing 
were embedded into the legislative design of the EHZ and other policy initiatives.  
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5 Conclusion 
After the chapter on the German housing market policies more narrowly, this 
contribution has shed light onto the financial aspects of those programmes. It has 
started from a discussion about the concept and conceptualisation of affordability 
where it was highlighted how such a notion acquired a different understanding in a 
context of an indirect individual-state relationship. As the home ownership market 
was first not seen as a space where individuals would optimise their decisions 
according to their preferences and financial constraints, and second not as a 
mechanism that, through individual economic agency, would lead to socially accepted 
aims, the concept did not assume a universal right to an owned house. Instead the 
strong social associations between ownership and families with children limited the 
group that was morally fully entitled to state support. At the same time, the logic was 
not one of wealth accumulation but one where families deserved their owned house 
for its spatial qualities and the opportunity it gave them to transfer wealth to the next 
generation, hence issues linked to wider societal concerns. 
 
But this also meant that the individual was not addressed in terms of an active 
economic agent who teases out the best opportunities to maximise his/her assets 
through market processes. As the market was not regarded as an appropriate 
mechanism to allocate state aid in regard to home ownership, the rationale of support 
was direct, in the sense that only state policies decided who was entitled to it and then 
delivered it. Also, the financial help was meant to directly impact upon the financial 
possibilities of the household, not only to open ways that then still need exploration. 
As such the German state was perceived neither as a market-enabler, nor a market-
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optimiser, but adopted a much more reticent approach to the way in which market 
mechanisms ought to be connected to housing (512/98, 280598). The reason for such 
a conception was policy-makers tried to keep housing away from openly political 
debates though ensuring adequate levels of supply of various tenures. At the same 
time, this chapter also mentioned that such a discourse did not effectively eliminate 
political issues with the financial aspects of housing policies.  
 
Indeed, the very way in which financial issues that did relate to the everyday life of 
individuals were taken on by policies in macro-economic terms was indicative first of 
the fact that the German rationale for state intervention, just as the British one, did 
facilitate certain sets of the naïve theories in relation to economic agency. Second, as 
the latter were a particular way in which to try to temporarily fix the indeterminacy of 
the human mind, they acted in a political fashion. Even though the selection of 
conceptions to promote was not a rational decision, it still carried political weight as it 
excluded others. Third, the distinct sets of naïve theories that explained how the state 
functions as an institution in relation to the individual and vice versa were attributing 
differential conceptions of financial management to different social groups. Whereas 
there was a strong focus on saving for potential home owners, that was not the case 
for renters. Combined with the association between ownership and families, German 
housing policy depicted certain individuals in a stronger need for savings than others. 
In general, the categorisation of individuals according to social status was political as 
it imposed certain lifestyles over others. 
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To conclude, it is necessary to take a step back and contextualise the empirical 
analyses offered here not only with the theoretical framework set out in earlier 
chapters, but also to the gap that was identified in the literature. The critique had 
underlined in which sense the concept of the political was integrated into current 
debates on varieties of capitalist regimes that left space for complementary depictions 
of the political. Indeed, I have argued that the scholars tend to utilise a universal and 
hence context-independent notion of the state, and that more critically they turn a 
blind eye to the concrete relationship between the ideal-typical individual and the 
state as a polity. In that regard, the last four chapters, all in their specific ways, have 
first demonstrated how such a focus first be operationalised in case studies, and 
second what additional insights it might bring out when debating models of socio-
economic organisation. It has been shown how such an approach that picks out the 
conceptions of the individual as a more or less active economic agent and of the 
market can add an additional layer of the political. The cases selected here form the 
empirical basis to the constructivist contribution to the current debates on varieties of 
capitalism. 
 
Indeed, the empirical parts of the thesis have displayed the similarities and differences 
between parts of the British and German housing and mortgage markets. Even though 
it is unable to make claims about the overall state of these economic regimes because 
of its level of depth, the investigations make key claims in relation to an overlooked 
theme in that literature: the differential making of the economic agent through state 
intervention onto naïve theories. What is essential to highlight is how the combination 
between the elaboration of a theoretical framework and the systematic 
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operationalisation of the latter to selected cases has enabled the thesis to address the 
gaps in the VoC literature that have been identified beforehand. 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
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1 Introduction 
The thesis has made a multitude of arguments, theoretical and empirical. This final 
chapter does not add additional content to the claims made in the preceding chapters, 
it is much more meant to draw the links between the various aspects of my arguments 
and hence to present the internal consistency of the contribution to knowledge. At the 
same time, this space is also an opportunity to set out the topics of investigation that 
could follow from the investigation here, as well as presenting reflections about the 
limits of my current research. As such, this concluding chapter comes in four parts. I 
first offer a summary of the central steps that the argument has taken in order to make 
a particular contribution to the literature. I then provide an overview of the main 
findings from the case studies and explain how they relate to the questions the thesis 
addresses. Finally, adding reflections of the concepts operationalised in the thesis, I 
set out future research directions that build on from the theoretical and empirical 
analysis provided here. 
2 The Argument in Short 
The main contribution of the thesis is to set out an ontological and methodological 
framework that is able to highlight elements of the political in the literature on 
comparative capitalisms that have so far not been fully integrated (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Hancké et al. 2007). As such, the chapters need to be read as efforts to 
showcase why and how the analysis presented is able to carve out additional features 
of the political in relation to the study of various national capitalist regimes that relate 
not only to their distributional aspects but also to their constitutive elements (Clift 
 
 
317 
 
2012). In relation to such an objective, the approach put forward is constructivist, 
building on various accounts in social psychology (Heider 1958), social theory 
(Berger and Luckman 1966) and constructivist institutionalism (Schmidt 2005). 
However before such knowledge is referred back to, the central issue of the literature 
was explained. 
 
Under the general concern with the depiction of aspects of the political domain, the 
critique of the Varieties of Capitalism literature (VoC) framework (Hall and Soskice 
2001) has focussed on the way that such contributions tend to offer an account of 
capitalist diversity in terms of the various ways in which firms cooperate with other 
actors in order to produce goods or services that are then sold on international markets 
(chapter two). The level of analysis then starts from the company and is interested in 
how a particular set of external structures influences firm structure as well as the 
relations it engages in with providers, the labour market and financial actors (Hancké 
2010). From there, the theory presents an explanation of institutional advantage in the 
global economic order (Hall and Gingerich 2004). The level of analysis engaged with 
is hence between the national and international spheres of activity. As such, these 
insights highlight the political aspects in the international distribution of firm 
specialisations, but they tend not to further investigate the political aspects of 
capitalist variety per se (Pontusson 2005). 
 
I claim that such an analysis breaks with the focus on the firm and the attention of 
how firms react to external sets of incentives set by institutional structures. At the 
same time, such a perspective depicts national economies not only as production 
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systems, but enables concerns with the consumption side of the economy and the 
economic subject as a particular form of individual
17
 (Bröckling 2007). However, a 
study of earlier contributions to this field of investigations, even though not called 
VoC (Porter 1990; Albert 1993), underlines that there are ways to link the productive 
regime more genuinely with national actors outside the limited production sphere, like 
the state or social activists (Coates 2000). But again, such analyses have not so much 
focussed on the interaction between the definition of the individual and the wider 
system as they are interested in the specific features of production of national 
regimes. In short, I argue that the wider VoC contributions constitute a literature that 
is not well-equipped to dig deeper into the constitutive political aspects of capitalist 
diversity at the national level. 
 
The comparative capitalism literature offers a potentially more adequate body of 
studies as it tends to focus on the national level and the distributional issues within 
economic settings (Martin 2005). As such it could offer a way into additional political 
features of economic models. However, as Schmidt herself mentions, there is a 
perceived need with such contributions to engage in efforts concentrating on „bringing 
the state back in‟ (Schmidt 2009b). As such, this body offers more leverage for an 
analysis of the political features of national varieties of capitalist socio-economic 
organisation as it is interested in the quintessential political actors, the state. Indeed, 
through a perspective that looks into the mode of governance that various economies 
experience, such a mode of study brings out the distributional implications of 
                                                        
17
 I use the notion of „the individual‟ not as referring to one specific physical person, but to 
one particular kind of economic agent that is depicted through state policies. As such, such an 
individual constitutes an ideational and abstracted concept (von Glasersfeld 1997, 154), not a 
material one. It is a model held up as the ideal kind of economic agent. As such, the thesis is 
not interested in the agential capacities of the concrete people.  
 
 
319 
 
institutional differences in terms of power and economic outcomes (Goyer 2006). In 
this regard, the literature offers a contribution in the direction that the thesis is also 
interested in. By bringing out the interaction between various societal actors that goes 
beyond the firm, such contributions present observation to build on from in a thesis 
that points to the political characteristics of capitalist varieties (Mayntz and Scharpf 
2005). 
 
However, I claim that the move to bring back the state often leads to implication that 
the state is a universal concept that can be assumed as such. The way that the notion is 
operationalised certainly offers variations in the activities that states engage in 
according to various national contexts (Clift 2007), but it does not tend to allow for 
the state itself to be defined in a variety of ways in relation to the ideal-typical 
individual. Phrased differently, whereas state output is allowed to vary, the 
constitutive nature of the state is supposed to be universal (Jackson and Deeg 2008a). 
As such, the focus in terms of the political is again on the distributional consequences 
of „who gets what when and how‟ (Lasswell 1936). However, I claim that the very 
definition of the state, as an institution and as a body of policies, is context-dependent 
and thus should be allowed to vary according to national environments. As such, I 
argue, the state should not be taken as a meta-theoretical notion that is given, but as a 
concept that is constructed in particular national contexts (Dyson 1980), and that it 
ought to be allowed to take on a variety of meanings (Abdelal 2010). Here it becomes 
obvious how a constructivist account is able to offer the theoretical toolkit to provide 
a more flexible notion of the state, taking into account the context-dependent features 
of both the definition of the state and of the economic subject. At the same time, that 
means that the nature of such a state is political in the sense that its definition is not a 
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natural product, or meta-theoretical, but a social process in the making (Desrosières 
1998). 
 
Extending such a perspective, I claim that a constructivist account of varieties of 
capitalism is able to go beyond the distributional aspects of the political in this field of 
studies. Indeed, what is set forth is not only that the nature of states are context-
dependent, but even more importantly that the human mind, that the economic subject 
itself is open to a multiplicity of definitions. The notion of the indeterminate mind is 
central here (Vico 1744, 75; chapter three), not only as it firmly sets the analysis into 
constructivist territory, but also because it then allows the individual-state relationship 
to come to the forefront. Indeed, when the human subject, as an individual per se and 
in the ideal-typical form, is taken as a subject in the making whose definition is open 
to a variety of interpretations, then such variety itself becomes political (Butler 2000, 
12; Bourdieu 2005). It is the starting point into setting out the political aspects of the 
definition of what/who the individual as an economic subject is, according to which 
schemes of interpretation he/she makes sense of the lived environment. Whatever the 
set of naïve theories (or everyday ways of making sense of economic phenomena; 
Heider 1958) adopted, such a choice is political as it involves marginalising 
alternative ways to make sense of economic phenomena (Laclau 1990; Soeffner 
2004). As such, such sets of naïve theories are political in terms of ontology, by their 
very existence (aspect 1 as explained in chapter four). At the same time they are 
political in distributional terms as they depict certain behaviour as more appropriate 
than others. They hence distribute moral value between different sets of economic 
behaviour (aspect 2). Such an approach then also allows one to study the making of 
 
 
321 
 
the economic subject as a consumer, in opposition to the productionist focus of VoC 
(Campbell 2005, 7: Hancké et al. 2007). 
 
But if the human mind is indeterminate, then the state, in whatever form it might 
come as an institution and as a set of policies, inevitably influences such schemes of 
interpretation (chapter four). Following on from the constructivist institutionalist 
literature (Schmidt 2005: Hay 2006), I combine the variety of states (in form and 
output) with the variability of the human mind. There are thus two levels on which the 
constructivist approach comes in. On the one hand certain state policies, following a 
more or less coherent legitimation rationale of why which kind of state interventions 
is necessary for which members of society inevitably engages in the normalisation of 
particular sets of naïve theories over others. On the other hand, the very definition of 
the state through certain taken-for-granted assumptions held by policy-makers 
impacts on the way that the rationale for state intervention is framed and legitimated. 
Again then, and falling back onto notions from the constructivist institutionalist 
literature, the state polity (Schmidt 2008a) itself is again political as it side-lines other 
ways of making sense of what a state is supposed to be (literature on the sociology of 
policy instruments; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007; aspect 3). It is here where the link 
back to the depiction of the state in the comparative capitalisms literature can be 
made. Indeed, the framework here does allow for variability in the conceptions of 
what the state is, taking into account the wider socio-economic context of meaning. 
Additionally, such specific policies themselves are political as they favour some 
groups in society more than others (aspect 4). This element of the distributional 
elements of the political is already part of the literature as it represents the 
Lasswellian definition of the political. 
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Methodologically then, what is essential is the individual-state relationship. It is from 
this interaction that the questions of how a particular type of economic subjectivity is 
reproduced through the depiction of a certain set of naïve theories. At the same time, 
the exact ways in which policies are legitimated is crucial, exactly because it is here 
where the construction of the meanings of „good‟ and „bad‟ behaviour in relation to 
economic phenomena is located. Through the very policy-making process, policy-
makers infer normative meanings into the programmes. This occurs in the 
coordinative discourse (Schmidt 2005) where the reasons for a certain kind of state 
intervention are set out, and in the material features of the policy themselves. I have 
thus used parliamentary debates as the source of my data as they constitute the 
material the taken-for-granted assumptions can be extracted from, as well as the 
meaning that policies are then facilitating in relation to the definition of the ideal-
typical economic subject. As such, the theoretical chapters set out a framework that is 
able to shed light into additional aspects of the political in relation to the VoC and 
Comparative Capitalisms literatures, but also as far as the constructivist 
institutionalist body of studies goes. Indeed, the latter points towards the political 
features of coordinative discourse. 
3 The Findings in Short 
The thesis then goes on to present a series of chapters concerned with the political 
aspects of the making of a particular ideal-typical model of economic agent so as to 
operationalise the method suggested earlier. The cases selected are the British and 
German home ownership and mortgage markets. The rationale behind this choice first 
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relates to the differences in capitalist regimes that all three literatures (VoC, 
Comparative Capitalisms and Constructivist Institutionalism) have set out. Indeed, all 
of these bodies of knowledge positions the UK and Germany on the extreme ends of 
their classifications efforts, either in terms of Liberal vs. Coordinated Market 
Economy or as far as the simple vs. compound polity goes. The choice for these 
markets is informed by them being spaces where the individual subject acts in his/her 
role as a final consumer, either of housing or of financial products. As such, they are 
adequate for the application of the suggested method. At the same time, in both 
economies these markets are central to economic regime, even though in various 
ways, as fostering internal demand in the UK, and in terms of employment in 
Germany. As such, they constitute important aspects of the type of capitalism in both 
socio-economic orders. The reason for analysing both housing and mortgage markets 
lies with the centrality of the financial aspects when acquiring owned property. 
Additionally, the house price trajectories observed in these economies differ 
markedly, the UK having experienced a house price boom, whereas the German 
prices have been flat. In terms of the period under investigation, the start date was set 
to the year 1997 and the end date to 2007. This is the period that saw the massive 
increase in house prices in the UK. In relation to the framework this means that one 
particular state rationale for intervention can be found in this period, even though that 
is not to say that such a rationale for state intervention was always internally 
consistent. 
 
In terms of the main findings of the case studies, it is impossible here to go into all the 
details about how exactly the political aspects of policies was legitimated and how 
such efforts depicted some naïve theories as more adequate than others in making 
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sense of the home ownership market, of the state and of the economic agent. In this 
sense, I focus on those findings that directly relate to the central issues and questions 
of the thesis. In general the hypothesis that the same rationale can be found in both the 
housing and the mortgage market has been confirmed in both cases. This is the reason 
for why I am not distinguishing between these two markets here. 
 
As far as the ideal-typical individual goes, the British policies were depicting an 
active and responsible agent that was using the mortgage market to both play the 
housing market and accumulate wealth on the back of rising house prices. It was the 
responsibility of such an agent him/herself to make sure the economic opportunities 
that markets presented were taken. Rather differently, the German market participant 
was depicted as a person that avoids the uncertainty in markets and behaves according 
to his/her social position and the behavioural patterns that state policies assign to such 
a socio-economic group. Indeed, the typical home owner was supposed to be a 
household with a family, the owned house being legitimated in terms of offering a 
vehicle to ameliorate the living conditions of the family and to allow wealth transfer 
between generations. Whereas the British subject was seen in his/her own terms, the 
German individual was regarded as being part of a wider socio-economic group of 
married couples and children.  
 
As regards the depictions of the concept of the market, the British study found the 
market was seen by policy-makers as a space that, if the adequate conditions were 
offered through state policy, could lead to socially accepted macro-economic 
outcomes on the mere basis of free and active economic agency. As such, the market 
 
 
325 
 
was trusted to be a mechanism in itself was able to produce beneficial results for the 
vast majority of the population. Market volatility was hence welcome as a mechanism 
that was offering opportunities to the economic agent to maximise his/her wealth, and 
through this very process realise the potential for the macro-economy to work in the 
interest of its members. In relation to this, the way that German policy-makers 
understood the market as such was one of caution. Indeed, housing markets were seen 
to be too central to the German economic regime to be left to economic processes and 
individual agents alone. As the political implications of markets mechanisms were 
noticed, the state officials saw themselves as the managers of the economy that had to 
actively manage the market by enforcing rules of who was eligible to enter the home 
ownership market and wider macro-economic issues were to be accommodated in 
relation to such a market. 
 
Finally, and this comes back to the conceptions of states per se, the British policy-
makers were understanding the state as an actor that was helping people into the home 
ownership market (market-enabler), at the same time as making sure it was delivering 
not undermining the wealth already accumulated by market participants (market-
optimiser). Even these conceptions were not always easy to combine, the role of the 
state was seen as ensuring agents had the adequate level of knowledge to make 
market decisions, and as legislating against unfair behaviour from financial 
institutions. These perceptions are then in line with a direct individual-state 
relationship where the policies are meant to help the economic subject directly. In 
Germany meanwhile, the policy-makers were more careful in embracing market 
mechanisms as they perceive the role of the state as catering not so much for the 
individual per se, but for the good of the community. Among the many macro-
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economic domains that state policy had to address, the home ownership and the 
mortgage markets were only two among many. As such, state intervention had to 
balance priorities and ensure outcomes through the granting of public funds. The 
notion of the market was thus much less debated in the German parliament. 
 
To come back to why these accounts not only represent applications of the 
constructivist account of varieties of capitalism, but also highlight additional layers of 
the political within them, I relate these findings to the four aspects of the political as 
set out in chapters three and four. The mere comparative aspect of the method 
demonstrated the indeterminacy of the mind and the variety of naïve theories 
facilitated in both contexts. Whereas the same markets have been analysed, the exact 
way of how economic agency, the market itself and the state have been made sense of 
significantly differs. This is hence an indication that in different polities the same 
economic phenomena can be interpreted in different lights. This finding showcases 
how economic regimes more generally favour certain understandings over others, 
hence marginalising alternative ways to interpret economic phenomena (aspect 1). At 
the same time, it demonstrates how the state, as an institution or polity and as a set of 
policies with the same underlying rationale, can be made sense of, depending on the 
context. As such, this is a direct reply to the effort of the Comparative Capitalisms 
literature to bring the state back in, not so much for its sake, but because it is a social 
construct. At the same time, the analysis of parliamentary debates has shown how 
such a process of legitimation of particular readings of the economy also involves the 
distribution of moral value to some sorts of behaviour more than to others (aspect 2). 
For instance, whereas the individual agent was seen as active and profit-seeking in the 
UK, such a reading was warned against in the German context.  
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Simultaneously, the political character also relates to the way that particular taken-
for-granted conceptions of policy-makers in relation to what the economic agent, the 
market and the state were supposed to be. As the analysis of coordinative discourse 
has demonstrated, policy-makers both in the UK and Germany were defining and 
addressing policy in particular ways and thus showed how particular understanding 
limit the range of policy instruments theoretically available, in other words how those 
conceptions engaged in violence towards alternative policy approaches (aspect 3). As 
an example, whereas in the UK the issue with rising house prices was seen through 
the lens of an inefficient market, in Germany policy-makers were not that concerned 
with house prices as that was not part of the priority of policy. Finally then, the 
variety of policy interventions also had effects in terms of the distributions of costs 
and benefits in line with the depiction of moral value (aspect 4). Whereas those 
individuals that had jumped onto the housing ladder early on in the UK saw their 
equity go up, those that came into the home ownership market later on had to climb 
higher entry barriers and saw less appreciation of their housing assets. In the German 
case, the housing policies were benefiting those families that wanted to buy an own 
home at the time of the state aid, on the back of single individuals who got much less 
out of the programme. Also the German building industry must be seen as a winner in 
this context.   
 
Another notion that the thesis has introduced is the concept of „micro-macro 
complementarities‟, as an analogy to the „institutional complementarities‟ used in the 
VoC analysis (Hall and Soskice 2001, 17). What it relates to is the link between those 
sets of naïve theories observed and the economic mechanisms according to which a 
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market, or even economy, works. Indeed, it points to the interrelation between the 
micro- and macro-economic levels, as being interdependent. This is probably not 
surprising if the terms „micro‟ and „macro‟ are defined as heuristic tools and not as 
ontological categories. I introduce the concept to underline the ways that markets 
should not merely be analysed through a focus on institutions as VoC tends to do, but 
through a prism that allows the scholar to have a closer look at the ways the 
individual is integrated into broader economic evolutions. In both the British and 
German case, the developments of housing and of mortgage markets alike went hand-
in-hand with a particular legitimation discourse in parliament, the one influencing the 
other and vice versa. As such, the notion is helpful in highlighting the definition of 
economic agency as being embedded into a particular reading of economic 
phenomena. 
4 Further Intellectual Avenues 
In this section I would like to position the approach set out, the argument made and 
the findings discovered against other topics and fields of intellectual enquiry. This is 
done to depict the even larger socio-economic context than has been covered here. In 
a series of reflections, I subsequently focus on the connections between the thesis and 
concerns with the welfare state, the implications for the notion of market-making 
(Clift 2012) and the European level, the British and German growth model, Critical 
International Political Economy (Cox 1981), and Everyday International Political 
Economy (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007).  
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When talking about varieties of capitalism, Esping-Andersen´s contribution (1990) 
comes to mind, especially when the British and German cases are investigated. At the 
same time Crouch‟s notion of „Privatised Keynesianism‟ (2009) for the British case 
also links particular models of capitalism to forms of welfare state behaviour (also 
Young 2009). The thesis has not engaged with such studies more fully in an attempt 
to focus on the core arguments presented, but I acknowledge that the links between 
the micro-macro complementarities displayed throughout the empirical chapters can 
be linked to welfare state forms, especially as far as the housing market goes (Doling 
and Ronald 2010). Indeed, and this is also in line with Crouch‟s insights, home 
ownership presents a potential avenue for state officials (at least in the UK) to build 
assets for a wide section of the population and hence get around issues of heavy 
pension expenditures and fiscal discipline (Doling and Ronald 2010). So far, these 
evolutions have not been observed in Germany where the meaning housing is more 
focused on the accommodation purpose. At the same time, such policy discussions 
connect to different forms not only of capitalism, but also of residential market 
settings (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008), as well as to the notion of welfare state 
restructuring (Tedeger and Helbrecht 2007). As such, the more or less deliberate 
integration of the home ownership market into economic strategies is an avenue that 
further research could deal with. 
 
In relation to the notion of market-making (Clift 2012), I see this notion as potentially 
fruitful to analyse not only the ideational bases of national capitalisms but also to 
investigate the policy-making process at an international level like the European 
Union. In discussions about a European mortgage market that seems to take longer 
than some EU officials would wish, such national differences in the perceptions of 
 
 
330 
 
what markets are and what they are for can potentially lead to intense political debates 
(COM (2007) 807 final). Even though the thesis operates under the premises of 
„methodological nationalism‟ (Amelia et al. 2012) and is positioned in the 
comparative capitalisms literature, there is potential to move beyond this realm and 
demonstrate how nationally-held assumptions filter up into the international policy-
arena. The case of a potential European mortgage credit market in line with the Single 
Market is thus a potential research path to explore. 
 
Building on the notion of micro-macro complementarities, there is scope to extend 
such a concept beyond the realms that have been covered in the thesis. In terms of 
international comparisons, the UK is an economy that is dependent on internal 
demand whereas Germany‟s growth is driven by its exports. This has been openly 
acknowledged in the British Treasury‟s growth plan as the following quote 
demonstrates. 
Our share of world exports has fallen from 4.4 per cent in 2000 to 2.8 per cent 
in 2009. These trends are not inevitable for an advanced economy: look at 
Germany whose share of world exports was 9.0 per cent in 2009 compared 
with 8.5 per cent in 2000. Not only do we export just a third as much as 
Germany, we even lie behind the Netherlands, a country a third our size. (HM 
Treasury 2011, 3) 
Extending the notion of micro-macro complementarities could help link the micro, the 
national and the international level of the world economy together. 
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Indeed, the depiction of the active economic agent and the flexible market 
mechanisms in the UK matches with an economic setting that is built upon internal 
demand stimulated though mortgages (Benito and Power 2004). In Germany, the 
rationale of savings and even a disdain for consumption (Hecken 2010) plays into a 
socio-economic regime that is aligned with a strong export sector (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer 1997). In a sense, such an extension would link the national concerns with 
understandings of economic agency and markets with Hall and Soskice‟s interests in 
explaining institutional advantage on the global scale. This then also underlines that 
the approach suggested here is complementary with the VoC perspective in certain 
domains. In the end, the thesis does not claim that a focus on individual-state 
relationships can explain all features of capitalist diversity, but that it can bring out 
additional political elements when trying to understand national differences in 
economic regimes. 
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Annex I: Naïve Theories of the Luxembourgish Housing Market 
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1 Introduction 
In line with the investigations into the facilitation of British and German naïve 
theories in their respective housing and mortgage markets, the Luxembourgish case is 
analysed in the subsequent two chapters. Just as was the case with the latter 
investigations, the central procedure follows from the theoretical reflections initiated 
in the literature review and developed in chapters three and four. The reasons why the 
Luxembourgish country is included are various and deserve explicit attention here. 
First, just as the other economies under investigation, Luxembourg presents a society 
that is firmly integrated into capitalist features. However, contrary to the British and 
German variants, the literature has entirely omitted studies of the Luxembourgish 
economy in relation to the models of capitalism thematic. Internally, the notion of 
„Tripartite‟ (Hirsch 2007) refers to the way in which state officials coordinate policies 
with labour representatives and the industry. But again, such insights do not engage in 
a more detailed analysis of the individual-state relationship under a constructivist 
view point as laid out in the thesis. As such, the insights presented here are findings 
on their own right, but also need to be interpreted as an attempt to highlight elements 
of how the latter economy sits with the two others studied beforehand. This is not so 
much to locate Luxembourg on the liberal market economy – coordinate market 
economy axis of the VoC literature (Jackson and Deeg 2006a), but to describe yet 
other legitimation regime and the kinds of coordinative discourse used in yet another 
setting. As the thesis is interested more specifically in the domains of the investigated 
societies that relate to housing and the individual-state relationship within them, that 
is also the focal point here.  
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Second, as far as prices for owned housing properties go, the Luxembourgish figures 
display characteristics from both previously analysed cases. With the level of 
medium-term volatility being comparable to the German market, but the dynamics of 
appreciation closer aligned with the British economy (HC E-2007-19-02, p.40), the 
raw data throws up questions of how to possibly reconcile two opposing sets of naïve 
theories. At the same time, as chapter four has made clear, it also raises the question 
of what kind of individual-state relationship is to be found in such a case. It becomes 
apparent that Luxembourg is not neatly matching with any of the cases of capitalist 
housing markets analysed so far. That is not only interesting in empirical terms but 
would also be in line with more recent claims in the VoC literature that reject 
classifications altogether and take greater care to analyse economies or sectors of 
entire societies in their own terms. This is necessary as economies are always socially 
embedded (Streeck in Crouch and Streeck 1997). 
 
Nominal prices (in euro) for unifamily houses built after September 10
th
 1944 (above) and for 
unifamily houses built before September 11
th
 1944 (below) in Luxembourg. The trend for 
owned apartments is very similar. I acknowledge the help of Claude Lamboray from Statec 
who provided me with the data upon this graph was produced. 
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Third, this case demonstrates how the framework and methodology promoted in the 
theoretical chapters can be applied to socio-economic contexts that have not yet 
figured as prominently on the academic agenda. In other words, it showcases how an 
analysis of how the individual and the state relate to each other is complementary of 
how to make sense of different forms of capitalism. Once such an approach is adopted 
where the state is not seen as a universally identical concept but as a deeply context-
dependent entity that can provide facilitation of interpretative patterns, the research 
area of varieties of capitalisms opens towards novel fronts. Such an entry point 
complements the current literature not only on capitalist diversity but also on state 
activity more broadly (Best and Paterson 2010). 
 
Fourth, these chapters also show the inevitably political character of all forms of 
collective life as described in chapter three and four. Indeed, even though house prices 
have been on an upwards trajectory for a long time in Luxembourg (HC HC I-2002-0-
1005, p. 20), that is not to say that the underlying processes were free from 
contradictory tendencies. Through the exposition of the various ways of how the 
indeterminate character of the human mind was temporarily fixed, the thesis shows 
that opting for one way over others is already an engagement with the political 
domain as such a choice necessarily exercises an act of violence against alternative 
ways to making sense of economic phenomena. 
 
Finally, the inclusion of the Luxembourgish case in the annexes is also accountable to 
the generous funding by the „Fond National de la Recherche Luxembourg‟ (FNR) that 
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requested insights directly related to the Luxembourgish context. I can only repeat 
that I deeply acknowledge their financial support. 
 
In line with previous empirical investigations then, the present chapter looks into the 
exact articulations and justifications of Luxembourgish housing policies undertaken 
or discussed between the years 1997 and 2007. The material fallen back onto are 
policy statements made in the unique chamber of parliament that the Luxembourgish 
political system knows („Chambre des Deputés‟). As the taken-for-granted 
conceptions of policy-makers are central in exposing the justificatory narratives of 
specific housing policies, coordinative discourse is analysed here. Indeed, the 
rationale for this data selection is that the exposition of certain naïve theories 
regarding the positions of the individual in relation to market processes is best 
expressed in parliamentary utterances. Again, as the definitions of what constitutes a 
housing market, of what state activity is supposed to achieved, and of what economic 
agency means are fundamental to this study, statements form the basis of the 
investigative material. As the official languages of Luxembourg are Luxembourgish, 
French and German, and all of them have been used in the documents of my analysis. 
All translations are my own. 
 
This chapter is divided in three parts. Firstly, I quickly highlight the nature of the 
housing policies in place in 1997 as well as the main axes according to which the 
subsequent discussions have been framed in. This section is not only meant to figure 
as an introduction but also offers some commentary about the politics of who 
qualified for which aids and for what reasons. The second part focuses on the 
 
 
337 
 
interplay between state facilitations and the market. The questions raised here concern 
the mechanisms through which the social goals outlined were supposed to translate 
into materiality. A certain definition of how the housing market was supposed to 
operate comes to the forefront. Thirdly, attention turns towards the making of the 
individual as an economic agent within the structures described beforehand, either in 
terms of the market or others. It is here that the individual-state relationship comes 
most clearly into focus. 
2 Which individual-state relationship? 
Just as in the cases analysed, Luxembourgish housing policy was also linked to 
previously enacted legislations. In this respect, the main document upon which the 
state was falling back was a law from 1979 entitled „housing aid‟ (Mémorial A 16, p. 
293). Most of the subsequent policies were in fact only modifications or additions to 
this legal document so that a high degree of path-dependency was found in the 
arguments presented in favour of these changes (HC J-2003-0-0531, p. 2). For this 
reason it is worth to have a closer look at this particular law (HC E-2007-19-02, p. 48) 
At the same time, it shows how naïve theories can be embedded into longer historical 
processes, or state traditions (Dyson 1980). 
 
The first paragraph listed the objectives as promoting the access to housing property 
for individuals on moderate income, the adequate supply of building space, the 
construction of sets of houses at moderated price (social housing), the rehabilitation of 
older houses, and the creation of public accommodation (Mémorial A 16, p.294). The 
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law went on to mention the different schemes of aid that state policies could make use 
of to achieve these aims. As this text was only changed in some technical aspects until 
2007, this is also the basis upon which the analysis here starts from. This strong 
embedding into previous legislations has more strongly been noticed with the German 
case in the respective chapters, just as the macro-concerns with public services. 
 
In terms of more detailed content, the policy-makers were first “authorised to 
guarantee” (p. 294) the repayment of interest from loans that have been granted to 
private individual in order to build, transform or improve the accommodation that was 
used as the principal and permanent domicile of the borrower. Second, state policies 
were “authorised to encourage the access of housing property through granting 
construction and acquisition allowances according to the income and the family 
situation of the beneficiaries” (p.295; HC A-2004-105-0001, p.1644). The third tool 
in relation to home ownership was to give out allowances to help with the interest 
payments that are generated by mortgages in line with construction or acquisition 
objectives (Mémorial A 16, p.296). Those were the main policy means that had 
survived over the years, and they were being used extensively (HC C-2005-0-007-
0006, p. 55). At the same time, the housing issue was one that was heavily debated in 
the period of observation as becomes apparent later on. 
 
What this section is concerned with for now is to draw a first picture of the main 
characteristics of Luxembourgish state interventions into the housing market. The 
overall approach was one that started from economic observations that conditioned 
the granting of state allowances to the individual. As such, individuals were only 
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entitled to public support when they were actively living in their home (Mémorial A 
16, p. 294 and 295). Also, these aids were only able to be granted to non-owners, state 
policies did not support second properties. The owned house was not seen as a 
speculative good then, but one that was to be used in terms of accommodation. This 
also became obvious when financial speculation was attacked as one of the main 
causes behind overheating house price trajectories as owners of land were delaying to 
put it onto the market as supply was already limited (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 
1627; HC Q-2003-0-E-2658-01, p. 4). In this sense, and although this might have 
been a strategy for private consumers, the Luxembourgish state officials did not treat 
housing property as an asset that was supposed to gain value over time. 
 
However, I argue that policy-makers did consider ownership as the default tenure. 
Not only was there a consensus in the house of parliament that the seventy percent 
home ownership ratio was positive (HC C-2002-0-041-001, p.511), but the 
continuous measures also facilitated a view that social housing could only be an 
intermediary step into ownership (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1108).  
But I also want to mention that the social housing sector cannot solve the lack 
of housing constructions, and that Luxembourgers look forward to acquire a 
house that is theirs. To fulfil the desire of an owned home is an absolute 
priority among state duties. (…) but regardless of all the mentioned aids, there 
is still a group of people that (…) afford an owned house. Hence they cannot 
benefit from the support mechanisms, and for them it is important that we help 
them to fulfil their desire to life in a decent accommodation. (Minister of 
Housing, F. Boden, CSV: HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1123) 
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This quote also highlights that outsiders to the ownership market, or those individuals 
that did not try to access it, lost out on income streams. There were thus financial 
reasons for doing so, even if the latter were related to state aids, not necessarily to the 
acquired object per se. However, even though this was not an explicit aim of the 
Luxembourgish state intervention, the generous nature of the funding schemes and the 
coordinative discourse do present a naïve theory that favoured ownership over other 
tenures (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 1628). Indeed, when faced with a critique of very 
high rent prices, the Minister only mentioned that the state was “enacting an active 
housing policy in relation to the access of private housing property” (HC Q-1999-0-E-
0256-02, p. 3) without going into to tensions that such a policy might entail. 
 
As hinted at already there existed an affordability issue in the ownership market as 
prices were hitting new highs (HC Q-2004-0-E-0325-02, p.4). But just as with the 
reflections offered when treating the German case, the definition of such a concern 
always comes with assumptions about what home ownership is supposed to be in the 
first place. Indeed, what was regretted was that on the one hand an owned house was 
supposed to be the default tenure for all members of society (HC C-2000-0-064-0001, 
p. 2430), but that on the other hand  
the owner-occupied dwelling here in Luxembourg is on a way to become a 
luxury item. The dream of the own four walls risks to stay a dream for ever 
more people (M. Di Bartolomeo, LSAP: HC C-2000-0-064-0001, p. 2418). 
An owned home was then seen by policy-makers as a quasi-right that state 
interventions were supposed to deliver for the individual (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, 
p.1005). Or to use the words quoted, the individual had a right to claim that dreams 
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become reality, on the back of housing policies. The Luxembourgish policy-makers 
then framed ownership in a way that was always going to be difficult to stand up to 
unless extensive resources were released.  
 
The policies in operation in 1997 focussed on helping the individual with coping with 
the financial problems that the entry into the ownership market presented. At the same 
time however, the way in which the affordability situation was being explained by 
policy-makers and hence addressed was through a macro-economic lens. Indeed, all 
of the policy-making actors shared the interpretation that the price evolutions were 
due to a mismatch between offer and demand on the market (HC J-2001-0-1645, p. 1; 
HC J-2001-0-1661, p.1). Again then, the choice of policy instruments was entailed by 
certain taken-for-granted assumptions of policy-makers. But such an approach seems 
to be an inconsistent plan of actions, as the policies seemed to be targeted at the 
individual, as shown above, but they were legitimated in relation to macro-economic 
evaluations. The individual-state relationship hence appeared to be less clear-cut than 
in the previous cases analysed. The following two examples with relation to the place 
of the individual in the policy design bring more light into this apparently inconsistent 
individual-state relationship. They are concerned with the valuation of the family and 
the connections drawn with other socio-economic themes.  
 
Even though the 1979 law was signed by the Minister of „family, social housing and 
social solidarity“, the tone was not overly explicit in the family element. Surely, the 
housing aids were linked to the „family situation of the beneficiaries“ (Mémorial A 
16, p.295; HC Q-2004-0-E-0152-02, p. 2), but the policy-makers had not introduced a 
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social categorisation between singles or unmarried couples and married couples in the 
way the German state policies did. Also the interest payment support was set up in a 
way that allowed single individuals to receive more than half of the aid that families 
with one child are entitled to (Mémorial A 16, p. 312; HC A-2000-035-0002, p. 855). 
That meant that the transition between the social statuses was smooth, especially as 
income played a significant role in the distribution of state allowances. With higher 
income limits for households than for singles, the underlying logic was one where the 
individual is valued per se, not merely in relation to his/her quality as a (potential) 
parent (Mémorial A 16, p. 312). This was underlined by the annual report of activity 
of the housing department that listed the amount of aid that had been granted. Instead 
of talking about „families‟, it mentions „households‟ with a certain amount of children 
(HC E-1998-25-02, p. 62). At the same time, it also itemised various social categories 
from singles to widow over cohabitation. Again, the categorisation element did exit, 
but in a way that imposed no social barriers to state support in terms of naïve theories 
and material funding opportunities. This is important as such a language of 
coordinative discourse highlight the conceptions held by policy-makers as well as the 
axio-rationality that legislations were facilitating. 
 
These observations would point towards a direct individual-state relationship for the 
Luxembourgish case, but as mentioned, they are taken from the 1979 legislation. 
When more recent utterances in relation to the housing market are taken into account, 
the theme of families was also rarely mentioned. Indeed, it tended to be overridden by 
much more general reflections on the state of the Luxembourgish society and 
economy. The main subject of discussion here were demographic upward 
developments in the national population (HC C-2000-0-064-0001, p.2420). The 
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central mechanism through which the offer/supply inadequacy had come about was 
the constant influx of new citizens into the country, mostly through immigration (HC 
I-2002-0-1005, p.10). Indeed, the affordability issue was in most cases introduced as 
one that followed these demographic tendencies (HC E-2007-19-02). This then 
demonstrated a much stronger emphasis on a macro-economic and managerial 
approach to housing. 
 
The inconsistent tendency can be seen in other examples. One particular issue in 
parliamentary debates was the fact that there were a considerable number of 
Luxembourgish citizens that moved out of the country to access home ownership in 
the neighbouring areas (HC Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, p. 2440; HC C-2000-0-064-0001, 
p. 2418). This was regarded as a form of state failure as it showed that market prices 
were driving away the very individuals for which it was supposed to work for (Besley 
2007, 49). Also, particular family logics were now considered to be detrimental to the 
housing market in terms of the availability of building space. As parents wanted to 
keep the land for their children once they are growing into home ownership, they 
delayed the supply of land into the general market (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 1628). 
Here the individual-state relationship was twice regarded as being direct, state 
policies being legitimated as catering for the individual as such, not for social or 
wider societal reasons. 
 
However, the linking with the building sector was an instance where such a focus on 
the on the individual was given up in favour of a more managerial perspective (HC C-
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1997-0-020-0002, p. 1123; HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 1628; HC C-2002-0-041-001, 
p.501). 
Housing construction is only one aspect of the development of the 
Luxembourgish country, and as important as it is to discuss about prices and 
aids and similar issues, we also need to ask ourselves other questions, in 
relation to housing or potentially even before it: questions, where we build. 
Questions, how we build. It imports to integrate questions about qualitative as 
well as quantitative aspects of the land-use policy into the discussion. (A. 
Bodry, LSAP, HC C-2000-0-064-0001, p. 2432). 
In this sense, themes like the pension system were also brought up to understand how 
housing could act as a pension-like tool for some members of society (HC C-2000-0-
064-0001, p. 2438; see also Ronald and Doling 2010). The focus then seemed to have 
been wider than the individual only, even though considerable attention was devoted 
to the exact ways in which owner-occupation was to be delivered through state 
channels. Even if the individual-state relationship was mixed, interventions into the 
housing market were legitimated with reference to the individual and the quasi-right 
to housing property (HC Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, p.2427).  
 
However, in 2002 when new housing measures were taken up that added to the 
objectives outlined in 1979 (HC C-2002-0-041-001, p.501), the balance seems to have 
struck back to an indirect individual-state relationship. Apart from the inscription of 
the „right to housing‟, the new policies introduced a stronger focus on housing for 
students, a demand that had been brought forward by a special interest group, and set 
out to ensuring a degree of „social plurality‟ in order to prevent the local accumulation 
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of social classes (HC J-2001-0-1584, p. 2). However, the central novelties were the 
introduction of a fund for social housing and a central unit that gathered housing data 
(p. 8). Again, this displayed a perspective from policy-makers that was mixed in 
terms of its targeting, addressing macro-topics as well as trying to deliver goods for 
the individual more directly. Even though the moral end of home ownership was to 
make sure the wide majority of households were able to enter this tenure, the 
legitimation narratives were not clear of the reasons for such an undertaking were 
lying with the individual him/herself or with larger socio-economic considerations. 
 
In short then, the Luxembourgish state involvement with the housing market 
displayed mixed features. On the one hand the policies were focused on individual 
outcomes where the notion of affordability underlined such a principle. On the other 
hand, more macro-economic themes also came into the discussion, especially when 
framing the very affordability problem in terms of market disequilibrium (HC Q-
1999-0-E-0256-02, p. 2432). These observations here show that a positioning exercise 
in relation to the UK and Germany are futile routes as it would not allow to 
adequately representing the complexity of the Luxembourgish case. In relation to the 
ideal-typical nature of VoC categorisations and those established by the constructivist 
institutionalist literature, the thesis argues for concrete analyses of economic 
phenomena, concepts being used as heuristic tools rather than as meta-theoretical 
artefacts. The chapter now moves on to analyse the notion of the market in such a 
context, as apparently it were market processes that were driving up prices. 
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3 The Market-State Articulation 
Once it has been outlined how housing policies were framed in general, it imports to 
look more precisely into the ways in which market mechanisms were made sense of 
in relation to delivering housing outcomes. As the thesis focuses not only on the 
individual-state relationship but also on the understanding of the market by policy-
makers, or other economic processes that come as intermediaries into this 
relationship, the exact way in which housing aid was delivered comes to the forefront. 
Even though in the 1979 legislation and the subsequent changes made to that text the 
notion was not used, the analogy of supply and demand in the analysis of the 
affordability issue was a clear indication that some elements of the provision of 
housing were seen in terms of the market. 
 
Indeed, the discourse on housing was one that paid much more attention to outcomes 
than to the channels such state support was to be delivered through. As such, the 
housing market was considered in terms of a market, but one that had to be judged in 
how well it was able to deliver the right to home ownership. In this regard, the 
discussions to include the „right to housing‟ into the Luxembourgish constitution were 
insightful (HC I-2002-0-M-2649-01, p.2; HC I-2006-O-M-0242-01). They showcased 
concerns with the ends of public policy much more than with the means to be utilised. 
In a situation where market mechanisms were progressively leading to a situation 
where some members of society were unable to access their preferred tenure, policy-
makers reaffirmed that the state as an institution had a duty to guarantee adequate 
accommodation for all citizens. What was interesting in this regard was that not only 
was the seventy percentage mark of owner-occupation hailed, such a high level was 
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also defended against the adverse economic issues it contributed to, meaning house 
price inflation (HC C-2002-0-041-001, p.511-2). Such a reaction showed that home 
ownership was seen as the default housing choice (HC I-2002-0-M2839-01, p.1). 
    
It was also in this way that the affordability issue was phrased. As the market, seen as 
a quasi impersonal set of processes, was displaying high price levels, it undermined 
the social element of housing (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1105) as access was 
becoming more limited to poorer individuals. Even though the housing market was 
seen as delivering outcomes that were in line with the conception of the right to 
housing, and not as opportunities for the accumulation of financial wealth, such a 
perception was becoming ever harder to translate into practice. However, even though 
there were real concerns with the effect of house prices on first-time buyers, 
especially framed as relation to younger consumers (HC J-2001-0-1645, p. 1), there 
was also a majority of households that were benefiting from them. As the individual-
state relationship was mixed and that only a part of the population was confronted 
with the affordability issue, the problem was not openly debated in parliament until 
up to a point where prices had been rising to excessive levels. 
 
Thus markets were seen as a mechanism to distribute housing that could potentially 
fail (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1119), not as a rightful process in itself that produced 
socially acceptable outputs as has been observed for the British case. As such it 
followed more closely the German conception of markets as fulfilling social duties in 
order to enable a society to reproduce itself.  However, the affordability issue did 
relate to purely financial considerations of individuals, not the family as was the case 
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in Germany (Mémorial A 92, p.1546; HC E-2004-12-02, p. 71). Indeed, the concepts 
of households and individuals were used, independently from the social status of the 
beneficiary. The market was then supposed to cater for the housing requirements of 
all the population with state interventions coming in when market prices were deemed 
to be unsuccessful. These levels were slightly different for singles and families with 
children but they were still determined on the same market, which was different from 
the German case. 
 
Against the British analysis, the Luxembourgish coordinative discourse was quiet as 
far as regulation went (HC I-2002-0-1005, p.62). This was indicative that the market 
was not considered to be a sphere of its own, but was coupled with the delivery of the 
objectives of the state intervention. Because there was a very tight interconnectedness 
between the market and state policy, the concept of regulation made little sense as it 
assumes the political sphere making sure the economic domain performs its tasks 
correctly. As such, the case of Luxembourgish housing markets demonstrated how 
different taken-for-granted conceptions of what markets were supposed to be 
influenced upon patterns of economic governance. The exact definition of the classic 
distinction between state and markets then became much more complex than the 
notions sometimes seem to infer. 
  
Once it was asserted that the market had failed due to a mismatch between the supply 
and demand of housing, state interventions could take place on the back of arguments 
of a structural disequilibrium. Contrary to the British case that was also featuring a 
seventy percent ownership ratio and was unable or unwilling to acknowledge a u-turn, 
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the Luxembourgish state did consider measures to inverse the trend (HC Q-2007-0-E-
2053-01, p. 1), even though they came in at a late stage. However, it acted in two 
ways, one consistent with a direct legitimation regime and one with the indirect 
version where macro-economic outcomes dominated.  
The chamber of the members of parliament (…) invites the government  
 to increase the offer of building space by putting – together with the 
municipalities and developers – onto the market the properties it 
possesses (…) 
 to promote the demand by pursuing its generous aid policy (…) (N. 
Haupert, CSV: HC J-2000-0-M-2140-01, p. 1) 
 
As the problematisation of the affordability issue was framed in terms of a macro-
economic inadequacy and hence mixed up features related to the individual with top-
down elements, the solutions were framed in a similar fashion. The argument here is 
first that the Luxembourgish rationale for state intervention was addressing the 
identified problems in the housing market in terms of active market interventions. As 
such, the market was regarded as a tool in the hands of the polity to ensure the right to 
housing understood in terms of owner-occupation, and one that had to be managed to 
make sure the outcomes where in line with the socially defined ends. Second, the 
actions taken following such an understanding were partly in tension because they 
boosted the supply-side as well as the demand element of the market. In their form 
these measures were in line with macro-economic management principles, but in their 
content they defied the latter at the same time. The simultaneous backing of both sides 
of the equation meant that no significant effect could realistically be expected from 
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such actions. In this sense, the accusations that state policies had partly manufactured 
the spiral of house price inflation („Chambre de Commerce‟: HC J-2001-0-1661, p.2) 
were not groundless. 
 
More generally, it was argued that the efficiency of state interventions to curb price 
trajectories were undermined by the price hikes themselves (HC C-2000-0-064-0001, 
p. 2423). As such policies into the market were subverting their very capacity to act 
upon prices in a way that was bringing them in line with levels that would temper the 
affordability issue. It seemed then that even though there were genuine attempts to 
help young people into the market, the effectiveness of such measures were 
ambiguous (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 55). Even though market mechanisms were 
only seen as intermediaries to distribute state resources but not as acting upon house 
price levels, they exactly did the latter. The mixed approach to tackling the problem 
underlined such market conceptualisations. Indeed, the way in which the policy-
making process was operating was favouring mixed outcomes. 
 
Indeed, in the discussions about the introduction of additional market interventions in 
2002, it became clear that the multiplicity of actors involved entailed a whole range of 
possibly inconsistent policy requests. 
In the context of the examination of the present draft law, the State Council 
wonders if the complementary measures would not contribute in reinforcing 
the arsenal of envisaged measures (State Council, HC J-2001-0-1645, p. 2). 
In other words, even though the 1979 law was said to “give a whole array of state 
aids”, they were unable to act upon the market in the sense of reducing the supply-
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demand mismatch and the “explosion of costs” (HC J-2001-0-1645, p. 2). Drawing 
from chapter four, I argue that the simultaneous boosting of both sides of the 
economy was a consequence of the specific setup of the Luxembourgish polity. More 
specifically, the aim of consensus-building among policy actors lead to particular 
policy outcomes (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1128), highlighting the political 
character of polities. It was difficult to enforce a targeting towards lower-income 
members of society as the Council suggested (HC J-2001-0-1645, p. 2) because the 
nature of such a demand was too targeted. It is here again that Luxembourg presented 
a special case as the relatively large number of actors in the policy-making process 
was leading to a situation where a large part of the population did benefit from state 
aids. 
 
Before such claims can be substantiated, this paragraph shortly outlines the relevant 
features of the policy process when it came to housing. Once a draft law was put 
down, a series of political bodies were giving their views on the proposed changes. 
The State Council figured as the main authority here, a body mostly made up by 
lawyers that mostly controlled the legality of the propositions. Additionally, 
professional bodies were putting in their opinion like the „Chambre de Commerce‟, 
defending the interests of Luxembourgish companies, the „Chambre de Travail‟, the 
chamber of work, the „Chambre des Metiers‟, favourable to small and medium-sized 
companies, as well as the „Chambre des Fonctionnaires et Employés Privés‟, on the 
side of the employers in the public sector (HC J-2001-0-1763, p. 8). All these 
instances were formulating their own positions that were factored into the policy text. 
In a consociationalist regime in terms of actors such as Luxembourg (HC Q-1999-0-
E-0256-02, p. 2438; see also Lijphart 1985; Mair 2001), the bargaining process was 
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smooth in the sense that even though parties had differing views they expressed them 
in relatively non-confrontational terms (HC C-2002-0-041-001). In terms of outcomes 
this meant that the demand and well as the supply side of the housing market were fed 
through state interventions to accommodate the political demands. 
 
In terms of understandings of market mechanisms and the mixed case of the 
individual-state relationship that Luxembourg presented, the chapter claims that the 
arguments of the various policy actors were not phrased in market terms to begin 
with. Apart from the statements about the inadequacy between the offer and demand 
in the owner-occupation market, the justifications by the policy-actors were starting 
with a statement about the individual, and then moved on to more general themes (HC 
C-2002-0-041-001, p. 507). In the definition of the problem, the individual quasi-right 
in terms of owner-occupation were held up against the market. This meant that 
individual patterns of behaviour were not considered to be the sole determinant 
influencing market outcomes. Indeed, policy-makers saw the institution of the state as 
a potent actor (p.504). Also, economic agency as such was never held responsible for 
house price inflation, something that was the case in the UK. Whereas the British 
policy interventions targeted the exact ways in which market participants were acting 
on the market, the Luxembourgish interventions were less concerned with market 
mechanisms per se as with the social resultants of them. This then was a 
complementary explanation of why state policies acted upon both the demand and the 
supply side of the housing market. The political requests lead to an inconsistent 
market approach. As such, a reduced focus on the economics of markets and a more 
pronounced attention to the political domain of delivering housing meant that 
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extensive resources were spent in multiple locations (HC J-2001-0-1584, p. 2; Becker 
and Hesse 2010, 413). 
 
This policy approach was so widespread in housing that the Prime Minister not only 
had taken it on personally to act against the price trajectories (HC J-2001-0-1763, 
p.3), but also he was admitting failure on the task at hand. 
Since 1991 I have done everything in my role as Prime Minister and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to make housing in Luxembourg accessible for 
all people in this country. I have failed in this attempt. (…) And I consider this 
as a massive personal failure that I failed in the housing question. (Prime 
Minister, J.-C. Juncker in H. Kox, HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p.54, 2005) 
This quote demonstrates a series of claims made above. First, there was a genuine 
focus on the individual in the way that affordability was defined. Second, market 
evolutions were not openly discussed apart from the fact that prices were going up. 
Third, the market was not considered as a space for financial wealth accumulation by 
the state officials but as a mechanism to allocate housing among the population. 
Fourth, the state interventions were phrased around naïve theories of exactly those 
social functions of owner-occupation, not so much in terms of market processes. 
Fifth, the measures taken did not produce the envisaged effects but were possibly 
counterproductive in their impact. 
 
Additionally, the failure was not attributed to the market as such or economic agency, 
but was located with state policies being unable to act upon the ways ownership was 
progressively becoming harder to access (HC J-2003-0-0531, p. 1). Apart from 
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underlining once again what significance home ownership had in the Luxembourgish 
context, the quote also hinted at the structural issues in the policy-process itself. The 
acknowledgement of the Prime Minister of state failure after fourteen years was not 
only a sign that policy interventions had facilitated naïve theories that had been 
promising more than could be delivered in terms of owner-occupation, but also that 
they had covered up a limited understanding of markets. Indeed, references to either 
micro- or macro-economic theories as they appeared more or less explicitly in the two 
cases investigated beforehand were rare in the Luxembourgish context (HC Q-2003-
0-E-2658-01). The ad hoc approach of delivering housing to all meant that excessive 
resources had been granted since 1979 and that the underlying explanatory 
mechanisms had been replicated over the years. 
 
What was crucial in this regard was an individual-state relationship that did not 
impose either a focus on direct or indirect features and policy interventions that were 
trying to achieve more than they possibly could do in a market setting. By playing 
simultaneously into the hands of the final consumer and the professional industry, the 
naïve theories depicted a view that the evidently political contradictions between 
supply-side and demand-side policies were inexistent (Drazen 2001). As such, the 
political aspects of the subjectivities facilitated were covered, until a point where the 
price levels did showcase the socio-economic consequences for younger first-time 
buyers. The naïve theories that had been functional in the build-up of the price 
trajectories were unable to be sustained for a younger generation. Even though they 
applied a different perspective towards the workings of the market, Luxembourgish 
housing policies presented the same political tensions that foreshadowed the demise 
of British house prices. 
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4 Economic Agency and the Rationale for State Intervention 
Following on from the understanding of the workings of the market, this section 
analyses in more depth the ways in which private economic agents were integrated 
first into such market understandings and second what implications this had for the 
individual-state relationship. What appears was a triangular setup where certain 
everyday subjectivities of economic agency were linked on the one hand to the 
economic sphere and to political authority on the other. That is also the reason why 
this part follows the one on how markets were viewed in the policy-making process.  
 
As the chapter has claimed that market outcomes were not theorised as direct 
consequences of strictly individual pattern of economic behaviour, private agents 
were not considered to be the sole constitutive elements of the way the housing 
market worked. Indeed, it was openly stated that the state was one of the foundational 
actors when it came to housing. If the role of state intervention was going beyond that 
of an arbitrator of market outputs, and that individual behaviour could not be held 
accountable for price trajectories, then the state could be seen as a market-maker 
(Clift 2012). However, as the very notion of markets was not central to the way in 
which the Luxembourgish policy-makers were looking at housing, the latter term 
needs to be taken with care. In effect, it did apply to the Luxembourgish interventions 
in practical terms, but it does not relate to the way in which the latter where set out in 
coordinative discourse. Whereas the notion of market-enabler does not apply here, the 
concept of market-optimiser makes sense as state policies were actively trying to 
bring housing prices back in line with levels that ensured their affordability. 
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A similar argument applies to the notion of economic agency. What is crucial here is 
that even though the distribution of home ownership was characterised through 
market mechanisms and individual behaviour, the individual agent was not 
conceptualised in these terms. Matching the naïve theories of housing not being a 
domain of wealth accumulation but one that was supposed to allocate the housing 
good, economic agents were not meant to act according to an investing logic, but in 
terms of making sure they acquire adequate accommodation (Mémorial A 16, p. 294). 
A breakdown of the level of mortgage interest support for different categories of 
households was indicative that state policies were helping the population into home 
ownership in a way that took into account the conditions of their financial 
commitments (HC A-2000-035-0002). Paralleling the German approach, what was 
central were the outcomes in terms of effective owner-occupation, not the 
mechanisms that lead to it. State policies were helping the individual with entering 
home ownership, they were not helping them with merely creating opportunities to do 
so. This distinction played on the directness of the state aids granted. 
 
Together with the consociationalist logic of policy-making, this points to an indirect 
legitimation regime (HC J-2002-0-0970). Even though the denomination of a mixed 
regime was more adequate in general, the degree of activism that was supposed to 
come from economic agents in relation to housing was minimal. In other words, 
economic agents were seen as beneficiaries of state aid, but not as active home 
ownership market participants. Neither in the problematisation nor in the solutions 
suggested to curb prices was economic agency referred to as the central issue or target 
(HC I-2002-0-1005). Individual behaviour was not assessed as being the main 
determinant of house prices and policy-makers had taken on the task of guaranteeing 
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housing outcomes that were in line with its social values. Thus it was the latter that 
had to take the responsibility of acting directly against a situation that ran counter to 
its declared ends (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 1627). Even though the end to making 
people access housing property was similar with the British objectives, the 
legitimation process was different. Whereas the British consumer was said to be ill-
informed, which lead to market reforms, the Luxembourgish economic agent was not 
seen as constitutive of any of the price developments. Hence, policy reactions were 
not framed in these terms, even though the individual per se was the target of many 
state allowances. These indications point towards a type of economic agency that was 
passive in the sense that it was not supposed to play a key role in national wealth. 
 
In relation to the two cases investigated earlier in the thesis, the Luxembourgish 
interventions displayed characteristics of both in a way that is novel. On the one hand, 
the claim to provide the large majority of the population with an owned house has 
also been noticed in the British context. On the other hand the focus on outcomes was 
more in line with the German perspectives even though the legitimation regime was 
more aligned with the British focus on the individual. But crucially for this section, 
the way in which agency was conceptualised was hybrid. On the one hand, the naïve 
theories facilitated were applicable to all households. Not only was ownership 
depicted as the tenure that all members of society should strive for, but such naïve 
theories were also backed up by extensive policy programmes. On the other hand, it 
was not the individual him/herself that was supposed to arrive at that end but it was 
state policy that was responsible for the achievement of this goal. Effectively then, the 
Luxembourgish coordinative discourse and policies were not only advancing an 
understanding of home ownership as a quasi-right (HC Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, p.2448), 
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but they was also promising outcomes that were always going to be difficult to 
translate into reality. As basic market principles were not applicable to housing, those 
economic, and highly political, contradictions were not taken into account. The latter 
were specific to the Luxembourgish context where in the end a passive model of 
agency and a direct type of state support where effectively backing an upwards price 
trajectory. 
 
The concepts of means and ends introduced in chapter three can be used to describe 
the situation in different terms. The ends were identified in social terms that focussed 
on the delivery aspects (HC C-2000-0-064-0001). The means through which such an 
objective was to be achieved were direct uses of state resources (Mémorial A 92). 
This effectively meant a redistributive mechanism towards those individuals that were 
not yet into the home ownership market, or better, the home ownership sector. As 
such, the notion of the market was irrelevant to the Luxembourgish housing context 
as both means and ends had been outlined by political entities that side-lined 
economic theories, depicting economic agents as sole recipients of benefits once they 
adhered to the conception of home ownership as not being a tool to wealth 
accumulation. But contrary to the German interpretation of the housing market as a 
foundation for the functioning of wider society, the Luxembourgish rationale for state 
intervention did not make those links towards other macro-economic themes explicit. 
In the end, the housing market was mostly serving the individual, not the society in its 
entirety (HC J-2001-0-1763, p. 4).  
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Interestingly in relation to the other two case studies, the issue of energy certification 
was also discussed in Luxembourg (HC J-2006-0-0188). This instance was exemplary 
of the way in which the individual-state relationship was played out, in relation to the 
policy-making process and the naïve theories facilitated. Indeed, the draft legislation 
handed in in January 2007 addressed the topic of “energetic performance of housing 
building”. It first outlined the justifications for such a law by giving a quick overview 
of the way in which the European Union was going to be progressively exposed to 
energy dependency. As such it set a technical tone, quoting figures of projections (HC 
J-2006-0-0188, p. 2). Before going into the position of Luxembourg in relation to 
these concerns, it made clear that the reason for such intervention was lying with a 
translation of a European law into the national legislature (p. 3). What was to be done 
in the latter then was a clarification of the „judicial situation‟ by introducing rather 
technical details about thermal insulation, gas furnaces and climatisation systems that 
could lead to energy savings (p. 4). 
 
In general, Luxemburgish policy-makers were not seeing any involvement of 
individual economic agency in the matter. Instead, it was a technical-legal affair that 
had no real connection with the housing market (p. 15). When it came to introducing 
the „energetic performance certificate‟, the text was again framed in economic terms 
that were outlining the conditions under which buildings had to be granted such 
documentation with additional information. So whereas the German authorities had 
been careful to explain the wider societal benefits of such energy passes, and their 
British counterparts had focussed in the way they would be enhancing market 
mechanisms, none of those features was noticeable in the Luxembourgish case. As 
housing was not considered in terms of a market, and that agents did not play the 
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central role in the distribution of housing, energy certification became very much a 
legal procedure (Mémorial A 92, p. 1546). Even though their introduction was seen as 
providing additional information to potential buyers (HC J-2006-0-0188, p. 11), the 
state policies did not depict individuals as profit-maximising actors whose 
behavioural patterns would be influenced by incremental information. They were 
merely treated as subjects that would hopefully build more energy-efficient homes 
through the raising of energy awareness (HC J-2007-0-0154, p. 2). 
 
In the draft project, it was curious that among the usual French text were introduced 
German sentences about the formula about how to calculate the energetic 
performance of a building. Even though both are official languages in Luxembourg, 
the State Council was also puzzled and recommended linguistic changes (HC J-2006-
0-0521, p. 4). Even though this is a statement hard to proof without insider 
information, the German terminology could well indicate that the technicalities were 
copied from a report commissioned to a German company. This would make sense as 
a German institute had been asked in 1991 to submit an analysis of the 
Luxembourgish housing market (HC Q-2006-0-E-1729-02, p. 1). Speculations apart, 
these findings illustrate that the Luxembourgish approach to the theme was closer 
aligned with the German one. The focus on technicalities in general and the framing 
of the policy in terms of the materiality of buildings and not of economic agents or 
market interference was shared by the two perspectives. 
 
It was then no wonder that the comments from the advisory chambers did not go 
beyond some legalistic suggestions of how to make the policy text free of ambiguous 
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phrasing (HC J-2006-0-0231). All of the instances were accepting the European 
claims about energy efficiency, and even though they were at times connected to the 
national economy, the general logic was one of the legal terms of the “transposition of 
the directive” (HC J-2006-0-0270, p. 2). In other words, the assessments of 
Luxembourgish policy-makers were based upon rather fluid assumptions that 
combating global warming was a good thing and that was why an adequate law was 
needed (HC J-2006-0-0276, p.2). The legitimation aspect then was largely 
marginalised as no further political reasons had to be given. In relation to the 
individual-state relationship this process meant that the law changes were not even 
explained in parliamentary debates but that were taken for granted. Policy-makers 
were not debating the introduction of such an “energy pass” (HC Q-2004-0-E-0152-
02), the denominations formulated by the European Union were only taken over. 
 
For this case then, and also more generally, even though housing was apparently such 
a discussed topic in Luxembourgish politics, the mixed state-individual relationship, 
even if slightly leaning to the direct side, meant that it was neither fully politicised as 
an issue of affordability and individual fairness, nor as an issue of national 
significance in relation to the way in which the economy was to develop in the future. 
The focus on outcomes and the legal aspects of housing as well as the passive 
interpretation of economic agency entailed that the deeply political nature of these 
policies was not coming to the forefront. This chapter has picked out the tensions and 
contradictions that did exist with the Luxembourgish housing policies. At the same 
time the comparison with the British and German cases also allowed to locate the 
nature of the political not only in observable developments as investigated here, but 
also in the subjectivities about homeownership, state policies, markets and economic 
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agency itself. It is also in such a line that the exact definitions and understandings of 
these terms come to emerge in the next chapter on naïve theories in the 
Luxembourgish mortgage market. 
 
To render these political features explicit, the passive naïve theories about economic 
agency and of markets as essentially only a mechanism to distribute housing were not 
only setting aside alternative conceptions as demonstrated in the other case studies, 
but were also constitutive of the very price evolutions that the Luxembourgish market 
has seen. Again, the notion of micro-macro complementarities can be related to as 
certain socio-economic developments, not necessarily only markets, operate upon 
taken-for-granted assumptions of everyday agents. Second, these naïve theories 
implied that home ownership was the default tenure even to those citizens that were 
not making sense of an owned home in these terms. Third, the ontological aspects of 
the political of the Luxembourgish polity come in form of the taken-for-granted 
conceptions of policy-makers, but also with the structure of the policy-making 
process itself. Both contributed to state interventions that marginalised the tensions 
with markets and allowed for vast housing support schemes to be proceeded with. 
Fourth, such conceptions also sustained distributional consequences, such as making 
it progressively harder for younger members of society to access owner-occupation, 
and hence undermining the very naïve theories facilitated. 
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5 Conclusion 
After the analyses of the British and the German case studies, this chapter has applied 
the same framework, laid out in chapters three and four, to the Luxembourgish 
housing market. In relation to the two cases that have been found to demonstrate 
different logics not only at the level of the individual-state relationship but also in the 
way that particular sets of naïve  theories in relation in the housing market have been 
facilitated, the Luxembourgish case laid bare yet different characteristics. In terms of 
the ends promoted, the policy framework was similar to the British counterpart where 
home ownership was regarded as the most appropriate tenure for all members of 
society. However, as far as the means are concerned through which the latter were to 
be delivered, the Luxembourgish state displayed features more closely associated with 
the German polity. 
This mix of features then entails that the Luxembourgish state interventions should be 
best seen as specific to particular circumstances as the categories of analysis do not 
always stand the empirical data. Just to compare, the individual-state relationship was 
in a sense even more direct than in the UK as the market intermediaries were not as 
pronounced. Whereas the British state policies were managing the market, and 
facilitating a specific form of economic agency that was consistent with active market 
participants, the Luxembourgish homebuyer was immediately linked to the state as a 
possible player on his/her side. Even though in economic terms, it was still the market 
through which the housing goods were distributed, the state policies were firstly not 
acting upon the latter, but was directly reallocating resources to the individual. It was 
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only when prices were seen as excessive that the market analogy entailed a shifting of 
policies towards the role of market-optimising. The quasi-right to home ownership 
was then not achieved through the bypass of market processes to be governed, but 
through direct state channels. In short, the notion of the market was not one widely 
used when making sense of the housing market.  
 
However, this finding is not merely another example of how a focus on individual-
state relationships can shed light into the way in which elements of modern 
capitalisms work, it also offers impulses to theoretical reflections. First of all, it 
demonstrates that the definitions of social ends and means are a matter of concrete 
state policies, not of universal concepts of the state per se. In this sense, this chapter 
reinforces the arguments stated against the ways in which the state has been treated in 
the literature on comparative capitalisms so far. Once an ontological position of the 
individual is set out, the role of the state in relation to the latter becomes a topic worth 
investigative efforts. 
 
Second, the Luxembourgish case offers a potent counter argument against the 
tendency of dichotomisation and categorisation of varieties of capitalist economies. 
As has been argued in chapter four, it is necessary to look deeper into the policies to 
understand the inner workings of a capitalist regime. That is not to say that they were 
not coherent, it only means that the spectrum of potential models is not limited to two. 
If a regime is able to facilitate naïve theories that appeal to the human mind, and 
prove their validity through adequate policy-making, at least for as certain period of 
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time, then such a system must be judged to be a model of socio-economic 
organisation.  
 
Third, if it is true that mixed or varied forms of capitalism can exist and do well in 
economic terms, that undermines arguments claiming the convergence of all capitalist 
regimes to one (Berger and Dore 1996; Fingleton 1999), but more generally it also 
offers a point of critique against the external imposition of a particular economic 
order as it threatens to undermine the consistency of naïve theories. The thesis does 
not argue that consistency is the ultimate goal in naïve theories for a socio-economic 
system, it only calls attention to the fact that the latter play an integral role in the way 
an economy works, for the better or the worst. Special care should be taken when 
policy interventions are performed as they might be in open conflict with existing 
understandings. 
 
Fourth, even in a case where policies took over such an extensive role in the provision 
of housing, they were still falling back on certain narratives to make sense not only of 
state actions but also of what economic agency was meant to be. Although 
Luxembourgish policies painted a passive picture of the individual, they still made 
assumptions about how the latter was integrated into a wider regime of policies. This 
demonstrates that whatever the discourse, naïve theories about agency and markets 
play constitutive roles in the very way that socio-economic processes operate. As 
developed in chapter three and four, it is thesis‟ intention to call for a more careful 
treatment of conceptions of economic realities in order to understand diverse modes 
of capitalism. The concept of micro-macro complementarities can complement that 
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one of institutional complementarities here as taken from the VoC literature (Hall and 
Gingerich 2009). 
 
Fifth, all three cases have displayed tensions in the policy design. In the end, they 
have all highlighted deeply political characteristics, first in the contradictions internal 
to the naïve theories they have been facilitating, and second in their action to violate 
the original position of the indeterminacy of the mind. The policy-making process 
itself has inevitably side-lined some sets of how to make sense of economic 
observations against others that have been imported into the official understandings of 
housing markets and the individual as an economic agent. As explained in theoretical 
terms in chapter three, this empirical analysis supports a reading of variation of 
capitalist regimes as being itself a political topic. At the same time, it also advances 
the claim that the ontological basis laid down about the individual is a starting point 
that allows for this approach to point at additional elements of politics of capitalist 
diversity. 
 
After this investigation into policies in relation to Luxembourgish housing markets, 
the next chapter turns towards the mortgage markets and explore which naïve theories 
were providing sense not only to the markets per se, but also to the connections 
between the individual, the market, and the rationale for state intervention. It 
operationalises the framework of the thesis once again to demonstrate how different 
the definitions of markets and of the economic agent can be. 
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Annex II: Naïve Theories of the Luxembourgish Mortgage Market 
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1 Introduction 
Once the Luxembourgish interventions into the housing market have been analysed, 
the mortgage market comes into focus. Just as in the other case studies, such 
complementary attention is needed to fully comprehend the nature of the policy 
approach and of the naïve theories promoted in relation to the ways in which 
individual agents were supposed to act when it came to the financial aspects of home 
ownership. As has been found in the previous chapter, the framing of the central 
housing issues according to concerns of affordability made implicit links between 
acquiring a house and financing such a transaction. Indeed, the very logic was that the 
affordability problem was not so much located in the housing market per se, but that it 
had led to price evolutions that rendered the on-going processes in the mortgage 
market unable to cater for the financial needs imposed through the housing channel. It 
thus becomes relevant in how far the latter was seen as feeding into the housing 
market, but also in which ways individual agents were meant to use mortgages to 
enter the ownership market. 
 
Again the individual-state relationship is investigated. This chapter investigates the 
policies enacted by the Luxembourgish authorities by looking into policy texts and 
respective parliamentary discussions. Such an approach enables a depiction of the 
form as well as of the content of the policy-process and sheds light upon the taken-
for-granted assumptions held by the relevant policy actors. It also analysed how such 
conceptions translated into justificatory narratives for the facilitation of naïve theories 
in relation to economic agents and markets. The very definition and conceptualisation 
of the individual as an economic actor are brought to the forefront to render explicit 
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the assumptions made through certain kinds of policy interventions. What this chapter 
is particularly interested in is the making of the good mortgager, in the sense that it 
highlights the central features of how Luxembourgish households were supposed to 
act in the realm of the management of private wealth with regard to an owned home. 
 
In relation to the previous chapters on mortgage markets, this part falls back on 
relevant elements found beforehand to either draw parallels or contrasts with the 
British and German cases. But again, this is not a positioning exercise as such an 
endeavour could not allow for the conceptual flexibility that accounts for the 
empirical details found in this case. Still, as the Luxembourgish institutional setting 
has been characterised by its mixed character in the previous chapter, it is insightful to 
analyse the mortgage market interventions according to the same principles. Just as 
the previous chapter, this exposition engages in a comparison of the Luxembourgish 
mortgage market against those analysed beforehand but without categorising them on 
a scale or in a multi-dimensional space. As a distinctively capitalist economy, and 
hence society, Luxembourg constitutes another distinctive case, not merely in terms 
of its institutional design, but also in the way that economic agency and market 
processes were made sense of. With financial issues playing an essential role in the 
housing market, mortgage market policies are the logical next topic to look into. As 
for the previous cases, the hypothesis is that similar logics in the naïve theories of the 
housing market are found here.  
 
This chapter then is yet another demonstration of how financial aspects of modern 
forms of capitalism can be analysed in ways that takes variations into account 
 
 
370 
 
(Watson 2009a). This chapter demonstrates that once the human mind is treated as 
originally indeterminate, and that the focus is shifted towards the making of a certain 
kind of individual in terms of an economic agent, the issue of the degree of 
financialisation of daily life (Martin 2002) is able to be investigated without excessive 
additional efforts. It is only an application of the general framework developed in the 
theoretical parts of the thesis onto topics of financial relevance to everyday people. It 
also underlines how crucial it is to present such an open ontology of the human being 
first as it allows the scholar to shed light upon the exact processes through which 
financial aspects play out in various forms of capitalism. At the same time, this 
method is able to set such developments into a much larger framework, first in terms 
of the underlying legitimation mechanisms, and second as far as the political 
implications are concerned. 
 
Indeed, one of the follow-up questions with regard to the understanding of the 
economic individual relates to the tensions in certain subjectivities and the differential 
distributional outcomes they legitimate. First, the very process of framing the 
individual in a specific way is a political act by itself as it does violence to the original 
position of the indeterminate mind by excluding other conceptions of the human 
being as an economic subject. This is equivalent with the inevitability of political 
features of all collective action as it sets out the domains of the good and the bad. 
Second, the model of agency promoted, and hence the variety of capitalist socio-
economic organisation, distributes life chances in unequal ways between certain 
social groups of the population. As such, it favours specific layers of society more 
than others, even if such differences might not be obvious from policies at the first 
glance. It is here where the second political character of the definition of economic 
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agency lays. Again, that is however not to state that the latter is necessarily openly 
politicised.  
 
The chapter is set up in three parts. The second section here describes the main traits 
of Luxembourgish interventions and reviews the policy-making process in relation to 
mortgages to find out about the directness of the legitimation process. It also 
highlights the links that were drawn between the mortgage market and the wider 
housing context. Third, the theme of financial prudence is investigated through the 
policy texts and parliamentary debates that were describing proper financial 
behaviour by private individuals. It becomes obvious that concerns with careful 
wealth management were central to axio-rationality facilitated, but at the same time 
did not grasp the totality of the approach to the good mortgager. Fourth, the political 
elements in a certain conception of mortgage markets are analysed to demonstrate 
which tensions were arising not only from state interventions but also from the 
understandings of the latter. A complex picture of how state policies and economic 
agents relate to house price trajectories is depicted for the Luxembourgish case. 
2 Conceptualisations of Mortgages 
Apart from the housing policies per se, the Luxembourgish state policies also enacted 
policy elements that were targeting the ways in which individuals were assumed to 
behave in the mortgage market. These were not always explicitly mentioned as such, 
but the way in which the policies were designed reflected a set of taken-for-granted 
assumptions that saw the intertwinement of housing interventions and financial 
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concerns at their very centre. As highlighted before, the framing of housing issues on 
the basis of the concept of affordability was indicative here. As in the German case, 
the housing legislation contained prescriptions of how good financial management 
was to look like. Such policy-outcomes not only assumed that the process of 
acquiring home-ownership was requiring large amounts of resources, but also that the 
social categorisation that was adequate for housing was applicable for financing the 
latter. 
 
In other words, as the financial arm of central to housing, those individuals qualified 
for resources that were seen as deserving homeowners. As the housing schemes 
themselves contained indications about mortgage behaviour, the legitimation 
mechanism for the latter was intertwined with housing aspects, mortgages being 
desirable not per se but in relation to the social outcomes they contributed to in terms 
of the acquisition of an owned home. Simultaneously, this also meant that a mortgage 
was strictly seen as a way to acquire housing property (Mémorial A 16).This 
reinforces the argument found in the previous chapter that the procurement of decent 
accommodation was regarded in terms of outcomes. In this sense, the mortgage 
market was regarded as a means to the accession of home ownership, not as a sphere 
governed on its own.   
 
Even though the end of home ownership was targeted at the practical nature of 
housing in terms of its material qualities and not according to its mere financial value 
as was the case in the UK, it was obvious that the Luxembourgish policy-makers 
regarded the mortgage market as feeding into the housing market. As seen in the 
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previous chapter, the rising entry barriers into home ownership were only an issue 
because the loans taken out could not keep up. The focus on “financially accessible 
housing” (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1106) was indicative of these linkages. As such, 
both the naïve theories in mortgage and housing markets need to be studied side-by-
side. Indeed, the subjectivities facilitated in the one sphere of the economy and of the 
other needed to be coherent in order to present naïve theories that were making sense 
of the intertwined nature of the two. As such, certain conceptions of markets but also 
of economic agency were constitutive of wider economic evolutions. Or to use 
another concept, micro-macro complementarities existed in the sense that the 
understandings of mortgage markets played into the ways that they were operating in 
relation to the home ownership market, and hence the house price evolutions set out 
in the previous chapter.  
 
When it comes to the 1979 legislation on housing, these policy texts already included 
a significant amount of regulations that established the ways in which financial 
aspects were to be covered in order to ensure a high degree of owner-occupation 
(Mémorial A 16). In fact this text was concerned not so much with the functions of 
home ownership per se, but much more how state interventions could intervene in 
helping agents to access it through “individual aids” (p. 294). Again then, the moral 
end of home ownership was not explained in terms of legitimation strategies, but 
instead it was taken for granted, state measures contributing to such unchallenged 
notions. The policy hence mentioned paybacks, interests and mortgages in relation to 
the financial tools that state policies were falling back to in order to target the 
individual either directly or through market intermediaries. This section dissects the 
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various policies and parliamentary discussions to look deeper into their underlying 
processes and the understandings of economic phenomena that they put forward. 
 
The Luxembourgish policy-makers had the power to offer guarantees to borrowing 
institutions so that the latter could offer mortgages to households that wanted to buy 
or build their own home (p. 294, HC E-1997-14-01, p. 54).  State polices offered 
guarantees to the financial industry stating that the repayments would be provided, 
and that in case of default, public money was to be used to compensate for financial 
compensation. Even though this scheme was not a direct financial involvement into 
mortgage markets, it significantly reduced the uncertainty of costly defaults to the 
financial institution (Ciochetti et al. 2003). As such, it was able to offer loans to more 
households than it would have otherwise done. In this sense, the denomination of 
“individual aid” is ambiguous as it did not target the individual directly. Only by 
acting upon the mortgage market itself were state interventions able to reduce access 
barriers into mortgages and hence into home ownership. 
 
By infusing a sense of security into the market, state policy considerably altered the 
lending conditions that only then filtered down to economic agents themselves. In 
relation to the suggestions made in the previous chapter about the state policies 
actually playing a role in the house price evolutions (HC C-2002-0-041-001), this 
observation seems consistent. By using resources that had been accumulated through 
the taxpayer channel, state policies were indirectly lowering the financial criteria 
according to which first-time buyers could afford to move into the ownership market. 
This signified that public i.e. collective means were used to support potential 
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homeowners, even if this only operated in the background through the guaranteeing 
scheme. Home ownership, in theoretical terms but also in its practical ways of how 
households could access it, was depicted as worth of collective support (HC J-2001-0-
1584, p. 2). As such, mortgage market policies underlined the subjectivities that home 
ownership was regarded as the default tenure, largely indifferent of the social 
conditions of individuals (HC I-2002-0-1005, p.1). At the same time, they also 
legitimated the transfer of public money towards first-time buyers, a distributional 
consequence justified through such naïve theories. 
 
This policy displayed parallels with the British case where in a similar vein market 
processes were sustained in order to lower accessibility barriers into the ownership 
market (HC C-2002-0-004-0005, p.23). One significant difference however was that 
markets were supposed to be optimised in their outcomes through enhancing the 
agential capacity of the individual, whereas the Luxembourgish intervention was at 
the level of the financial institutions themselves. Whereas the ends of both policy 
regimes were similar, the means were different, especially in their definition of the 
linkages between mortgage and housing market, but also in their conception of the 
how state interventions were supposed to act upon ownership affordability. However, 
in both cases house prices were characterised by steady growth paths, with the 
difference that they were sustained only in the Luxembourgish case. However, the 
political tensions were no less present here as the previous chapter has already 
demonstrated. 
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The „allowance in favour of housing‟ was following a different logic as it was not 
passing through the mortgage market but directly targeted the individual (Mémorial A 
16, p. 295). That is however not to say that it did not have a financial aspect. On the 
contrary, even if it was bypassing the market it was still facilitating the accumulation 
of resources that would enable low-income families to enter homeownership (HC E-
1997-14-01, p. 57). The political end was thus identical, an indication that the 
Luxembourgish policy-makers were consensual in their judgement that owner-
occupation was the adequate tenure for its citizens. But it also showed that the 
policies in relation to the mortgage market were inconsistent, one helping mortgagers 
in offering more favourable deals, the other one directly targeting the individuals that 
want to acquire housing property. It was hence impossible to talk about one approach 
to mortgage markets as multiple logics were at play. The mixed individual-state 
relationship observed in housing policies is also found here. 
 
The „interest subsidy‟ intervention was yet another way to support future homebuyers. 
Indeed, the Luxembourgish state policies offered to relieve individuals from part of 
the interest they were meant to pay on their mortgages (Mémorial A 16, p. 296). In 
other words, state policy was again falling back on public money to cover mortgage 
costs of potential homeowners. This time, the lending structure of financial 
institutions was not altered but the interventions took sides with the individual 
economic agent directly. By offering to pay part of the mortgage cost, the logic was 
that it allowed future home owners to take out a more substantial loan than they could 
have otherwise afforded to pay back. By shifting the immediate repayments upon the 
state budget, policy-makers took pressure off households to move into more 
considerable mortgages. At the same time however, the introduction of these policy 
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interventions back in 1979 undermined their own efficiency over time as these 
favourable conditions were coming to mean ever rising requirements of 
downpayments (HC C-2000-0-064-0001, p. 2423; HC Q-2007-0-E-2053-01, p. 2). 
This tension was similar to the ones that has been investigated in the British analysis.  
 
It is also worth mentioning some technical details with the interest relief programme 
as it provided more insight into the conceptions of the individual in relation to 
mortgages. First, the amount of effective relief was calculated according to the 
revenue and the family situation of the beneficiary (HC A-2003-060-002, p.1023). 
The highest amount was reserved for households with six or more children that had 
the least income, with the allowance progressively going down with increased income 
and a decrease of children at charge. Single people with a very high income were not 
benefitting from the scheme whereas big families (six children or more) were always 
granted a discount on their interest payments, even if small. This was to say that 
individuals that have to cater for a family or were in a less favourable situation 
themselves had a right to get public support when they wanted to acquire (or 
reconstruct) their own home. As with housing, the Luxembourgish state policies 
differentiated according to social classes but in a much smoother way than the 
German counterpart did. 
 
Second, the relevancy of this programme was noticeable in two instances. Apart from 
it being by far the most extensive scheme in terms of annual resources granted and the 
way it increased in its coverage over the years (HC E-2007-19-02, p.49), the amount 
of interest costs covered by the policy was adopted on a frequent basis to match the 
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evolution of the base rate (HC A-1999-055-0007, p. 1327). This meant that the 
financial details of the law were corrected so to match with the general economic 
situation of the overall economy. Such a process then avoided the programme to 
favour certain layers of society in ways that were not consistent with the naïve 
theories about which individuals were to benefit most from state initiatives. In other 
words, the target of the policy was able to be maintained over time.    
 
As regards naïve theories about good financial wealth management, this policy 
portrayed debt as essential or even necessary in the process of acquiring home 
ownership (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 56, see also Ingham 2001). As set out, the 
interest subsidy was incentivising agents to move into debt in a more considerable 
way that they would have otherwise been able to, effectively promoting the naïve 
theory that the reliance on external resources was not only morally correct but was 
also supported by the public authorities. This was in stark contrast to a series of other 
elements built into the policy design that were putting forward much more prudential 
ways of financial behaviour. Even though these are only analysed in the next section, 
it can already be argued here that the Luxembourgish state interventions were mixed 
in their targeting and the ways they operationalised the means to access 
homeownership (HC C-2002-0-004-0005, p. 23). 
 
All these policy elements give clues about the exact individual-state relationship in 
the Luxembourgish mortgage case. As has been noticed in the housing chapter, the 
findings for the mortgage market also hint at a mixed relationship as far as the 
legitimation regime goes. In the end, all of the policies were targeted at the individual, 
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but the ways in which this was done greatly varied, especially in how far they play on 
market rationales. In the most significant programme, the interest subsidy scheme, the 
state policies took on the role of the individual and stepped in to pay part of the 
mortgage interests. This was indicative of a direct legitimation regime where policy-
makers were interested in the economic well-being of citizens. However, the 
guaranteeing policy pursued a very different logic, one that first played into the hands 
of mortgage companies and only then into those of future homeowners. So even 
though the targeting was largely towards individuals, the legitimation regime 
displayed more diverse facets. The variety of approaches suggests that the interests of 
diverse policy-actors had to be taken into account (HC I-2002-0-1005). The policies 
were then not only justified in terms of what they were to achieve for the individual, 
but also for the other actors like the financial sector for instance (HC J-2002-0-0970) 
as is described below. 
3 Financial Prudence and Conceptions of Agency 
Following on from the theoretical chapters and more specifically from the 
development of the concepts of indeterminacy of the mind and of naïve theories 
therein, this section explores in more depth the depiction of the individual agent as 
financially responsible (Godfrey 2004). As the literature review has pointed at, not 
only is the literature of Varieties of Capitalism limited in its focus on firms but so are 
also accounts of the state in comparative economic regimes as they offer an 
incomplete ontology of centrality of the individual to the type of capitalism at hand. 
After the more general analysis of Luxembourgish interventions into the mortgage 
market, the exact mechanisms of the making of the good mortgagee are looked into 
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here. This is crucial as the central argument of the thesis has been about an alternative 
and constructivist approach to economic models and a deeper understanding of the 
position of the individual in relation to the state within them. The very definition of 
economic agency then becomes a variable in the design of models of socio-economic 
organisation that relates to macro-economic developments in terms of micro-macro 
complementarities. 
 
As has been pointed out briefly before, the way the mortgage policies were set up in 
relation to housing was indicative of a concern with individuals being financially 
prudent when engaging in mortgage activities (HC Q-1996-0-E-0214-01, p. 398). 
Even though this was inconsistent with the interest relief scheme that promoted the 
taking out of debt, the conditions linked up with the guaranteeing programme 
depicted debt as rightful in particular circumstances. Indeed, the state policies were 
incentivising individuals into certain patterns of behaviour as far as a particular 
savings habit (HC E-2007-19-02, p. 47 ; see also Watson 2008a) went by connecting 
the granting of its aids to financial requirements (HC C-2002-0-004-0005, p.25). But 
it was not only that these conditions acted materially upon people‟s behaviour, they 
also facilitated naïve theories about how to handle financial matters more generally. 
 
The guarantee (…) is only granted to the borrower who is in possession of a 
special account called „housing savings account‟, or, if such an account does 
not exist, brings proof of regular and constant savings for at least three years 
(Mémorial A 16, p.294) 
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This quote was acting as a direct association between home ownership and savings 
patterns. Such a legal text facilitated a view that own resources, saved up over a 
longer period of time with the specific aim to acquire home ownership, were essential 
when home ownership was sought (Mémorial A 92, p. 1552). The rationale of the 
guarantee underlined such a conception where the agent first made the necessary 
concessions in terms of spending to accumulate wealth before the state interventions 
were ensuring additional credit was accessible at a more affordable rate (HC E-1997-
14-01, p. 54). In terms of agency, the individual could only count on state aid once 
he/she had put him/herself in a situation where the risk of default had been minimised 
before state interventions took place (HC Q-1996-0-E-0214-01, p. 398). Other 
elements in this scheme attested more evidence to such a conception of economic 
agency. 
 
Indeed, the conditions under which the policy was valid were very detailed. The state 
guarantee could only cover a maximum of 30% of the total costs of the home to 
acquire or built, and was only granted once the beneficiary had obtained a mortgage 
of 60% of the price of the property to acquire or built. However, the loan taken out 
under this programme needed to be at least hundred and fifty percent of the own 
resources (Mémorial A 16, p. 295). In order to make sense of these figures, some 
comments are necessary. First, the guaranteeing scheme was not covering the full 
mortgage taken out, but only a maximum of 30% of the price of the home to own. 
This meant that the intervention by state action was limited. It was hard to evaluate 
how much more favourable credit conditions were becoming with such state action, 
but it definitely meant that the individual borrower only felt the effect indirectly 
through the communications with the financial institution. Even though the policy 
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was targeted at the individual, these details pointed towards an indirect legitimation 
regime where state action was not immediately obvious to the eyes of the economic 
agent. 
 
Second, to benefit from such aids the mortgager had to get a 60% loan granted in the 
first place, with that figure representing at least 1.5 times the saved resources. Again 
these elements gave mixed clues as far as naïve theories of savings and mortgaging 
were concerned. On the one hand, individuals were incentivised to provide regular 
savings in order to qualify for the scheme (HC C-2002-0-004-0005, p. 23). This was 
highlighted with a condition that the guarantee only stepped in if the costs of paying 
back the loan where not outreaching a third of the disposable income of the 
beneficiary (Mémorial A 16, p. 295). On the other hand, the mortgage to be acquired 
on the back of the latter was fixed with a minimum, hence pushing individuals to take 
out a relatively large sum. Even though the mortgage guarantee was capped to a fixed 
level, it could still be argued that such policy elements suggested that once a certain 
amount of savings had been set aside, a considerable mortgage was consistent with 
good financial management principles. 
 
In order to make further sense of the ways the economic agent was defined in the 
Luxembourgish policy-making context, another savings scheme in relation to the 
homeownership market needs to be consulted. Apart from guaranteeing a part of the 
mortgage with public money, the state also supported households up to an amount of 
5000 euros with their interests (HC E-1997-14-01, p. 41). Again then, taking out a 
mortgage was considered to be integral to the process of enter housing property. This 
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led to the legitimation of the accumulation of debt and of more favourable lending 
conditions for individuals. Just as the guaranteeing programme, this intervention 
helped potential homeowners to step over the entry barriers of the mortgage market 
(HC C-2002-0-041-001, p. 500). Whereas the first scheme acted upon lending 
institutions, this effort targeted the economic individual directly, mirroring the 
approach described above. In terms of the individual-state relationship, these actions 
demonstrate the multiple dimensions according to which Luxembourgish policy-
making was implemented.  
 
Interestingly, the savings allowance had been changed in 1994 to drop the condition 
for beneficiaries to have children at their charge (HC E-2006-04-02, p. 40). As 
underlined in the previous chapter, the family dimension was present in the naïve 
theories of how much support the state should grant to certain socio-economic groups, 
but it was not a criterion of exclusion (HC I-2002-0-1005, p.29). Home ownership 
was supposed to be the tenure of choice not only for families with children, but also 
for single people. The rationale was merely that individuals were helped to a larger 
extent as they had to cover the costs of raising children, but not that ownership was 
best suited for families, as was the case in the German case. The reason for supporting 
families more extensively followed pragmatic reflections about the expenses of 
households, not moral assumptions about who home ownership was best for (HC A-
2004-105-0001, p. 1644). Indeed, children were regarded as members of society on 
their own that were taken care of by their parents for a certain amount of time until 
they were able to provide their own income. This policy was then characterised by a 
targeting of the individual, not certain social groups.  
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These findings shed more light onto how essential the motive of financial prudence 
really was in relation to individual mortgage behaviour (HC Q-2000-0-E-0874-01, 
p.3; see also Buchanan 1985; Eisenhauer 2000). There was a certain degree of 
ambivalence in the application of the concept. Two sets of tensions were discernable. 
First, the notion itself was consulted for reasons that possibly undermined its very 
principle. Savings were first promoted in the naïve theories about how to go about to 
access the ownership market, it was then also taken as a condition upon which to take 
out a considerable mortgage (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 56), and thus moving 
against the concept of prudence. This was at least the case for the individual lender, it 
might not have been so on a systemic level. Indeed, as the state guarantee was 
covering a maximum of 30% of the loan, that might still be judged to be in line with 
prudential behaviour. Still, in relation to the issues that this thesis is mostly interested 
in, a policy that facilitated savings and mortgages at the very same time stood in 
ambivalence to the sole category of financial prudence. 
 
Second, once the adequate savings could be demonstrated, the financial support to 
enter the ownership market turned the prudential notion from a moral principle into a 
necessity. Whereas initially prudence was depicted as the proper start on a long way 
to enter owner-occupation, later on it was presented as the very problem in relation to 
the affordability issue (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 56). Indeed, the problem identified 
was that personal savings were inadequate relatively to the mortgages that were 
necessary to acquire housing property. Again, this evolution displayed the 
interconnectedness between housing and then financial markets as the price levels in 
the ownership market were rendering the very naïve theories ambiguous, possibly 
even ineffective. Still, the Luxembourgish state officials was sticking with this set of 
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conceptions (HC Q-2005-0-E-1180-01; HC Q-2007-0-E-2053-01), even if that meant 
that policy-makers were helpless against ever rising property prices. Indeed, when the 
Prime Minister claimed that the house price trajectories constituted a personal failure 
for himself, it was not only a statement about the state of the market, but also about 
the state of the naïve theories that had brought it about (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 
54). 
 
More generally, it was an acknowledgement that the theories upon which mortgage 
and housing policies had been set up against were no longer able to offer the 
explanations of how to move on, not for policy-makers, nor for the individual. As far 
as at the latter went, the economic agent first had to fulfil the conditions imposed by 
state policies before claiming support. In a mixed type of agency, the individual had 
to show first that he/she was behaving properly in the sense of being able to manage 
income in a way that was focussed on regular and long-term saving. It was only once 
those capabilities had been demonstrated that support was granted with the payment 
of mortgage interests and other means (HC E-1998-25-02, p.39). State interventions 
were directly facilitating savings behaviour with the individual, but they were also 
helping financial institutions offer more favourable mortgage conditions to low-
income households.  
 
In terms of agency then, the setup of the policy programmes demonstrated that the 
individual was regarded as the central driver behind efforts to access homeownership, 
the tenure of choice for all. But in contrast to the British case where individuals were 
seen as the ultimate constituents of market forces, the Luxembourgish policy-makers 
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saw a much more extended role for the state interventions in relation to helping 
potential homeowners into their home. Largely leaving aside any conceptualisations 
of the market, the state policies were placing the institution of the state on the side of 
the individual to reduce the entry barriers. The directness of the support meant that 
apart from the savings behaviour, economic agency was a rather passive conception 
where the individual could fall back onto state support to help not only in opening 
opportunities but actually in delivering owner-occupation directly. Again, the 
outcome of policy in terms of personal achievement was justifying the role of the 
polity, striking the balance in favour of a direct legitimation regime. 
 
The latter was thus based upon what state interventions could offer to citizens, 
underlining the passive nature of agency. Even though policy elements were making 
claims about how individuals should behave, that did not automatically mean that 
agents were defined as active profit-maxi misers in the British sense. The programmes 
and policy-makers were certainly talking about the individual, but at the same time 
they were depicted the state as a central player in rendering ownership accessible for 
the majority of citizens. The Luxembourgish regime followed various rationales, 
where in the end the passive nature of economic agency and the moral end of 
ownership for all were unchallenged. Why else would it have been such a dramatic 
case of state failure that homeownership was becoming a dream rather than reality? 
Such a statement was symptomatic of the conception of strong state and an economic 
agent that, once the basic economic modes of behaviour were fulfilled in terms of 
savings, was reliant upon the latter. 
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As far as the legitimation regime goes, it is fair to say that even though care needs to 
be taken when making such a statement, the direct features of the individual-state 
relationship dominated for the reason that policies tended to be justified for the good 
they were delivering for the individual him/herself, not for larger socio-economic 
objectives. This then confirms the hypothesis that similar logics were at play in the 
Luxembourgish mortgage and housing market. 
4 Markets as Neglected Elements in Naïve Theories 
After an analysis of the mortgage programmes and the positioning of the individual 
within them, this section investigates what role the notion of the market was playing 
in the Luxembourgish context. When it comes to the distribution of mortgages and 
housing, market mechanisms are at the very centre. However, that does not need to 
mean that all coordinative discourses display the same approach to how and to what 
end markets are supposed to work. As price evolutions are reflections of market 
forces and hence influence how official authorities are making sense of economic 
realities, the exact way in which the latter were conceptualised comes to the forefront 
here. Although this chapter has rarely mentioned the concept of markets so far as it 
was not an essential part of the discourse, the next paragraphs highlight why and how 
it still mattered a great deal. 
 
Following from the expositions about the focus upon outcomes in the policy design 
and the subsequently rather passive model of economic agency facilitated by state 
policies, concrete and complex notions of markets seemed remote from housing and 
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mortgages (HC C-2002-0-041-001; HC E-2006-04-02). Even though the level of 
interest that was covered by the relief scheme was adjusted according to the evolution 
of the base rate (HC I-2002-0-1005, p. 14), this move was not mentioned in policy 
discussions and hence was not debated in economic terms of markets. It was seen as a 
technical adjustment rather than a political intervention (HC A-1998-097-0001, p. 
2404; HC I-2002-0-1005, p.2). Also, neither policy text nor the parliamentary debates 
were going into any detail about the economic mechanisms of how state action was 
supporting the individual. Again, the exact way in which such interventions were 
supposed to work, surely through market mechanisms, was secondary against their 
aim to help individuals move into owner-occupation. In other words, the attention on 
outcomes was not only depicting the state as a central actor in the determination of 
house prices, but was also sidelining a focus on the working of market processes (HC 
Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, p.2422). Indeed as markets needed regulation, state policies 
were better placed to intervene directly (HC C-1997-0-020-0002, p. 1119) 
 
This comes back to the legitimation regime that was entailed from the individual-state 
relationship. Policy-makers took on an extensive role not only in the provision of 
home ownership but also in helping the individual to access credit that the allowed 
market entry (HC Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, p.3). As such, market concerns were 
marginalised, even though they were still operating in the background. This then led 
to the depoliticisation of the mortgage market as it was merely conceived of as a tool 
to achieve socially accepted aims, meaning the provision of housing property. 
Because state policies were able to overcome the entry barriers into markets through 
additional measures, the political aspects of the latter were not becoming obvious for 
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a certain time (HC J-2001-0-1584, p. 2). However, there are clues that suggest that 
with time the schemes were unable to keep up with the house price trajectories. 
 
Firstly, there were comments in parliament that the mortgage packages were 
undermining their own efficiency as they were contributing in pushing prices into 
price levels for which state policies were not designed (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 
1627) 
In sum one notices that we have too little affordable housing here in 
Luxembourg. (…) The state helps a lot but the housing market – and that is 
also a fact – eats up parts of these aids quicker than they have been created or 
increased. (…) Some banks now even offer loans with a duration of 40 years 
as they have noticed that people cannot cope with 25 years. (M. Di 
Bartolomeo, LSAP: HC C-2000-0-064-0001, p. 2)  
Even though market mechanisms were not conceptualised in the policy setup, they 
came to undermine their effectiveness over time. It was exactly because the financial 
realities were complicating the task of lending institutions in the distribution of credit 
that the political programmes were becoming less influential on market processes (HC 
I-0-M-2137-01, p. 1). The focus on outcomes was undercutting the means through 
with they were to be achieved. Whereas before state interventions had highlighted a 
set of naïve theories that they were a central element in the provision of mortgages, 
market realities and hence profit-making rationales of financial actors were 
considerably eroding the latter (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p. 1627).  
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Secondly, and this had been observed in the British case as well, state efforts also 
rendered the entry barriers into the ownership market more pronounced (HC J-2001-
0-1645, l p. 9). The support that public policy was granting to individuals on the back 
of a naïve theory that home ownership was the default tenure for all members of 
society and that the state as an institution had its role to play the delivery, was making 
this very help more difficult to provide. Again, even though these basic market 
principles were not taken into account, the mortgage policies were creating economic 
and political tensions that they were supposed to solve in the first place. An 
interventionist state had been able to depoliticise housing through its mortgage 
policies, but it were the latter as well that brought up a situation where market 
mechanisms were displaying the tensions of such efforts. As such, the role of state 
policies as delivering home ownership for all was hitting a point of resistance that was 
not only technical, but that was deeply political. Indeed, even though such policy 
initiatives were supposed to provide ownership for the vast majority of the population, 
this very objective was building up barriers for younger citizens to acquire their own 
home. 
 
In the problematisation of the affordability issue, the tone was a very different one. 
This section claims that mentioning market procedures at this stage was a move that 
again allowed the depolitisation of the situation. Framing the theme in terms of a 
mismatch or disequilibrium between offer and demand in the housing market (HC C-
2002-0-041-001, p. 507) and implying that the mortgage market was unable to 
provide the necessary levels of accessible credit was a way to downplay the role of 
the state intervention at that point (HC Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, p. 2421). Not following 
the route to work more closely with the industry, as had been seen for the British case, 
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the Luxembourgish policy-makers were also unwilling to place the responsibility with 
the individual agent. Indeed, the passive conception of agency had made such an 
interpretation nearly impossible. In the end then, the rather vague and impersonal 
market analogy was certainly correct in technical terms, but it also offered an 
explanation for much more complex and political developments that had taken place. 
Also, the referral to building area speculators in vague terms that did not single out 
specific individuals was another method in this context that was replicating the vague 
use of economic notions (HC C-1999-0-045-0003, p.1627; HC C-2000-0-064-0001, 
p.2430). 
 
This shift in the way in which markets were depicted once the issue of affordability 
was openly discussed in parliament underlined the particular nature of the 
Luxembourgish legitimation regime. The schemes that allowed individuals to access 
credit in the form of mortgages and subsequently to enter the home ownership market 
combined elements from both case studies performed beforehand. The directness in 
which the economic agents were promised access these social ends was matching 
with the British focus on the individual, even though the Luxembourgish case is less 
clear-cut. However, whereas the latter was falling back on market mechanisms and an 
active conception of economic agency in order to achieve this aim, the 
Luxembourgish naïve theories saw the state in the role of a „dirigiste‟ provider (HC 
C-2002-0-041-001, 509; see also Clift 2006). The notions of market-enabling and 
even of market-optimising did not make sense as markets were side-lined, or at least 
not acknowledged as channels of the provision of housing. These strong direct 
interventions from state policies were more in line with the German counterpart that 
had set out criteria in how housing markets were supposed to work. This then led to a 
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legitimation regime where the state officials had taken upon themselves the task to 
provide an owned home for virtually all its citizens without really exposing why that 
was adequate. In this line, the framing of the affordability issue was done in an 
imprecise invocation of the market. The repetitive calling but no further explaining of 
the denominations of „demand‟ and „supply‟ were indicative of a rather basic 
understanding of market processes (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 55). 
 
It was only when the Prime Minister was openly acknowledging that state policy, and 
even the state per se, had failed in the task to keep homeownership affordable in 
Luxembourg that the theme was politicised (HC C-2005-0-007-0006, p. 54). The 
housing crisis, to repeat these terms here (Becker and Hesse 2010, 412), was not one 
of strictly economic nature, but was also one of the naïve theories of owner-
occupation and mortgage behaviour facilitated beforehand. The perplexity displayed 
was certainly related to the economic situation, but even more so to the causes that 
had brought it about and measures that were to be taken (HC Q-1999-0-E-0256-02, 
p.2434). Once the conceptions of mortgage markets as playing the role of providing 
credit to relatively passive agents had come to a halt, the situation literally did not 
make sense anymore (HC J-2001-0-1584, p. 6). 
 
The tools that had been able to explain the domain of mortgages and housing was 
been depleted of theoretical points of interpretative certainty so that the original 
position of the indeterminacy of the mind re-emerged. In such a context of 
meaningful emptiness, it was impossible to suggest solutions as the latter would have 
meant giving up the established naïve theories (HC J-2003-0-1012, p. 2). What was 
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clear that more state intervention was needed to bring prices back in line (HC Q-
2005-0-E-1180-01,p. 1). The ends were then maintained, emphasising the existing 
conceptions of home ownership and of the role of the state (HC Q-2006-0-E-1482-01; 
HC Q-2007-0-E-2053-01). However, how this was to be achieved was less clear. 
 
Even though owner-occupation was effectively distributed through market 
mechanisms, the strong reliance on state intervention to cater for housing needs 
entailed a poor degree of market governance, but also little efforts to facilitate a more 
active axio-rationality. It was curious that whereas policy-makers tended towards 
removing the political content out of housing through an interventionist approach, it 
was the markets that showcased their inevitably political character. For instance, an 
allowance that supported the acquisition of homes either by building or buying an 
existing building became to act against the ultimate aim of allowing wider sectors of 
the population to access homeownership. Whereas the aid was progressively 
supporting more construction projects (HC E-1997-14-01, p. 39), this tendency turned 
over to the acquisition side (HC E-2005-06-02, p. 62). A policy that was meant to 
neutralise the terms of credit access irrespective of the financial position of the 
individual beneficiaries was then overly used to promote acts of buying existing stock 
and driving prices up instead of bringing a more extended offer to the market (HC C-
2002-0-004-0005, p. 29). In the end, sidelining basic market principles came to haunt 
the Luxembourgish policy-makers, at least the Prime Minister. 
 
In order to explain such a reticence to engage with economic studies of mortgage and 
housing markets, it is worth falling back onto the institutional features of the decision-
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making process. Key explanatory features here were the multi-actor constitution of 
the policy-making process with professional bodies being represented, and the 
technical focus on the legality of policy texts. These points meant that input from 
economic policy-advisers was limited (HC C-2002-0-041-001, p.500). First, the legal 
professionals of the State Council were concerned with the notions of rights (HC J-
2001-0-1645) and the duties of the state in relation to its citizens. Second, the 
representatives of the professional associations were pushing forward their specific 
interests. Thirdly, the members of parliament were interested in gaining political 
capital for their party in relation to the electorate and hence legitimate the current 
consociationalist state. The purely economic mechanisms were underplayed in such a 
context, but re-emerged in form of the affordability issue, more precisely the problem 
of mortgage accessibility (HC J-2001-0-1763, p.6). 
 
In sum then, a passive conception of economic agency and an active role of state 
intervention were coupled with a limited set of naïve theories about markets. As the 
mortgage market was merely seen as a neutral intermediary that could help in the 
effects to distribute home ownership among all members of society, the inherent 
political tensions were not fully taken into account. Apart from the affordability issue 
that was undeniable at a certain point in relation to the price evolutions, the 
discussions involved little openly political content in general. This was an indication 
that mortgages and housing were largely depoliticised for a considerable amount of 
time. As the upwards price trajectories were playing into the hands of a majority of 
households, the dynamics were legitimating themselves though their outcomes, once 
again highlighting the directness of the Luxemburgish individual-state relationship. In 
a sense then, it could also be argued that the programmes were successful not only in 
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providing home ownership, but also in enabling the accumulation of private wealth 
without this process being debated along explicitly political lines. 
5 Conclusion 
After the analysis of conceptions of markets and economic agency in the 
Luxembourgish housing market, this chapter has focussed on the naïve theories 
facilitated in the mortgage market. A first finding was that the two spheres need to be 
studied simultaneously as the policy-makers were linking them in the coordinative 
discourse. Indeed, the housing policies themselves contained numerous references to 
the financial aspects of entering home ownership through saving practices and taking 
out mortgages.  
 
Indeed, the allowances in relation to housing were conditioned upon certain patterns 
of financial behaviour. It was only once the individual had demonstrated a certain 
degree of responsibility as a saver that state aids were granted. However, that is not to 
say that the principle of financial prudence was univocally dominating the policy 
setup. Indeed, state interventions also allowed households to take out considerable 
mortgages, which then acted counter to the initial motive of financial discipline. This 
was only one example of the tensions inherent in the naïve theories that were set out 
to make sense of mortgage markets and their inter-linkage with the acquisition of 
housing property. In general, as in the case of housing policy, the Luxembourgish 
regime did not display a clear-cut individual-state relationship as in the British and 
German cases analysed. As the central focus was on the outcomes that the public 
policy was helping to promote ownership for the individual, the focus of legitimation 
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was very much one where an interventionist approach was able to move additional 
individuals into home ownership. Even though the individual was not seen as an 
active constituent of market outcomes, the latter justified not only the policies but also 
the individual-state setup itself.  
 
This also meant that the mortgage market was mostly seen as a tool in the distribution 
of home ownership among the population. However, as outcomes were primarily 
regarded as such and not in relation to the exact way in which they were to be 
achieved, markets were not conceived of as economic entities that carried political 
weight, but as mere intermediary between the individual and the state policies. The 
type of economic agency promoted was in line with such a reading of markets. Indeed, 
apart from savings efforts, the economic agent was not asked to operate on its own in 
terms of making sure him/herself was active in the procurement of housing property. 
As the discourse was depicting the state as a key player in the housing market, and 
hence also acted upon lending conditions, the individual was seen as a rather passive 
taker, on the one hand of state support, and on the other hand of market developments. 
Indeed, individual actors were not understood as being the sole constituents of market 
outcomes.  
 
However, it were exactly these market principles that then led to an affordability issue 
as house prices had moved up to levels with which mortgages were judged to be out 
of line. In other words, the efforts to lower the accessibility barriers into the mortgage 
market had entailed a situation where the latter were actually making it progressively 
harder for individuals to join the status of the home owner. The framing of the 
situation in the technical and impersonal words of demand-and-supply inadequacy 
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was indicative of the limited attention that had been devoted to the economic but also 
political underpinnings of markets. It was at this point that the naïve theories that had 
contributed to the justificatory narratives of an interventionist state were starting to 
lose their explanatory power. In fact the statements of the Prime Minister as excessive 
prices being synonymous with a failure of the state underlined the conceptions of the 
policy-makers as having a duty to fulfil the quasi-right to home ownership. It was also 
here that the deeply political nature of the naïve theories promoted became obvious as 
the tensions internal to them could not be explained away by outcomes of social 
support. Indeed, the inevitably political nature of naïve theories in distributional terms 
was becoming apparent. 
 
In relation to the contribution of the thesis, this chapter has offered yet another 
example of how different conceptions of markets and economic agency can be in 
apparently similar economic spheres analysed in various socio-economic contexts. At 
the same time it has also displayed how essential taken-for-granted assumption of 
policy-makers and naïve theories are to fully understand not only state interventions 
but also socio-economic evolutions like house price trajectories. The Luxembourgish 
case has shown differences both in relation to the two cases analysed beforehand, 
which suggests that the indeterminacy of the mind can temporarily be filled with a 
whole range of sets of interpretations that all carry political weight as they define 
notions of good and bad. Such an observation supports the theoretical starting point 
here that in chapter three described in some detail of why and how focussing on the 
individual can contribute to the literature on Varieties of Capitalism.  
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As found in the earlier chapters of this thesis, such a perspective also allows a reading 
of models of capitalism that adds a layer of the political to the current literature. As 
for this case, the political features are again of four natures. First, the naïve theories 
facilitated as far as the market and economic agency go implies that both the home 
ownership and the mortgage market were working on specific understandings that 
were functional to them. In other words, these conceptions and the macro-economic 
developments were complementary. Second, these subjectivities then also implied 
that some individual behaved more in line with them than others, in other words that 
they introduced good and bad mortgagers, some more worth of state aid than others. 
Third, the taken-for-granted assumptions of policy-makers in relation to the individual 
not limits the domain of policy instruments that are regarded as adequate, hence 
eliminating others a priori. In this case, the state policies being so focussed on the 
delivery of home ownership side-lined aspects of housing finance that concerned the 
financial industry or demographic planning for instance. As such, these conceptions 
were elementary in the form and content of the mortgage policies enacted. Fourth, the 
policies themselves has distributional effects, like favouring one generation of 
households but simultaneously building up barriers for the next one to access this 
tenure. In this sense, one could argue that such schemes were unfair as they favoured 
those generations whose parents were already well established into the market of 
housing property, hence potentially enforcing social inequalities over time. In other 
words, these state policies impacted upon the life chances of everyday people. 
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